
aass_nSJI15_ 



y 



THE FIGHT FOR THE 
REPUBLIC IN CHINA 



BOOKS BY B. L. PUTNAM WEALE 

POLITICAL 

Manchu & Muscovite 

The Re-Shaping of the Pae East (2 volumes) 

The Truce in the East and Its Aftermath 

The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia 

The Conflict of Colour 

The Fight for the Republic in China 

ROMANTIC 

Indiscreet Letters from Peking 

The Forbidden Boundary 

The Human Cobweb 

The Unknown God 

The Romance of a Few Days 

The Revolt 

The Eternal Priestess 

The Altar Fire 




Gen£rai. Fexg Kuo-chaxg, Presidext of the Repu] 



THE FIGHT FOR THE 
REPUBLIC IN CHINA 



BY 



B. L. PUTNAM WEALE 



(i ijL^LJ-.-^'-'' 



WITH ILL U8TBA TIONS 




NEW YORK 

DODD, MEAD AND COMPANY 

1917 






Copyright, 1917 
Bt DODD. mead and company. Inc. 



NOV 27 1917 



)CI,A477769 



PREFACE 

This volume tells everything that the student or the 
casual reader needs to know about the Chinese Question. 
It is sufficiently exhaustive to show very clearly the 
new forces at work, and to bring some realisation of the 
great gulf which separates the thinking classes of to-day 
from the men of a few years ago; whilst, at the same 
time, it is sufficiently condensed not to overwhelm the 
reader with too great a multitude of facts. 

Particular attention may be devoted to an unique 
feature — namely, the Chinese and Japanese documenta- 
tion which affords a sharp contrast between varying 
types of Eastern brains. Thus, in the Memorandum of 
the Black Dragon Society (Chapter VII) we have a 
very clear and illuminating revelation of the Japanese 
political mind which has been trained to consider prob- 
lems in the modern Western way, but which remains 
saturated with theocratic ideals in the sharpest conflict 
with the Twentieth Century, In the pamphlet of Yang 
Tu (Chapter VIII) which launched the ill-fated Mon- 
archy Scheme and contributed so largely to the dramatic 
death of Yuan Shih-kai, we have an essentially Chinese 
mentality of the reactionary or corrupt type which ex- 
presses itself both on home and foreign issues in a naively 
dishonest way, helpful to future diplomacy. In the 
Letter of Protest (Chapter X) against the revival of 
Imperialism written by Liang Ch'i-chao — the most bril- 



vi PREFACE 

liant scholar living — we have a Chinese of the New or 
Liberal China, who in spite of a complete ignorance 
of foreign languages shows a marvellous grasp of poHti- 
cal absolutes, and is a harbinger of the great days which 
must come again to Cathay. In other chapters dealing 
with the monarchist plot we see the official mind at work, 
the telegraphic despatches exchanged between Peking 
and the provinces being of the highest diplomatic inter- 
est. These documents prove conclusively that although 
the Japanese is more practical than the Chinese — and 
more concise — there can be no question as to which brain 
is the more fruitful. 

Coupled with this discussion there is much matter 
giving an insight into the extraordinary and calamitous 
foreign ignorance about present-day China, an ignorance 
which is just as marked among those resident in the 
country as among those who have never visited it. The 
whole of the material grouped in this novel fashion 
should not fail to bring conviction that the Far East, 
with its 500 millions of people, is destined to play an im- 
portant role in posthellum history because of the new 
type of modern spirit which is being there evolved. The 
influence of the Chinese Republic, in the opinion of the 
writer, cannot fail to be ultimately world-wide in view 
of the practically unlimited resources in man-power 
which it disposes of. 

In the Appendices will be found every document of 
importance for the period of under examination, — 1911 
to 1917. The writer desires to record his indebtedness 
to the columns of The Peking Gazette, a newspaper 
which under the briUiant editorship of Eugene Ch'en — 
a pure Chinese born and educated under the British 
flag — has fought consistently and victoriously for Lib- 



PREFACE 



vu 



eralism and Justice and has made the RepubHc a reality 
to countless thousands who otherwise would have refused 
to believe in it. 

Putnam Weale. 
Peking, June, 1917. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER y^jjj. 

L, I General Introduction ......... 1 

m The Enigma of Yuan Shih-kai . . ... . . gi 

iJOil The Dream Republic . 39 

(From the Manchu Abdication to the dissolu- 
tion of Parliament) 

vIV The Dictator at Work 58 

(From the Coup d'etat of the 4th. Nov. 1913 to 
the outbreak of the World-war, 1. August, 
1914) 

V The Factor of Japan .; . ,., ,., . . . . 71 

VI The Twenty-one Demands 88 

VII The Origin of the Twenty-one Demands . .123 

VIII The Monarchist Plot ....... 145 

1° The Pamphlet of Yang Tu 

y IX The Monarchy Plot ,. . 173 

2° Dr. Goodnow's Memorandum 

txX. The Monarchy Movement Is Opposed . . .191 

The Appeal of the Scholar Liang Chi-chao 
XI The Dream Empire 215 

("The People's Voice" and the action of the 
Powers) 

. XII "The Third Revolution" ...... 236 

The Revolt of Yunnan 

XIII "The Third Revolution" (continued) . . . 249 
Downfall and Death of Yuan Shih-kai 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTE* PAGE 

:.XIV The New Regime— from 1916 to 1917 . . .271 

(^.XV The Republic in Collision with Reality: Two 
Typical Instances of "Foreign Aggres- 
sion" 292 

tXVI China and the War . . . . . . , . . 309 

I^XVII The Final Problem : — ^Remodelling the Polit- 
ico-economic Relationship Between China 
AND THE World 370 

I ^Appendices — Documents and Memo»anj>a , . 393 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

General Feng Kuo-chang, President of the Republic 

Frontispiece 

FACING 
PAQB 

President Yuan Shih-kai, photographed immediately after 
his inauguration as Provisional President, March 10, 
1912 24i 

The late President Yuan Shih-kai . . . •. . . . 32 

The National Assembly sitting as a National Convention 
engaged on the Draft of the Permanent Constitution. 
Specially photographed by permission of the Speaker 
for the present work 44 

View from rear of hall of The National Assembly sitting 
as a National Convention engaged on the Draft of the 
Permanent Constitution. Specially photographed by 
permission of the Speaker for the present work . . 52 

The Re-opening of Parliament on August 1, 1916, after 

three years of Dictatorial Rule 60 

The original Constitutional Drafting Committee of 1913. 
Photographed on the steps of the Temple of Heaven 
where the Draft was completed 66 

Village mummers: elaborate festivals occur in China in 
Spring and Autumn to celebrate the Fruitfulness of 
the Earth, every temple and every village having its 
own celebration 74 

Toilers of the Plain. Country produce being hauled to 

the city 74 

A Manchu woman grinding grain 82 

Silk-reeling done in the open under the walls of Peking . 82 

xi 



xii ILLUSTRATIONS 



rACINfl 
FAGB 



Ruins of the famous Yuan Ming Yuan Palace outside 
Peking. Built for the Manchu sovereigns by the 
Jesuit fathers, and destroyed by the Allies in 1860 . 98" 

Modern Peking: a run on a bank 98' 



1/ 



Modern Peking: the Palace entrance lined with troops. 

Note the new-type Chinese policeman in foreground . 110 

Peasants raising water by the oldest method in the world . 126 

Transporting grain by donkey in the roadless country . 126 

The Peerless Lake of the Summer Palace near Peking . . 138'" 

Another view of the Peerless Lake of the Summer Palace 

near Peking 138'' 

Chinese art-forms: a beautiful gateway . . . > -. 150"^ 

Dragon and clouds perfectly represented in a marble col- . 

umn . 150 

The *'P'ai Lou," or Memorial Arch which is a conspicuous 

feature in Northern China . . 164*'^ 

'A princely burial-ground, the memorial tablets being 

placed on the backs of giant marble-tortoises . . 164' 

The bas-relief in a Peking Temple, well-illustrating Indo- 
Chinese influences 182 '^ 

The scholar Liang Ch'i-chao, sometimes Minister of Justice 

and the foremost "Brain" in China . . . . . 200 "^ 

Model Military Police in Peking under the command of 
General Munthe, a Norwegian, raised for the protec- 
tion of the Legation Quarter .... . . . 218 

March-post of an Infantry Division 226 

The Yunnan Rebellion of 1915-16 which led to the down- 
fall of Yuan Shih-kai: a big junk loaded with sup- 
plies passing up the Rapids of the Upper Yangtsze . 238^ 

JThe Rapids of the Upper Yangtsze 238"^ 



y 



ILLUSTRATIONS xiii 

TACINa 
PAGB 

General Tsai-ao, the hero of the Yunnan Rebellion of 

1915-16, who died from the effects of the campaign . S^^j"^ 

Liang Shih-yi, who was the power behind Yuan Shih-kai, 

now proscribed and living in exile at Hongkong . . 256 

The funeral of Yuan Shih-kai — the catafalque over the 

coffin on its way to the railway station .... 262 

The funeral of Yuan Shih-kai — the procession passing 
down the great Palace approach with the famous 
Ch'ien Men (gate) in the distance 262'"^ 

An encampment of "the Punitive Expedition" of 1916 on 

the Upper Yangtsze 274^ 

Revival of the Imperialistic worship of Heaven by Yuan 
Shih-kai in 1914. Scene on the Altar of Heaven with 
sacrificial officers clothed in costumes dating from 
2000 years ago 274s 

A Presidential Review of Troops in the Southern Hungting 

Park outside Peking : arrival of the President . _ . 286 '^ 

President Li Yuan-hung . . 294j 

President Li Yuan-hung and the General Staff watching 

the Review 302^ 

Assault of the Republican Troops on the Imperial Palace 

in Peking, July 12, 1917: scaling the Palace walls . 320 

Eastern Palace entrance: Peking, after assault of the Re- 
publican Troops, July 12, 1917 ...... 320' 

The Premier General Tuan Chi-jui, head of the Cabinet 

which decided to declare war on Germany .... 354 

The famous, or infamous, General Chang Hsun, the lead- 
ing reactionary in China to-day, who still commands 
a force of 30,000 men astride of the Pukow Railway . 380 



THE FIGHT FOR THE 
REPUBLIC IN CHINA 



THE REPUBLIC IN CHINA 

CHAPTER I 

GENERAL INTRODUCTION 

The revolution which broke out in China on the 10th 
October, 1911, and which was completed with the abdi- 
cation of the Manchu Dynasty on the 12th February, 
1912, though acclaimed as highly successful, was in its 
practical aspects something very different. With the 
proclamation of the Republic, the fiction of autocratic 
rule had truly enough vanished; yet the tradition sur- 
vived and with it sufficient of the essential machinery of 
Imperialism to defeat the nominal victors until the 
death of Yuan Shih-kai. 

The movement to expel the Manchus, who had seized 
the Dragon Throne in 1644 from the expiring Ming 
Dynasty, was an old one. Historians are silent on the 
subject of the various secret plots which were always 
being hatched to achieve that end, their silence being 
due to a lack of proper records and to the difficulty of 
establishing the simple truth in a country where rumour 
reigns supreme. But there is little doubt that the fa- 
mous Ko-lao-hui, a Secret Society with its headquarters 
in the remote province of Szechuan, owed its origin to 
the last of the Ming adherents, who after waging a 
desperate guerilla warfare from the date of their ex- 
pulsion from Peking, finally fell to the low level of in- 



2 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

citing assassinations and general unrest in the vain hope 
that they might some day regain their heritage. At 
least, we know one thing definitely: that the attempt 
on the life of the Emperor Chia Ching in the Peking 
streets at the beginning of the Nineteenth Century was 
a Secret Society plot, and brought to an abrupt end the 
pleasant habit of travelling among their subjects which 
the great Manchu Emperors K'anghsi and Ch'ien Lung 
had inaugurated and always pursued and which had so 
largely encouraged the growth of personal loyalty to a 
foreign House. 

From that day onwards for over a century no Em- 
peror ventured out from behind the frowning Walls of 
the Forbidden City save for brief annual ceremonies 
such as the Worship of Heaven on the occasion of the 
Winter Solstice, and during the two "flights" — first, in 
1860 when Peking was occupied by an Anglo-French 
expedition and the Court incontinently sought sanctu- 
ary in the mountain Palaces of Jehol ; and, again, in 
1900, when with the pricking of the Boxer bubble and 
the arrival of the International relief armies, the Impe- 
rial Household was forced along the stony road to far- 
off Hsianfu. 

The effect of this immurement was soon visible; 
the Manchu rule, which was emphatically a rule of the 
sword, was rapidly so weakened that the emperors be- 
came no more than rots faineants at the mercy of their 

ministers.^ The history of the Nineteenth Century is 

1 As there is a good deal of misunderstanding on the subject of the Man- 
chus an explanatory note is useful. 

The Manchu people, who belong to the Mongol or Turanian Group, num- 
ber at the maximum five million souls. Their distribution at the time of 
the revolution of 1911 was roughly as follows: In and around Peking say 
two millions; in posts through China say one-half million, — or possibly 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 3 

thus logically enough the history of successive collapses. 
Not only did overseas foreigners openly thunder at the 
gateways of the empire and force an ingress, but native 
rebellions were constant and common. Leaving minor 
disturbances out of account, there were during this pe- 
riod two huge Mahommedan rebellions, besides the cata- 
clysmic Taiping rising which lasted ten years and is 
supposed to have destroyed the unbelievable total of 
one hundred million persons. The empire, torn by in- 
ternecine warfare, surrendered many of its essential 
prerogatives to foreigners, and by accepting the princi- 
ple of extraterritoriahty prepared the road to ultimate 
collapse. 

How in such circumstances was it possible to keep 
alive absolutism? The answer is so curious that we 
must be explicit and exhaustive. 

The simple truth is that save during the period of 
vigour immediately following each foreign conquest 
I (such as the Mongol conquest in the Thirteenth Century 
and the Manchu in the Seventeenth) not only has there 
never been any absolutism properly so-called in China, 
but that apart from the most meagre and inefficient tax- 
collecting and some rough-and-ready policing in and 
around the cities there has never been any true govern- 

three-quarters of a million; in Manchuria Proper — ^the home of the race — 
say two or two and a half millions. The fighting force was composed in 
this fashion: When Peking fell into their hands in 1644 as a result of 
a stratagem combined with dissensions among the Chinese themselves, the 
entire armed strength was re-organized in Eight Banners or Army Corps, 
each corps being composed of three racial divisions, (1) pure Manchus, 
(9) Mongols who had assisted in the conquest and (3) Northern Chinese 
who had gone over to the conquerors. These Eight Banners, each com- 
manded by an "iron-capped" Prince, represented the authority of the Throne 
and had their headquarters in Peking with small garrisons throughout the 
provinces at various strategic centres. These garrisons had entirely ceased 
to have any value before the 18th Century had closed and were therefore 
purely ceremonial and symbolic, all the fighting being done by special 
Chinese corps which were raised as necessity arose. 



4 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

ing at all save what the people did for themselves or 
what they demanded of the officials as a protection 
against one another. Any one who doubts these state- 
ments has no inkling of those facts which are the crown 
as well as the foundation of the Chinese group-system, 
and which must be patiently studied in the village-life 
of the country to be fitly appreciated. To be quite 
frank, absolutism is a myth coming down from the days 
of Kublai Khan when he so proudly built his Khan- 
haligh (the Cambaluc of Marco Polo and the forebear 
of modern Peking) and filled it with his troops who so 
soon vanished like the snows of winter. An elaborate 
pretence, a deliberate pohcy of make-believe, ever since 
those days invested Imperial Edicts with a majesty 
which they have never really possessed, the effacement 
of the sovereign during the Nineteenth Century con- 
tributing to the legend that there existed in the capital a 
Grand and Fearful Panjandi'um for whom no miracle 
was too great and to whom people and officials owed 
trembling obedience. 

In reality, the office of emperor was never more than 
a politico-religious concept, translated for the benefit 
of the masses into socio-economic ordinances. These 
pronouncements, cast in the form of periodic homilies 
called Edicts, were the ritual of government ; their pur- 
pose was instructional rather than mandatoiy; they 
were designed to teach and keep alive the State-theory 
that the Emperor was the High Priest of the Nation 
and that obedience to the morality of the Golden Age, 
which had been inculcated by all the philosophers since 
Confucius and Mencius flourished twenty-five cen- 
turies ago, would not only secure universal happiness 
but contribute to national greatness. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 5 

The office of Emperor was thus heavenly rather than 
terrestrial, and suasion, not arms, was the most potent 
argument used in everyday life. The amazing reply 
(i. e., amazing to foreigners) made by the great Em- 
peror K'ang-hsi in the tremendous Eighteenth Century 
controversy between the Jesuit and the Dominican mis- 
sionaries, which ruined the prospects of China's ever 
becoming Roman Cathohc and which the Pope refused 
to accept — that the custom of ancestor-worship was 
political and not religious — ^was absolutely correct, poli- 
tics in China under the Empire being only a system of 
national control eocercised by inculcating obedience to 
forebears. The great efforts which the Manchus made 
from the end of the Sixteenth Century (when they were 
still a small Manchurian Principality striving for the 
succession to the Dragon Throne and launching des- 
perate attacks on the Great Wall of China) to receive 
from the Dalai Lama, as well as from the lesser Pontiffs 
of Tibet and Mongolia, high-sounding religious titles, 
prove conclusively that dignities other than mere posses- 
sion of the Throne were held necessary to give solidity 
to a reign which began in militarism and which would 
collapse as the Mongol rule had collapsed by a mere 
Palace revolution unless an effective moral title were 
somehow won. 

Nor was the Manchu military Conquest, even after 
they had entered Peking, so complete as has been repre- 
sented by historians. The Manchus were too small a 
handful, even with their Mongol and Chinese auxil- 
iaries, to do more than defeat the Ming armies and 
obtain the submission of the chief cities of China. It is 
well-known to students of their administrative methods, 
that whilst they reigned over China they ruled only in 



6 .THE FIGHT FOK THE 

company with the Chinese, the system in force being a 
dual control which, beginning on the Grand Council and 
in the various great Boards and Departments in the 
capital, proceeded as far as the provincial chief cities, 
but stopped short there so completely and absolutely 
that the huge chains of villages and burgs had their 
historic autonomy virtually untouched and lived on as 
they had always lived. The elaborate system of exam- 
inations, with the splendid official honours reserved for 
successful students which was adopted by the Dynasty, 
not only conciliated Chinese society but provided a vast 
body of men whose interest lay in maintaining the new 
conquest; and thus Literature, which had always been 
the door to preferment, became not only one of the in- 
struments of government, but actually the advocate 
of an alien rule. With their persons and properties 
safe, and their women-folk protected by an elaborate set 
of capitulations from being requisitioned for the harems 
of the invaders, small wonder if the mass of Chinese 
welcomed a firm administration after the frightful dis- 
orders which had torn the country during the last days 
of the Mings.* 

It was the foreigner, arriving in force in China after 
the capture of Peking and the ratification of the Tientsin 
Treaties in 1860, who so greatly contributed to making 
the false idea of Manchu absolutism current through- 
out the world ; and in this work it was the foreign diplo- 
mat, coming to the capital saturated with the tradition 
of European absolutism, who played a not unimportant 

iThis most interesting point — the immunity of Chinese women from 
forced marriage with Manchus — has been far too little noticed by his- 
torians though it throws a flood of light on the sociological aspects of the 
Manchu conquest. Had that conquest been absolute it would have been 
impossible for the Chinese people to have protected their womenfolk in 
such a significant way. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 7 

part. Investing the Emperors with an authority with 
which they were never really clothed save for cere- 
monial purposes (principally perhaps because the Court 
was entirely withdi'awn from view and very insolent in 
its foreign intercourse) a conception of High Mighti- 
ness was spread abroad reminiscent of the awe in which 
Eighteenth Century nabobs spoke of the Great Mogul of 
India. Chinese officials, quickly discovering that their 
easiest means of defence against an irresistible pressure 
was to take refuge behind the august name of the sover- 
eign, played their role so successfully that until 1900 it 
was generally believed by Europeans that no other form 
of government than a despotism sans phrase could be 
dreamed of. Finding that on the surface an Imperial 
Decree enjoyed the majesty of an Ukaze of the Czar, 
Europeans were ready enough to interpret as best suited 
their enterprises something which they entirely failed to 
construe in terms expressive of the negative nature of 
Chinese civilization ; and so it happened that though the 
government of China had become no government at all 
from the moment that extraterritoriality destroyed the 
theory of Imperial inviolability and infallibility, the 
miracle of turning state negativism into an active gov- 
erning element continued to work after a fashion be- 
cause of the disguise which the immense distances 
afforded. 

Adequately to explain the philosophy of distance in 
China, and what it has meant historically, would require 
a whole volume to itself; but it is sufficient for our pur- 
pose to indicate here certain prime essentials. The old 
Chinese were so entrenched in their vastnesses that with- 
out the play of forces which were supernatural to them, 
i. e., the steam-engine, the telegraph, the armoured war- 



8 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

vessel, etc., their daily lives could not be affected. Left 
to themselves, and assisted by their own methods, they 
knew that blows struck across the immense roadless 
spaces were so diminished in strength, by the time they 
reached the spot aimed at, that they became a mere 
mockery of force; and, just because they were so value- 
less, paved the way to effective compromises. Being 
adepts in the art which modern surgeons have adopted, 
of leaving wounds as far as possible to heal themselves, 
they trusted to time and to nature to solve political 
differences which western countries boldly attacked on 
very different principles. Nor were they wrong in their 
view. From the capital to the Yangtsze Valley ( which 
is the heart of the country), is 800 miles, that is far 
more than the mileage between Paris and Berlin. 
From Peking to Canton is 1,400 miles along a hard 
and difficult route; the journey to Yunnan by the 
Yangtsze river is upwards of 2,000 miles, a distance 
greater than the greatest march ever undertaken by 
Napoleon. And when one speaks of the Outer Do- 
minions — Mongolia, Tibet, Turkestan — for these hun- 
dreds of miles it is necessary to substitute thousands, and 
add there to difficulties of terrain which would have dis- 
heartened even Roman Generals. 

Now the old Chinese, accepting distance as the 
supreme thing, had made it the starting-point as well as 
the end of their government. In the perfected viceregal 
system which grew up under the Ming Dynasty, and 
which was taken over by the Manchus as a sound and 
admirable governing principle, though they superim- 
posed their own military system of Tartar Generals, we 
have the plan that nullified the great obstacle. Author- 
ity of every kind was delegated by the Throne to various 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 9 

distant governing centuries in a most complete and 
sweeping manner, each group of provinces, united under 
a viceroy, being in everything but name so many inde- 
pendent linked commonwealths, called upon for matric- 
ular contributions in money and grain but otherwise 
left severely alone.^ The chain which bound provincial 
China to the metropolitan government was therefore in 
the last analysis finance and nothing but finance; and 
if the system broke down in 1911 it was because financial 
reform — to discount the new forces of which the steam 
engine was the symbol — had been attempted, like mili- 
tary reform, both too late and in the wrong way, and 
instead of strengthening, had vastly weakened the 
authority of the Throne. 
; In pursuance of the reform-plan which became pop- 
ular after the Boxer Settlement had allowed the court 
to return to Peking from Hsianfu, the viceroys found 
their most essential prerogative, which was the con- 
trol of the provincial purse, largely taken from them 
and handed over to Financial Commissioners who were 
directly responsible to the Peking Ministry of Finance, 
a Department which was attempting to replace the 

1 A very interesting proof — and one that has never been properly ex- 
posed — 'Of the astoundingly rationalistic principles on which the Chinese 
polity is founded is to be seen in the position of priesthoods in China. 
Unlike every other civilization in the world, at no stage of the development 
of the State has it been necessary for religion in China to intervene between 
the rulers and the ruled, saving the people from oppression. In Europe 
without the supernatural barrier of the Church, the position of the common 
people in the Middle Ages would have been intolerable, and life, and virtue 
totally unprotected. Buckle, in his "History of Civilization," like other 
extreme radicals, has failed to understand that established religions have 
paradoxically been most valuable because of their vast secular powers, 
exercised under the mask of spiritual authority. Without this ghostly re- 
straint rulers would have been so oppressive as to have destroyed their 
peoples. The two greatest monuments to Chinese civilization, then consist of 
these twin facts; first, that the Chinese have never had the need for such 
supernatural restraints exercised by a privileged body, and secondly, that 
they are absolutely without any feeling of class or caste — prince and pauper 
meeting on terms of frank and humorous equality — the race thus being the 
only pure and untinctured democracy the world has ever known. 



10 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

loose system of matricular contributions by the Eu- 
ropean system of a directly controlled taxation every 
penny of which would be shown in an annual Budget j 
No doubt had time been vouchsafed, and had European 
help been enlisted on a large scale, this change could 
ultimately have been made successful. But it was pre- 
cisely time which was lacking; and^the Manchus con- 
sequently paid the penalty which is always paid by those 
who delay until it is too late. The old theories having 
been openly abandoned, it needed only the promise of 
a Parliament completely to destroy the dignity of the 
Son of Heaven, and to leave the viceroys as mere hos- 
tages in the hands of rebels. A few short weeks of re- 
bellion was sufficient in 1911 to cause the provinces to 
revert to their condition of the earlier centuries when 
they had been vast unfettered agricultural communities. 
And once they had tasted the joys of this new inde- 
pendence, it was impossible to conceive of their becom- 
ing "obedient" again. 

Here another word of explanation is necessary to 
show clearly the precise meaning of regionahsm in 
China. 

What had originally created each province was the 
chief city in each region, such cities necessarily being 
the walled repositories of all increment. Greedy of 
territory to enhance their wealth, and jealous of their 
power, these provincial capitals throughout the ages had 
left no stone unturned to extend their influence in every 
possible direction and bring under their economic con- 
trol as much land as possible, a fact which is abundantly 
proved by the highly diversified system of weights and 
measures throughout the land deliberately drawn-up 
to serve as economic barriers. River-courses, moun- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 11 

tain-ranges, climate and soil, no doubt assisted in 
governing this expansion, but commercial and financial 
greed was the principal force. Of this we have an ex- 
ceedingly interesting and conclusive illustration in the 
struggle still proceeding between the three Manchurian 
provinces, Fengtien, Kirin and Heilungchiang, to seize 
the lion's share of the virgin land of Eastern Inner 
Mongolia which has an "open frontier" of rolling 
prairies. Having the strongest provincial capital — 
Moukden — it has been Fengtien province which has 
encroached on the Mongolian grasslands to such an 
extent that its jurisdiction to-day envelops the entire 
western flank of Kirin province (as can be seen in the 
latest Chinese maps) in the form of a salamander, effec- 
tively preventing the latter province from controlling 
territory that geographically belongs to it. In the same 
way in the land-settlement which is still going on 
the Mongolian plateau immediately above Peking, much 
of what should be Shansi territory has been added to the 
metropolitan province of Chihli. Though adjustments 
of provincial boundaries have been summarily made in 
times past, in the main the considerations we have indi- 
cated have been the dominant factors in determining 
the area of each unit. 

Now in many provinces where settlement is age-oid, 
the regionalism which results from great distances and 
bad communications has been greatly increased by race- 
admixture. Canton province, which was largely settled 
by Chinese adventurers sailing down the coast from the 
Yangtsze and intermarrying with Annamese and the 
older autochthonous races, has a population-mass pos- 
sessing very distinct characteristics, which sharply con- 
flict with Northern traits. Fuhkien province is not only 



12 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

as diversified but speaks a dialect which is virtually a 
foreign language. And so on North and West of the 
Yangtsze it is the same story, temperamental differences 
of the highest political importance being everywhere in 
evidence and leading to perpetual bickerings and jeal- 
ousies. For although Chinese civilization resembles in 
one great particular the Mahommedan religion, in that 
it accepts without question all adherents irrespective of 
racial origin, politically the effect of this regionalism 
has been such that up to very recent times the Central 
Government has been almost as much a foreign govern- 
ment in the eyes of many provinces as the government 
of Japan. Money alone formed the bond of union; so 
long as questions of taxation were not involved, Peking 
was as far removed from daily life as the planet Mars. 
As we are now able to see very clearly, fifty years ago 
— that is at the time of the Taiping Rebellion — the 
old power and spell of the National Capital as a military 
centre had really vanished. Though in ancient days 
horsemen armed with bows and lances could sweep like 
a tornado over the land, levelling everything save the 
walled cities, in the Nineteenth Century such methods 
had become impossible. Mongoha and Manchuria had 
also ceased to be inexhaustible reservoirs of warlike men; 
the more adjacent portions had become commercialized; 
whilst the outer regions had sunk to depopulated gra- 
ziers' lands. The Government, after the collapse of the 
Rebellion, being greatly impoverished, had openly 
fallen to balancing province against province and per- 
sonality against personality, hoping that by some means 
it would be able to regain its prestige and a portion of 
its former wealth. Taking down the ledgers containing 
the lists of provincial contributions, the mandarins of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 13 

Peking completely revised every schedule, redistributed 
every weight, and saw to it that the matricular levies 
should fall in such a way as to be crushing. The new 
taxation, likin, which, like the income-tax in England, 
is in origin purely a war-tax, by gripping inter-provin- 
cial commerce by the throat and rudely controlling it 
by the barrier-system, was suddenly disclosed as a new 
and excellent way of making felt the menaced sover- 
eignty of the Manchus; and though the system was 
plainly a two-edged weapon, the first edge to cut was 
the Imperial edge; that is largely why for several dec- 
ades after the Taipings China was relatively quiet. 

Time was also giving birth to another important de- 
velopment — important in the sense that it was to prove 
finally decisive. It would have been impossible for 
Peking, unless men of outstanding genius had been 
living, to have foreseen that not only had the real bases 
of government now become entirely economic control, 
but that the very moment that control faltered the cen- 
tral government of China would openly and absolutely 
cease to be any government at all. Modern commercial- 
ism, already invading China at many points through 
the medium of the treaty-ports, was a force which in the 
long run could not be denied. Every year that passed 
tended to emphasize the fact that modern conditions 
were cutting Peking more and more adrift from the 
real centres of power — the economic centres which, with 
the single exception of Tientsin, lie from 800 to 1,500 
miles away. It was these centres that were developing 
revolutionaiy ideas — i. e., ideas at variance with the 
Socio-economic principles on which the old Chinese com- 
monwealth had been slowly built up, and which foreign 
dynasties such as the Mongol and the Manchu had 



14 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

never touched.^ The Government of the post-Taiping 
period still imagined that by making their hands lie 
more heavily than ever on the people and by tightening 
the taxation control — not by true creative work — they 
could rehabilitate themselves. 

It would take too long, and would weary the indul- 
gence of the reader to establish in a conclusive manner 
this thesis which had long been a subject of inquiry on 
the part of political students. Chinese society, being 
essentially a society organized on a credit-co-operative 
system, so nicely adjusted that money, either coined or 
fiduciary, was not wanted save for the petty daily pur- 
chases of the people, any system which boldly clutched 
at the financial establishments undertaking the move- 
ment of sycee (silver) from province to province for 
the settlement of trade-balances, was bound to be effec- 
tive so long as those financial establishments remained 
unshaken. 

The best known establishments, united in the great 
group known as the Shansi Bankers, being the govern- 
ment bankers, undertook not only all the remittances of 
surpluses to Peking, but controlled by an intricate pass- 
book system the perquisites of almost every office- 
holder in the empire. No sooner did an official, under 
the system which had grown up, receive a provincial 
appointment than there hastened to him a confidential 
clerk of one of these accommodating houses, who in the 
name of his employers advanced all the sums necessary 
for the payment of the official's post, and then proceeded 
with him to his province so that moiety by moiety, as 
taxation flowed in, advances could be paid off and the 
equilibrium re-established. A very intimate and far- 
reaching connection thus existed between provincial 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 15 

money-interests and the official classes. The practical 
work of governing China was the balancing of tax-books 
and native bankers' accounts. Even the "melting- 
houses," where sycee was "standardized" for provincial 
use, were the joint enterprises of officials and merchants; 
bargaining governing every transaction ; and only when a 
violent break occurred in the machinery, owing to famine 
or rebellion, did any other force than money intervene. 

There was nothing exceptional in these practices, in 
the use of which the old Chinese empire was merely 
following the precedent of the Roman Empire. The 
vast polity that was formed before the time of Christ 
by the military and commercial expansion of Rome in 
the Mediterranean Basin, and among the wild tribes of 
IsTorthern Europe, depended very largely on the genius 
of Italian financiers and tax-collectors to whom the rev- 
enues were either directly "farmed," or who "assisted" 
precisely after the Chinese method in financing officials 
and local administrations, and in replenishing a central 
treasury which no wealth could satisfy. The Chinese 
phenomenon was therefore in no sense new; the dearth 
of coined money and the variety of local standards made 
the methods used economic necessities. The system 
was not in itself a bad system : its fatal quality lay in its 
woodenness, its lack of adaptability, and in its growing 
w^eakness in the face of foreign competition which it 
could never understand. Foreign competition — that 
was the enemy destined to achieve an overwhelming 
triumph and dash to ruins a hoary survival. 

War with Japan sounded the first trumpet-blast 
which should have been heeded. In the year 1894, be- 
ing faced with the necessity of finding immediately a 
large sum of specie for purpose of war, the native 



16 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

bankers proclaimed their total inability to do so, and the 
first great foreign loan contract was signed/ Little 
attention was attracted to what is a turning-point in 
Chinese history. There cannot be the slightest doubt 
that in 1894 the Manchus wrote the first sentences of an 
abdication which was only formally pronounced in 1912 : 
they had inaugurated the financial thraldom under 
which China still languishes. Within a period of forty 
months, in order to settle the disastrous Japanese war, 
foreign loans amounting to nearly fifty-five million 
pounds were completed. This indebtedness, amounting 
to nearly three times the "visible" annual revenues of 
the country — that is, the revenues actually accounted 
for to Peking — was unparalleled in Chinese history. 
It was a gold indebtedness subject to all sorts of manip- 
ulations which no Chinese properly understood. It had 
special political meaning and special political conse- 
quences because the loans were virtually guaranteed by 
the Powers. It was a long-drawn coup d'etat of a 
nature that all foreigners understood because it forged 
external chains. 

The internal significance was even greater than the 
external. The loans were secured on the most import- 
ant "direct" revenues reaching Peking — the Customs 
receipts, which were concerned with the most vital func- 

1 (a) This loan was the so-called 7 per cent Silver loan of 1894 for 
Shanghai Taels 10,000,000 negotiated by the Hongkong & Shanghai Bank. 
It was followed in 1895 by a £3,000,000 Gold 6 per cent Loan, then by two 
more 6 per cent loans for a million each in the same year, making a total 
of £6,635,000 sterling for the bare war-expenses. The Japanese war indem- 
nity raised in three successive issues— from 1895 to 1898 — of £16,000,000 
each, added £48,000,000. Thus the Korean imbroglio cost China nearly 
55 millions sterling. As the purchasing power of the sovereign is eight 
times larger in China than in Europe, this debt economically would mean 
440 ^ millions in England— say nearly double what the ruinous South 
African war cost. It is by such methods of comparison that the? vital na- 
ture of the economic factor in recent Chinese history is made clear. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 17 

tion in the new economic life springing up, the steam- 
borne coasting and river-trade as well as the purely- 
foreign trade. That most vital function tended conse- 
quently to become more and more hall-marked as for- 
eign; it no longer depended in any direct sense on 
Peking for protection. The hypothecation of these 
revenues to foreigners for periods running into decades 
— coupled with their administration by foreigners — was 
such a distinct restriction of the rights of eminent do- 
main as to amount to a partial abrogation of sovereignty. 
That this was vaguely understood by the masses is 
now quite certain. The Boxer movement of 1900, like 
the great proletarian risings which occurred in Italy in 
the pre-Christian era as a result of the impoverishment 
and moral disorder brought about by Roman misgovern- 
ment, was simply a socio-economic catastrophe exhibit- 
ing itself in an unexpected form. Jk The dying Manchu 
dynasty, at last in open despair, turned the revolt, 
insanely enough, against the foreigner — that is against 
those who already held the really vital portion of their 
sovereignty. So far from saving itself by this act, the 
dynasty wrote another sentence in its death-warrant. 
Economically the Manchus had been for years almost 
lost; the Boxer indemnities were the last straw. By 
more than doubling the burden of foreign commitments, 
and by placing the operation of the indemnities directly 
in the hands of foreign bankers by the method of 
monthly quotas, payable in Shanghai, the Peking Gov- 
ernment as far hack as fifteen years ago was reduced 
to being a government at thirty days" sight, at the 
mercy of any shock of events which could be protracted 
over a few monthly settlements. There is no denjdng 
this signal fact, which is probably the most remarkable 



18 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

illustration of the restrictive power of money which has 
ever been afforded in the history of Asia. 

The phenomenon, however, was complex and we must 
be careful to understand its workings. A mercantile 
curiosity, to find the parallel for which we must go 
back to the Middle Ages in Europe, when "free cities" 
such as those of the Hanseatic League plentifully dotted 
river and coast line, served to increase the general diffi- 
culties of a situation which no one formula could ade- 
quately cover. Extraterritoriality, by creating the 
"treaty port" in China, had been the most powerful 
weapon in undermining native economics; yet at the 
same time it had been the agent for creating powerful 
new counter-balancing interests. Though the increas- 
ingly large groups of foreigners, residing under their 
own laws, and building up, under their own specially 
protected system of international exchange, a new and 
imposing edifice, had made the hovel-like nature of 
Chinese economics glaringly evident, the mercantile 
classes of the New China, being always quick to avail 
themselves of money-making devices, had not only taken 
shelter under this new and imposing edifice, but were 
rapidly extending it of their own accord. In brief, the 
trading Chinese were identifying themselves and their 
major interests with the treaty-ports; they were trans- 
ferring thither their specie and their credits; making 
huge investments in land and properties, under the aegis 
of foreign flags in which they absolutely trusted. The 
money-interests of the country knew instinctively that 
the native system was doomed and that with this doom 
there would come many changes; these interests, in the 
way common to money all the world over, were insuring 
themselves against the inevitable. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 19 

The force of this — politically — became finally evident 
in 1911 ; and what we have said in our opening sentences 
should now be clear. %The Chinese Kevolution was an 
emotional rising against the Peking System because it 
was a bad and inefficient and retrograde system, just as 
much as against the Manchus, who after all had adopted 
purely Chinese methods and who were no more for- 
eigners than Scotchmen or Irishmen are foreigners to- 
day in England. The Revolution of 1911 derived its 
meaning and its value — as well as its mandate — not 
from what it proclaimed, but for what it stood for.)> 
Historically, 1911 was the lineal descendant of 1900, 
which again was the offspring of the economic collapse 
advertised by the great foreign loans of the Japanese 
war, loans made necessary because the Taipings had 
disclosed the complete disappearance of the only raison 
d'etre of Peking sovereignty, i.e. the old-time military 
power. The story is, therefore, clear and well-conoected 
and so logical in its results that it has about it a finality 
suggesting the unrolling of the inevitable. 

During the Revolution the one decisive factor was 
shown to be almost at once — money, nothing but money. 
The pinch was felt at the end of the first thirty days. 
Provincial remittances ceased; the Boxer quotas re- 
mained unpaid; a foreign embargo was laid upon the 
Customs funds. The Northern troops, raised and 
trained by Yuan Shih-kai, when he was Viceroy of the 
Metropolitan province, were, it is true, proving them- 
selves the masters of the Yangtsze and South China 
troops; yet that circumstance was meaningless. Those 
troops were fighting for what had already proved 
itself a lost cause — the Peking System as well as the 
Manchu dynasty. The fight turned more and more 



20 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

into a money-fight. It was foreign money which 
brought about the first truce and the transfer of the 
so-called republican government from Nanking to Pe- 
king. In the strictest sense of the words every phase 
of the settlement then arrived at was a settlement in 
terms of cash.^ 

Had means existed for rapidly replenishing the Chi- 
nese Treasury without having recourse to European 
stockmarkets (whose actions are semi-officially con- 
trolled when distant regions are involved) the Republic 
might have fared better. But placed almost at once 
through foreign dictation under a species of police- 
control, which while nominally derived from Western 
conceptions, was primarily designed to rehabilitate the 
semblance of the authority which had been so sensation- 
ally extinguished, the Republic remained only a dream ; 
and the world, taught to believe that there could be no 
real stability until the scheme of government approxi- 
mated to the conception long formed of Peking abso- 
lutism, waited patiently for the rude awakening which 
came with the Yuan Shih-kai cowp d'etat of 4th Novem- 
ber, 1913. Thus we had this double paradox; on the 
one hand the Chinese people awkwardly trying to be 
western in a Chinese way and failing: on the other, 
foreign officials and foreign governments trying to be 
Chinese and making the confusion worse confounded. 
It was inevitable in such circumstances that the history 
of the past six years should have been the history of a 
slow tragedy, and that almost every page should be 
written over with the name of the man who was the 
selected bailiff of the Powers — Yuan Shih-kai. 

1 There is no doubt that the so-called Belgian loan, £1,800,000 of which 
was paid over in cash at the beginning of 1912, was the instrument which 
brought every one to terms. 



CHAPTER II 

THE ENIGMA OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 

THE HISTORY OF THE MAN FROM THE OPENING OF HIS CAREER IN 

KOREA IN 1882 TO THE END OF THE REVOLUTION, 

12tH FEBRUARY, 1912 

Yuan Shih-kai's career falls into two clear-cut parts, 
almost as if it had been specially arranged for the biog- 
rapher; there is the probationary period in Korea, and 
the executive in North China. The first is important 
only because of the moulding-power which early in- 
fluences exerted on the man's character ; but it is inter- 
esting in another way since it affords glimpses of the 
sort of things which affected this leader's imagination 
throughout his life and finally brought him to irretriev- 
able ruin. The second period is choke-full of action; 
and over every chapter one can see the ominous point of 
interrogation which was finally answered in his tragic 
political and physical collapse. 

Yuan Shih-kai's origin, without being precisely ob- 
scure, is unimportant. He came of a Honanese family 
who were nothing more distinguished than farmers pos- 
sessing a certain amount of land, but not too much of 
the world's possessions. The boy probably ran wild 
in the field at an age when the sons of high officials and 
literati were already pale and anaemic from overmuch 
study. To some such cause the man undoubtedly owed 
his powerful physique, his remarkable appetite, his gen- 
eral roughness. Native biographers state that as a 

21 



22 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

youth he failed to pass his hsiu-tsai examinations — ^the 
lowest civil service degree — ^because he had spent too 
much time in riding and boxing and fencing. An uncle 
in official life early took charge of him; and when this 
relative died the young man displayed filial piety in 
accompanying the corpse back to the family graves and 
in otherwise manifesting grief. Through official con- 
nections a place was subsequently found for him in that 
public department under the Manchus which may be 
called the military intendancy, and it was through this 
branch of the civil service that he rose to power. Prop- 
erly speaking Yuan Shih-kai was never an army-officer ; 
he was a military official — his highest rank later on being 
that of military judge, or better. Judicial Commis- 
sioner. 

Yuan Shih-kai first emerges into public view in 1882 
when, as a sequel to the opening of Korea through the 
action of foreign Powers in forcing the then Hermit 
kingdom to sign commercial treaties, China began dis- 
patching troops to Seoul. Yuan Shih-kai, with two 
other officers, commanding in all some 3,000 men, arrived 
from Shantung, where he had been in the train of a 
certain General Wu Chang-ching, and now encamped 
in the Korean capital nominally to preserve order, but 
in reality, to enforce the claims of the suzerain power. 
For the Peking Government had never retreated from 
the position that Korea had been a vassal state ever since 
the Ming Dynasty had saved the country from the 
clutches of Hideyoshi and his Japanese invaders in the 
Sixteenth Century. Yuan Shih-kai had been person- 
ally recommended by this General Wu Chang-ching 
as a young man of ability and energy to the famous lii 
Hung Chang, who as Tientsin Viceroy and High Com- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 23 

missioner for the Northern Seas was responsible for the 
conduct of Korean affairs. The future dictator of 
China was then only twenty-five year's old. 

His very first contact with practical politics gave him 
a peculiar manner of viewing political problems. The 
arrival of Chinese troops in Seoul marked the beginning 
of that acute rivalry with Japan which finally cul- 
minated in the short and disastrous war „Qf... 1894-95. 
China, in order to preserve her influence in Korea 
against the growing influence of Japan, intrigued night 
and day in the Seoul Palaces, allying herself with the 
Conservative Court party which was led by the notorious 
Korean Queen who was afterwards assassinated. The 
Chinese agents aided and abetted the reactionary group, 
constantly inciting them to attack the Japanese and 
drive them out of the country. 

Continual outrages were the consequence. The Jap- 
anese legation was attacked and destroyed by the 
Korean mob not once but on several occasions during a 
decade which furnishes one of the most amazing chap- 
ters in the history of Asia. Yuan Shih-kai, being then 
merely a junior general officer under the orders of the 
Chinese Imperial Resident, is of no particular import- 
ance; but it is significant of the man that he should 
suddenly come well under the limelight on the first pos- 
sible occasion. On 6th December, 1884, leading 2,000 
Chinese troops, and acting in concert with 3,000 Korean 
soldiers, he attacked the Tong Kwan Palace in which 
the Japanese Minister and his staff, protected by two 
companies of Japanese infantry, had taken refuge ow- 
ing to the threatening state of affairs in the capital. 
Apparently there was no particular plan — it was the 
action of a mob of soldiery tumbling into a political 



24 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

brawl and assisted by their officers for reasons which 
appear to-day nonsensical. The sequel was, however, 
extraordinary. The Japanese held the Palace gates as 
long as possible, and then being desperate exploded a 
mine which killed numbers of Koreans and Chinese sol- 
diery and threw the attack into confusion. They then 
fought their way out of the city escaping ultimately to 
the nearest sea-port, Chemulpo. 

The explanation of this extraordinary episode has 
never been made public. The practical result was that 
after a period of extreme tension between China and 
Japan which was expected to lead to war, that political 
genius, the late Prince Ito, managed to calm things 
down and arrange workable modus vivendi. Yuan 
Shih-kai, who had gone to Tientsin to report in person 
to Li Hung Chang, returned to Seoul triumphantly in 
October, 1885, as Imperial Resident. He was then 
twenty-eight years old; he had come to the front, no 
matter by what means, in a quite remarkable manner. 
The history of the next nine years furnishes plenty 
of minor incidents, but nothing of historic importance. 
As the faithful lieutenant of Li Hung Chang, Yuan 
Shih-kai's particular business was simply to combat 
Japanese influence and hold the threatened advance in 
check. He failed, of course, since he was playing a 
losing game; and yet he succeeded where he undoubt- 
edly wished to succeed. By rendering faithful service 
he established the reputation he wished to win; and 
though he did nothing great he retained his post right up 
to the act which led to the declaration of war in 1894. 
Whether he actually precipitated that war is still a mat- 
ter of opinion. On the sinking by the Japanese fleet 
of the British steamer Kowshing, which was carrying 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 25 

Chinese reinforcements from Taku anchorage to Asan 
Bay to his assistance, seeing that the game was up, he 
quietly left the Korean capital and made his way over- 
land to North China. That swift, silent journey home 
ends the period of his novitiate. 

It took him a certain period to weather the storm 
which the utter collapse of China in her armed en- 
counter with Japan brought about — and particularly to 
obtain forgiveness for evacuating Seoul without orders. 
Technically his offence was punishable by death — the 
old Chinese code being most stringent in such matters. 
But by 1896 he was back in favour again, and through 
the influence of his patron Li Hung Chang, he was at 
length appointed in command of the Hsiaochan camp 
near Tientsin, where he was promoted and given the 
task of reforming a division of old-style troops and 
making them as efficient as Japanese soldiery. He had 
already earned a wide reputation for severity, for will- 
ingness to accept responsibility, for nepotism, and for a 
rare ability to turn even disasters to his own advantage 
r — all attributes which up to the last moment stood him 
in good stead. 

In the Hsiaochan camp the most important chapter 
of his life opens ; there is every indication that he fully 
realized it. Tientsin has always been the gateway to 
Peking: from there the road to high preferment is easily 
reached. Yuan Shih-kai marched steadily forward, 
taking the very first turning-point in a manner which 
stamped him for many of his compatriots in a way which 
can never be obliterated. 

It is first necessary to say a word about the troops 
of his command, since this has a bearing on present-day 
pohtics. The bulk of the soldiery were so-called Huai 



26 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Chun — L e., nominally troops from the Huai districts, 
just south of Li Hung Chang's native province Anhui. 
These Kiangu men, mixed with Shantung recruits, had 
earned a historic place in the favour of the Manchus ow- 
ing to the part they had played in the suppression of the 
Taiping Rebellion, in which great event General Gor- 
don and Li Hung Chang had been so closely associated. 
They and the troops of Hunan province, led by the 
celebrated Marquis Tseng Kuo-fan, were "the loyal 
troops," resembling the Sikhs during the Indian Mu- 
tiny; they were supposed to be true to their salt to the 
last man. Certainly they gave proofs of uncustomary 
fidelity. 

In those military days of twenty years ago Yuan 
Shih-kai and his henchmen were, however, concerned 
with simpler problems. It was then a question of drill 
and nothing but drill. In his camp near Tientsin the 
future President of the Chinese Republic succeeded in 
reorganizing his troops so well that in a very short time 
the Hsiaochan Division became known as a corps d' elite. 
The discipline was so stern that there were said to be 
only two ways of noticing subordinates, either by pro- 
moting or beheading them. Devoting himself to his 
task Yuan Shih-kai gave promise of being able to han- 
dle much bigger problems. 

His zeal soon attracted the attention of the Manchu 
Court. The circumstances in Peking at that time were 
peculiar. The famous old Empress Dowager, Tzu- 
Hsi, after the Japanese war, had greatly relaxed her 
hold on the Emperor Kwanghsu, who though still in 
subjection to her, nominally governed the empire. A 
well-intentioned but weak man, he had surrounded him- 
self with advanced scholars, led by the celebrated Kang 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 27 

Yu Wei, who daily studied with him and filled him 
with new doctrines, teaching him to believe that if he 
would only exert his power he might rescue the nation 
from international ignominy and make for himself an 
imperishable name. 

The sequel was inevitable. In 1898 the oriental 
world was electrified by the so-called Reform Edicts, in 
which the Emperor undertook to modernize China, and 
injwhich he exhorted the nation to obey him. The 
greatest alarm was created in Court circles by this 
action ; the whole vast body of Metropolitan officialdom, 
seeing its future threatened, flooded the Palace of the 
Empress Dowager with Secret Memorials praying her 
to resume power. Flattered, she gave her secret assent. 

Things marched quickly after that. The Empress, 
nothing loth, began making certain dispositions. 
Troops were moved, men were shifted here and there in 
a way that presaged action ; and the Emperor, now thor- 
oughly alarmed and yielding to the entreaties of his 
followers, sent two members of the Reform Party to 
Yuan Shih-kai bearing an alleged autograph order for 
him to advance instantly on Peking with all his troops ; 
to surround the Palace, to secure the person of the Em- 
peror from all danger, and then to depose the Empress 
Dowager for ever from power. What happened is 
equally well-known. Yuan Shih-kai, after an exhaus- 
tive examination of the message and messengers, as well 
as other attempts to substantiate the genuinenessr of the 
appeal, communicated its nature to the then Viceroy of 
Chihli, the Imperial Clansman Jung Lu, whose intimacy 
with the Empress Dowager since the days of her youth 
has passed into history. Jung Lu lost no time in acting. 
He beheaded the two messengers and personally re- 



28 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ported the whole plot to the Empress Dowager who was 
already fully warned. The result was the so-called 
coup d'etat of September, 1898, when all the Reformers 
who had not fled were summarily executed, and the Em- 
peror Kwanghsu himself closely imprisoned in the 
Island Palace within that portion of the Forbidden City 
known as the Three Lakes, having (until the Boxer out- 
break of 1900 carried him to Hsianfu), as sole com- 
panions his two favourites, the celebrated odalisques 
^Tearl" and "Lustre." 

This is no place to enter into the controversial aspect 
of Yuan Shih-kai's action in 1898 which has been hotly 
debated by partisans for many years. For onlookers 
the verdict must always remain largely a matter of opin- 
ion; certainly this is one of those matters which cannot 
be passed upon by any one but a Chinese tribunal 
furnished with all the evidence. Those daj'^s which wit- 
nessed the imprisonment of Kwang Hsu were great 
because they opened wide the portals of the Romance 
of History: all who were in Peking can never forget 
the counter-stroke ; the arrival of the hordes composed of 
Tung Fu-hsiang's Mahommedan cavalry — men who had 
ridden hard across a formidable piece of Asia at the 
behest of their Empress and who entered the capital in 
great clouds of dust. It was in that year of 1898 also 
that Legation Guards reappeared in Peking — a few 
files for each Legation as in 1860 — and it was then that 
clear-sighted prophets saw the beginning of the end of 
the Manchu Dynasty. 

Yuan Shih-kai's reward for his share in this counter- 
revolution was his appointment to the governorship of 
Shantung province. He moved thither with all his 
troops in December, 1899. Armed cap-a-pie he was 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 29 

ready for the next act — the Boxers, who burst on 
China in the Summer of 1900. These men were akeady 
at work in Shantung villages with their incantations and 
alleged witchcraft. There is evidence that their prop- 
aganda had been going on for months, if not for years, 
before any one had heard of it. Yuan Shih-kai had the 
priceless opportunity of studying them at close range 
and soon made up his mind about certain things. When 
the storm burst, pretending to see nothing but mad 
fanatics in those who, realizing the plight of their coun- 
try, had adopted the war-cry "Blot out the Manchus 
and the foreigner," he struck at them fiercely, driving 
the whole savage horde headlong into the metropolitan 
province of Chilili. There, seduced by the Manchus, 
they suddenly changed the inscription on their flags. 
Their sole enemy became the foreigner and all his works, 
and forthwith they were officially protected. Far and 
wide they killed every white face they could find. They 
tore up railways, burnt churches and chapels and pro- 
duced a general anarchy which could only have one end 
— European intervention. The man, sitting on the 
edge of Chinese history but not yet identifying himself 
with its main currents because he was not strong enough 
for that, had once again not judged wrongly. With his 
Korean experience to assist him, he had seen precisely 
what the end must inevitably be. 

The crash in Peking, when the siege of the Legations 
had been raised by an international army, found him 
alert and sympathetic — ready with advice, ready to 
shoulder new responsibilities, ready to explain away 
everything. The signature of the Peace Protocol of 
1901 was signalized by his obtaining the viceroyalty of 
Chihli, succeeding the great Li Hung Chang hinjself, 



30 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

who had been reappointed to his old post, but had found 
active duties too wearisome. This was a marvellous 
success for a man but little over forty. And when the 
fugitive Court at length returned from Hsianfu in 1902, 
honours were heaped upon him as a person particularly 
worthy of honour because he had kept up appearances 
and maintained the authority of the distressed Throne. 
As if in answer to this he flooded the Court with me- 
morials praying that in order to restore the power of 
the Dynasty a complete army of modern troops be 
raised — as numerous as possible but above all efficient. 

His advice was listened to. From 1902 until 1907 as 
Minister of the Army Reorganization Council — a special 
post he held simultaneously with that of metropolitan 
Viceroy — Yuan Shih-kai's great effort was concentrated 
on raising an efficient fighting force. In those five 
years, despite all financial embarrassments, North China 
raised and equipped six excellent Divisions of field- 
troops — 75,000 men — all looking to Yuan Shih-kai as 
their sole master. So much energy did he display in 
pushing military reorganization throughout the prov- 
inces that the Court, warned by jealous rivals of his 
growing power, suddenly promoted him to a post where 
he would be powerless. One day he was brought to 
Peking as Grand Councillor and President of the Board 
of Foreign Affairs, and ordered to hand over all army 
matters to his noted rival, the Manchu Tieh Liang. 
The time had arrived to muzzle him. His last phase 
as a pawn had come. 

Few foreign diplomats calling at China's Foreign 
Office to discuss matters during that short period which 
lasted barely a twelve-month, imagined that the square 
resolute-looking man who as President of the Board 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 31 

gave the same energy and attention to consular squab- 
bles as to the reorganization of a national-fighting force, 
was ahnost daily engaged in a fierce clandestine struggle 
to maintain even his modest position. Jealousy, which 
flourishes in Peking like the upas tree, was for ever 
blighting his schemes and blocking his plans. He had 
been brought to Peking to be tied up; he was con- 
stantly being denounced ; and even his all powerful pat- 
roness, the old Empress Dowager, who owed so much to 
him, suffered from constant premonitions that the end 
was fast approaching, and that with her the Dynasty 
would die. 

In the Autumn of 1908 she took sick. The gravest 
fears quickly spread. It was immediately reported that 
the Emperor Kwanghsu was also very ill — an ominous 
coincidence. Very suddenly both personages collapsed 
and died, the Empress Dowager slightly before the Em- 
peror. There is little doubt that the Emperor himself 
wasppisoned. The legend runs that as he expired not 
only did he give his Consort, who was to succeed him in 
the exercise of the nominal power of the Throne, a last 
secret Edict to behead Yuan Shih-kai, but that his fal- 
tering hand described circle after circle in the air until 
his followers understood the meaning. In the vernac- 
ular the name of the great viceroy and the word for 
circle have the same sound; the gesture signified that 
the dying monarch's last wish was revenge on the man 
who had failed him ten years before. 

An ominous calm followed this great break with the 
past. It was understood that the Court was torn by 
two violent factions regarding the succession which the 
Empress Tzu-hsi had herself decided. The fact that 
another long Regency had become inevitable through 



32 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the accession of the child Hsuan Tung aroused instant 
apprehensions among foreign observers, whilst it was 
confidently predicted that Yuan Shih-kai's last days had 
come. 

The blow fell suddenly on the 2nd January, 1909. 
In the interval between the death of the old Empress 
and his disgrace, Yuan Shih-kai was actually promoted 
to the highest rank in the gift of the Throne, that is 
made ^'Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent" and 
placed in charge of the Imperial funeral arrangements 
— a lucrative appointment. During that interval it is 
understood that the new Regent, brother of the Em- 
peror Kwang-hsu, consulted all the most trusted mag- 
nates of the empire regarding the manner in which the 
secret decapitation Decree should be treated. All ad- 
vised him to be warned in time, and not to venture on a 
course of action which would be condemned both by the 
nation and by the Powers. Another Edict was there- 
fore prepared simply dismissing Yuan Shih-kai from 
office and ordering him to return to his native place. 

Every one remembers that day in Peking when pop- 
ular rumour declared that the man's last hour had come. 
Warned on every side to beware. Yuan Shih-kai left 
the Palace as soon as he had read the Edict of dismissal 
in the Grand Council and drove straight to the railway- 
station, whence he entrained for Tientsin, dressed as a 
simple citizen. Rooms had been taken for him at a 
European hotel, the British Consulate approached for 
protection, when another train brought down his eldest 
son bearing a message direct from the Grand Council 
Chamber, absolutely guaranteeing the safety of his life. 
Accordingly he duly returned to his native place in 
Honan province, and for two years — until the outbreak 





The Late President Yuan Shih-kai 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 33 

of the Revolution — devoted feimself sedulously to the de- 
velopment of the large estate he had acquired with the 
fruits of office. Living like a patriarch of old, sur- 
rounded by his many wives and children, he announced 
constantly that he had entirely dropped out of the politi- 
cal life of China and only desired to be left in peace. 
There is reason to believe, however, that his henchmen 
continually reported to him the true state of affairs and 
bade him bide his time. Certain it is that the firing of 
the first shots on the Yangtsze found him alert and 
issuing private orders to his followers. It was inevit- 
able that he should have been recalled to office — and 
actually within one hundred hours of the first news of 
the_outbreak the Court sent for him urgently and un- 
graciouslj^ 

From the 14th October, 1911, when he was appointed 
by Imperial Edict Viceroy of Hupeh and Hunan and 
ordered to proceed at once to the front to quell the insur- 
rection, until the 1st November, when he was given 
virtually Supreme Power as President of the Grand 
Council in place of Prince Ching, a whole volume is re- 
quired to discuss adequately the maze of questions 
involved. For the purposes of this account, however, 
the matter can be dismissed very briefly in this way. 
Welcoming the opportunity which had at last come and 
determined once for all to settle matters decisively, so 
far as he was personally concerned. Yuan Shih-kai de- 
liberately followed the policy of holding back and de- 
laying everything until the very incapacity marking 
both sides — the Revolutionists quite as much as the 
Manchus — forced him, as man of action and man of 
diplomacy, to be acclaimed the sole mediator and saviour 
of the nation. 



34 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

The detailed course of the Kevolution, and the pecu- 
liar manner in which Yuan Shih-kai allowed events 
rather than men to assert their mastery has often been re- 
lated and need not long detain us. It is generally con- 
ceded that in spite of the bravery of the raw revolution- 
ary levies, their capacity was entirely unequal to the 
trump card Yuan Shih-kai held all the while in his hand 
— the six fully-equipped Divisions of Field Troops he 
himself had organized as Tientsin Viceroy. It was a 
portion of this field-force which captured and destroyed 
the chief revolutionary base in the triple city of Hankow, 
Hanyang and Wuchang in November, 1911, and which 
he held back just as it was about to give the coup de 
grace by crossing the river in force and sweeping the 
last remnants of the revolutionary army to perdition. 
Thus it is correct to declare that had he so wished Yuan 
Shih-kai could have crushed the revolution entirely be- 
fore the end of 1911; but he was sufficiently astute to 
see that the problem he had to solve was not merely 
military but moral as well. The Chinese as a nation 
were suffering from a grave complaint. Their civiliza- 
tion had been made almost bankrupt owing to unre- 
sisted foreign aggression and to the native inability to 
cope with the mass of accumulated wrongs which a su- 
perimposed and exhausted feudalism — the Manchu 
system — had brought about.] Yuan Shih-kai knew that 
the Boxers had been theoretically correct in selecting as 
they first did the watchword which they had first placed 
on their banners — "blot out the Manchus and all for- 
eign things." Both had sapped the old civilization 
to its foundations. But the program they had pro- 
posed was idealistic, not practical. One element could 
be cleared away — the other had to be endured. Had 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 35 

the Boxers been sensible they would have modified their 
program to the extent of protecting the foreigners, 
whilst they assailed the Dynasty which had brought 
them so low. The Court Party, as we have said, se- 
duced their leaders to acting in precisely the reverse 
sense. 

Yuan Shih-kai was neither a Boxer, nor yet a believer 
in idealistic foolishness. He had realized that the es- 
sence of successful rule in the China of the Twentieth 
Century was to support the foreign point of view — • 
nominally at least — because foreigners disposed of un- 
limited monetary resources, and had science on their 
side. He knew that so long as he did not openly flout 
foreign opinion by indulging in barefaced assassina- 
tions, he would be supported owing to the international 
reputation he had established in 1900. Arguing from 
these premises, his instinct also told him that an appear- 
ance of legality must always be sedulously preserved 
and the aspirations of the nation nominally satisfied. 
For this reason he arranged matters in such a manner 
as to appear always as the instrument of fate. For this 
reason, although he destroyed the revolutionists on the 
mid- Yangtsze, to equalize matters, on the lower 
Yangtsze he secretly ordered the evacuation of Nan- 
king by the Imperialist forces so that he might have a 
tangible argument with which to convince the Manchus 
regarding the root and branch reform which he knew 
was necessary. That reform had been accepted in 
principle by the Throne when it agreed to the so-called 
Nineteen Fundamental Articles, a corpus of demands 
which all the Northern Generals had endorsed and had 
indeed insisted should be the basis of government be- 
fore they would fight the rebellious South in 1911. 



36 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

There is reason to believe that (provided he had been 
made de facto Regent, Yuan Shih-kai would have sup- 
ported to the end a Manchu Monarchy. But the sur- 
prising swiftness of the Revolutionary Party's action in 
proclaiming the Republic at Nanking on the 1st Jan- 
uary, 1912, and the support which foreign opinion gave 
that venture confused him. He had already consented 
to peace negotiations with the revolutionary South in the 
middle of December, 1911, and once he was drawn into 
those negotiations his policy wavered, the armistice in 
the field being constantly extended because he saw that 
the Foreign Powers, and particularly England, were 
averse from further civil war. Having dispatched a 
former lieutenant, Tong Shao-yi, to Shanghai as his 
Plenipotentiary, he soon found himself committed to 
a course of action different from what he had originally 
contemplated. South China and Central China in- 
sisted so vehemently that the only solution that was ac- 
ceptable to them was the permanent and absolute elim- 
ination of the Manchu Dynasty, that he himself was 
half-convinced, the last argument necessary being the 
secret promise that he should become the first Presi- 
dent of the united Republic. In the circumstances, 
had he been really loyal, it was his duty either to re- 
sume his warfare or resign his appointment as Prime 
Minister and go into retirement. He did neither. In 
a thoroughly characteristic manner he sought a middle 
course, after having vaguely advocated a national con- 
vention to settle the matter. By specious misrepre- 
sentation the widow of the Emperor Kwang Hsu — the 
Dowager Empress Lung Yu who had succeeded the 
Prince Regent Ch'un in her care of the interests of the 
child Emperor Hsuan Tung — was induced to beheve 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 37 

that ceremonial retirement was the only com'se open 
to the Dynasty if the country was to be saved from 
disruption and partition. There is reason to believe 
that the Memorial of all the Northern Generals which 
was telegraphed to Peking on the 28th January, 1912, 
and which advised abdication, was inspired by him. In 
any case it was certainly Yuan Shih-kai, who drew up 
the so-called Articles of Favourable Treatment for the 
Manchu House and caused them to be telegraphed to 
the South, whence they were telegraphed back to him 
as the maximum the Revolutionary Party was pre- 
pared to concede: and by a curious chance the attempt 
made to assassinate him outside the Palace Gates ac- 
tually occurred on the very day he had submitted an 
outline of these terms on his bended knees to the Em- 
press Dowager and secured their qualified acceptance. 
The pathetic attempt to confer on him as late as the 
26th January the title of Marquess, the highest rank of 
nobility which could be given a Chinese, an attempt 
which was four times renewed, was the last despairing 
gesture of a moribund power. Within very few days 
the Throne reluctantly decreed its own abdication in 
three extremely curious Edicts which are worthy of 
study in the appendix. They prove conclusively that 
the Imperial Family believed that it was only abdicating 
its political power, whilst retaining all ancient cere- 
monial rights and titles. Plainly the conception of a 
Republic, or a People's Government, as it was termed 
in the native ideographs, was unintelligible to Peking. 
Yuan Shih-kai had now won everything he wished 
for. By securing that the Imperial Commission to or- 
ganize the Republic and re-unite the warring sections 
was placed solely in his hands, he prepared to give a 



38 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

type of Government about which he knew nothing a 
trial. It is interesting to note that he held to the very- 
end of his life that he derived his powers solely from 
the Last Edicts, and in nowise from his compact with 
the Nanking Republic which had instituted the so-called 
Provisional Constitution. He was careful, however, 
not to lay this down categorically until many months 
later when his dictatorship seemed undisputed. But 
from the day of the Manchu Abdication almost, he was 
constantly engaged in calculating whether he dared risk 
everything on one throw of the dice and ascend the 
Throne himself; and it is precisely this which imparts 
such dramatic interest to the astounding story which 
follows. 



CHAPTER III 

THE DREAM EEPUBLIC 

(from the 1st JANUARY, 1912, TO THE DISSOLUTION OF 

parliament) 

To DESCRIBE briefly and intelligibly the series of trans- 
actions from the 1st January, 1912, when the Republic 
was proclaimed at Nanking by a handful of provincial 
delegates, and Dr. Sun Yat Sen elected Provisional 
President, to the coup d'etat of 4th November, 1913, 
when Yuan Shih-kai, elected full President a few weeks 
previously, after having acted as Chief Executive for 
twenty months, boldly broke up Parliament and made 
himself de facto Dictator of China, is a matter of ex- 
traordinary difficulty. 

All through this important period of Chinese history 
one has the impression that one is in dreamland and 
that fleeting emotions take the place of more solid 
things. Plot and counter-plot follow one another so 
rapidly that an accurate record of them all would be 
as wearisome as the Book of Chronicles itself; whilst 
the amazing web of financial intrigue which binds the 
whole together is so complex — and at the same time so 
antithetical to the political struggle — that the two 
stories seem to run counter to one another, although 
they are as closely united as two assassins pledged to 
carry through in common a dread adventure. A huge 
agglomeration of people estimated to number four hun- 
dred millions, being left without qualified leaders and 
told that the system of government, which had been laid 

39 



40 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

down by the Nanking Provisional Constitution and en- 
dorsed by the Abdication Edicts, was a system in which 
every man was as good as neighbour, swayed meaning- 
lessly to and fro, vainly seeking to regain the equili- 
brium which had been so sensationally lost. A litigious 
spirit became so universal that all authority was openly 
derided, crimes of every description being so common 
as to force most respectable men to withdraw from 
public affairs and leave a bare rump of desperadoes in 
power. 

Long embarrassed by the struggle to pay her for- 
eign loans and indemnities, China was also virtually 
penniless. The impossibility of arranging large bor- 
rowings on foreign markets without the open support 
of foreign govermnents — a support which was hedged 
round with conditions — made necessary a system of 
petty expedients under which practically every provin- 
cial administration hypothecated every liquid asset it 
could lay hands upon in order to pay the inordinate 
number of undisciplined soldiery who littered the coun- 
tryside. The issue of unguaranteed paper -money soon 
reached such an immense figure that the market was 
flooded with a worthless currency which it was unable 
to absorb. The Provincial leaders, being powerless to 
introduce improvement, exclaimed that it was the busi- 
ness of the Central Government as representative of the 
sovereign people to find solutions; and so long as they 
maintained themselves in office they went their respec- 
tive ways with a sublime contempt for the chaos around 
them. 

What was this Central Government? In order suc- 
cessfully to understand an unparalleled situation we 
must indicate its nature. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 41 

The manoeuvres to which Yuan Shih-kai had so as- 
tutely lent himself from the outbreak of the Revolution 
had left him at its official close supreme in name. Not 
only had he secured an Imperial Commission from the 
abdicating Dynasty to organize a popular Government 
in obedience to the national wish, but having brought 
to Peking the Delegates of the Nanking Revolutionary 
Body he had received from them the formal offer of 
the Presidency. 

These arrangements had, of course, been secretly 
agreed to en bloc before the fighting had been stopped 
and the abdication proclaimed, and were part and par- 
cel of the elaborate scenery which officialdom always 
employs in Asia even when it is dealing with matters 
within the purview of the masses. They had been made 
possible by the so-called "Article of Favourable Treat- 
ment" drawn-up by Yuan Shih-kai himself, after con- 
sultation with the rebellious South. In these Capitu- 
lations it had been clearly stipulated that the Manchu 
Imperial Family should receive in perpetuity a Civil 
List of $4,000,000 Mexican a year, retaining all their 
titles as a return for the surrender of their political 
power, the bitter pill being gilded in such fashion as to 
hide its real meaning, which alone was a grave political 
error. 

In spite of this agreement, however, great mutual 
suspicion existed between North and South China. 
Yuan Shih-kai himself was unable to forget that the 
bold attempt to assassinate him in the Peking streets 
on the 17th January, when he was actually engaged in 
negotiating these very terms of the Abdication, had been 
apparently inspired from Nanking; whilst the Southern 
leaders were daily reminded by the vernacular press 



42 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

that the man who held the balance of power had always 
played the part of traitor in the past and would cer- 
tainly do the same again in the near future. 

When the Delegates came to Peking in February, 
by far the most important matter which was still in dis- 
pute was the question of the oath of office which Yuan 
Shih-kai was called upon to take to insure that he would 
be faithful to the Republic. The Delegates had been 
charged specifically to demand on behalf of the seced- 
ing provinces that Yuan Shih-kai should proceed with 
them to Nanking to take that oath, a course of action 
which would have been held tantamount by the nation 
to surrender on his part to those who had been unable 
to vanquish him in the field. It must also not be for- 
gotten that from the very beginning a sharp and dan- 
gerous cleavage of opinion existed as to the manner 
in which the powers of the new government had been 
derived. South and Central China claimed, and 
claimed rightly, that the Nanking Provincial Constitu- 
tion was the Instrument on which the Republic was 
based: Yuan Shih-kai declared that the Abdication 
Edicts, and not the Nanking Instrument had estab- 
lished the Republic, and that therefore it lay within his 
competence to organize the new government in the 
way which he considered most fit. 

The discussion which raged was suddenly terminated 
<on the night of the 29th February (1912) when with- 
out any warning there occurred the extraordinary revolt 
of the 3rd Division, a picked Northern corps who for 
forty-eight hours plundered and burnt portions of the 
capital without any attempts at interference, there be- 
ing little doubt to-day that this manoeuvre was delib- 
erately arranged as a means of intimidation by Yuan 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 43 

Shih-kai himself. Although the disorders assumed 
such dimensions that foreign intervention was nar- 
rowly escaped, the upshot was that the Nanking Dele- 
gates were completely cowed and willing to forget all 
about forcing the despot of Peking to proceed to the 
Southern capital. Yuan Shih-kai as the man of the 
hour was enabled on the 10th March, 1912, to take his 
oath in Peking as he had wished thus securing full 
freedom of action during the succeeding years. ^ 

It was on this astounding basis — by means of an or- 
ganized revolt — that the Central Government was re- 
organized; and every act that followed bears the mark 
of its tainted parentage. Accepting readily as his 
Ministers in the more unimportant government De- 
partments the nominees of the Southern Confederacy 
(which was now formally dissolved). Yuan Shih-kai 
was careful to reserve for his own men everything that 
concerned the control of the army and the police, as 
well as the all-important ministry of finance. The 
framework having been thus erected, attention was 
almost inmiediately concentrated on the problem of 
finding money, an amazing matter which would weary 
the stoutest reader if given in all its detail but which 
being part and parcel of the general problem must be 
referred to. 

iThe defective nature of this oath of office will be patent at a glance: 
"At the beginning of the Republic there are many things to be taken 
care of. I, Yuan Shih-kai, sincerely wish to exert my utmost to promote 
the democratic spirit, to remove the dark blots of despotism, to obey 
strictly the Constitution, and to abide by the wish of the people, so as to 
place the country in a safe, united, strong, and firm position, and to eifect 
the happiness and welfare of the divisions of the Chinese race. All these 
wishes I will fulfil without fail. As soon as a new President is elected by 
the National Assembly I shall at once vacate my present position. With 
all sincerity I take this oath before the people of China. 

"Dated the tenth day of March in the First Year of the Republic of 
China (1912)." (Signed) Yuan Shih-kai. 



44 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Certain essential features can be very rapidly ex- 
posed. We have already made clear the purely eco- 
nomic nature of the forces which had sapped the foun- 
dations of Chinese society. Primarily it had been the 
disastrous nature of Chinese gold-indebtedness which 
had given the new ideas the force they required to work 
their will on the nation. And just because the ques- 
tion of this, gold-indebtedness had become so serious and 
such a drain on the nation, some months before the out- 
break of the Revolution an arrangement had been en- 
tered into with the bankers of four nations for a Cur- 
rency Loan of £10,000,000 with which to make an or- 
ganized effort to re-establish internal credit. But 
this loan had never actually been floated, as a six 
months' safety clause had permitted a delay during 
which the Revolution had come. It was therefore nec- 
essary to begin the negotiations anew; and as the rich 
prizes to be won in the Chinese lottery had attracted 
general attention in the European financial world 
through the advertisement which the Revolution had 
given the country, a host of alternative loan proposals 
now lay at the dis]3osal of Peking. 

Consequently an extraordinary chapter of bargain- 
ing commenced. Warned that an International Debt 
Commission was the goal aimed at by official finance. 
Yuan Shih-kai and the various parties who made up 
the Government of the day, though disagreeing on al- 
most every other question, were agreed that this dan- 
ger must be fought as a common enemy. Though the 
Four-Power group alleged that they held the first 
option on all Chinese loans, money had already been ad- 
vanced by a Franco-Belgian Syndicate to the amount 
of nearly two million pounds during the critical days of 



n :'fmp,m^:*m^M. 




«!, 




The National Assembly Sitting as a National Conven- 
tion Engaged on the Dkaft of the Permanent Con- 
stitution. Specially Photographed by Permission of 
the Speakers for the Present Work 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 45 

the Abdication. Furious at the prospect of losing their 
percentages, the Four Power group made the con- 
fusion worse confounded by blocking all competing 
proposals and closing every possible door. Russia and 
Japan, who had hitherto not been parties to the official 
consortium, perceiving that participation had become a 
political necessity, now demanded a place which was 
grudgingly accorded them; and it was in this way that 
the celebrated six-power Group arose. 

It was round this group and the proposed issue of 
a .£60,000,000 loan to reorganize Chinese finance that 
the central battle raged. The Belgian Syndicate, hav- 
ing been driven out of business by the financial boy- 
cott which the official group was strong enough to or- 
ganize on the European bourses, it remained for China 
to see whether she could not find some combination or 
some man who would be bold enough to ignore all gov- 
ernments. 

Her search was not in vain. In September (1912) 
a London stockbroker, Mr. Birch Crisp, determined to 
risk a brilliant coup by negotiating by himself a Loan 
of £10,000,000; and the world woke up one morning 
to learn that one man was successfully opposing six 
governments. The recollection of the storm raised in 
financial circles by this bold attempt will be fresh in 
many minds. Every possible weapon was brought into 
play by international finance to secure that the impu- 
dence of financial independence should be properly 
checked; and so it happened that although £5,000,000 
was secured after an intense struggle, it was soon plain 
that the large requirements of a derelict government 
could not be satisfied in this Quixotic manner. Two 
important points had, however, been attained; first. 



46 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

China was kept financially afloat during the year 1912 
by the independence of a single member of the London 
Stock Exchange; secondly, using this coup as a lever 
the Peking Government secured better terms than 
otherwise would have been possible from the official 
consortium. ^ 

Meanwhile the general internal situation remained 
deplorable. Nothing was done for the provinces whose 
paper currency was depreciating from month to month 
in an alarming manner ; whilst the rivalries between the 
various leaders instead of diminishing seemed to be in- 
creasing. The Tutuhs, or Military Governors, acting 
precisely as they saw fit, derided the authority of Pe- 
king and sought to strengthen their old position by add- 
ing to their armed forces. In the capital the old Man- 
chu court, safely entrenched in the vast Winter Palace 
from which it has not even to-day been ejected (1917) 
published daily the Imperial Gazette, bestowing hon- 
ours and decorations on courtiers and clansmen and 
preserving all the old etiquette. In the North-western 
provinces, and in Manchuria and Mongolia, the so- 
called Tsung She Tang, or Imperial Clan Society, in- 
trigued perpetually to create risings which would hasten 
the restoration of the fallen House; and although 
these intrigues never rose to the rank of a real menace 
to the country, the fact that they were surreptitiously 
supported by the Japanese secret service was a con- 
tinual source of anxiety. The question of Outer Mon- 
golia was also harassing the Central Government. The 
Hutuktu or Living Buddha of Urga — ^the chief city of 
Outer Mongolia — had utilized the revolution to throw 
off his allegiance to Peking; and the whole of this vast 
region had been thrown into complete disorder — which 



REPUBLIC IN CHIlSrA 47 

was still further accentuated when Russia on the 21st 
October (1912) recognized its independence. It was 
known that as a pendent to this Great Britain was about 
to insist on the autonomy of Tibet, — a development 
which greatly hurt Chinese pride. 

On the 15th August, 1912, the deplorable situation 
was well-epitomised by an extraordinary act in Peking, 
when General Chang Cheng- wu, one of the "heroes" 
of the original Wuchang rising, who had been enticed to 
the capital, was suddenly seized after a banquet in his 
honour and shot without trial at midnight. 

This event, trivial in itself during times when judi- 
cial murders were common, would have excited nothing 
more than passing interest had not the national sen- 
timent been so aroused by the chaotic conditions. As 
it was it served to focus attention on the general mal- 
administration over which Yuan Shih-kai ruled as pro- 
visional President. "What is my crime?" had shrieked 
the unhappy revolutionist as he had been shot and then 
bayonetted to death. That query was most easily an- 
swered. His crime was that he was not strong enough 
or big enough to compete against more sanguinary men, 
his disappearance being consequently in obedience to 
an universal law of nature. Yuan Shih-kai was de- 
termined to assert his mastery by any and every means ; 
and as this man had flouted him he must die. 
/ The uproar which this crime aroused was, however, 
not easily appeased; and the Advisory Council, which 
was sitting in Peking pending the assembling of the 
first Parliament, denounced the Provisional President 
so bitterly that to show that these reproaches were ill- 
deserved he invited Dr. Sun Yat-sen to the capital treat- 
ing him with unparalleled honours and requesting him 



48 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

to act as intermediary between the rival factions. All 
such manoeuvres, however, were inspired with one ob- 
ject, — namely to prove how nobody but the master of 
Peking could regulate the affairs of the country, i 

Still no Parliament was assembled. Although the 
Nanking Provisional Constitution had stipulated that 
one was to meet within ten months i. e. before 1st No- 
vember, 1912, the elections were purposely delayed, the 
attention of the Central Government being concentrated 
on the problem of destroying all rivals, and everything 
being subordinate to this war on persons, j, Rascals, get- 
ting daily more and more out of hand, worked their 
will on rich and poor alike, discrediting by their actions 
the name of republicanism and destroying public con- 
fidence — which was precisely what suited Yuan Shih- 
kai. Dramatic and extraordinary incidents continu- 
ally inflamed the public mind, nothing being too sin- 
gular for those remarkable days. 

Very slowly the problem developed, with everyone 
exclaiming that foreign intervention was becoming in- 
evitable. With the beginning of 1913, being unable to 
delay the matter any longer. Yuan Shih-kai allowed 
elections to be held in the provinces. He was so badly 
beaten at the polls that it seemed in spite of his military- 
power that he would be outvoted and outmanoeuvred 
in the new National Assembly and his authority un- 
dermined. To prevent this a fresh assassination was 
decided upon. The ablest Southern leader, Sung 
Chiao-jen, just as he was entraining for Peking with 
a number of Parliamentarians at Shanghai, was coolly 
shot in a crowded railway station by a desperado who 
admitted under trial that he had been paid £200 for 
the job by the highest authority in the land, the evi- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 49 

dence produced in court including telegrams from Pe- 
kiufy which left no doubt as to who had instigated the 
murder. > 

The storm raised by this evil measure made it ap- 
pear as if no parliament could ever assemble in Peking. 
But the feeling had become general that the situation 
was so desperate that action had to be taken. Not only 
was their reputation at stake, but the Kuomingtang or 
Revolutionary Party now knew that the future of their 
country was involved just as much as the safety of 
their own hves; and so after a rapid consultation they 
determined that they would beard the lion in his den. 
Rather unexpectedly on the 7th April (1913) Parlia- 
ment was opened in Peking with a huge Southern ma- 
jority and the benediction of all Radicals.^ Hopes 
rose with mercurial rapidity as a solution at last seemed 
in sight. But hardly had the first formalities been 
completed and Speakers been elected to both Houses, 
than by a single dramatic stroke Yuan Shih-kai re- 
duced to nought these labours by stabbing in the back 
the whole theory and practice of popular government. 

The method he employed was simplicity itself, and 
it is peculiarly characteristic of the man that he should 
have been so bluntly cynical. Though the Provisional 
Nanking Constitution, which was the "law" of China 
so far as there was any law at all, had laid down spe- 
cifically in article XIX that all measures affecting the 
National Treasury must receive the assent of Parlia- 

1 The Parliament of China is composed of a House of Representatives 
numbering 596 members and a Senate of 274!. The Representatives are 
elected by rneans of a property and educational franchise which is esti- 
mated to give about four million voters (1 per cent of the population) al- 
though in practice relatively fevi^ vote. The Senate is elected by the 
Provincial Assemblies by direct ballot. In the opinion of the vi'riter, the 
Chinese Parliament in spite of obvious shortcoming, is representative of 
the country in its present transitional stage. 



50 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ment, Yuan Shih-kai, pretending that the small Ad- 
visory Council which had assisted him during the pre- 
vious year and which had only just been dissolved, had 
sanctioned a foreign loan, peremptorily ordered the 
signature of the great Reorganization Loan of 
.£25,000,000 which had been secretly under negotiation 
all Winter with the financial agents of six Powers, ^ 
although the rupture which had come in the previous 
June as a forerunner to the Crisp loan had caused the 
general public to lose sight of the supreme importance of 
the financial factor. Parliament, seeing that apart 
from the possibility of a Foreign Debt Commission be- 
ing created something after the Turkish and Egyptian 
models, a direct challenge to its existence had been of- 
fered, raged and stormed and did its utmost to delay 
the question; but the Chief Executive having made up 
his mind shut himself up in his Palace and absolutely 
refused to see any Parliamentary representatives. Al- 
though the Minister of Finance himself hesitated to 
complete the transaction in the face of the rising storm 
and actually fled the capital, he was brought back by 
special train and forced to complete the agreement. At 
four o'clock in the morning on the 25th April the last 
documents were signed in the building of a foreign bank 
and the Finance Minister, galloping his carriage sud- 

1 The American Group at the last moment dropped out of the Sextuple 
combination (prior to the signature of the contract) after President Wilson 
had made his well-known pronouncem.ent deprecating the association of 
Americans in any financial undertakings which impinged upon the rights 
of sovereignty of a friendly Power, — v-^hich was his considered view of the 
manner in which foreign governments were assisting their nationals to 
gain control of the Salt Administration. The exact language the President 
used was that the conditions of the loan seemed "to touch very nearly the 
administrative independence of China itself," and that a loan thus ob- 
tained was "obnoxious" to the principles upon which the American govern- 
ment rests. It is to be hoped that President Wilson's dictum will be uni- 
versally accepted after the war and that meddling in Chinese affairs will 
cease. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 51 

denly out of the compound to avoid possible bombs, 
reported to his master that at last — in spite of the nom- 
inal foreign control which was to govern the disburse- 
ment — a vast sum was at his disposal to further his own 
ends. 

Safe in the knowledge that possession is nine points 
of the law, Yuan Shih-kai now treated with derision the 
resolutions which Parliament passed that the transac- 
tion was illegal and the loan agreement null and void. 
Being openly backed by the agents of the Foreign 
Powers, he immediately received large cash advances 
which enabled him to extend his power in so many di- 
rections that further argimient with him seemed use- 
less. It is necessary to record that the Parliamentary 
leaders had almost gone down on their knees to cer- 
tain of the foreign Ministers in Peking in a vain at- 
tempt to persuade them to delay — as they could very 
well have done — the signature of this vital Agreement 
for forty-eight hours so that it could be fomially passed 
by the National Assembly, and thus save the vital por- 
tion of the sovereignty of the country from passing un- 
der the heel of one man. But Peking diplomacy is a 
perverse and disagreeable thing; and the Foreign Min- 
isters of those days, although accredited to a govern- 
ment which while it had not then been formally recog- 
nized as a Republic by any Power save the United 
States, was bound to be so very shortly, were determined 
to be reactionary and were at heart delighted to find 
things running back normally to absolutism.^ High 

1 The United States accorded formal recognition to the Republic on the 
election of the Speakers of the two Houses of Parliament: the other Treaty 
Powers delayed recognition until Yuan Shih-kai had been elected full 
President in October. It has been very generally held that the long delay 
in foreign recognition of the Republic contributed greatly to its internal 
troubles by making every one doubt the reality of the Nanking transac- 



52 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

finance had at last got hold of everything it required 
from China and was in no mood to relax the monopoly 
of the salt administration which the Loan Agreement 
conferred. Nor must be the fact be lost sight of that 
of the nominal amount of .£25,000,000 which had been 
borrowed, fully half consisted of repayments to for- 
eign Banks and never left Europe. According to the 
schedules attached to the Agreement, Annex A, com- 
prising the Boxer arrears and bank advances, absorbed 
£4, 317,778 : Annex B, being so-called provincial loans, 
absorbed a further £2,870,000: Annex C, being liabili- 
ties shortly maturing, amounted to £3,592,263: Annex 
D, for disbandment of troops, amounted to £3,000,000 : 
Annex C, to cover current administrative expenses to- 
talled £5,500,000: whilst Annex E which covered the 
reorganization of the Salt Administration, absorbed the 
last £2,000,000. The bank profits on this loan alone 
amounted to 1^ million pounds; whilst Yuan Shih-kai 
himself was placed in possession by a system of weekly 
disbursements of a sum roughly amounting to ten 
million sterling, which was amply sufficient to allow him 
to wreak his will on his fellow-countrymen. Exasper- 
ated to the pitch of despair by this new development, the 
Central and Southern provinces, after a couple of 
months' vain argument, began openly to arm. On the 
10th July in Kiangse province on the river Yangtsze 
the Northern garrisons were fired upon from the Hu- 
kow forts by the provincial troops under General Li 
lii i-chun and the so-called Second Revolution com- 
n^ei ^ed. 

tion. Tost important, however, is the historical fact that a group of 
Pow: r.'i numbering the two great leaders of democracy in Europe — Eng- 
land and France — did everything they could in Peking to enthrone Yuan 
Shih-kai as dictator. 




A'iKW KUO.M Ri;.\U OK HaI.I. of Till-; XaTIONAI. As.SK.MItl.V SlT- 
TINC AS A XaTIOXAI, CoX VE.VTIOX Exc:A(;KI) on rilK DllAKT 

or THE Per.maxext Coxstititiox. Si-eciai.i.v I'koto- 

GllAPHEl) BY PeRMISSIOX OK THE SPEAKEHS KOK THE 

Presext Work 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 53 

The campaign was short and inglorious. The South, 
ill-furnished with munitions and practically penniless, 
and always confronted by the same well-trained North- 
ern Divisions who had proved themselves invincible only 
eighteen months before, fought hard for a while, but 
never became a serious menace to the Central Gov- 
ernment owing to the lack of co-operation between the 
various Rebel forces in the field. The Kiangse troops 
under General Li Lieh-chun, who numbered at most 
20,000 men, fought stiffly, it is true, for a while but were 
unable to strike with any success and were gradually 
driven far back from the river into the mountains of 
Kiangse where their numbers rapidly melted away. 
The redoubtable revolutionary Huang Hsin, who had 
proved useful as a propagandist and a bomb-thrower 
in earlier days, but who was useless in serious warfare, 
although he assumed command of the Nanking garri- 
son which had revolted to a man, and attempted a 
march up the Pukow railway in the. direction of Tient- 
sin, found his effort break down ahnost immediately 
from lack of organization and fled to Japan. The 
Nanking troops, although deserted by their leader, of- 
fered a strenuous resistance to the capture of the south- 
ern capital which was finally effected by the old reac- 
tionary General Chang Hsun operating in conjunction 
with General Feng Kuo-chang who had been dis- 
patched from Peking with a picked force. The attack 
on the Shanghai arsenal which had been quietly occu- 
pied by a small Northern Garrison during the months 
succeeding the great loan transaction, although pushed 
with vigour by the South, likewise ultimately collapsed 
through lack of artillery and proper leadership. The 
navy, which was wholly Southern in its sympathies and 



54 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

which had been counted upon as a valuable weapon in 
cutting off the whole Yangtsze Valley, was at the last 
moment purchased to neutrahty by a liberal use of 
money obtained from the foreign banks, under, it is said, 
the heading of administrative expenses! The turbu- 
lent city of Canton, although it also rose against the 
authority of Peking, had been well provided for by 
Yuan Shih-kai. A border General, named Lung Chi- 
Kwang, with 20,000 semi-savage Kwangsi troops had 
been moved near the city and at once attacked and over- 
awed the garrison. Appointed Mihtary Governor of 
the province in return for his services, this Lung Chi- 
kwang, who was an infamous brute, for three years 
ruled the South with heartless barbarit}^ until he was 
finally ejected by the great rising of 1916. Thor- 
oughly disappointed in this and many other directions 
the Southern Party was now emasculated; for the 
moneyed classes had withheld their support to the end, 
and without money nothing is possible in China. The 
1913 outbreak, after lasting a bare two months, igno- 
miniously collapsed with the flight of every one of the 
leaders on whose heads prices were put. The road was 
now left open for the last step Yuan Shih-kai had in 
mind, the coup against Parliament itself, which al- 
though unassociated in any direct way with the rising, 
had undoubtedly maintained secret relations with the 
rebellious gefierals in the field. - 

Parliament had further sinned by appointing a Spe- 
cial Constitutional Drafting Committee which had held 
its sittings behind closed doors at the Temple of Heaven. 
During this drafting of the Permanent Constitution, 
admittance had been absolutely refused to Yuan Shih- 
kai's delegates who had been sent to urge a modifica- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 55 

tion of the decentralization which had been such a char- 
acteristic of the Nanking Instrument. Such details as 
transpired showed that the principle of absolute money- 
control was not only to be the dominant note in the Per- 
manent Constitution, but that a new and startling in- 
novation was being included to secure that a de facto 
Dictatorship should be rendered impossible. Briefly, 
it was proposed that when Parliament was not actually 
in session there should be left in Peking a special Par- 
liamentary Committee, charged with supervising and 
controlling the Executive, and checking any usurpation 
of power. 

This was enough for Yuan Shih-kai: he felt that he 
was not only an object of general suspicion but that he 
was being treated with contempt. He determined to 
finish with it all. He was as yet, however, only pro- 
visional President and it was necessary to show cun- 
ning. Once more he set to work in a characteristic way. 
By a liberal use of money Parliament was induced to 
pass in advance of the main body of articles the Chap- 
ter of the Constitution dealing with the election and 
term of office of the President. When that had been 
done the two Chambers sitting as an Electoral College, 
after the model of the French Parliament, being partly 
bribed and partly terrorised by a military display, were 
induced to elect him full President. 

On the 10th October he took his final oath of office 
as President for a term of five years before a great 
gathering of officials and the whole dix3lomatic body in 
the magnificent Throne Room of the Winter Palace. 
Safe now in his Constitutional position nothing re- 
mained for him but to strike. On the 4th November 
he issued an arbitrary Mandate, which received the 



56 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

counter-signature of the whole Cabinet, ordering the 
unseating of all the so-called Kuomingtang or Radical 
Senators and Representatives on the counts of conspir- 
acy and secret complicity with the July rising and 
vaguely referring to the filling of the vacancies thus 
created by new elections/ The Metropolitan Police 
rigorously carried out the order and although no bru- 
tality was shown, it was made clear that if any of the 
indicted men remained in Peking their lives would be at 
stake. Having made it impossible for Parliament to 
sit owing to the lack of quorums. Yuan Shih-kai was 
able to proceed with his work of reorganization in the 
way that best suited him; and the novel spectacle was 
offered of a truly Mexican situation created in the Far 
East by and with the assent of the Powers. It is sig- 
nificant that the day succeeding this coup d'etat of the 
4th November the agreement conceding autonomy to 
Outer Mongolia was signed with Russia, China simply 
retaining the right to station a diplomatic representa- 
tive at Urga.^ 

In spite of his undisputed power, matters however 
did not improve. The police-control, judiciously min- 
gled with assassinations, which was now put in full 
vigour was hardly the administration to make room for 
which the Manchus had been expelled ; and the country 
secretly chafed and cursed. But the disillusionment of 
the people was complete. Revolt had been tried in 

1 According to the official lists published subsequent to the coup d'etat, 
98 Senators and 252 Members of the House of Representatives had their 
Parliamentary Certificates impounded by the police as a result of the 
Mandates of the 4th November, and were ordered to leave the Capital. In 
addition 34 Senators and 54 Members of the Lower House fled from 
Peking before their Certificates could be seized. Therefore the total num- 
ber affected by the proscription was 132 Senators and 306 Representatives. 
As the quorums in the case of both Houses are half the total membership, 
any further sittings were thus made impossible. 

2 A full copy of this agreement will be found in the appendix. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 57 

vain ; and as the support which the Powers were afford- 
ing to this regime was well understood there was nothing 
to do but to wait, safe in the knowledge that such a 
situation possessed no elements of permanency. 



CHAPTER IV 

THE DICTATOE AT WORK 

(from the coup d'etat of the 4th NOVEMBER, 1913, TO THE 

OUTBREAK OF THE WORLD-WAR IST AUGUST, 

1914) 

With the Parliament of China effective^ destroyed, 
and the turbulent Yangtsze Valley dragooned into sul- 
len submission, Yuan Shih-kai's task had become so 
vastly simplified that he held the moment to have arrived 
when he could openly turn his hand to the problem of 
making himself absolutely supreme, de jure as well as 
de facto. But there was one remaining thing to be 
done. To drive the last nail into the coffin of the Re- 
public it was necessary to discredit and virtually im- 
prison the man who was Vice-President. 

It is highly characteristic that although he had re- 
ceived from the hero of the Wuchang Rising the most 
loyal co-operation — a co-operation of a very arduous 
character since the Commander of the Middle Yangtsze 
had had to resist the most desperate attempts to force 
him over to the side of the rebellion in July, 1913, 
nevertheless, Yuan Shih-kai was determined to bring 
this man to Peking as a prisoner of state. 

It was just the fact that General Li Yuan-hung was 
a national hero which impelled the Dictator to action. 
In the election which had been carried out in October, 
1913, by the National Assembly sitting as a National 
Convention, in spite of every effort to destroy his influ- 

58 



' REPUBLIC IN CHINA 59 

ence, the personal popularity of the Vice-President had 
been such that he had received a large number of votes 
for the office of full President — which had necessitated 
not one but three ballots being taken, making most 
people declare that had there been no bribery or intimi- 
dation he would have probably been elected to the sU''2/^/iM^**j^^ 
"preme office in the land, and ousted the ambitious " 
usurper. In such circumstances his complete elimina- 
lion was deemed an elementary necessity. To secure 
that end Yuan Shih-kai suddenly dispatched to Wu- 
chang — where the Vice-President had resided without 
break since 1911 — the Minister of War, General Tuan 
Chi-jui, with implicit instructions to deal with the prob- 
lem in any way he deemed satisfactory, stopping short 
of nothing should his victim prove recalcitrant. 

Fortunately General Tuan Chi-jui did not belong to 
the ugly breed of men Yuan Shih-kai loved to sur- 
round himself with; and although he was a loyal and 
efficient officer the politics of the assassin were unknown 
to him. He was therefore able to convince the Vice- 
President after a brief discussion that the easiest way 
out of the ring of intriguers and plotters in which Yuan 
Shih-kai was rapidly surrounding him in Wuchang was 
to go voluntarily to the capital. There at least he would 
be in daily touch with developments and able to fight his 
own battles without fear of being stabbed in the back; 
since under the eye of the foreign Legations even Yuan 
Shih-kai was exhibiting a certain timidity. Indeed 
after the outcry which General Chang Cheng-wu's ju- 
dicial murder had aroused he had reserved his ugliest 
deeds for the provinces, only small men being done to 
death in Peking. Accordingly, General Li Yuan-hung 
packed a bag and accompanied only by an aide-de-camp 



60 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

left abruptly for the capital where he arrived on the 
11th December, 1913.,i 

A great sensation was caused throughout. China by 
this sudden departure, consternation prevailing among 
the officers and men of the Hupeh (Wuchang) army 
when the newspapers began to hint that their beloved 
chief had been virtually abducted. Although cordially 
received by Yuan Shih-kai and given as his personal res- 
idence the Island Palace where the unfortunate Em- 
peror Kwang Hsu had been so long imprisoned by the 
Empress Dowager Tsu Hsi after her coup d'etat of 
1898, it did not take long for General Li Yuan-hung 
to understand that his presence was a source of embar- 
rassment to the man who would be king. Being, how- 
ever, gifted with an astounding fund of patience, he 
prepared to sit down and allow the great game which 
he knew would now unroll to be played to its normal 
ending. What General Li Yuan-hung desired above 
all was to be forgotten completely and absolutely — 
springing to life when the hour of deliverance finally 
arrived. His policy was shown to be not only psycho- 
logically accurate, but masterly in a political sense. 
The greatest ally of honesty in China has always been 
time, the inherent decency of the race finally discredit- 
ing scoundrehsm in every period of Chinese history. 

The year 1914 dawned with so many obstacles re- 
moved that Yuan Shih-kai became more and more per- 
emptory in his methods. In February the young Em- 
press Lun Yi, widow of the Emperor Kwang Hsu, 
who two years previously in her character of guardian 
of the boy-Emperor Hsuan Tung, had been cajoled into 
sanctioning the Abdication Edicts, unexpectedly ex- 
pired, her death creating profound emotion because it 




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REPUBLIC IN CHINA 61 

snapped the last link with the past. Yuan Shih-kai's 
position was considerably strengthened by this auspi- 
cious event which secretly greatly delighted him; and 
by his order for three days the defunct Empress lay in 
State in the Grand Hall of the Winter Palace and 
received the obeisance of countless multitudes who ap- 
peared strangely moved by this hitherto unknown pro- 
cedure. There was now only a nine-year old boy 
between the Dictator and his highest ambitions. Two 
final problems still remained to be dealt with: to give 
a legal form to a purely autocratic rule, and to find 
money to govern the countiy. The second matter was 
vastly more important than the first to a man who did 
not hesitate to base his whole polity on the teachings of 
Machiavelli, legality being looked upon as only so much 
political window-dressing to placate foreign opinion and 
prevent intervention, whilst without money even the 
semblance of the rights of eminent domain could not 
be preserved. Everything indeed hinged on the ques- 
tion of finding money. 

There was none in China, at least none for the gov- 
ernment. Financial chaos still reigned supreme in spite 
of the great Reorganization Loan of £25,000,000, which 
had been carefully arranged more for the purpose of 
wiping-out international indebtedness and balancing the 
books of foreign bankers than to institute a modern 
government. All the available specie in the country 
had been very quietly remitted in these troubled times 
by the native merchant-guilds from every part of China 
to the vast emporium of Shanghai for safe custody, 
where a sum not far short of a hundred million ounces 
now choked the vaults of the foreign banks, — being safe 
from governmental expropriation. The collection of 



62 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

provincial revenues having been long disorganized, Yuan 
Shih-kai, in spite of his military dictatorship, found it 
impossible to secure the proper resumption of the pro- 
vincial remittances. Fresh loans became more and more 
sought after; by means of forced domestic issues a cer- 
tain amount of cash was obtained, but the country lived 
from hand to mouth and everybody was unhappy. 
Added to this by March the formidable insurrection of 
the "White Wolf" bandits in Central China — under the 
legendary leadership of a man who was said to be invul- 
nerable — necessitated the mobilization of a fresh army 
which ran into scores of battalions and which was vainly 
engaged for nearly half a year in rounding-up this 
replica of the Mexican Villa. So demoralized had the 
army become from long license that this guerilla war- 
fare was waged with all possible slackness until a chance 
shot mortally wounded the chief brigand and his im- 
mense following automatically dispersed. During six 
months these pests had ravaged three provinces and 
menaced one of the most strongly fortified cities in 
Asia — the old capital of China, Hsianfu, whither the 
Manchu Court had fled in 1900. 

Meanwhile wholesale executions were caiTied out in 
the provinces with monotonous regularity and all at- 
tempts at rising ruthlessly suppressed. In Peking the 
infamous Chih Fa Chu or Military Court — a sort of 
Chinese Star-Chamber — was continually engaged in 
summarily dispatching men suspected of conspli'ing 
against the Dictator. Even the printed word was 
looked upon as seditious, an unfortunate native editor 
being actually flogged to death in Hankow for telling 
the truth about conditions in the riverine districts. 
These cruelties made men more and more determined 



KEPUBLIC IN CHINA 63 

to pay off the score the very first moment that was 
possible. Although he v/as increasingly pressed for 
ready money, Yuan Shih-kai, by the end of April, 1914, 
had the situation sufficiently in hand to bring out his 
supreme surprise, — a brand-new Constitution promul- 
gated under the euphonious title of "The Constitutional 
Compact." 

This precious document, which had no more legality 
behind it as a governing instrument than a private letter, 
can be studied by the curious in the appendix where it 
is given in full: here it is sufficient to say that no such 
hocuspocus had ever been previously indulged in China. 
Drafted by an American legal adviser. Dr. Goodnow, 
who was later to earn unenviable international notoriety 
as the endorser of the monarchy scheme, it erected what 
it was pleased to call the Presidential System ; that is, it 
placed all pov/er directly in the hands of the President, 
giving him a single Secretary of State after the Ameri- 
can model and reducing Cabinet Ministers to mere De- 
partment Chiefs Vv^ho received their instructions from 
the State Department but had no real voice in the actual 
government. A new provincial system was likewise 
invented for the provinces, the Tutuhs or Governors of 
the Revolutionary period being turned into Chiang Chun 
or Military Officials on the Manchu model and provin- 
cial control absolutely centralized in their hands, whilst 
the Provincial Assemblies established under the former 
dynasty were summarily abolished. The worship at 
the Temple of Heaven was also re-established and so 
was the official worship of Confucius — both Imperial- 
istic measures — whilst a brand-new ceremony, the wor- 
ship of the two titulary Military Gods, was ordered so 
as to inculcate military virtue! It was laid down that 



64 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

in the worship of Heaven the President would wear the 
robes of the Dukes of the Chow dynasty, b. c. 1112, a 
novel and interesting republican experiment. Excerpts 
from two Mandates which belong to these days throw a 
flood of light on the kind of reasoning which was held 
to justify these developments. The first declares: 

. . . "In a Republic the Sovereign Power is vested in the 
people, and the main principle is that all things should be de- 
termined in accordance with the desires of the majority. These 
desires may be embraced by two words, namely, existence and 
happiness. I, the President, came from my farm because I 
was unable to bear the eternal sufferings of the innocent people. 
I assumed office and tried vainly to soothe the violent feelings. 
The greatest evil nowadays is the misunderstanding of true prin- 
ciples. The Republicans on the pretext of public interest try 
to attain selfish ends, some going so far as to consider the for- 
saking of parents as a sign of liberty and regarding the viola- 
tion of the laws as a demonstration of equality. I will cer- 
tainly do my best to change all this." 

In the second Mandate Yuan Shih-kai justifies the 
re-establishment of the Confucian worship in a singular 
way, incidentally showing how utterly incomprehensible 
to him is the idea of representative government, since he 
would appear to have imagined that by dispatching 
circular telegrams to the provincial capitals and receiv- 
ing affirmative replies from his creatures all that is 
necessary in the way of a national endorsement of high 
constitutional measures had been obtained. 

. . . ^'China's devotion to Confucius began with the reign of 
the Emperor Hsiaowu, of the Han d3masty, who rejected the 
works of the hundred authors, making the six Confucian classics 
the leading books. Confucius, born in the time of the tyranny 
of the nobility, in his works declared that after war disturb- 
ances comes peace, and with peace real tranquillity and hap- 



REPUBLIC IM CHINA 65 

piness. This, therefore, is the fountain of Republicanism. 
After studying the history of China and consulting the opinions 
of scholars, I find that Confucius must remain the teacher for 
thousands of generations. But in a Republic the people pos- 
sess sovereign power. Therefore circular telegrams were dis- 
patched to all the provinces to collect opinions, and many affir- 
mative answers have already been received. Therefore, all col- 
leges, schools, and public bodies are ordered to revive the sac- 
rificial ceremony of Confucius, which shall be carefully and 
minutely ordained" ... \ 

With the formal promulgation of the Constitutional 
Compact the situation had become bizarre in the ex- 
treme. Although even the child-mind might have 
known that powers for Constitution-making were vested 
solely in the National Assembly, and that the re-division 
of authority which was now made was wholly illegal, 
because Yuan Shih-kai as the bailiff of the Powers 
was able to do much as he pleased; and at a moment 
when Liberal Europe was on the eve of plunging into the 
most terrible war in history in defence of right against 
might, reaction and Prussianism of the most repulsive 
type were passed by unnoticed in China. , In a few 
loosely drafted chapters not only was the governance of 
the country rearranged to suit a purely dictational rule, 
but the actual Parliament was permanently extinguished 
and replaced by a single Legislative Chamber (Li Fa 
Yuan) which from its very composition could be nothing 
but a harmless debating Society with no greater signifi- 
cance than a dietine of one of the minor German States. 
Meanwhile, as there was no intention of allowing even 
this chamber to assemble until the last possible mo- 
ment, a Senate was got together as the organ of public 
opinion, ten Senators being chosen to draft yet another 
Constitution which would be the final one. Remark- 



66 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

able steps were taken a little later in the year (1914) 
to secure that the succession to the dictatorship should 
be left in Yuan Shih-kai's own hands. An elaborate 
ritual was contrived and officially promulgated under 
the title of the Presidential Succession Law on the 29th 
December whereby the Chief Executive selected three 
names which were placed in a gold box in a Stone 
House in the grounds of the Palace, — the gold box 
only to be opened when death or incapacity deprived 
the nation of its self-appointed leader. For the term 
of the presidency was openly converted into one of ten 
years and made subject to indefinite renewal by this 
precious instrument which was the work of the puppet 
senate. In case of the necessity of an election sud- 
denly arising, an Electoral College was to be formed by 
fifty members drawn from the Legislative Chamber and 
fifty from the Senate, the Presidential candidates con- 
sisting of the President (if he so desired) and the three 
whose names were in the gold box in the Stone House in 
the Palace grounds. It is not definitely known to whom 
these provisions were due, but it is known that at least 
they were not the work of the American adviser. 

His responsibility, however, was very great; for the 
keynote of all this scheme, according to Dr. Goodnow,^ 
was "centralization of power," a parrot-like phrase 
which has deluded better men than ever came to China 
and which — save as a method necessary during a state 
of war — should have no place in modern politics. But 
it was precisely this which appealed to Yuan Shih-kai. 
Although as President he was ex officio Commander-in- 

1 It is significant that Dr. Goodnow carried out all his Constitutional 
studies in Germany, specializing in that department known as Adminis- 
trative Law which has no place, fortunately, in Anglo-Saxon conceptions 
of the State. 




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REPUBLIC IN CHINA 67 

Chief of the Army and Navy, he now turned this office 
into a direct and special organization installed within 
the precincts of the Imperial City. The flags of this 
new dictatorship constantly floated over his palace, 
whilst scores of oflicers were appointed to scores of 
departments which were directly concerned with cen- 
tralizing the control of every armed man in the country 
in the master's hands. Meanwhile in order to placate 
provincial commanders, a "Palace of Generals," was 
created in Peking to which were brought aU men it was 
held desirable to emasculate. Here, drawing ample 
salaries, they could sit in idleness the livelong day, dis- 
cussing the battles they had never fought and intriguing 
against one another, two occupations in which the prod- 
uct of the older school of men in China excels. Provin- 
cial levies which had any military virtue, were gradually 
disbanded, though many of the rascals and rapscallions, 
who were open menaces to good government were left 
with arms in their hands so as to be an argument in 
favour of drastic police-rule. Thus it is significant of 
the underlying falseness and weakness of the dictator's 
character that he never dared to touch the troops of the 
reprobate General Chang Hsun, who had made trouble 
for years, and who had nearly embroiled China in war 
with Japan during the so-called Second Revoluti'on 
(July- August, 1913) by massacring some Japanese ci- 
vilians in the streets of Nanking when the city was re- 
captured. So far from disbanding his men, Chang 
Hsun managed constantly to increase his army of 30,000 
men on the plea that the post of Inspector-General of 
the Yangtsze Valley, which had been given to him as a 
reward for refusing to throw in his lot with the South- 
ern rebels, demanded larger forces. Yuan Shih-kai, 



68 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

although half -afraid of him, found him at various pe- 
riods useful as a counterweight to other generals in the 
provinces; in any case he was not the man to risk any- 
thing by attempting to crush him. As he was planted 
with his men astride of the strategically important 
Pukow railway, it was always possible to order him at a 
moment's notice into the Yangtsze Valley which was 
thus constantly under the menace of fire and sword. > 

Far and wide Yuan Shih-kai now stretched his nets. 
He even employed Americans throughout the United 
States in the capacity of press-agents in order to keep 
American public opinion favourable to him, hoping to 
invoke their assistance against his life-enemy — Japan — 
should that be necessary. The precise details of this 
propaganda and the sums spent in its prosecution are 
known to the writer ; if he refrains from publishing them 
it is solely for reasons of policy. England it was not 
necessary to deal with in this way. Chance had willed 
that the British Representative in Peking should be an 
old friend who had known the Dictator intimately since 
his Korean days ; and who faithful to the extraordinary 
English love of hero-worship believed that such a sur- 
prising character could do little wrong. British policy 
which has always been a somewhat variable quantity in 
China, owing to the spasmodic attention devoted to such 
a distant problem, may be said to have been non-existent 
during all this period — a state of affairs not conducive 
to international happiness. 

Slowly the problem developed in a shiftless, irresolute 
way. Unable to see that China had vastly changed, and 
that government by rascality had become a physical and 
moral impossibility, the Legations in Peking adopted an 
attitude of indifference leaving Yuan Shih-kai to wreak 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 69 

his will on the people. The horde of foreign advisers 
who had been appointed merely as a piece of political 
window-dressing, although they were allowed to do no 
work, were useful in running backwards and forwards 
between the Legations and the Presidential headquart- 
ers and in making each Power suppose that its influence 
was of increasing importance. It was made abund- 
antly clear that in Yuan Shih-kai's estimation the Lega- 
tions played in international politics much the same role 
that provincial capitals did in domestic politics : so long 
as you bound both to benevolent neutrality the main 
problem — the consolidation of dictatorial power — could 
be pushed on with as you wished. Money, however, re- 
mained utterly lacking and a new twenty-five million 
sterling loan was spoken of as inevitable — the accumu- 
lated deficit in 1914 being alone estimated at thirty-eight 
million pounds. But although this financial dearth was 
annoying, Chinese resources were sufficient to allow the 
account to be carried on from day to day. Some prog- 
ress was made in railways, building concessions being 
liberally granted to foreign corporations, this policy 
having received a great impetus from the manner in 
which Dr. Sun Yat Sen had boomed the necessity for 
better communications during the short time he had 
ruled at a National Bailway Bureau in Shanghai, an of- 
fice from which he had been relieved in 1913 on it being 
discovered that he was secretty indenting for quick-firing 
guns. Certain questions proved annoying and insol- 
uble, for instance the Tibetan question concerning which 
England was very resolute, as well as the perpetual 
risings in Inner Mongolia, a region so close to Peking 
that constant concentrations of troops were necessary. 
But on the whole as time went on there was increasing 



70 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

indifference both among the Foreign Powers and 
Chinese for the extraordinary state of affairs which had 
been allowed to grow up. 

There was one notable exception, however, Japan. 
Never relaxing her grip on a compHcated problem, 
watchful and active, where others were indifferent and 
slothful, Japan bided her time. Knowing that the hour 
had almost arrived when it would be possible to strike, 
Japan was vastly active behind the scenes in China long 
before the outbreak of the European war gave her the 
longed for opportunity; and largely because of her the 
pear, which seemed already almost ripe, finally withered 
on the tree, j? 



CHAPTER V 

THE FACTOE OF JAPAN 

(froai the outbreak of the world-war, 1st august, 1914, 
to the filing of the twenty-one demands, 

18th JANUARY, 1915) 

The thunderclap of the European war shattered the 
uneasy cahn in China, not because the Chinese knew 
anything of the mighty issues which were to be fought 
out with such desperation and valour, but because the 
presence of the German colony of Kiaochow on Chinese 
soil and the activity of German cruisers in the Yellow 
Sea brought the war to China's very doors. Vaguely 
conscious that this might spell disaster to his own am- 
bitious plans, Yuan Shih-kai was actually in the midst 
of tentative negotiations with the German Legation re- 
garding the retrocession of the Kiaochow territory when 
the news reached him that Japan, after some rapid 
negotiations with her British Ally, had filed an ulti- 
matum on Germany, peremptorily demanding the hand- 
ing-over of all those interests that had been forcibly 
acquired in Shantung province in the great leasing-year 
of 1898. 

At once Yuan Shih-kai realized that the Nemesis 
which had dogged his footsteps all his life was again 
close behind him. In the Japanese attack on Kiaochow 
he foresaw a web of complications which even his unriv- 
alled diplomacy might be unable to unravel ; for he knew 

well from bitter experience that wherever the Japanese 

71 



72 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

sets his foot there he remains. It is consequently round 
this single factor of Japan that the history of the two 
succeeding years revolves. From being indisputably 
the central figure on the Chinese canvas. Yuan Shih-kai 
suddenly becomes subordinate to the terror of Japan- 
ese intervention which hangs over him constantly like a 
black cloud, and governs every move he made from the 
15th August, 1914, to the day of his dramatic death on 
the 6th June, 1916. We shall attempt to write down 
the true explanation of why this should have been so. 

It is extremely hard to discuss the question of Japan 
for the benefit of an exclusively Western audience in 
a convincing way because Japanese policy has two dis- 
tinct facets which seem utterly contradictory, and yet 
which are in a great measure understandable if the ob- 
jects of that diplomacy are set down. Being endowed 
with an extraordinary capacity for taking detached 
views, the Statesmen of Tokio long ago discerned 
the necessity of having two independent policies — an 
Eastern policy for Eastern Asia and a Western policy 
for Western nations — because East and West are essen- 
tially antithetical, and cannot be treated (at least not 
yet) in precisely the same manner. Whilst the West- 
ern policy is frank and manly, and is exclusively in the 
hands of brilhant and attractive men who have been 
largely educated in the schools of Europe and America 
and who are fully able to deal with all matters in accord- 
ance with the customary traditions of diplomacy, the 
Eastern policy is the work of obscurantists whose imagi- 
nations are held by the vast projects which the Military 
Party believes are capable of realization in China. 
There is thus a constant contradiction in the attitude of 
Japan which men have sought in vain to reconcile. It is 



KEPUBLIC IN CHIlSrA 73 

for this reason that the outer world is divided into two 
schools of thought, one believing implicitly in Japan's 
bona fides, the other vulgarly covering her with abuse 
and declaring that she is the last of all nations in her 
conceptions of fair play and honourable treatment. 
Both views are far-fetched. It is as true of Japan as it 
is of every other Government in the world that her ac- 
tions are dictated neither by altiTiism nor by perfidy, 
but are merely the result of the faulty working of a 
number of falhble brains and as regards the work of ad- 
ministration in Japan itself the position is equally 
extraordinary. Here, at the extreme end of the world, 
so far from being in any way threatened, the principle of 
Divine Kight, which is being denounced and dismem- 
bered in Europe as a crude survival from almost heathen 
days, stands untouched and still exhibits itself in all its 
pristine glory. A highly aristocratic Court, possessing 
one of the most complicated and jealously protected 
hierarchies in the world, and presided over by a monarch 
claiming direct descent from the sacred Jimmu Tenno 
of twenty-five hundred years ago, decrees to-day pre- 
cisely as before, the elaborate ritual governing every 
move, every decision and every agreement. There is 
something so engaging in this political curiosity, some- 
thing so far removed from the vast world-movement 
now rolling fiercely to its conclusion, that we may be 
pardoned for interpolating certain capital considera- 
tions which closely affect the future of China and there- 
fore cannot fail to be of public interest. 

The Japanese, who owe their whole theocratic con- 
ception to the Chinese, just as they owe all their letters 
and their learning to them, still nominally look upon 
their ruler as the link between Heaven and Earth, and 



74 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

the central fact dominating their cosmogony. Al- 
though the vast number of well-educated men who 
to-day crowd the cities of Japan are fully conscious of 
the bizarre nature of this belief in an age which has 
turned its back on superstition, nothing has yet been 
done to modify it because — and this is the important 
point — the structure of Japanese society is such that 
without a violent upheaval which shall hurl the military 
clan system irremediably to the ground, it is absolutely 
impossible for human equality to be admitted and the 
man-god theory to be destroyed. So long as these 
two features exist; that is so long as a privileged mili- 
tary caste supports and attempts to make all-powerful 
the man-god theory, so long will Japan be an inter- 
national danger-spot because there will lack those demo- 
cratic restraints which this war has shown are absolutely 
essential to secure a peaceful understanding among the 
nations. It is for this reason that Japan will fail to 
attain the position the art-genius and industry of her 
people entitle her to and must limp behind the progress 
of the world unless a very radical revision of the consti- 
tution is achieved. The disabilities which arise from an 
archaic survival are so great that they will affect China 
as adversely as Japan, and therefore should be uni- 
versally understood. 

Japanese history, if stripped of its superficial aspects, 
has a certain remarkable quality; it seems steeped in 
heroic blood. The doctrine of force, which expresses 
itself in its crudest forms in Europe, has always been 
in Japan a system of heroic-action so fascinating to 
humanity at large that until recent times its interna- 
tional significance has not been realized. The feudal 
organization of Japanese society which arose as a result 




A 11.1.AGE MUMMKKS. K_LABOKATJK FESTIVALS OcCUK IN ChINA 

IX Spring and Autumn to Celebrate the Fruitfulness 
OF the Earth, Every Temple and Every Village Hav- 
ing Its Own Celebration 




Toilers of the Plain. Country Produce Being Hauled 

TO the City . 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 75 

of the armed conquest of the islands fifteen hundred 
years ago, precluded centralizating measures being 
taken because the Throne, relying on the virtues of 
Divine Ancestors rather than on any well-articulated 
poHtical theory, was weak in all except certain quasi- 
sacerdotal qualities, and forced to rely on great chief- 
tains for the execution of its mandates as well as for its 
defence. The military title of "barbarian-conquering 
general," which was first conferred on a great clan leader 
eight centuries ago, was a natural enough development 
when we remember that the autochthonous races were 
even then not yet pushed out of the main island, and 
were still battling with the advancing tide of Japanese 
civilization which was itself composed of several rival 
streams coming from the Asiatic mainland and from the 
Malayan archipelagoes. This armed settlement satur- 
ates Japanese history and is responsible for the unend- 
ing local wars and the glorification of the warrior. The 
conception of triumphant generalship which Hideyoshi 
attempted unsuccessfully to cany into Korea in the 
Sixteenth Century, led directly at the beginning of the 
Seventeenth Century to the formal establishment of the 
Shogunate, that military dictatorship being the result of 
the backwash of the Korean adventure, and the greatest 
proof of the disturbance which it had brought in Japan- 
ese society. The persistence of this hereditary military 
dictatorship for more than two and a half centuries is a 
remarkable illustration of the fact that as in China so in 
Japan the theocratic conception was unworkable save in 
primitive times — civilization demanding organization 
rather than precepts and refusing to bow its head to 
speechless kings. Although the Restoration of 1868 
nominally gave back to the Throne all it had been forced 



76 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to leave in other hands since 1603, that transfer of 
power was imaginary rather than real, the new military 
organization which succeeded the Shogun's government 
being the vital portion of the Restoration. In other 
words, it was the leaders of Japan's conscript armies 
who inherited the real power, a fact made amply evi- 
dent by the crushing of the Satsuma Rebellion by these 
new corps whose organization allowed them to over- 
throw the proudest and most valourous of the Samurai 
and incidentally to proclaim the triumph of modern 
fire-arms. 

Now it is important to note that as early as 1874 — ^ 
that is six years after the Restoration of the Emperor 
Meiji — these facts were attracting the widest notice in 
Japanese society, the agitation for a Constitution and a 
popular assembly being veiy vigourously pushed. Led 
by the well-known and aristocratic Itagaki, Japanese 
Liberalism had joined battle with out-and-out Imperial- 
ism more than a quarter of a century ago ; and although 
the question of recovering Tariff and Judicial autonomy 
and revising the Foreign Treaties was more urgent in 
those days, the foreign question was often pushed aside 
by the fierceness of the constitutional agitation. 

It was not, however, until 1889 that a Constitution 
was finally granted to the Japanese — that instrument 
being a gift from the Crown, and nothing more than a 
conditional warrant to a limited number of men to be- 
come witnesses of the processes of government but in no 
sense its controllers. The very fii'st Diet summoned in 
1890 was sufficient proof of that. A collision at once 
occurred over questions of finance which resulted in the 
resignation of the Ministry. And ever since those days, 
that is for twenty-seven consecutive years, successive 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 77 

Diets in Japan have been fighting a forlorn fight for the 
power which can never be theirs save by revolution, it 
being only natural that Socialism should come to be 
looked upon by the governing class as Nihilism, whilst 
the mob-threat has been very acute ever since the Tokio 
peace riots of 1905. 

Now it is characteristic of the ceremonial respect 
which all Japanese have for the Throne that all through 
this long contest the main issue should have been pur- 
posely obscured. The traditional feelings of veneration 
which a loyal and obedient people feel for a line of 
monarchs, whose origin is lost in the mists of antiquity, 
are such that they have turned what is in effect an ever- 
growing struggle against the archaic principle of divine 
right into a contest with clan-leaders whom they assert 
are acting "unconstitutionally" whenever they choose 
to assert the undeniable principles of the Constitution. 
Thus to-day we have this paradoxical situation: that 
although Japanese Liberalism must from its very es- 
sence be revolutionary, i.e., destructive before it can 
hope to be constnictive, it feigns blindness, hoping that 
by suasion rather than by force the principle of parlia- 
mentary government will somehow be grafted on to the 
body politic and the emperors, being left outside the 
controversy, become content to accept a greatly mod- 
ified rule. 

This hope seems a vain one in the light of all history. 
Mihtarism and the clans are by no means in the last 
ditch in Japan, and they will no more surrender their 
power than would the Russian bureaucracy. The only 
argument which is convincing in such a case is the last 
one which is ever used; and the mere mention of it by 
so-called socialists is sufficient to cause summary arrest 



78 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

in Japan. Sheltering themselves behind the Throne, 
and nominally deriving their latter-day dictatorship 
from the Imperial mandate, the mihtary chiefs remain 
adamant, nothing having yet occurred to incline them 
to surrender any of their privileges. By a process of 
adaptation to present-day conditions, a formula has now 
been discovered which it is hoped will serve many a long 
year. By securing by extra-legal means the return of a 
"majority" in the House of Representatives the fiction 
of national support of the autocracy has been re-invig- 
ourated, and the doctrine laid down that what is good 
for every other advanced people in the world is bad for 
the Japanese, who must be content with what is granted 
them and never question the superior intelligence of a 
privileged caste. In the opinion of the writer, it is 
every whit as important for the peace of the world that 
the people of Japan should govern themselves as it is 
for the people of Germany to do so. The persistence of 
the type of military government which we see to-day in 
Japan is harmful for all alike because it is as antiquated 
as Tsarism and a perpetual menace to a disarmed nation 
such as China. So long as that government remains, so 
long must Japan remain an international suspect and 
be denied equal rights in the council-chambers of the 
Liberal Powers. 

If the situation which arose on the 15th August, 1914, 
is to be thoroughly understood, it is necessary to pick 
up threads of Chino-Japanese relations from a good 
many years back. First-hand familiarity with the ac- 
tors and the scenes of at least three decades is essential 
to give the picture the completeness, the brilliancy of 
colouring, and withal the suggestiveness inseparable 
from all true works of art. For the Chino-Japanese 



KEPUBLIC IN CHINA 79 

question is primarily a work of art and not merely a 
piece of jejune diplomacy stretched across the years. 
As the shuttle of Fate has been cast swiftly backwards 
and forwards, the threads of these entwining relations 
have been woven into patterns involving the whole Far 
East, until to-day we have as it were a complete Gobelin 
tapestry, magnificent with meaning, replete with action, 
and full of scholastic interest. 

Let us follow some of the tracery. It has long been 
the habit to affirm that the conflict between China and 
Japan had its origin in Korea, when Korea was a vassal 
state acknowledging the suzerainty of Peking; and that 
the conflict merited ending there, since of the two pro- 
tagonists contending for empire Japan was left in undis- 
puted mastery. This statement, being incomplete, is 
dangerously false. Dating from that vital period of 
thirty years ago, when Yuan Shih-kai first went to Seoul 
as a general officer in the train of the Chinese Imperial 
Resident (on China being forced to take action in pro- 
tection of her interests owing to the "opening" of Korea 
by the American Treaty of 1882) three contestants, 
equally interested in the balance of land-power in East- 
ern Asia were constantly pitted against one another 
with Korea as their common battling-ground — Russia, 
China and Japan. The struggle, which ended in the 
eclipse of the first two, merely shifted the venue from 
the Korean zone to the Manchurian zone; and from 
thence gradually extended it further and further afield 
until at last not only was Inner Mongolia and the vast 
belt of country fronting the Great Wall embraced within 
its scope, but the entire aspect of China itself was 
changed. For these important facts have to be noted. 
Until the Russian war of 1904<-05 had demonstrated 



80 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the utter valuelessness of Tsarism as an interna- 
tional military factor, Japan had been almost willing 
to resign herself to a subordinate role in the Far East. 
Having eaten bitter bread as the result of her premature 
attempt in 1895 (after the Korean war) to becoi^e a 
continental power — an attempt which had resulted in 
the forced retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula — she 
had been placed on her good behaviour, an attitude 
which was admirably reflected in 1900 when her Peking 
Expeditionary Force proved itself so well-behaved and 
so gallant as to arouse the world's admiration. But the 
war with Russia and the collapse of the Tsar's Man- 
churian adventure not only drew her back into territory 
that she never hoped to see again, but placed her in 
possession of a ready-made railway system which car- 
ried her ahnost up to the Sungari river and surrendered 
to her military control vast grasslands stretching to the 
Khingan mountains. This Westernly march so greatly 
enlarged the Japanese political horizon, and so entirely 
changed the Japanese viewpoint, that the statesmen of 
Tokio in their excitement threw off their ancient spec- 
tacles and found to their astonishment that their eyes 
were every whit as good as European eyes. Now see- 
ing the world as others had long seen it, they understood 
that just as with the individuals so with nations the 
struggle for existence can most easily be conducted by 
adopting that war-principle of Clausewitz — the restless 
offensive, and not by writing meaningless dispatches. 
Prior to the Russian war they had written to Russia a 
magnificent series of documents in which they had 
pleaded with sincerity for an equitable settlement, — 
only to find that all was in vain. Forced to battle, they 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 81 

had found in combat not only success but a new prin- 
ciple. 

The discovery necessitated a new policy. During the 
eighties, and in a lesser degree in the nineties, Japan had 
apart from everything else been content to act in a 
modest and retiring way, because she wished at all costs 
to avoid testing too severely her immature strength. 
But owing to the successive collapses of her rivals, she 
now found herself not only forced to attack as the 
safest course of action, but driven to the view that the 
Power that exerts the maximum pressure constantly 
and unremittedly is inevitably the most successful. 
This conclusion had great importance. For just as 
the first article of faith for England in Asia has been 
the doctrine that no Power can be permitted to seize 
strategic harbours which menace her sea-communica- 
tions, so did it now become equally true of Japan 
that her dominant policy became not an Eastern Monroe 
doctrine, as shallow men have supposed, but simply the 
Doctrine of Maximum Pressure. To press with all her 
strength on China was henceforth considered vital by 
every Japanese ; and it is in this spirit that every diplo- 
matic pattern has been woven since the die was cast in 
1905. Until this signal fact has been grasped no useful 
analysis can be made of the evolution of present condi- 
tions. Standing behind this policy, and constantly re- 
inforcing it, are the serried ranks of the new democracy 
which education and the great increase in material 
prosperity have been so rapidly creating. The soaring 
ambition which springs from the sea lends to the attacks 
developed by such a people the aspect of piracies; and 
it is but natural in such circumstances that for Chinese 



82 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Japan should not only have the aspect of a sea-monster 
but that their country should appear as hapless Andro- 
meda bound to a rock, always awaiting a Perseus who 
never comes. . . . 

The Revolution of 1911 had been entirely unexpected 
in Japan. Whilst large outbreaks had been certainly 
counted on since the Chinese Revolutionary party had 
for years used Japan as an asylum and a base of opera- 
tions, never had it been anticipated that the fall of an 
ancient Dynasty could be so easily encompassed. Con- 
sequently, the abdication of the Manchus as the result of 
intrigues rather than of warfare was looked upon as 
little short of a catastrophe because it hopelessly compli- 
cated the outlook, broke the pattern which had been so 
carefully woven for so many years, and interjected harsh 
elements which could not be assigned an orderly place. 
Not only was a well-articulated State-system suddenly 
consigned to the flames, but the ruin threatened to be so 
general that the balance of power throughout the Far 
East would be twisted out of shape. Japanese states- 
men had desired a weak China, a China which would 
ultimately turn to them for assistance because they were 
a kindred race, but not a China that looked to the French 
Revolution for its inspiration. To a people as slow to 
adjust themselves to violent surprises as are the Japan- 
ese, there was an air of desperation about the whole 
business which greatly alarmed them, and made them 
determined at the earliest possible moment to throw 
every ounce of their weight in the direction which would 
best serve them by bringing matters back to their orig- 
inal starting-point. For this reason they were not only 
prepared in theory in 1911 to lend armed assistance to 
the Manchus but would have speedily done so had not 



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"viAXCHi' \V():max Gkixdixc; Gkaix 




SiLK-REELlXG DoXE IX THE OpEX UxDER THE WaLLS OF 

Pekixg 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 83 

England strongly dissented from such a course of action 
when she was privately sounded about the matter. 
Even to-day, when a temporary adjustment of Japan- 
ese policy has been successfully arranged, it is of the 
highest importance for political students to remember 
that the dynastic influences in Tokio have never de- 
parted from the view that the legitimate sovereignty of 
China remains vested in the Manchu House and that 
everything that has taken place since 1911 is irregular 
and unconstitutional. 

For the time being, however, two dissimilar circum- 
stances demanded caution: first, the enthusiasm which 
the Japanese democracy, fed by a highly excited press, 
exhibited towards the Young China which had been so 
largely grounded in the Tokio schools and which had 
carried out the Revolution : secondly — and far more im- 
portant — the deep, abiding and ineradicable animosity 
which Japanese of all classes felt for the man who had 
come out of the contest head and shoulders above every- 
body else — Yuan Shih-kai. These two remarkable fea- 
tures ended by completely thrusting into the back- 
ground during the period 1911-1914 every other element 
in Japanese statesmanship; and of the two the second 
must be counted the decisive one. Dating back to 
Korea, when Yuan Shih-kai's extraordinary diplomatic 
talents constantly allowed him to worst his Japanese 
rivals and to make Chinese counsels supreme at the 
Korean Court up to the very moment when the first 
shots of the war of 1894 were fired, this ancient dislike, 
which amounted to a consuming hatred, had become a 
fixed idea. Restrained by the world's opinion during 
the period prior to the outbreak of the world-war as 
well as by the necessity of acting financially in concert 



84 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

with the other Powers, it was not until August, 1914, 
that the longed-for opportunity came and that Japan 
prepared to act in a most remarkable way. 

The campaign against Kiaochow was unpopular from 
the outset among the Japanese public because it was 
felt that they were not legitimately called upon to inter- 
est themselves in such a remote question as the balance 
of power among European nations, which was what 
British warfare against Germany seemed to them to 
be. Though some ill-will was felt against Germany for 
the part played by her in the intervention of 1895, it 
must not be forgotten that just as the Japanese navy is 
the child of the British navy, so is the Japanese army 
the child of the German army — and that Japanese 
army chiefs largely control Japan. These men were 
averse from "spoiling their army" in a contest which did 
not interest them. There was also the feeling abroad 
that England by calling upon her Ally to carry out the 
essential provisions of her Alliance had shown that she 
had the better part of a bargain, and that she was ex- 
ploiting an old advantage in a way which could not fail 
to react adversely on Japan's future world's relation- 
ships. Furthermore, it is necessary to underline the 
fact that official Japan was displeased by the tacit sup- 
port an uninterested British Foreign Office had con- 
sistently given to the Yuan Shih-kai regime. That the 
Chinese experiment was looked upon in England more 
with amusement than with concern irritated the Japan- 
ese — more particularly as the British Foreign Office 
was issuing in the form of White Papers documents 
covering Yuan Shih-kai's public declarations as if they 
were contributions to contemporary history. Thus in 
the preceding year (1913) under the nomenclature of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 85 

"affairs in China" the text of a dementi regarding the 
President of China's Imperial aspirations had been pub- 
lished, — a document which Japanese had classified as a 
studied lie, and as an act of presumption because its 
wording showed that its author intended to keep his 
back turned on Japan. The Dictator had declared: — 

. . . "From my student days, I, Yuan Shih-kai, have ad- 
mired the example of the Emperors Yao and Shun, who treated 
the empire as a public trust, and considered that the record of 
a dynasty in history for good or ill is inseparably bound up 
with the public spirit or self-seeking by which it has been ani- 
mated. On attaining middle age I grew more familiar with for- 
eign affairs, was struck by the admirable repubHcan system in 
France and America, and felt that they were a true embodiment 
of the democratic precepts of the ancients. When last year 
the patriotic crusade started in Wuchang its echoes went forth 
into all the provinces, with the result that this ancient nation 
with its 2,000 years of despotism adopted with one bound the 
republican system of government. 

It was my good fortune to see this glorious day at my life's 
late eve ; I cherished the hope that I might dwell in the seclusion 
of my own home and participate in the blessings of an age of 
peace. 

But once again my fellow-countrymen honoured me with the 
pressing request that I should again assume a heavy burden, 
and on the day on which the Repubhc was proclaimed I an- 
nounced it the whole nation that never again should a mon- 
archy be permitted in China. At my inauguration I again 
took this solemn oath in the sight of heaven above and earth 
beneath. Yet of late ignorant persons in the provinces have 
fabricated wild rumours to delude men's minds, and have ad- 
duced the career of the First Napoleon on which to base their 
erroneous speculations. It is best not to inquire as to their 
motives ; in some cases misconception may be the cause, in 
others deliberate malice. 

The Republic has now been proclaimed for six months ; so 
far there is no prospect of recognition from the Powers, while 



86 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

order is far from being restored in the provinces. Our fate 
hangs upon a hair ; the slightest negligence may forfeit all. I, 
who bear this arduous responsibility, feel it my bounden duty 
to stand at the helm in the hope of successfully breasting the 
wild waves. 

But while those in office are striving with all their might to 
effect a satisfactory solution, spectators seem to find a diffi- 
culty in maintaining a generous forbearance. They forget 
that I, who have received this charge from my countrymen, 
cannot possibly look dispassionately on when the fate of the 
nation is in the balance. If I were aware that the task was 
impossible and played a part of easy acquiescence, so that the 
future of the Republic might become irreparable, others might 
not reproach me, but my own conscience would never leave me 
alone. 

My thoughts are manifest in the sight of high heaven. But 
at this season of construction and dire crisis how shall these 
mutual suspicions find a place? Once more I issue this an- 
nouncement ; if you, my fellow countrymen, do indeed place the 
safety of China before all other considerations, it behooves you 
to be large-minded. Beware of lightly heeding the plausible 
voice of calumny, and of thus furnishing a medium for foster- 
ing anarchy. If evilly disposed persons, who are bent on de- 
struction, seize the excuse for sowing dissension to the jeopardy 
of the situation, I, Yuan Shih-kai, shall follow the behest of 
my fellow-countrymen in placing such men beyond the pale of 
humanity. 

A vital Issue is involved. It is my duty to lay before you 
my inmost thought, so that suspicion may be dissipated. Those 
who know have the right to impose their censure. It is for pub- 
lic opinion to take due notice." 

Moreover Yuan Shih-kai had also shown in his selec- 
tion and use of foreign Advisers, that he was determined 
to proceed in such a manner as to advertise his suspicion 
and enmity of Japan. After the Coup d'etat of the 4th 
November, 1913, and the scattering of Parliament, it 
was an American Adviser who was set to work on the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 87 

new "Constitution"; and although a Japanese, Dr. 
Ariga, who was in receipt of a princely salary, aided and 
abetted this work, his endorsement of the dictatorial 
rule was looked upon as traitorous by the bulk of his 
countrymen. Similarly, it was perfectly well-known 
that Yuan Shih-kai was spending large sums of money 
in Tokio in bribing certain organs of the Japanese Press 
and in attempting to win adherents among Japanese 
members of Parliament. Remarkable stories are cur- 
rent which compromise very highly -placed Japanese but 
which the writer hesitates to set down in black and white 
as documentary proof is not available. In any case, be 
this as it may, it was felt in Tokio that the time had ar- 
rived to give a proper definition to the relations between 
the two states, — the more so as Yuan Shih-kai, by pub- 
licly proclaiming a small war-zone in Shantung within 
the limits of which the Japanese were alone permitted 
to wage war against the Germans, had shown himself 
indifferent to the majesty of Japan. The Japanese 
having captured Kiaochow by assault before the end of 
1914 decided to accept the view that a de facto Dictator- 
ship existed in China. Therefore on the 18th of Janu- 
ary, 1915, the Japanese Minister, Dr. Hioki, person- 
ally served on Yuan Shih-kai the now famous Twenty- 
one Demands, a list designed to satisfy every present 
and future need of Japanese policy and to reduce China 
to a state of vassalage. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 

Although the press of the world gave a certain promi- 
nence at the time to the astounding demarche with which 
we now have to deal, there was such persistent mystery 
about the matter and so many official dementis accom- 
panied every publication of the facts that even to this 
day the nature of the assault which Japan delivered on 
China is not adequately realized, nor is the narrow escape 
assigned its proper place in estimates of the future. 
Briefly, had there not been pubhcation of the facts and 
had not British diplomacy been aroused to action there 
is little doubt that Japan would have forced matters 
so far that Chinese independence would now be vir- 
tually a thing of the past. Fortunately, however, 
China in her hour of need found many who were willing 
to succour her; with the result that although she lost 
something in these negotiations, Japan nevertheless 
failed in a very signal fashion to attain her main objec- 
tive. The Pyrrhic victory which she won with her 
eleventh hour ultimatum will indeed in the end cost her 
more than would have a complete failure, for Chinese 
suspicion and hostility are now so deep-seated that 
nothing will ever completely eradicate them. It is 
therefore only proper that an accurate record should 
be here incorporated of a chapter of history which has 
much international importance; and if we invite close 
attention to the mass of documents that follow it is 
because we hold that an adequate comprehension of 

88 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 89 

them is essential to securing the future peace of the 
Far East. Let us first give the official text of the ori- 
ginal Demands : 

y-- japan's originax. twenty-one demands *|. a< '*^. 

Translations of Documents Handed to the President, Yuan- 
shih-kai, by Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, on January 18th, 
1915. 

GROUP I 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government being 
desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and 
further strengthening the friendly relations and good neigh- 
bourhood existing between the two nations agree to the follow- 
ing articles : — 

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full 
assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government 
may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to 
the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which 
Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in rela- 
tion to the Province of Shantung. 

Article 2. The Chinese Government engages that within the 
Province of Shantung and along its coast no territory or 
island will be ceded or leased to a third Power under any pre- 
text. 

Article 8. The Chinese Government consents to Japan's 
building a railway from Chefoo or Lungkow to join the Kiao- 
chou-Tsinanfu railway. 

Article 4?. The Chinese Government engages, in the inter- 
est of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by her- 
self as soon as possible certain important cities and towns in 
the Province of Shantung as Commercial Ports. What places 
shall be opened are to be jointly decided upon in a separate 
agreement. 

GROUP n 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, since 
the Chinese Government has always acknowledged the special 



90 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria, and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia, agree to the following articles : — 

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that 
the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the term 
of lease of the South Manchurian Railway and the Antung- 
Mukden Railway shall be extended to the period of 99 
years. 

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria and Eas- 
tern Inner Mongolia shall have the right to lease or own land 
required either for erecting suitable buildings for trade and 
manufacture or for farming. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and 
travel in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia and 
to engage in business and in manufacture of any kind whatso- 
ever. 

Article 4. The Chinese Government agrees to grant to Jap- 
anese subjects the right of opening the mines in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia. As regards what mines 
are to be opened, they shall be decided upon jointly. 

Article S. The Chinese Government agrees that in respect 
of the (two) cases mentioned herein below the Japanese Gov- 
ernment's consent shall be first obtained before action is 
taken : — 

(a) Whenever permission is granted to the subject of a 
third Power to build a railway or to make a loan with a third 
Power for the purpose of building a railway in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia. 

(b) Whenever a loan is to be made with a third Power 
pledging the local taxes of South Manchuria and Eastern Inner 
Mongolia as security. 

Article 6. The Chinese Government agrees that if the Chi- 
nese Government employs political, financial or military advisers 
or instructors in South Manchuria or Eastern Inner Mongolia, 
the Japanese Government shall first be consulted. 

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees that the control 
and management of the Kirin-Changchun Railway shall be 
handed over to the Japanese Government for a term of 99 years 
dating from the signing of this Agreement. 






REPUBLIC IN CHINA 91 



GROUP UI 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, see- 
ing that Japanese financiers and the Hanyehping Co. have 
close relations with each other at present and desiring that the 
common interests of the two nations shall be advanced, agree to 
the following articles : — 

Article 1. The two Contracting Parties mutually agree that 
when the opportune moment arrives the Hanyehping Company 
shall be made a joint concern of the two nations and they fur- 
ther agree that without the previous consent of Japan, China 
shall not by her own act dispose of the rights and property of 
whatsoever nature of the said Company nor cause the said Com- 
pany to dispose freely of the same. 

Article 2. The Chinese Government agrees that all mines in 
the neighbourhood of those owned by the Hanyehping Company 
shall not be permitted, without the consent of the said Com- 
pany, to be worked by other persons outside of the said Com- 
pany ; and further agrees that if it is desired to carry out any 
undertaking which, it is apprehended, may directly or indi- 
rectly affect the interests of the said Company, the consent of 
the said Company shall first be obtained. 

GROUP IV 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government with 
the object of effectively preserving the territorial integrity of 
China agree to the following special articles: — 

The Chinese Government engages not to cede or lease to a 
third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of 
China. 

GROUP V 

Article 1. The Chinese Central Government shall employ in- 
fluential Japanese advisers in political, financial and military 
affairs. 

Article 2. Japanese hospitals, churches and schools in the 
interior of China shall be granted the right of owning land. 

Article 3. Inasmuch as the Japanese Government and the 
Chinese Government have had many cases of dispute between 



92 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Japanese and Chinese police to settle cases which caused no 
little misunderstanding, it is for this reason necessary that the 
police departments of important places (in China) shall be 
jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese or that the police 
departments of these places shall employ numerous Japanese, 
so that they may at the same time help to plan for the improve- 
ment of the Chinese Police Service. 

Article 4. China shall purchase from Japan a fixed amount 
of munitions of war (say 50^ or more) of what is needed by 
the Chinese Government or that there shall be established in 
China a Sino- Japanese jointly worked arsenal. Japanese 
technical experts are to be employed and Japanese material to 
be purchased. 

Article 5. China agrees to grant to Japan the right of con- 
structing a railway connecting Wuchang with Kiukiang and 
Nanchang, another line between Nanchang and Hanchow, and 
another between Nanchang and Chaochou. 

Article 6. If China needs foreign capital to work mines, 
build railways and construct harbour-works (including dock- 
yards) in the Provinces of Fukien, Japan sl;iall be first con- 
sulted. 

Article 7. China agrees that Japanese subjects shall have 
the right of missionary propaganda in China.^ 

The five groups into which the Japanese divided their 
demands possess a remarkable interest not because of 
their sequence, or the style of their phraseology, but 
because every v^ord reveals a peculiar and very illumi- 
nating chemistry of the soul. To study the original 
Chinese text is to pass as it v^ere into the secret recesses 
of the Japanese brain, and to find in that darkened 
chamber a whole world of things which advertise ambi- 
tions mixed with limitations, hesitations overwhelmed 
by audacities, greatnesses succumbing to littlenesses, and 
vanities having the appearance of velleities. Given an 
intimate knowledge of Far Eastern politics and Far 

1 Refers to preaching Buddhism. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 93 

Eastern languages, only a few minutes are required to 
re-write the demands in the sequence in which they were 
originally conceived as well as to trace the natural his- 
tory of their genesis. Unfortunately a great deal is lost 
in their official translation, and the menace revealed in 
the Chinese original partly cloaked : for by transferring 
Eastern thoughts into Western moulds, things that are 
like nails in the hands of soft sensitive Oriental beings 
are made to appear to the steel-clad West as cold- 
blooded, evolutionary necessities which may be repellent 
but which are never cruel. The more the matter is 
studied the more convinced must the political student be 
that in this affair of the 18th January we have an inter- 
national coup destined to become classic in the new 
text-books of political science. All the way through the 
twenty-one articles it is easy to see the desire for action, 
the love of accomplished facts, struggling with the 
necessity to observe the conventions of a stereotyped 
diplomacy and often overwhelming those conventions. 
As the thoughts thicken and the plot develops, the effort 
to mask the real intention lying behind every word 
plainly breaks down, and a growing exultation rings 
louder and louder as if the coveted Chinese prize were 
already firmly grasped. One sees as it were the Japan- 
ese nation, released from bondage imposed by the Trea- 
ties which have been binding on all nations since 1860, 
swarming madly through the breached walls of ancient 
Cathay and disputing hotly the spoils of age-old do- 
mains. 

Group I, which deals with the fruits of victory in 
Shantung, has little to detain us since events which have 
just unrolled there have already told the story of those 
demands. In Shantung we have a simple and easily- 



94 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

understood repeated performance of the history of 1905 
and the settlement of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Placed at the very head of the list of demands, though 
its legitimate position should be after Manchuria, obvi- 
ously the purpose of Group I is conspicuously to call 
attention to the fact that Japan had been at war with 
Germany, and is still at war with her. This flourish of 
trumpets, after the battle is over, however, scarcely 
serves to disguise that the fate of Shantung, following 
so hard on the heels of the Hussian debacle in Manchuria, 
is the great moral which Western peoples are called 
upon to note. Japan, determined as she has repeatedly 
announced to preserve the peace of the Orient by any 
means she deems necessary, has found the one and only 
formula that is satisfactory — that of methodically an- 
nexing everything worth fighting about. 

So far so good. The insertion of a special preamble 
to Group II, which covers not only South Manchuria 
but Eastern Inner Mongolia as well, is an ingenious 
piece of work since it shows that the hot mood of con- 
quest suitable for Shantung must be exchanged for a 
certain judicial detachment. The preamble undoubt- 
edly betrays the guiding hand of Viscount Kato, the 
then astute Minister of Foreign Affairs, who saturated 
in the great series of international undertakings made 
by Japan since the first Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902, 
clearly believes that the stately Elizabethan manner 
which still characterizes British official phrasing is an 
admirable method to be here employed. The preamble 
is quite English ; it is so English that one is almost lulled 
into believing that one's previous reasoning has been at 
fault and that Japan is only demanding what she is 
entitled to. Yet study Group II closely and subtleties 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 95 

gradually emerge. By boldly and categorically placing 
Eastern Inner Mongolia on precisely the same footing 
as Southern Manchuria — though they have nothing in 
common — the assumption is made that the collapse in 
1908 of the great Anglo-American scheme to run a 
neutral railway up the flank of Southern Manchuria to 
Northern Manchuria (the once celebrated Chinchow- 
Aigun scheme), coupled with general agreement with 
Russia which was then arrived at, now impose upon 
China the necessity of publicly resigning herself to a 
Japanese overlordship of that region. In other words, 
the preamble of Group II lays down that Eastern Inner 
Mongolia has become part and parcel of the Manchu- 
rian Question because Japan has found a parallel for 
what she is doing in the acts of European Powers. 

These things, however, need not detain us. Not that 
Manchuria or the adjoining Mongolian plain is not im- 
portant ; not that the threads of destiny are not woven 
thickly there. For it is certain that the vast region 
immediately beyond the Great Wall of China is the 
Flanders of the Far East — and that the next inevitable 
war which will destroy China or make her something of 
a nation must be fought on that soil just as two other 
wars have been fought there during the past twenty 
years. But this does not belong to contemporary poli- 
tics; it is possibly an affair of the Chinese army of 1925 
or 1935. Some day China will fight for Manchuria, if 
it is impossible to recover it in any other way, — nobody 
need doubt that. For Manchuria is absolutely Chinese 
— people must remember. No matter how far the 
town-dwelling Japanese may invade the country dur- 
ing the next two or three decades, no matter what large 
alien garrisons may be planted there, the Chinese must 



96 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

and will remain the dominant racial element, since their 
population which already nmnbers twenty-five millions 
is growing at the rate of half a million a year, and in a 
few decades will equal the population of a first-class 
European Power. 

When we reach Group III we touch matters that are 
not only immediately vital but quite new in their type of 
audacity and which every one can to-day understand 
since they are politico-industrial. Group III, as it 
stands in the original text, is simply the plan for the 
conquest of the mineral wealth of the Yangtsze Valley 
which mainly centres round Hankow because the vast 
alluvial plains of the lower reaches of this greatest of 
rivers were once the floor of the Yellow Sea, the upper 
provinces of Hupeh, Hmian, Kiangsi being the region 
of ]3rehistoric forests clothing the coasts, which once 
looked down upon the slowly-receding waste of waters, 
and which to-day contain all the coal and iron. 
Hitherto every one has always believed that the Yang- 
tsze Valley was par eoccellence the British sphere in 
China ; and every one has always thought that that belief 
was enough. It is true that political students, going 
carefully over all published documents, have ended their 
search by declaring that the matter certainly required 
further elucidation. To be precise, this so-called Brit- 
ish sphere is not an enclave at all in the proper sense; 
indeed it can only seem one to those who still believe 
that it is still possible to pre-empt provinces by minis- 
terial declarations. The Japanese have been the first to 
dare to say that the preconceived general belief was 
stupid. They know, of course, that it was a British 
force which invaded the Yangtsze Valley seventy-five 
years ago, and forced the signature of the Treaty of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 97 

Nanking which first opened China to the world's trade ; 
but they are by no means impressed with the rights 
which that action has been held to confer, since ,the 
mineral resources of this region are priceless in their 
eyes and must somehow be won. 

' The study of twenty years of history proves this 
assumption to be correct. Ever since 1895, Japan has 
been driving wedges into the Yangtsze Valley of a 
peculiar kind to form the foundations for her sweeping 
claims of 1915. Thus after the war with China in 
1894-95, she opened by her Treaty of Peace four ports 
in the Yangtsze Valley region, Soochow, Hangchow, 
Chungking and Shasi; that is, at the two extreme ends 
of the valley she established politico-commercial points 
d'appui from which to direct her campaign. Whilst the 
proximity of Soochow and Hangchow to the British 
stronghold of Shanghai made it difficult to carry out any 
"penetration" work at the lower end of the river save in 
the form of subsidized steam-shipping, the case was dif- 
ferent in Hunan and Hupeh provinces. There she was 
unendingly busy, and in 1903 by a fresh treaty she for- 
mally opened to trade Changsha, the capital of the 
turbulent Hunan province. Changsha for years re- 
mained a secret centre possessing the greatest political 
importance for her, and seiwing as a focus for most 
varied activities involving Hunan, Hupeh, and Kiangsi, 
as well as a vast hinterland. The great Tayeh iron- 
mines, although entirely Chinese-owned, were already 
being tapped to supply iron-ore for the Japanese Gov- 
ernment Foundry at Wakamatsu on the island of 
Kiushiu. The rich coal mines of Pinghsiang, being con- 
veniently near, supplied the great Chinese Government 
arsenal of Hanyang with fuel; and since Japan had very 



98 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

little coal or iron of her own, she decided that it would 
be best to embrace as soon as possible the whole area 
of interests in one categorical demand — that is to claim 
a dominant share in the Hanyang arsenal, the Tayeh 
iron-mines and the Ping-hsiang collieries/ By lending 
money to these enterprises, which were grouped to- 
gether under the name of Hanyehping, she had early 
established a claim on them which she turned at the 
psychological moment into an international question. 

We can pass quickly by Group IV which is of little 
importance, except to say that in taking upon herself, 
without consultation with the senior ally, the duty of 
asking from China a declaration concerning the future 
non-leasing of harbours and islands, Japan has at- 
tempted to assume a protectorship of Chinese territory 
which does not belong to her historically. It is well 
also to note that although Japan wished it to appear 
to the world that this action was dictated by her desire 
to prevent Germany from acquiring a fresh foothold in 
China after the war, in reality Group IV was drafted 
as a general warning to the nations, one point being 
that she believed that the United States was contem- 
plating the reorganization of the Foochow Arsenal in 
Fuhkien province, and that as a corollary to that re- 
organization would be given the lease of an adjoining 
harbour such as Santuao. 

It is not, however, until we reach Group V that the 
real purpose of the Japanese demands becomes un- 
alterably clear, for in this Group we have seven sketches 
of things designed to serve as the coup de grace. Not 
only is a new sphere — Fuhkien province — indicated; 

1 The reader will observe, that the expression "Hanyehping enterprises" 
is compounded by linking together characters denoting the triple industry. 




HuiNs OF THE Famous Yuan Mixg Yuax Palace Outside 
Pekixg, Built for the Manchu Sovereigns by the 
Jesttit Fathers and Destroyed by the Allies in 1860 




Modern Peking: a Run on a Bank 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 99 

not only is the mid-Yangtsze, from the vicinity of Kiu- 
kiang, to serve as the terminus for a system of Japa- 
nese railways, radiating from the great river to the 
coasts of South China; but the gleaming knife of the 
Japanese surgeon is to aid the Japanese teacher in the 
great work of propaganda ; the Japanese monk and the 
Japanese policeman are to be dispersed like skirmishers 
throughout the land; Japanese arsenals are to supply 
all the necessary arms, or failing that a special Japa- 
nese arsenal is to be established; Japanese advisers are 
to give the necessary advice in finance, in politics, in 
every department — foreshadowing a complete and all 
embracing political control. Never was a more sweep- 
ing program of supervision presented, and small 
wonder if Chinese when they learnt of this climax ex- 
claimed that the fate of Korea was to be their own. 
For a number of weeks after the presentation of these 
demands everything remained clothed in impenetrable 
mystery, and despite every effort on the part of 
diplomatists reliable details of what was occurring could 
not be obtained. Gradually, however, the admission 
was forced that the secrecy being preserved was due to 
the Japanese threat that publicity would be met with 
the harshest reprisals; and presently the veil was en- 
tirely lifted by newspaper publication and foreign Am- 
bassadors began making inquiries in Tokio. The nat- 
ure and scope of the Twenty-one Demands could now 
be no longer hidden; and in response to the growing 
indignation which began to be voiced by the press and 
the pressure which British diplomacy brought to bear, 
Japan found it necessary to modify some of the most 
important items. She had held twenty-four meetings 
at the Chinese Foreign Office, and although the Chinese 



100 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

negotiators had been forced to give way in such mat- 
ters as extending the "leasing" periods of railways and 
territories in Manchuria and in admitting the Japanese 
right to succeed to all German interests and rights in 
Shantung (Group I and II), in the essential matters 
of the Hanyehping concessions (Group III) and the 
noxious demands of Group V China had stood abso- 
lutely firm, declining even to discuss some of the items. 
Accordingly Japanese diplomacy was forced to re- 
state and re-group the whole corpus of the demands. 
On the 26!'th April, acting under direct instructions from 
Tokio, the Japanese Minister to Peking presented a 
revised list for renewed consideration, the demands 
being expanded to twenty-four articles (in place of the 
original twenty-one largely because discussion had 
shown the necessity of breaking up into smaller units 
some of the original articles). Most significant, how- 
ever, is the fact that Group V, (which in its original 
form was a more vicious assault on Chinese sovereignty 
than the Austrian Ultimatum to Serbia of June, 1914) 
was so remodelled as to convey a very different 
meaning, the group heading disappearing entirely and 
an innocent-looking exchange of notes being asked for. 
It is necessary to recall that, when taxed with making 
Demands which were entirely in conflict with the spirit 
of the Anglo-Japanese Alhance, the Japanese Govern- 
ment through its ambassadors abroad had categorically 
denied that they had ever laid any such Demands on 
the Chinese Government. It was claimed that there 
had never been twenty-one Demands, as the Chinese 
alleged, but only fourteen, the seven items of Group V 
being desiderata which it was in the interests of China 
to endorse hut which Japan had no intention of forcing 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 101 

upon her. The writer, being acquainted from first to 
last with everything that took place in Peking from 
the 18th January to the filing of the Japanese ultima- 
tum of the 7th May, has no hesitation in stigmatising 
this statement as false. The whole aim and object of 
these negotiations was to force through Group V. 
Japan would have gladly postponed sine die the dis- 
cussion of all the other Groups had China assented to 
provisions which would have made her independence 
a thing of the past. Every Chinese knew that, in the 
main. Group V was simply a repetition of the measures 
undertaken in Korea after the Russo-Japanese war of 
1905 as a forerunner to annexation; and although ob- 
viously in the case of China no such rapid surgery could 
be practised, the endorsement of these measures would 
have meant a virtual Japanese Protectorate. Even a 
cursory study of the text that follows will confirm in 
every particular these capital contentions : 

japan's revised demands 

Japan's Revised Demands on China, twenty-four in all, pre- 
sented April 26, 1915. 

Note on original text: 

[The revised list of articles is a Chinese translation of the 
Japanese text. It is hereby declared that when a final de- 
cision is reached, there shall be a revision of the wording of the 
text.] 

GROUP I 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, being 
desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and 
further strengthening the friendly relations and good neigh- 
bourhood existing between the two nations, agree to the follow- 
ing articles : — 

Article 1. The Chinese Government engages to give full 



102 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may- 
hereafter agree with the German Government, relating to the 
disposition of all rights, interests and concessions, which Ger- 
many, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation 
to the Province of Shangtung. 

Article 2. (Changed into an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declares that within the Province of 
Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be 
ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext. 

Article 3. The Chinese Government consents that as regards 
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lung- 
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu Railway, if Ger- 
many is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo- 
Weihsien line. China will approach Japanese capitalists to 
negotiate for a loan. 

Article 4. The Chinese Government engages, in the interest 
of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China 
herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Prov- 
ince of Shantung as Commercial Ports. 

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes) 

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen and 
the regulations are to be drafted, by the Chinese Government, 
but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a 
decision. 

GROUP II 

The Japanese Government and the Chinese Government, with 
a view to developing their economic relations in South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongoha, agree to the following 
articles : — 

Article 1. The two contracting Powers mutually agree that 
the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of 
the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Rail- 
way shall be extended to 99 years. 

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes) 

The term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in 
the 86th year of the Republic or 199T. The date fqr restoring 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 103 

the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall due in the 
91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original 
South Manchurian Railway Agreement stating that it may be 
redeemed by China after 36 years after the traffic is opened is 
hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden Railway 
shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007. 

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may lease 
or purchase the necessary land for erecting suitable buildings 
for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural 
enterprises. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and 
travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manu- 
facture of any kind whatsoever. 

Article 3^ The Japanese subjects referred to in the pre- 
ceding two articles, besides being required to register with the 
local authorities pass-ports which they must procure under the 
existing regulations, shall also submit to police laws and ordi- 
nances and tax regulations, which are approved by the Jap- 
anese consul. Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants 
are Japanese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese 
consul ; those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried 
and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an offi- 
cer can be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But 
mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to land 
shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both nations con- 
jointly in accordance with Chinese law and local usage. When 
the judicial system in the said region is completely reformed, 
all civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese subjects shall 
be tried entirely by Chinese law courts. 

Article 4. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government agrees that Japanese subjects 
shall be permitted forthwith to investigate, select, and then 
prospect for and open mines at the following places in South 
Manchuria, apart from those mining areas in which mines 
are being prospected for or worked; until the Mining Ordi- 
nance is definitely settled methods at present in force shall 
be followed. 



104 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

PROVINCE OF Feng-Tien 
Locality District Mineral 

Niu Hsin T'ai . ., Pen-hsi . . . ., Coal 

Tien Shih Fu Kou " " 

Sha Sung Kang Hai-lung " 

T'ieh Ch'ang Tung-hua " 

Nuan Ti Tang Chin " 

An Shan Chan region. .From Liao-yang to 

Pen-hsi Iron 

Province of Kirin 

( Southern portion) 

Sha Sung Kang ...... .Ho-lung Coal and Iron 

Kang Yao Chi-lin (Kirin) . .,. Coal 

Chia P'i Kou Hua-tien Gold 

Article 5. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government declares that China will hereafter 
provide funds for building railways in South Manchuria ; if 
foreign capital is required, the Chinese Government agrees to 
negotiate for the loan with Japanese capitalists first. 
Article 5^. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter, when a for- 
eign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of South 
Manchuria (not including customs and salt revenue on the se- 
curity of which loans have already been made by the Central 
Government), it will negotiate for the loan with Japanese cap- 
italists first, 

Article 6. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 
The Chinese Government declares that hereafter if foreign 
advisers or instructors on political, financial, military or police 
matters, are to be employed in South Manchuria, Japanese will 
be employed first. 

Article 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make 
a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan 
Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railroad loan 
agreements made heretofore between China and foreign finan- 
ciers. If, in future, more advantageous terms than those in 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 105 

existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign finan- 
ciers, in connection with railway loans, the above agreement 
shall again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes. 

All existing treaties between China and Japan relating to 
Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for by this 
Convention, remain in force. 

1. The Chinese Government agrees that hereafter when a 
f oi'eign loan is to be made on the security of the taxes of Eastern 
Inner Mongolia, China must negotiate with the Japanese Gov- 
ernment first. 

2. The Chinese Government agrees that China will herself 
provide funds for building the railways in Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia ; if foreign capital is required, she must negotiate with 
the Japanese Government first. 

3. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of trade 
and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself, 
as soon as possible, certain suitable places in Eastern Inner 
Mongolia as Commercial Ports. The places which ought to be 
opened are to be chosen, and the regulations are to be drafted, 
by the Chinese Government, but the Japanese Minister must be 
consulted before making a decision. 

4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring jointly to 
undertake agricultural enterprises and industries incidental 
thereto, the Chinese Government shall give its permission. 

GROUP m 

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company 
being very intimate, if those interested in the said Company 
come to an agreement with the Japanese capitalists for co-op- 
eration, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its con- 
sent thereto. The Chinese Government further agrees that, 
without the consent of the Japanese capitalists, China will not 
convert the Company into a state enterprise, nor confiscate it, 
nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than 
Japanese. 

GROUP IV 

China to give a pronouncement by herself in accordance with 
the following principle : — 



106 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

No bay, harbour, or island along the coast of China may be 
ceded or leased to any Power. 

Notes to be Exchanged 
A 

As regards the right of financing a railway from Wuchang 
to connect with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang line, the Nanchang- 
Hangchow railway, and the Nanchang-Chaochow railway, if it 
is clearly ascertained that other Powers have no objection, 
China shall grant the said right to Japan. 

B 

As regards the rights of financing a railway from Wuchang 
to connect with the Kiu-kiang-Nanchang railway, a railway 
from Nanchang to Hangchow and another from Nanchang to 
Chaochow, the Chinese Government shall not grant the said 
right to any foreign Power before Japan comes to an under- 
standing with the other Power which is heretofore interested 
therein. 

NOTES TO BE EXCHANGED 

The Chinese Government agrees that no nation whatever is 
to be permitted to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, 
a dockyard, a coaling station for military use, or a naval base ; 
not to be authorized to set up any other military establish- 
ment. The Chinese Government further agrees not to use for- 
eign capital for setting up the above mentioned construction 
or establishment. 

Mr. Lu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated as follows : — 

1. The Chinese Government, shall, whenever, in future, it 
considers this step necessary, engage numerous Japanese ad- 
visers. 

2. Whenever, in future, Japanese subjects desire to lease or 
purchase land in the interior of China for establishing schools 
or hospitals, the Chinese Government shall forthwith give its 
consent thereto. 

3. When a suitable opportunity arises in future, the Chinese 
Government will send military officers to Japan to negotiate 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 107 

with Japanese military authorities the matter of purchasing 
arms or that of estabhshing a joint arsenal. 

Mr. Hioki, the Japanese Minister, stated as follows : — 
As relates to the question of the right of missionary prop- 
aganda the same shall be taken up again for negotiation in 
future. 

An ominous silence followed the delivery of this docu- 
ment. The Chinese Foreign Office had already ex- 
hausted itself in a discussion which had lasted three 
months, and pursuant to instructions from the Presi- 
dential Palace prepared an exhaustive Memorandum 
on the subject. It was understood by now that all the 
Foreign Offices in the world were interesting them- 
selves very particularly in the matter ; and that all were 
agreed that the situation which had so strangely de- 
veloped was very serious. On the 1st May, proceeding 
by appointment to the Waichiaopu (Foreign Office) 
the Japanese Minister had read to him the following 
Memorandum which it is very necessary to grasp as it 
shows how solicitous China had become of terminating 
the business before there was an open international 
break. It will also be seen that this Memorandum, 
was obviously composed for purpose of public record, 
the fifth group being dealt with in such a way as to fix 
upon Japan the guilt of having concealed from her 
British Ally matters which conflicted vitally with the 
aims and objects of the Anglo- Japanese Alliance 
Treaty. 

MEMORANDUM 

Read by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Hioki, the 
Japanese Minister, at a Conference held at Wai Chiao Pu, 
May 1, 1915. 

The list of demands which the Japanese Government first 
presented to the Chinese Government consists of five groups, the 



108 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

first relating to Shantung, the second relating to South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, the third relating to Han- 
yehping Company, the fourth asking for non-alienation of the 
coast of the country, and the fifth relating to the questions of 
national advisers, national police, national arms, missionary 
propaganda, Yangtsze Valley railways, and Fukien Province. 
Out of profound regard for the intentions entertained by Japan, 
the Chinese Government took these momentous demands into 
grave and careful consideration and decided to negotiate with 
the Japanese Government frankly and sincerely what were 
possible to negotiate. This is a manifestation to Japan of the 
most profound regard which the Chinese Government enter- 
tains for the relations between the two nations. 

Ever since the opening of the negotiations China has been 
doing her best to hasten their progress holding as many as 
three conferences a week. As regards the articles in the sec- 
ond group, the Chinese Government being disposed to allow the 
Japanese Government to develop the economic relations of the 
two countries in South Manchuria, realizing that the Japanese 
Government attaches importance to its interests in that region, 
and wishing to meet the hope of Japan, made a painful effort, 
without hesitation, to agree to the extension of the 25-year 
lease of Port Arthur and Dalny, the 36-year period of the 
South Manchurian Railway and the IS-year period of the An- 
tung-Mukden Railway, all to 99 years ; and to abandon its own 
cherished hopes to regain control of these places and prop- 
erties at the expiration of their respective original terms of 
lease. It cannot but be admitted that this is a most genuine 
proof of China's friendship for Japan. 

As to the right of opening mines in South Manchuria, the 
Chinese Government has already agreed to permit Japanese 
to work mines within the mining areas designated by Japan. 
China has further agreed to give Japan a right of preference 
in the event of borrowing foreign capital for building railways 
or of making a loan on the security of the local taxes in South 
Manchuria. The question of revising the arrangement for the 
Kirin-Changchun Railway has been settled in accordance with 
the proposal made by Japan. The Chinese Government has 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 109 

further agreed to employ Japanese first in the event of em- 
ploying foreign advisers on political, military, financial and 
police matters. 

Furthermore, the provision about the repurchase period in 
the South Manchurian Railway was not mentioned in Japan's 
original proposal. Subsequently, the Japanese Government al- 
leging that its meaning was not clear, asked China to cancel 
the provision altogether. Again, Japan at first demanded 
the right of Japanese to carry on farming in South Man- 
churia, but subsequently she considered the word "farming" 
was not broad enough and asked to replace it with the 
phrase "agricultural enterprises." To these requests the 
Chinese Government, though well aware that the proposed 
changes could only benefit Japan, still acceded without delay. 
This, too, is a proof of China's frankness and sincerity 
towards Japan. 

As regards matters relating to Shangtung the Chinese Gov- 
ernment has agreed to a majority of the demands. 

The question of inland residence in South Manchuria is, in 
the opinion of the Chinese Government, incompatible with the 
treaties China had entered into with Japan and other Powers, 
still the Chinese Government did its best to consider how it was 
possible to avoid that incompatibility. At first, China sug- 
gested that the Chinese Authorities should have full rights of 
jurisdiction over Japanese settlers. Japan declined to agree 
to it. Thereupon China reconsidered the question and revised 
her counter-proposal five or six times, each time making some 
definite concession, and went so far to agree that all civil and 
criminal cases between Chinese and Japanese should be arranged 
according to existing treaties. Only cases relating to land or 
lease contracts were reserved to be adjudicated by Chinese 
Courts, as a mark of China's sovereignty over the region. This 
is another proof of China's readiness to concede as much as 
possible. 

Eastern Inner Mongolia is not an enlightened region as yet 
and the conditions existing there are entirely different from 
those prevailing in South Manchuria. The two places, there- 
fore, cannot be considered in the same light. Accordingly, 



110 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

China agreed to open commercial marts first, in the interests of 
foreign trade. 

The Hanjehping Company mentioned in the third group is 
entirely a private company, and the Chinese Government is pre- 
cluded from interfering with it and negotiating with another 
government to make any disposal of the same as the Govern- 
ment likes, but having regard for the interests of the Japanese 
capitalists, the Chinese Government agreed that whenever, in 
future, the said company and the Japanese capitalists should 
arrive at a satisfactory arrangement for co-operation, China 
will give her assent thereto. Thus the interests of the Jap- 
anese capitalists are amply safeguarded. 

Although the demand in the fourth group asking for a dec- 
laration not to alienate China's coast is an infringement of her 
sovereign rights, yet the Chinese Government offered to make a 
voluntary pronouncement so far as it comports with China's 
sovereign rights. Thus, it is seen that the Chinese Govern- 
ment, in deference to the wishes of Japan, gave a most serious 
consideration even to those demands, which gravely affect the 
sovereignty and territorial rights of China as well as the prin- 
ciple of equal opportunity and the treaties with foreign Powers. 
All this was a painful effort on the part of the Chinese Govern- 
ment to meet the situation — a fact of which the Japanese Gov- 
ernment must be aware. 

As regards the demands in the fifth group, they all infringe 
China's sovereignty, the treaty rights of other Powers or the 
principle of equal opportunity. Although Japan did not indi- 
cate any difference between this group and the preceding four 
in the list which she presented to China in respect to their char- 
acter, the Chinese Government, in view of their palpably objec- 
tionable features, persuaded itself that these could not have 
been intended by Japan as anything other than Japan's mere 
advice to China. Accordingly China has declared from the 
very beginning that while she entertains the most profound re- 
gard for Japan's wishes, she was unable to admit that any of 
these matters could be made the subject of an understanding 
with Japan. Much as she desired to pay regard to Japan's 
wishes, China cannot but respect her own sovereign rights and 




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REPUBLIC IN CHINA 111 

the existing treaties with other Powers. In order to be rid of 
the seed for future misunderstanding and to strengthen the 
basis of friendship, China was constrained to iterate the rea- 
sons for refusing to negotiate on any of the articles in the 
fifth group, yet in view of Japan's wishes China has expressed 
her readiness to state that no foreign money was borrowed to 
construct harbour work in Fukien Province- Thus it is clear 
that China went so far as to see a solution for Japan of a ques- 
tion that really did not admit of negotiation. Was there, 
then, evasion, on the part of China.? 

Now, since the Japanese Government has presented a revised 
list of demands and declared at the same time, that it will 
restore the leased territory of Kiaochow, the Chinese Govern- 
ment reconsiders the whole question and herewith submits a 
new reply to the friendly Japanese Government. 

In this reply the unsettled articles in the first group are 
stated again for discussion. 

As regards the second group, those articles which have al- 
ready been initialled are omitted. In connection with the ques- 
tion of inland residence the police regulation clause has been 
revised in a more restrictive sense. As for the trial of cases 
relating to land and lease contracts the Chinese Government 
now permits the Japanese Consul to send an officer to attend the 
proceedings. 

Of the four demands in connection with that part of Eastern 
Inner Mongolia which is within the jurisdiction of South Man- 
churia and the Jehol intendency, China agrees to three. 

China, also, agrees to the article relating to the Hanyehping 
Company as revised by Japan. 

It is hoped that the Japanese Government will appre- 
ciate the conciliatory spirit of the Chinese Government in 
making this final concession and forthwith give her assent 
thereto. 

There is one more point. At the beginning of the present 
negotiations it was mutually agreed to observe secrecy but 
unfortunately a few days after the presentation of the de- 
mands by Japan an Osaka newspaper published an "Extra" 
giving the text of the demands. The foreign and the Chinese 



112 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

press has since been paying considerable attention to this ques- 
tion and frequently publishing pro-Chinese or pro-Japanese 
comments in order to call forth the World's conjecture — a mat- 
ter which the Chinese Government deeply regrets. 

The Chinese Government has never carried on any news- 
paper campaign and the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
has repeatedly declared this to the Japanese Minister. 

In conclusion, the Chinese Government wishes to express its 
hope that the negotiations now pending between the two coun- 
tries will soon come to an end and whatever misgivings foreign 
countries entertain toward the present situation may be quickly 
dispelled. 

The Peking Government, although fully aware 
of the perils now confronting it, had dared to 
draft a complete reply to the revised Demands and 
had reduced Japanese redundancy to effective limits. 
Not only were various articles made more compact, 
but the phraseology employed conveyed unmistakably, 
if in a somewhat subtle way, that China was not a 
subordinate State treating with a suzerain. Moreover, 
after dealing succinctly and seriously with Groups I, 
II and III, the Chinese reply terminates abruptly, 
the other points in the Japanese List being left entirely 
unanswered. It is important to seize these points in 
the text that follows. 

china's reply to revised demands 

China's Reply of May 1, 1915, to the Japanese Revised De- 
mands of April 26, 1915. 

GROUP I 

The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, being 
desirous of maintaining the general peace in Eastern Asia and 
further strengthening the friendly relations and good neigh- 
bourhood existing between the two nations, agree to the follow- 
ing articles: — 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 113 

Article 1. The Chinese Government declares that they will 
give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese and 
German Governments may hereafter mutually agree, relating 
to the disposition of all interests, which Germany, by virtue 
of treaties or recorded cases, possesses in relation to the Prov- 
ince of Shantung. 

The Japanese Government declares that when the Chinese 
Government give their assent to the disposition of interests 
above referred to, Japan will restore the leased territory of 
Kiaochow to China; and further recognize the right of the 
Chinese Government to participate in the negotiations referred 
to above between Japan and Germany. 

Article 2. The Japanese Government consents to be respon- 
sible for the indemnification of all losses occasioned by Japan's 
military operation around the leased territory of Kiaochow. 
The customs, telegraphs and post offices within the leased ter- 
ritory of Kiaochow shall, prior to the restoration of the said 
leased territory to China, be administered as heretofore for the 
time being. The railways and telegraph lines erected by Japan 
for military purposes are to be removed forthwith. The Jap- 
anese troops now stationed outside the original leased terri- 
tory of Kiaochow are now to be withdrawn first, those within 
the original leased territory are to be withdrawn on the res- 
toration of the said leased territory to China. 

Article 3. (Changed to an exchange of notes.) 

The Chinese Government declares that within the Province 
of Shantung and along its coast no territory or island will be 
ceded or leased to any Power under any pretext. 

Article 4. The Chinese Government consent that as regards 
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lung- 
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Ger- 
many is willing to abandon the privilege of financing the Chefoo- 
Weihsien line, China will approach Japanese capitalists for a 
loan. 

Article 5. The Chinese Government engage, in the interest 
of trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by herself 
as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province of 
Shantung as Commercial Ports. 



114 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

(Supplementary Exchange of Notes) 

The places which ought to be opened are to be chosen, and 
the regulations are to be drafted by the Chinese Government, 
but the Japanese Minister must be consulted before making a 
decision. 

Article 6. If the Japanese and German Governments are 
not able to come to a definite agreement in future in their ne- 
gotiations respecting transfer, etc., this provisional agreement 
contained in the foregoing articles shall be void. 



The Chinese Government and the Japanese Government, with 
a view to developing their economic relations in South Man- 
churia, agree to the following articles : — 

Article 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by 
arrangement with the owners, lease land required for erecting 
suitable buildings for trade and manufacture or agricultural 
enterprises. 

Article 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and 
travel in South Manchuria and to engage in business and man- 
ufacture of any kind whatsoever. 

Article 3^ The Japanese subjects referred to in the preced- 
ing two articles, besides being required to register with the local 
authorities pass-ports which they must procure under the ex- 
isting regulations, shall also observe police rules and regulations 
and pay taxes in the same manner as Chinese. Civil and crim- 
inal cases shall be tried and adjudicated by the authorities of 
the defendant nationality and an officer can be deputed to at- 
tend the proceedings. But all cases purely between Japanese 
subjects and mixed cases between Japanese or Chinese, relat- 
ing to land or disputes arising from lease contracts, shall be 
tried and adjudicated by Chinese Authorities and the Japanese 
Consul may also depute an officer to attend the proceedings. 
When the judicial system in the said Province is completely 
reformed, all the civil and criminal cases concerning Japanese 
subjects shall be tried entirely by Chinese law courts. 

1 Six articles found in Japan's Revised Demands are omitted here as they 
had already been initiated by the Chinese Foreign Minister and the 
Japanese minister. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 115 

EELATING TO EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA 

(To be Exchanged by Notes) 

1. The Chinese Government declare that China will not in 
future pledge the taxes, other than customs and salt revenue 
of that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction 
of South Manchuria and Jehol Intendency, as security for 
raising a foreign loan. 

2. The Chinese Government declare that China will herself 
provide funds for building the railways in the part of Eastern 
Inner Mongolia under the jurisdiction of South Manchuria and 
the Jehol Intendency ; if foreign capital is required, China will 
negotiate with Japanese capitalists first, provided this does not 
conflict with agreements already concluded with other Powers. 

The Chinese Government agree, in the interest of trade and 
for the residence of foreigners, to open by China herself cer- 
tain suitable places in that part of Eastern Inner Mongolia 
under the jurisdiction of South Manchurian and the Jehol 
Intendency, as Commercial Marts. 

The regulations for the said Commercial Marts will be made 
in accordance with those of other Commercial Marts opened 
by China herself. 

GROUP m 

The relations between Japan and the Hanyehping Company 
being very intimate, if the said Company comes to an agree- 
ment with the Japanese capitalists for co-operation, the Chi- 
nese Government shall forthwith give their consent thereto. 
The Chinese Government further declare that China will not 
convert the company into a state enterprise, not confiscate it, 
nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than 
Japanese. 

Letter to be addressed by the Japanese Minister to the Chi- 
nese Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

Excellency: I have the honour to state that a report has 
reached me that the Chinese Government have given permission 
to foreign nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, 
dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases and 
other establishments for military purposes; and further, that 



116 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the Chinese Government are borrowing foreign capital for 
putting up the above-mentioned constructions or establishments. 
I shall be much obliged if the Chinese Government will inform 
me whether or not these reports are well founded in fact. 

Reply to be addressed by the Chinese Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to the Japanese Minister. 

Excellency: I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt 

of your Excellency's Note of In reply I beg to state 

that the Chinese Government have not given permission to for- 
eign Powers to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, 
dock-yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases or 
other establishments for military purposes ; nor do they con- 
template to borrow foreign capital for putting up such con- 
structions or establishments. 

Within forty-eight hours of this passage-at-arms of 
the 1st May it was understood in Peking that Japan 
was meditating a serious step. That vague feeling 
of unrest which so speedily comes in capitals when 
national affairs reach a crisis was very evident, and 
the word "ultimatum" began to be whispered. It was 
felt that whilst China had held to her rights to the ut- 
most and had received valuable indirect support from 
both England and the United States, the world-situation 
was such that it would be difficult to prevent Japan 
from proceeding to extremities. Accordingly there 
was little real surprise when on the 7th May Japan 
filed an ultimatum demanding a satisfactory reply 
within 48 hours to her Hevised Demands — failing which 
those steps deemed necessary would be taken. A 
perusal of the text of the Ultimatum will show an inter- 
esting change in the language employed. Coaxing 
having failed, and Japan being now convinced that so 
long as she did not seek to annex the rights of other For- 
eign Powers in China open opposition could not he of- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 117 

fered to her, states her case very defiantly. One signifi- 
cant point, however, must be carefully noted — that she 
agrees "to detach Group V from the present negotia- 
tions and to discuss it separately in the future." It is 
this fact which remains the sword of Damocles hanging 
over China's head; and until this sword has been flung 
back into the waters of the Yellow Sea the Far East- 
ern situation will remain perilous. 

japan's ultimatum to china 

Japan's Ultimatum delivered by the Japanese Minister to 
the Chinese Government, on May 7th, 1915. 

The reason why the Imperial Government opened the present 
negotiations with the Chinese Government is first to endeavour 
to dispose of the complications arising out of the war between 
Japan and China, and secondly to attempt to solve those va- 
rious questions which are detrimental to the intimate relations 
of China and Japan with a view to solidifying the foundation 
of cordial friendship subsisting between the two countries to 
the end that the peace of the Far East may be effectually and 
permanently preserved. With this object in view, definite pro- 
posals were presented to the Chinese Government in January of 
this year, and up to today as many as twenty-five conferences 
have been held with the Chinese Government in perfect sin- 
cerity and frankness. 

In the course of the negotiation the Imperial Government have 
consistently explained the aims and objects of the proposals 
in a conciliatory spirit, while on the other hand the proposals 
of the Chinese Government, whether important or unimportant, 
have been attended to without any reserve. 

It may be stated with confidence that no effort has been 
spared to arrive at a satisfactory and amicable settlement of 
those questions. 

The discussion of the entire corpus of the proposals was 
practically at an end at the twenty-fourth conference ; that is 
on the 17th of the last month. The Imperial Government, tak- 
ing a broad view of the negotiation and in consideration of the 



118 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

points raised by the Chinese Government, modified the original 
proposals with considerable concessions and presented to the 
Chinese Government on the 26th of the same month the revised 
proposals for agreement, and at the same time it was offered 
that, on the acceptance of the revised proposals, the Imperial 
Government would, at a suitable opportunity, restore, with 
fair and proper conditions, to the Chinese Government the 
Kiaochow territory, in the acquisition of which the Imperial 
Government had made a great sacrifice. 

On the 1st of May, the Chinese Government delivered the reply 
to the revised proposals of the Japanese Government, which is 
contrary to the expectations of the Imperial Government. The 
Chinese Government not only did not give a careful considera- 
tion to the revised proposals but even with regard to the offer 
of the Japanese Government to restore Kiaochow to the Chi- 
nese Government the latter did not manifest the least apprecia- 
tion for Japan's good will and difficulties. 

From the commercial and military point of view Kiaochow 
is an important place, in the acquisition of which the Japanese 
Empire sacrificed much blood and money, and, after the acquisi- 
tion the Empire incurs no obligation to restore it to China. 
But with the object of increasing the future friendly relations 
of the two countries, they went to the extent of proposing its 
restoration, yet to her great regret, the Chinese Government did 
not take into consideration the good intention of Japan and 
manifest appreciation of her difficulties. Furthermore, the 
Chinese Government not only ignored the friendly feelings of 
the Imperial Government in offering the restoration of Kiao- 
chow Bay, but also in replying to the revised proposals they 
even demanded its unconditional restoration ; and again China 
demanded that Japan should bear the responsibility of paying 
indemnity for all the unavoidable losses and damages resulting 
from Japan's military operations at Kiaochow; and still fur- 
ther in connection with the territory of Kiaochow China ad- 
vanced other demands and declared that she has the right of 
participation at the future peace conference to be held between 
Japan and Germany. Although China is fully aware that the 
unconditional restoration of Kiaochow and Japan's responsi- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 119 

bility of indemnification for the unavoidable losses and damages 
can never be tolerated by Japan yet she purposely advanced 
these demands and declared that this reply was final and de- 
cisive. 

Since Japan could not tolerate such demands the settlement 
of the other questions, however compromising it may be, would 
not be to her interest. The consequence is that the present 
reply of the Chinese Government is, on the whole, vague and 
meaningless. 

Furthermore, in the reply of the Chinese Government to the 
other proposals in the revised list of the Imperial Government, 
such as South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, where 
Japan particularly has geographical, commercial, industrial 
and strategic relations, as recognized by all the nations, and 
made more remarkable in consequence of the two wars in which 
Japan was engaged the Chinese Government overlooks these 
facts and does not respect Japan's position in that place. The 
Chinese Government even freely altered those articles which the 
Imperial Government, in a compromising spirit, have formu- 
lated in accordance with the statement of the Chinese Repre- 
sentatives thereby making the statements of the Representatives 
an empty talk ; and on seeing them conceding with the one hand 
and withholding with the other it is very difficult to attribute 
faithfulness and sincerity to the Chinese authorities. 

As regards the articles relating to the employment of ad- 
visers, the establishment of schools, and hospitals, the supply 
of arms and ammunition and the establishment of arsenals and 
railway concessions in South China in the revised proposals 
they were either proposed with the proviso that the consent of 
the Power concerned must be obtained, or they are merely to 
be recorded in the minutes in accordance with the statements of 
the Chinese delegates, and thus they are not in the least in con- 
flict either with Chinese sovereignty or her treaties with the For- 
eign Powers, yet the Chinese Government in their reply to the 
proposals, alleging that these proposals are incompatible with 
their sovereign rights and treaties with Foreign Powers, defeat 
the expectations of the Imperial Government. However in 
spite of such attitude of the Chinese Government, the Imperial 



120 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Government, though regretting to see that there is no room for 
further negotiations, yet warmly attached to the preservation 
of the peace of the Far East, is still hoping for a satisfactory 
settlement in order to avoid the disturbance of the relations. 

So in spite of the circumstances which admitted no patience, 
they have reconsidered the feelings of the Government of their 
neighbouring country and, with the exception of the article 
relating to Fukien which is to be the subject of an exchange of 
notes as has already been agreed upon by the Representatives 
of both nations, will undertake to detach the Group V from the 
present negotiation and discuss it separately in the future. 
Therefore the Chinese Government should appreciate the 
friendly feelings of the Imperial Government by immediately 
accepting without any alteration all the articles of Group I, 
II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes in connection with 
Fukien province in Group V as contained in the revised pro- 
posals presented on the 26th of April. 

The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice 
and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will 
give a satisfactory reply by 6 o'clock p. m. on the 9th day of 
May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is 
received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Govern- 
ment will take steps they may deem necessary. 

EXPLANATORY NOTE 

Accompanying Ultimatum delivered to the Minister of For- 
eign Affairs by the Japanese Minister, May 7th, 1915. 

1. With the exception of the question of Fukien to be ar- 
ranged by an exchange of notes, the five articles postponed for 
later negotiation refer to (a) the employment of advisers, (b) 
the establishment of schools and hospitals, (c) the railway con- 
cessions in South China, (d) the supply of arms and ammuni- 
tion and the establishment of arsenals and (e) right of Mis- 
sionary propaganda. 

2. The acceptance by the Chinese Government of the article 
relating to Fukien may be either in the form as proposed by 
the Japanese Minister on the 26th of April or in that contained 
in the Reply of the Chinese Government of May 1st. Although 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 121 

the Ultimatum calls for the immediate acceptance by China of 
the modified proposals presented on April 26'th, without altera- 
tion but it should be noted that it merely states the principle and 
does not apply to this article and articles 4 and 5 of this note. 

3. If the Chinese Government accept all the articles as de- 
manded in the Ultimatum the offer of the Japanese Government 
to restore Kiaochow to China, made on the 26th of April, will 
still hold good. 

4. Article 2 of Group II relating to the lease or purchase of 
land, the terms "lease" and "purchase" may be replaced by the 
terms "temporary lease" and "perpetual lease" or "lease on 
consultation," which means a long-term lease with its uncon- 
ditional renewal. 

Article 4 of Group II relating to the approval of police laws 
and Ordinances and local taxes by the Japanese Council may 
form the subject of a secret agreement. 

5. The phrase "to consult with the Japanese Government" 
in connection with questions of pledging the local taxes for 
raising loans and the loans for the construction of railways, in 
Eastern Inner Mongolia, which is similar to the agreement in 
Manchuria relating to the matters of the same kind, may be re- 
placed by the phrase "to consult with the Japanese capitalists." 

The article relating to the opening of trade marts in Eastern 
Inner Mongolia in respect to location and regulations, may, 
following their precedent set in Shantung, be the subject of an 
exchange of notes. 

6. From the phrase "those interested in the Company" in 
Group III of the revised list of demands, the words "those in- 
terested in" may be deleted. 

7. The Japanese version of the Formal Agreement and its 
annexes shall be the official text or both the Chinese and Jap- 
anese shall be the official texts. 

Whilst it would be an exaggeration to say that open 
panic followed the filing of this document, there was 
certainly very acute alarm, — so much so that it is to- 
day known in Peking that the Japanese Legation cabled 
urgently to Tokio that even better terms could be ob- 



122 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

tained if the matter was left to the discretion of the men 
on the spot. But the Japanese Government had by 
now passed through a sufficiently anxious time itself, 
being in possession of certain unmistakable warnings 
regarding what was likely to happen after a world-peace 
had come, — if matters were pressed too far. Conse- 
quently nothing more was done, and on the following 
day China signified her acceptance of the Ultimatum in 
the following terms. 

Reply of the Chinese Government to the Ultimatum of the 
Japanese Government, delivered to the Japanese Minister hy 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 8th of May, 1915. 

On the 7th of this month, at three o'clock p. m. the Chinese 
Government received an Ultimatum from the Japanese Govern- 
ment together with an Explanatory Note of seven articles. 
The Ultimatum concluded with the hope that the Chinese Gov- 
ernment by six o'clock p. m. on the 9th of May will give a 
satisfactory reply, and it is hereby declared that if no satis- 
factory reply is received before or at the specified time, the 
Japanese Government will take steps she may deem necessary. 

The Chinese Government with a view to preserving the peace 
of the Far East hereby accepts, with the exception of those 
five articles of Group V postponed for later negotiation, all the 
articles of Group I, II, III, and IV and the exchange of notes 
in connection with Fukien Province in Group V as contained 
in the revised proposals presented on the 26th of April, and in 
accordance with the Explanatory Note of seven articles accom- 
panying the Ultimatum of the Japanese Government with the 
hope that thereby all the outstanding questions are settled, so 
that the cordial relationship between the two countries may be 
further consolidated. The Japanese Minister is hereby re- 
quested to appoint a day to call at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to make the literary improvement of the text and sign 
the Agreement as soon as possible. 

Thus ended one of the most extraoramary diplomatic 
negotiations ever undertaken in Peking. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE ORIGIN OF THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS 

The key to this remarkable business was supplied by a 
cover sent anonymously to the writer during the course 
of these negotiations with no indication as to its origin. 
The documents which this envelope contained are so 
interesting that they merit attention at the hands of 
all students of history, explaining as they do the psy- 
chology of the Demands as well as throwing much light 
on the manner in which the world-war has been viewed 
in Japan. 

The first docmnent is purely introductory, but is 
none the less interesting. It is a fragment, or rather a 
precis of the momentous conversation which took place 
between Yuan Shih-kai and the Japanese Minister 
when the latter personally served the Demands on the 
Chief Executive and took the opportunity to use lan- 
guage unprecedented even in the diplomatic history of 
Peking. 

The precis begins in a curious way. After saying 
that "the Japanese Minister tried to influence Presi- 
dent Yuan Shih-kai with the following words," several 
long lines of asterisks suggest that after reflection the 
unknown chronicler had decided, for political reasons 
of the highest importance, to allow others to guess how 
the "conversation" opened. From the context it seems 
absolutely clear that the excised words have to deal with 
the possibility of the re-estabhshment of the Empire in 
China — a very important conclusion in view of what 

123 



124 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

followed later in the year. Indeed there is no reason 
to doubt that the Japanese Envoy actually told Yuan 
Shih-kai that as he was already virtually Emperor it 
lay within his power to settle the whole business and to 
secure his position at one blow. In any case the precis 
begins with these illuminating sentences : 

. . . Furthermore, the Chinese revolutionists are in close 
touch and have intimate relations with numerous irresponsible 
Japanese, some of whom have great influence and whose policy 
is for strong measures. Our Government has not been in- 
fluenced by this policy, but if your Government does not quickly 
agree to these stipulations, it will be impossible to prevent some 
of our irresponsible people from inciting the Chinese revolu- 
tionists to create trouble in China. 

The majority of the Japanese people are also opposed to 
President Yuan and Yuan's Government. They all declare 
that the President entertains anti-Japanese feeling and adopts 
the policy of "befriending the Far" (Europe and America) and 
"antagonizing the Near" (Japan). Japanese public opinion 
is therefore exceedingly hostile. 

Our Government has all along from first to last exerted its 
best efforts to help the Chinese Government, and if the Chinese 
Government will speedily agree to these stipulations it will have 
thus manifested its friendship for Japan. 

The Japanese people will then be able to say that the Presi- 
dent never entertained anti-Japanese feelings, or adopted the 
policy of "befriending the Far and antagonizing the Near." 
Will not this then be indeed a bona fide proof of our friendly re- 
lations ? 

The Japanese Government also will then be inclined to ren- 
der assistance to President Yuan's Government whenever it is 
necessary. ... 

We are admittedly living in a remarkable age which 
is making waste paper of our dearest principles. But 
in all the welter which the world war has made it would 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 125 

be difficult to find anything more extraordinary than 
these few paragraphs. Japan, through her official rep- 
resentative, boldly tears down the veil hiding her ambi- 
tions, and using the undoubted menace which Chinese 
revolutionary activities then held for the Peking Gov- 
ernment, declares in so many words that unless Presi- 
dent Yuan Shih-kai bows his head to the dictation of 
Tokio, the duel which began in Seoul twenty-five years 
ago would be openly resumed. 

Immediately following the "conversation" is the prin- 
cipal document in the dossier. This is nothing less than 
an exhaustive Memorandum, divided into two sections, 
containing the policy advocated by the Japanese secret 
society, called the Black Dragon Society, which is said to 
have assumed that name on account of the members 
(military officers) having studied the situation in the 
Heilungchiang (or "Black Dragon") province of Man- 
churia. The memorandum is the most remarkable 
document dealing with the Far East which has come to 
light since the famous Cassini Convention was pub- 
lished in 1896. Written presumably late in the 
autumn of 1914 and immediately presented to the 
Japanese Government, it may Undoubtedly be called 
the fulminate which exploded the Japanese mine of the 
18th January, 1915. It shows such sound knowledge 
of world-conditions, and is so scientific in its detach- 
ment that little doubt can exist that distinguished Japa- 
nese took part in its drafting. It can therefore be 
looked upon as a genuine expression of the highly edu- 
cated Japanese mind, and as such cannot fail to arouse 
serious misgivings. The first part is a general review 
of the European War and the Chinese Question: the 
second is concerned with the Defensive Alliance between 



126 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

China and Japan which is looked upon as the one goal 
of all Japanese Diplomacy. 

PART I. THE EUKOPEAN WAR AND THE CHINESE QUESTION 

The present gigantic struggle in Europe has no parallel in 
history. Not only will the equilibrium of Europe be affected 
and its effect felt all over the globe, but its results will create a 
New Era in the political and social world. Therefore, whether 
or not the Imperial Japanese Government can settle the Far 
Eastern Question and bring to realization our great Ifnperial 
policy depends on our being able to skilfully avail ourselves of 
the world's general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence 
and to decide upon a course of action towards China which shall 
be practical in execution. If our authorities and people view 
the present European War with indifference and without deep 
concern, merely devoting their attention to the attack on Kiao- 
chow, neglecting the larger issues of the war, they will have 
brought to nought our .great Imperial policy, and committed a 
blunder greater than which it can not be conceived. We are 
constrained to submit this statement of policy for the consid- 
eration of our authorities, not because we are fond of argu- 
ment but because we are deeply anxious for our national wel- 
fare. 

No one at present can foretell the outcome of the European 
War. If the Allies meet with reverses and victory shall crown 
the arms of the Germans and Austrians, German militarism will 
undoubtedly dominate the European Continent and extend south- 
ward and eastward to other parts of the world. Should such a 
state of affairs happen to take place the consequences resulting 
therefrom will be indeed great and extensive. On this account 
we must devote our most serious attention to the subject. If, 
on the other hand, the Germans and Austrians should be crushed 
by the Allies, Germany will be deprived of her present status 
as a Federated State under a Kaiser. The Federation will be 
disintegrated into separate states, and Prussia will have to be 
content with the status of a second-rate Power. Austria and 
Hungary, on account of this defeat, will consequently be di- 
vided. What their final fate shall be, no one would now venture 




Peasants Raising AV'atku by the Oi^uest Method in the 

World 




Traxsportixg Grain by Donkey in the Roadeess Country 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 127 

to predict. In the meantime Russia will annex Galicia and the 
Austrian Poland: France will repossess Alsace and Lorraine: 
Great Britain will occupy the German Colonies in Africa and 
the South Pacific; Servia and Montenegro will take Bosnia, 
Herzegovina and a certain portion of Austrian Territory ; thus 
making such great changes in the map of Europe that even the 
Napoleonic War in 1815 could not find a paralleh 

When these events take place, not only will Europe expe- 
rience great changes, but we should not ignore the fact that 
they will occur also in China and in the South Pacific. After 
Russia has replaced Germany in the territories lost by Ger- 
many and Austria, she will hold a controlling influence in Eu- 
rope, and, for a long time to come, will have nothing to fear 
from her western frontier. Immediately after the war she will 
make an effort to carry out her policy of expansion in the East 
and will not relax that effort until she has acquired a controlling 
influence in China. At the same time Great Britain will 
strengthen her position in the Yangtsze Valley and prohibit any 
other country from getting a footing there. France will do 
likewise in Yunnan province using it as her base of operations 
for further encroachments upon China and never hesitate to 
extend her advantages. We must therefore seriously study the 
situation remembering always that the combined action of 
Great Britain, Russia, and France will not only affect Europe 
but that we can even foresee that it will also affect China. 

Whether this combined action on the part of England, France 
and Russia is to terminate at the end of the war or to con- 
tinue to operate, we can not now predict. But after peace in 
Europe is restored, these Powers will certainly turn their atten- 
tion to the expansion of their several spheres of interest in 
China, and, in the adjustment, their interests will most likely 
conflict with one another. If their interests do not conflict, 
they will work jointly to solve the Chinese Question. On this 
point we have not the least doubt. If England, France and 
Russia are actually to combine for the coercion of China, what 
course is to be adopted by the Imperial Japanese Government 
to meet the situation? What proper means shall we employ to 
maintain our influence and extend our interests within this ring 



' t 



'"^ i28 '' THE FIGHT FOR THE 



V 



of rivalry and competition? It is necessary that we bear in 
mind the final results of the European War and forestall the 
trend of events succeeding it so as to be able to decide upon a 
policy towards China and determine the action to be ulti- 
mately taken. If we remain passive, the Imperial Japanese 
Government's policy towards China will lose that subjective in- 
fluence and our diplomacy will be checked forever by the com- 
bined force of the other Powers. The peace of the Far East 
will be thus endangered and even the existence of the Japanese 
Empire as a nation will no doubt be imperilled. It is therefore 
our first important duty at this moment to enquire of our Gov- 
ernment what course is to be adopted to face that general sit- 
uation after the war,'' What preparations are being made to 
meet the combined pressure of the Allies upon China? What 
policy has been followed to solve the Chinese Question? When 
the European War is terminated and peace restored we are not 
concerned so much with the question whether it be the Dual 
Monarchies or the Triple Entente which emerge victorious but 
whether, in anticipation of the future expansion of European 
influence in the Continents of Europe and Asia, the Imperial 
Japanese Government should or should not hesitate to employ 
force to check the movement before this occurrence. Now is 
the most opportune moment for Japan to quickly solve the Chi- 
nese Question. Such an opportunity will not occur for hun- 
dreds of years to come. Not only is it Japan's divine duty to 
act now, but present conditions in China favour the execution 
of such a plan. We should by all means decide and act at once. 
If our authorities do not avail themselves of this rare oppor- 
tunity, great difficulty will surely be encountered in future in 
the settlement of this Chinese Question. Japan will be isolated 
from the European Powers after the war, and will be regarded 
by them with envy and jealousy just as Germany is now re- 
garded. Is it not then a vital necessity for Japan to solve at 
this very moment the Chinese Question? 

TsTo one — not even those who care nothing for politics 
— can deny that there is in this document an astound- 
ing disclosure of the mental attitude of the Japanese 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 129 

not only towards their enemies but towards their friends 
as well. They trust nobody, befriend nobody, envy 
nobody; they content themselves with believing that the 
whole world may in the not distant future turn against 
them. The burden of their argument swings just as 
much against their British ally as against Germany and 
Austria ; and the one and only matter which preoccupies 
Japanese who make it their business to think about such 
things is to secure that Japan shall forestall Europe 
in seizing control of China. It is admitted in so many 
words that it is too early to know who is to triumph in 
the gigantic European struggle ; it is also admitted that 
Germany will forever be the enemy. At the same time 
it is expected, should the issue of the struggle be clear- 
cut and decisive in favour of the Allies, that a new three- 
Power combination formed by England, France and 
Russia may be made to operate against Japan. Al- 
though the alliance with England, twice renewed since 
1902, should occupy as important a place in the Far 
East as the Entente between England and France oc- 
cupies in Europe, not one Japanese in a hundred knows 
or cares anything about such an arrangement ; and even 
if he has knowledge of it, he coolly assigns to his coun- 
try's major international commitment a minimum and 
constantly diminishing importance. In his view the 
British Alliance is nothing but a piece of paper which 
may be consumed in the great bonfire now shedding 
such a lurid light over the world. What is germane to 
the matter is his own plan, his own method of taking 
up arms in a sea of troubles. The second part of the 
Black Dragon Society's Memorandum, pursuing the 
argument logically and inexorably and disclosing traces 
of real political genius, makes this unalterably clear. 



130 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Having established clearly the attitude of Japan to- 
wards the world — and more particularly towards the 
rival political combinations now locked together in a 
terrible deaiii-struggie, this second part of the Memo- 
randum is conceixicvi huiely with China and can be 
broken into two coiivenient sections. The first section is 
constructive — the plan for the i cconstruction of China 
is outlined in terms suited to the Japanese^genius. This 
part .begins with an illuminating piece of rhetoric. 

PART n. THE CHINESE aUESTION AND THE DEFENSIVE ALLIANCE 

It is a very important matter of policy whether the Jap- 
anese Government, in obedience to its divine mission, shall solve 
the Chinese Question in a heroic manner by making China vol- 
untarily rely upon Japan. To force China to such a position 
there is nothing else for the Imperial Japanese Government to 
do but to take advantage of the present opportunity to seize 
the reigns of political and financial power and to enter by all 
means into a defensive alliance with her under secret terms as 
enumerated below: 

The Secret Terms of the Defensive Alliance 

The Imperial Japanese Government, with due respect for the 
Sovereignty and Integrity of China and with the object and 
hope of maintaining the peace of the Far East, undertakes to 
share the responsibility of co-operating with China to guard 
her against internal trouble and foreign invasion and China 
shall accord to Japan special facilities in the matter of China's 
National Defence, or the protection of Japan's special rights 
and privileges and for these objects the following treaty of 
Alliance is to be entered into between the two contracting 
parties : 

1. When there is internal trouble in China or when she is at 
war with another nation or nations, Japan shall send her army 
to render assistance, to assume the responsibility of guarding 
Chinese territory and to maintain peace and order in China. 

2. China agrees to recognize Japan's privileged position in 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 131 

South Manchuria and Inner Mongolia and to cede the sovereign 
rights of these regions to Japan to enable her to carry out a 
scheme of local defence on a permanent basis. 

3. After the Japanese occupation of Kiaochow, Japan shall 
acquire all the rights and privileges hitherto enjoyed by the 
Germans in regard to railways, mines and all other interests, 
and after peace and order is restored in Tsingtao, the place 
shall be handed back to China to be opened as an International 
^Treaty port. 

4. For the maritime defence of China and Japan, China shall 
lease strategic harbours along the coast of the Fukien province 
to Japan to be converted into naval bases and grant to Japan 
in the said province all railway and mining rights. 

5. For the reorganization of the Chinese army China shall 
entrust the training and drilling of the army to Japan. 

6. For the unification of China's firearms and munitions of 
war, China shall adopt firearms of Japanese pattern, and at 
the same time establish arsenals (with the help of Japan) in 
different strategic points. 

7. With the object of creating and maintaining a Chinese 
Navy, China shall entrust the training of her navy to Japan. 

8. With the object of reorganizing her finances and improv- 
ing the methods of taxation, China shall entrust the work to 
Japan, and the latter shall elect competent financial experts 
who shall act as first-class advisers to the Chinese Government. 

9. China shall engage Japanese educational experts as edu- 
cational advisers and extensively establish schools in different 
parts of the country to teach Japanese so as to raise the edu- 
cational standard of the country. 

10. China shall first consult with and obtain the consent of 
Japan before she can enter into an agreement with another 
Power for making loans, the leasing of territory, or the ces- 
sion of the same. 

From the date of the signing of this Defensive Alliance, 
Japan and China shall work together hand-in-hand. Japan 
will assume the responsibility of safeguarding Chinese terri- 
tory and maintaining the peace and order in China. This will 
relieve China of all future anxieties and enable her to proceed 



132 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

energetically with her reforms, and, with a sense of territorial 
security, she may wait for her national development and regen- 
eration. Even after the present European War is over and 
peace is restored China will absolutely have nothing to fear in 
the future of having pressure brought against her by the for- 
eign powers. It is only thus that permanent peace can be se- 
cured in the Far East. 

But before concluding this Defensive Alliance, two points 
must first be ascertained and settled. ( 1 ) Its bearing on the 
Chinese Government. (2) Its bearing on those Powers having 
intimate relations with and great interests in China. 

In considering its effect on the Chinese Government, Japan 
must try to foresee whether the position of China's present 
ruler Yuan Shih-kai shall be permanent or not; whether the 
present Government's policy will enjoy the confidence of a large 
section of the Chinese people ; whether Yuan Shi-kai will readily 
agree to the Japanese Government's proposal to enter into a 
treaty of alliance with us. These are points to which we are 
bound to give a thorough consideration. Judging by the atti- 
tude hitherto adopted by Yuan Shi-kai we know he has always 
resorted to the policy of expediency in his diplomatic dealings, 
and although he may now outwardly show friendliness towards 
us, he will in fact rely upon the influence of the different 
Powers as the easiest check against us and refuse to accede to 
our demands. Take for a single instance, his conduct towards 
us since the Imperial Government declared war against Ger- 
many and his action will then be clear to all. Whether we can 
rely upon the ordinary friendly methods of diplomacy to gain 
our object or not it does not require much wisdom to decide. 
After the gigantic struggle in Europe is over, leaving aside 
America which will not press for advantage, China will not be 
able to obtain any loans from the other Powers. With a de- 
pleted treasury, without means to pay the officials and the 
army, with local bandits inciting the poverty-stricken populace 
to trouble, with the revolutionists waiting for opportunities to 
rise, should an insurrection actually occur while no outside 
assistance can be rendered to quell it we are certain it will be 
impossible for Yuan Shi-kai, single-handed, to restore order 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 133 

"'and consolidate the country. The result will be that the na- 
tion will be cut up into many parts beyond all hope of remedy. 
That this state of affairs will come is not difficult to foresee. 
When this occurs, shall we uphold Yuan's Government and 
assist him to suppress the internal insurrection with the certain 
assurance that we could influence him to agree to our demands, 
or shall we help the revolutionists to achieve a success and real- 
ize our object through them? This question must be definitely 
decided upon this very moment so that we may put it into prac- 
tical execution. If we do not look into the future fate of China 
but go blindly to uphold Yuan's Government, to enter into a 
Defensive Alliance with China, hoping thus to secure a complete 
realization of our object by assisting him to suppress the rev- 
olutionists, it is obviously a wrong policy. Why? Because 
the majority of the Chinese people have lost all faith in the 
tottering Yuan Shi-kai who is discredited and attacked by the 
whole nation for having sold his country. If Japan gives Yuan 
the support, his Government, though in a very precarious state, 
may possibly avoid destruction. Yuan Shi-kai belongs to that 
school of politicians who are fond of employing craftiness and 
cunning. He may be friendly to us for a time, but he will 
certainly abandon us and again befriend the other Powers when 
the European war is at an end. Judging by his past we have 
no doubt as to what he will do in the future. For Japan to 
ignore the general sentiment of the Chinese people and support 
Yuan Shi-kai with the hope that we can settle with him the Chi- 
nese Question is a blunder indeed. Therefore in order to secure 
the permanent peace of the Far East, instead of supporting a 
Chinese Government which can neither be long continued in 
power nor assist in the attainment of our object, we should 
rather support the 400,000,000 Chinese people to renovate their 
corrupt Government, to change its present form, to maintain 
peace and order in the land and to usher into China a new era 
of prosperity so that China and Japan may in fact as well as 
in name be brought into the most intimate and vital relations 
with each other. China's era of prosperity is based on the 
China-Japanese Alliance and this Alliance is the foundational 
power for the repelling of the foreign aggression that is to be 



134 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

directed against the Far East at the conclusion of the .Euro- 
pean war. This Alliance is also the foundation-stone of the 
peace of the world. Japan therefore should take this as the 
last warning and immediately solve this question. Since the 
Imperial Japanese Government has considered it imperative to 
support the Chinese people, we should induce the Chinese rev- 
olutionists, the Imperialists and other Chinese malcontents to 
create trouble all over China. The whole country will be 
thrown into disorder and Yuan's Government will consequently 
be overthrown. We shall then select a man from amongst the 
most influential and most noted of the 400,000,000 of Chinese 
and help him to organize a new form of Government and to con- 
solidate the whole country. In the meantime our army must 
assist in the restoration of peace and order in the country, and 
in the protection of the lives and properties of the people, so 
that they may gladly tender their allegiance to the new Gov- 
ernment which will then naturally confide in and rely upon 
Japan. It is after the accomplishment of only these things 
that we shall without difficulty gain our object by the conclu- 
sion of a Defensive Alliance with China. 

For us to incite the Chinese revolutionists and malcontents 
to rise in China we consider the present to be the most oppor- 
tune moment. The reason why these men can not now carry 
on an active campaign is because they are insufficiently provided 
with funds. If the Imperial Government can take advantage 
of this fact to make them a loan and instruct them to rise 
simultaneously, great commotion and disorder will surely pre- 
vail all over China. We can intervene and easily adjust mat- 
ters. 

The progress of the European War warns Japan with greater 
urgency of the imperative necessity of solving this most vital of 
questions. The Imperial Government can not be considered as 
embarking on a rash project. This opportunity will not re- 
peat itself for our benefit. We must avail ourselves of this 
chance and under no circumstances hesitate. Why should we 
wait for the spontaneous uprising of the revolutionists and mal- 
contents? Why should we not think out and lay down a plan 
beforehand? When we examine into the form of Government 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 135 

in China, we must ask whether the existing RepubHc is well 
suited to the national temperament and well adapted to the 
thoughts and aspirations of the Chinese people. From the time 
the Republic of China was established up to the present mo- 
ment, if what it has passed through is to be compared to what 
it ought to be in the matter of administration and unification, 
we find disappointment everywhere. Even the revolutionists 
themselves, the very ones who first advocated the Republican 
form of government, acknowledge that they have made a mis- 
take. The retention of the Republican form of Government in 
China will be a great future obstacle in the way of a Chino-Jap- 
anese Alliance. And why must it be so ? Because, in a Repub- 
lic the fundamental principles of government as well as the 
social and moral aims of the people are distinctly different from 
that of a Constitutional Monarchy. Their laws and adminis- 
tration also conflict. If Japan act as a guide to China and 
China models herself after Japan, it will only then be possible 
for the two nations to solve by mutual effort the Far East 
Question without differences and disagreements. Therefore to 
start from the foundation for the purpose of reconstructing 
the Chinese Government, of establishing a Chino-Japanese Al- 
liance, of maintaining the permanent peace of the Far East 
and of realizing the consummation of Japan's Imperial policy, 
we must take advantage of the present opportunity to alter 
China's Republican form of Government into a Constitutional 
Monarchy which shall necessarily be identical, in all its details, 
to the Constitutional Monarchy of Japan, and to no other. 
This is really the key and first principle to be firmly held for 
the actual reconstruction of the form of Government in China. 
If China changes her Republican form of Government to that of 
a Constitutional Monarchy, shall we, in the selection of a new 
ruler, restore the Emperor Hsuan T'ung to his throne or choose 
the most capable man from the Monarchists or select the most 
worthy member from among the revolutionists? We think, 
however, that it is advisable at present to leave this question to 
the exigency of the future when the matter is brought up for 
decision. But we must not lose sight of the fact that to ac- 
tually put into execution this policy of a Chino-Japanese Al- 



136 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

liance and the transformation of the Republic of China into 
a Constitutional Monarchy, is, in reality, the fundamental prin- 
ciple to be adopted for the reconstruction of China. 

We shall now consider the bearing of this Defensive Alliance 
on the other Powers. Needless to say, Japan and China will in 
no way impair the rights and interests already acquired by the 
Powers. At this moment it is of paramount importance for 
Japan to come to a special understanding with Russia to define 
our respective spheres in Manchuria and Mongolia so that the 
two countries may co-operate with each other in the future. 
This means that Japan after the acquisition of sovereign rights 
in South Manchuria and Inner MongoHa will work together 
with Russia after her acquisition of sovereign rights in North 
Manchuria and Outer Mongolia to maintain the status quo, 
and endeavour by every effort to protect the peace of the Far 
East. Russia, since' the outbreak of the European War, has 
not only laid aside all ill-feelings against Japan, but has adopted 
the same attitude as her Allies and shown warm friendship for 
us. No matter how we regard the Manchurian and Mongolian 
Questions in the future she is anxious that we find some way of 
settlement. Therefore we need not doubt but that Russia, in 
her attitude towards this Chinese Question, will be able to come 
to an understanding with us for mutual co-operation. 

The British sphere of influence and interest in China is 
centred in Tibet and the Yangtsze Valley. Therefore if Japan 
can come to some satisfactory arrangement with China in re- 
gard to Tibet and also give certain privileges to Great Britain 
in the Yangtsze Valley, with an assurance to protect those priv- 
ileges, no matter how powerful Great Britain might be, she will 
surely not oppose Japan's policy in regard to this Chinese 
Question. While this present European War is going on 
Great Britain has never asked Japan to render her assistance. 
That her strength will certainly not enable her to oppose us in 
the future need not be doubted in the least. 

Since Great Britain and Russia will not oppose Japan's pol- 
icy towards China, it can readily be seen what attitude France 
will adopt in regard to the subject. What Japan must now 
somewhat reckon with is America. But America in her attitude 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 137 

towards us regarding our policy towards China has already 
declared the principle of maintaining China's territorial integ- 
rity and equal opportunity and will be satisfied, if we do not 
impair America's already acquired rights and privileges. We 
think America will also have no cause for complaint. Never- 
theless America has in the East a naval force which can be 
fairly relied upon, though not sufficiently strong to be feared. 
Therefore in Japan's attitude towards America there is noth- 
ing really for us to be afraid of. 

Since China's condition is such on the one hand and the 
Powers' relation towards China is such on the other hand, 
Japan should avail herself in the meantime of the European 
War to definitely decide upon a policy towards China, the most 
important move being the transformation of the Chinese Gov- 
ernment to be followed up by preparing for the conclusion of 
the Defensive Alliance. The precipitate action on the part of 
our present Cabinet in acceding to the request of Great Britain 
to declare war against Germany without having definitely set- 
tled our policy towards China has no real connection with our 
future negotiations with China or affect the political condition 
in the Far East. Consequently all intelligent Japanese, of 
every walk of life throughout the land, are very deeply con- 
cerned about the matter. 

Our Imperial Government should now definitely change our 
dependent foreign policy which is being directed by others into 
an independent foreign policy which shall direct others, pro- 
claiming the same with solemn sincerity to the world and carry- 
ing it out with determination. If we do so, even the gods and, 
spirits will give way. These are important points in our policy 
towards China and the result depends on how we carry them 
out. Can our authorities firmly make up their mind to solve 
this Chinese Question by the actual carrying out of this funda- 
mental principle? If they show irresolution while we have this 
heaven-conferred chance and merely depend on the good will of 
the other Powers, we shall eventually have greater pressure to 
be brought against the Far East after the European War is 
over, when the present equilibrium will be destroyed. That day 
will then be too late for us to repent of our folly. We are 



138 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

therefore impelled by force of circumstances to urge our au- 
thorities to a quicker sense of the situation and to come to a 
determination. 

The first point which leaps out of this extraordinarily- 
frank disquisition is that the origin of the Twenty-one 
Demands is at last disclosed. A perusal of the ten 
articles forming the basis of the Defensive alliance pro- 
posed by the Black Dragon Society, allows us to under- 
stand everything that occurred in Peking in the spring 
of 1915. As far back as November, 1914, it was gen- 
erally rumoured in Peking that Japan had a surprise 
of an extraordinary nature in her diplomatic archives, 
and that it would be merely a matter of weeks before 
it was sprung. Comparing this elaborate memoran- 
dum of the Black Dragon Society with the original 
text of the Twenty-one Demands it is plain that the 
proposed plan, having been handed to Viscount Kato, 
had to be passed through the diplomatic filters again 
and again until all gritty matter had been removed, and 
an appearance of innocuousness given to it. It is for 
this reason that the defensive alliance finally emerges 
as five compact little "groups" of demands, with the 
vital things directly affecting Chinese sovereignty 
labelled desiderata^ so that Japanese ambassadors abroad 
could leave very warm assurances at every Foreign 
Office that there was nothing in what Japan desired 
which in any way conflicted with the Treaty rights of 
the Powers in China. The air of mystery which sur- 
rounded the whole business from the 18th January to 
the 7th May — ^the day of the ultimatum — was due to 
the fact that Japan attempted to translate the conspir- 
acy into terms of ordinary intercourse, only to find that 
in spite of the "filtering" the atmosphere of plotting 



V-: 




The Pekrless Lake of the Summer Palace Near Peking 




AxoTHER View of the Peerless Lake of the Summer 
Palace Near Pekixg 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 139 

could not be shaken off or the poHtical threat adequately 
hidden. There is an arresting piece of psychology in 
this. 

The conviction expressed in the first portion of the 
Memorandum that bankruptcy was the rock on which 
the Peking administration must sooner or later split, 
and that the moment which Japan must seize is the out- 
break of insurrections, is also highly instructive in view 
of what happened later. Still more subtle is the man- 
ner in which the ultimate solution is left open: it is 
consistently admitted throughout the mass of reasoning 
that there is no means of knowing whether suasion or 
force will ultimately be necessary. Force, however, al- 
ways beckons to Japan because that is the simplest 
formula. And since Japan is the self-appointed de- 
fender of the dumb four hundred millions, her influence 
will be thrown on the side of the populace in order "to 
usher into China a new era of prosperity" so that China 
and Japan may in fact as well as in name be brought 
into the most intimate and vital relations with each 
other. 

The object of the subsidized insurrections is also 
clearly stated: it is to alter China's republican form of 
government into a Constitutional Monarchy which shall 
necessarily be identical in all its details to the Constitu- 
tional Monarchy of Japan and to no other. Who the 
new Emperor is to be is a point left in suspense, although 
we may here again recall that in 1912 in the midst of the 
revolution Japan privately sounded England regarding 
the advisability of lending the Manchus armed assist- 
ance, a proposal which was immediately vetoed. But 
there are other things : nothing is forgotten in the Memo- 
randum. Russia is to be specially placated, England 



140 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to be specially negotiated with, thus incidentally ex- 
plaining Japan's recent attitude regarding the 
Yangtsze Railways. Japan, released from her de- 
pendent foreign policy, that is from a policy which is 
bound by conventions and treaties which others respect, 
can then carry out her own plans without fear of mo- 
lestation. 

And this brings us to the two last documents of the 
dossier — the method of subsidizing and arranging in- 
surrections in China when and wherever necessary. 

The first document is a detailed agreement between 
th Revolutionary Party and various Japanese mer- 
chants. Trained leaders are to be used in the pro- 
vinces South of the Yellow River, and the matter of 
result is so systematized that the agreement specifies 
the amount of compensation to be paid for every 
Japanese killed on active sendee; it declares that the 
Japanese will deliver arms and ammunition in the dis- 
tricts of Jihchow in Shantung and Haichow in Kiangsu ; 
and it ends by stating that the first instalment of cash. 
Yen 400,000, had been paid over in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement. The second document is an 
additional loan agreement between the interested par- 
ties creating a special "trading" corporation, perhaps 
satirically named "The Europe and Asia Trading Com- 
pany," which in a consideration of a loan of half a mil- 
lion yen gives Japanese prior rights over all the mines 
of China. 

ALLEGED SECRET AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN SUN WEN (sUN 
YAT sen) and THE JAPANESE 

In order to preserve the peace in the Far East, it is neces- 
sary for China and Japan to enter into an offensive and defen- 
sive alliance whereby in case of war with any other nation or 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 141 

nations Japan shall supply the military force while China shall 
be responsible for the finances. It is impossible for the pres- 
ent Chinese Government to work hand in hand with the Jap- 
anese Government nor does the Japanese Government desire to 
co-operate with the former. Consequently Japanese politicians 
and merchants who have the peace of the Far East at heart 
are anxious to assist China in her reconstruction. For this 
object the following Agreement is entered into by the two 
parties : 

1. Before an uprising is started, Terao, Okura, Tseji Karoku 
and their associates shall provide the necessary funds, weapons 
and military force, but the funds so provided must not exceed 
1,500,000 yen and rifles not to exceed 100,000 pieces. 

2. Before the uprising takes place the loan shall be tem- 
porarily secured by 10,000,000 yen worth of bonds to be is- 
sued by Sun Wen (Sun Yat Sen). It shall however be secured 
afterwards by all the movable properties of the occupied terri- 
tory. (See Article 14 of this Agreement.) 

S. The funds from the present loan and military force to be 
provided are for operations in the provinces South of the Yellow 
River viz: Yunnan, Kweichow, Hunan, Hupeh, Szechuan, 
Kiangsi, Anhuei, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangsi and 
Kwangtung. If it is intended to invade the Northern provinces 
North of the Yellow River, Tseji Karoku and his associates 
shall participate with the revolutionists in all deliberations con- 
nected with such operations. 

4. The Japanese volunteer force shall be allowed from the 
date of their enrolment active service pay in accordance with 
the regulations of the Japanese army. After the occupation of 
a place, the two parties will settle the mode of rewarding the 
meritorious and compensating the family of the killed, adopt- 

-ing the most generous practice in vogue in China and Japan. 
In the case of the killed, compensation for each soldier shall, 
at the least, be more than 1,000 yen. 

5. Wherever the revolutionary army might be located the 
Japanese military officers accompanying these expeditions shall 
have the right to advise a continuation or cessation of opera- 
tions. 



142 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

6. After the revolutionary army has occupied a re- 
gion and strengthened its defences, all industrial un- 
dertakings and railway construction and the like, 
not mentioned in the Treaties with other foreign Powers, 
shall be worked with joint capital together with the Japan- 
ese. 

7. On the establishment of a new Government in China, all 
Japan's demands on China shall be recognized by the new Gov- 
ernment as settled and binding. 

8. All Japanese Military Officers holding the rank of Captain 
or higher ranks engaged by the Chinese revolutionary army 
shall have the privilege of being continued in their employment 
with a limit as to date and shall have the right to ask to be 
thus employed. 

9. The loan shall be paid over in three instalments. The 
first instalment will be 400,000 yen, the second instalment 

( yen and the third instalment yen. After the 

first instalment is paid over, Okura who advances the loan shall 
have the right to appoint men to supervise the expenditure of 
the money. 

10. The Japanese shall undertake to deliver all arms and 
ammunition in the Districts of Jih Chao and Haichow (in Shan- 
tung and Kiangsu, South of Kiaochow). 

11. The payment of the first instalment of the loan shall be 
made not later than three days after the signing of this 
Agreement. 

12. All the employed Japanese Military officers and Japan- 
ese volunteers are in duty bound to obey the orders of the 
Commander of the revolutionary army. 

13. The Commander of the revolutionary army shall have 
the right to send back to Japan those Japanese military officers 
and Japanese volunteers who disobey his orders and their pass- 
age money shall not be paid if such decision meets with the 
approval of three or more of the Japanese who accompany the 
revolutionary force. 

14. All the commissariat departments in the occupied terri- 
tory must employ Japanese experts to co-operate in their man- 
agement. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 143 

15. This Agreement takes effect immediately it is signed by 
the two parties. 

The foregoing fifteen articles have been discussed several 
times between the two parties and signed by them in February. 
The first instalment of 400,000 yen has been paid according to 
the terms of this Agreement. 

LOAN AGREEMENT MADE BETWEEN THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY 
REPRESENTED BY CHANG YAO CHING AND HIS ASSOCIATES OF 
THE EIRST PART AND KAWASAKI KULANOSKE OF THE SECOND 
PART 

1. The Europe and Asia Trading Company undertakes to 
raise a loan of 500,000 yen. After the Agreement is signed 
and sealed by the contracting parties the Japanese Central 
Bank shall hand over 3/10 of the loan as the first instalment. 
When Chang Yao Ching and his associates arrive at their 
proper destination the sum of 150,000 yen shall be paid over 
as the second instalment. When final arrangements are made 
the third and last instalment of 200,000 yen shall be paid. 

2. When money is to be paid out, the Europe and Asia Trad- 
ing Company shall appoint supervisers. Responsible individu- 
als of the contracting parties shall jointly affix their seals (to 
the checks) before money is drawn for expenditure. 

3. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall secure a 
volunteer force of 150 men, only retired officers of the Japanese 
army to be eligible. 

4. On leaving Japan the travelling expenses and personal 
effects of the volunteers shall be borne by themselves. After 
reaching China, Chang Yao Ching and his associates shall give 
the volunteers the pay of officers of the subordinate grade ac- 
cording to the established regulations of the Japanese army. 

5. If a volunteer is wounded while on duty Chang Yao Ching 
and his associates shall pay him a provisional compensation of 
not exceeding 1,000 yen. When wounded seriously a pro- 
visional compensation of 5,000 yen shall be paid as well as a 
life pension in accordance with the rules of the Japanese army. 
If a volunteer meets with an accident, thus losing his life, an 
indemnity of 50,000 yen shall be paid to his family. 



144 THE FIGHT FOE THE 

6. If a volunteer is not qualified for duty Change Yao-ching 
and his associates shall have the power to dismiss him. All vol- 
unteers are subject to the orders of Chang Yao-ching and his 
associates and to their command in the battlefields. 

7. When volunteers are required to attack a certain se- 
lected place it shall be their duty to do so. But the necessary 
expenses for the undertaking shall be determined beforehand 
by both parties after investigating into existing conditions. 

8. The volunteer force shall be organized after the model of 
the Japanese army. Two Japanese officers recommended by 
the Europe and Asia Trading Company shall be employed. 

9. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the 
power to dispose of the public properties in the places occupied 
by the volunteer force. 

10. The Europe and Asia Trading Company shall have the 
first preference for working the mines in places occupied and 
protected by the volunteer force. 

And here ends this extraordinary collection of papers. 
Is fiction mixed with fact — are these only "trial" drafts, 
or are they real documents signed, sealed, and deliv- 
ered? The point seems unimportant. The thing of 
importance is the undoubted fact that assembled and 
treated in the way we have treated them they present a 
complete and arresting picture of the aims and ambi- 
tions of the ordinary Japanese; of their desire to push 
home the attack to the last gasp and so to secure the 
infeodation of China. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE MONARCHIST PLOT 

THE PAMPHLET OF YANG TU 

A SHIVER of impotent rage passed over the country 
when the nature and acceptance of the Japanese Ulti- 
matum became generally known. The Chinese, always 
an emotional people responding with quasi-feminine 
volubility to oppressive acts, cried aloud at the igno- 
miny of the diplomacy which had so cruelly crucified 
them. One and all declared that the day of shame 
which had been so harshly imposed upon them would 
never be forgotten and that Japan would indeed pay 
bitterly for her policy of extortion. 

Two movements were started at once : one to raise a 
National Salvation Fund to be apphed towards 
strengthening the nation in any way the government 
might decide ; the other, to boycott all Japanese articles 
of commerce. Both soon attained formidable propor- 
tions. The nation became deeply and fervently inter- 
ested in the double-idea; and had Yuan Shih-kai pos- 
sessed true political vision there is little doubt that by 
responding to this national call he might have ultimately 
been borne to the highest pinnacles of his ambitions 
without effort on his part. His oldest enemies now 
openly declared that henceforth he had only to work 
honourably and whole-heartedly in the nation's inter- 
est to find them supporting him, and to have every black 
mark set against his name wiped out. 

145 



146 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

In these circumstances what did he do? His actions 
form one of the most incredible and, let it be said, con- 
temptible chapters of contemporary history. 

In dealing with the origins of the Twenty-one De- 
mands we have already discussed the hints the Japan 
Kepresentative had officially made when presenting his 
now famous Memorandum. Briefly Yuan Shih-kai 
had been told in so many words that since he was al- 
ready autocrat of all the Chinese, he had only to endorse 
the principle of Japanese guidance in his administra- 
tion to find that his Throne would be as good as publicly 
and solidly established. Being saturated with the dole- 
ful diplomacy of Korea, and seeing in these proposals a 
mere trap. Yuan Shih-kai, as we have shown, had drawn 
back in apparent alarm. Nevertheless the words 
spoken had sunk in deep, for the simple and excellent 
reason that ever since the coup d'etat of the 4th Novem- 
ber, 1913, the necessity of "consolidating" his position 
by something more permanent than a display of armed 
force had been a daily subject of conversation in the 
bosom of his family. The problem, as this misguided 
man saw it, was simply by means of an unrivalled dis- 
play of cunning to profit by the Japanese suggestion, 
and at the same time to leave the Japanese in the lurch. 

His eldest son, an individual of whom it has been 
said that he had absorbed every theory his foreign 
teachers had taught him without being capable of ap- 
plying a single one, was the leader in this family in- 
trigue. The unhappy victim of a brutal attempt to 
kill him during the Bevolution, this eldest son had been 
for years semi-paralyzed: but brooding over his dis- 
aster had only fortified in him the resolve to succeed his 
father as legitimate Heir. Having saturated himself 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 147 

in Napoleonic literature, and being fully aware of how 
far a bold leader can go in times of emergency, he daily 
preached to his father the necessity of plucking the pear 
as soon as it was ripe. The older man, being more 
skilled and more cautious in statecraft than this youth- 
ful visionary, purposely rejected the idea so long as its 
execution seemed to him premature. But at last the 
point was reached when he was persuaded to give the 
monarchy advocates the free hand they solicited, being 
largely helped to this decision by the argument that al- 
most anything in China could be accomplished under 
cover of the war, — so long as vested foreign interests 
were not jeopardized. 

In accordance with this decision, very shortly after the 
18th January,^ the dictator's lieutenants had begim to 
sound the leaders of public opinion regarding the feas- 
ibihty of substituting for the nominal Republic a Con- 
stitutional Monarchy. Thus, in a highly characteristic 
way, all through the tortuous course of the Japanese 
negotiations, to which he was supposed to be devoting 
his sole attention in order to save his menaced father- 
land. Yuan Shih-kai was assisting his henchmen to in- 
doctrinate Peking officialdom with the idea that the 
salvation of the State depended more on restoring on 
a modified basis the old empire than in beating off the 
Japanese assault. It was his belief that if some scholar 
of national repute could be found, who would openly 
champion these ideas and urge them with such per- 
suasiveness and authority that they became accepted as 
a Categorical Imperative, the game would be as good 
as won, the Foreign Powers being too deeply com- 
mitted abroad to pay much attention to the Far 
East. The one man who could have produced that 



148 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

result in the way Yuan Sliih-kai desired to see it, the 
brilliant reformer Liang Chi-chao, famous ever since 
1898, however, obstinately refused to lend himself to 
such work ; and, sooner than be involved in any way in 
the plot, threw up his post of Minister of Justice and 
retired to the neighbouring city of Tientsin from which 
centre he was destined to play a notable part. 

This hitch occasioned a delay in the public propa- 
ganda, though not for long. Forced to turn to a man 
of secondary ability, Yuan Shih-kai now invoked the 
services of a scholar who had been known to be his secret 
agent in the Old Imperial Senate under the Manchus — a 
certain Yang Tu — whose constant appeals in that cham- 
ber had indeed been the means of forcing the Manchus 
to summon Yuan Shih-kai back to office to their res- 
cue on the outbreak of the Wuchang rebellion in 1911. 
After very little discussion everything was arranged. 
In the person of this ex- Senator, whose whole appear- 
ance was curiously Machiavellian and decadent, the neo- 
imperialists at last found their champion. 

Events now moved quickly enough. In the Eastern 
way, very few weeks after the Japanese Ultimatum, a 
society was founded called the Society for the Preserva- 
tion of Peace (Cliou An Hut) and hundreds of affilia- 
tions opened in the provinces. Money was spent like 
water to secure adherents, and when the time was deemed 
ripe the now famous pamphlet of Yang Tu was pub- 
lished broadcast, being in everybody's hands during the 
idle summer month of August. This document is so 
remarkable as an illustration of the working of that 
type of Chinese mind which has assimilated some por- 
tion of the facts of the modern world and yet remains 
thoroughly reactionary and illogical, that special at- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 149 

tention must be directed to it. Couched in the form of 
an argument between two individuals— one the in- 
quirer, the other the expounder — it has something 
of the old Testament about it both in its blind faith and 
in its insistence on a few simple essentials. It embodies 
everything essential to an understanding of the old 
mentality of China which has not yet been completely 
destroyed. From a Hterary standpoint it has also much 
that is valuable because it is so naive ; and although it is 
concerned with such a distant region of the world as 
China its treatment of modern political ideas is so bi- 
zarre and yet so acute that it will repay study. 

It was not, however, for some time, that the signfi- 
cance of this pamphlet was generally understood. It 
was such an amazing departure from old precedents 
for the Peking Government to lend itself to public prop- 
aganda as a revolutionary weapon that the mind of the 
people refused to credit the fatal turn things were tak- 
ing. But presently when it became known that the "So- 
ciety for the Preservation of Peace" was actually housed 
in the Imperial City and in daily relations with the Pres- 
ident's Palace; and that furthermore the Procurator- 
General of Peking, in response to innumerable 
memorials of denunciation, having attempted to pro- 
ceed against the author and publishers of the pamphlet, 
as well as against the Society, had been forced to leave 
the capital under threats against his life, the document 
was accepted at its face-value. Almost with a gasp of 
incredulity China at last realized that Yuan Shih-kai had 
been seduced to the point of openly attempting to make 
himself Emperor. From those August days of 1915 
until the 6th June of the succeeding year, when Fate had 
her own grim revenge, Peking was given up to one of 



150 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the most amazing episodes that has ever been chronicled 
in the dramatic history of the capital. It was as if the 
old city walls, which had looked down on so much real 
drama, had determined to lend themselves to the staging 
of an unreal comedy. For from first to last the mon- 
archy movement had something unreal about it, and 
might have been the scenario of some vast picture-play. 
It was acting pure and simple — acting done in the hope 
that the people might find it so admirable that they 
would acclaim it as real, and call the Dictator their King. 
But it is time to turn to the arguments of Yang Tu and 
allow a Chinese to picture the state of his country : 

A DEFENCE OP THE MONARCHICAL, MOVEMENT 
PART I 

Mr. Kg (or 'the stranger') : Since the establishment of the 
Republic four years have passed, and upon the President de- 
pends the preservation of order at home and the maintenance 
of prestige abroad. I suppose that after improving her in- 
ternal administration for ten or twenty years, China will be- 
come a rich and prosperous country, and will be able to stand 
in the front rank with western nations. 

Mr. Hu : No ! No ! If China does not make any change in 
the form of government there is no hope for her becoming 
strong and rich; there is even no hope for her having a con- 
stitutional government. I say that China is doomed to perish. 

Mr. Ko: Why so? 

Mr. Hu: The republican form of government is responsi- 
ble. The Chinese people are fond of good names, but they do 
not care much about the real welfare of the nation. No plan 
to save the country is possible. The formation of the Repub- 
lic as a result of the first revolution has prevented that, 

Mr. Ko : Why is it that there is no hope of China's becom- 
ing strong? 

Mr. Hu : The people of a republic are accustomed to listen 
to the talk of equality and freedom which must affect the politi- 




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REPUBLIC IN CHINA 151 

cal and more especially the military administration. In normal 
circumstances both the military and student classes are required 
to lay great emphasis upon unquestioned obedience and respect 
for those who hold high titlesl The German and Japanese 
troops observe strict discipline and obey the orders of their 
chiefs. That is why they are regarded as the best soldiers in 
the world. France and America are in a different position. 
They are rich but not strong. The sole difference is that Ger- 
many and Japan are ruled by monarchs while France and 
America, are republics. Our conclusion therefore is that no 
republic can be strong. 

But since the French and American peoples possess general 
education, they are in a position to assume responsibility for 
the good government of their nations which they keep in good 
order. On that account, although these republics are not 
strong in dealing with the Powers, they can maintain peace at 
home. China, however, is unlike these countries, for her stand- 
ard of popiilar education is very low. Most of the Chinese 
soldiers declare as a commonplace; "We eat the imperial food 
and we must therefore serve the imperial master." But now 
the Imperial family is gone, and for it has been substituted an 
impersonal republic, of which they know nothing whatsoever. 
These soldiers are now law-abiding because they have awe- 
inspiring and respectful feelings for the man at the head of the 
state. But as the talk of equality and freedom has gradually 
influenced them, it has become a more difficult task to control 
them. As an example of this corrupt spirit, the commanders 
of the Southern troops formerly had to obey their subordinate 
officers and the subordinate officers had to obey their soldiers. 
Whenever there was an important question to be discussed, the 
soldiers demanded a voice and a share in the solution. These 
soldiers were called the republican army. Although the North- 
ern troops have not yet become so degenerate, still they never 
hesitate to disobey the order of their superiors whenever they 
are ordered to proceed to distant locahties. Now we have 
come to the point when we are deeply satisfied if the army of 
the Republic does not openly mutiny ! We cannot expect any 
more from them save to hope that they will not mutiny and 



152 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

that they will be able to suppress internal disturbances. In 
the circumstances there is no use talking about resistance of a 
foreign invasion by these soldiers. As China, a republic, is 
situated between two countries, Japan and Russia, both of 
which have monarchical governments, how can we resist their 
aggression once diplomatic conversations begin? From this 
it is quite evident that there is nothing which can save China 
from destruction. Therefore I say there is no hope of China 
becoming strong. 

Mr. Ko : But why is it that there is no hope of China ever 
becoming rich? 

Mr. Hu: People may not believe that while France and 
America are rich China must remain poor. Nevertheless, the 
reason why France and America are rich is that they were 
allowed to work out their own salvation without foreign inter- 
vention for many years, and that at the same time they were 
free from internal disturbances. If any nation wishes to be- 
come rich, it must depend upon industries for its wealth. Now, 
what industries most fear is disorder and civil war. During 
the last two years order has been restored and many things 
have returned their former State, but our industrial condi- 
tion is the same as under the Manchu Dynasty. Merchants who 
lost their capital during the troublous times and who are now 
poor have no way of retrieving their losses, while those who are 
rich are unwilling to invest their money in industrial under- 
takings, fearing that another civil war may break out at any 
moment, since they take the recent abortive second revolution 
as their warning. In future, we shall have disquietude every 
few years ; that is whenever the president is changed. Then our 
industrial and commercial condition will be in a still worse con- 
dition. If our industries are not developed, how can we expect 
to be strong? Take Mexico as a warning. There is very little 
difference between that country and China, which certainly can- 
not be compared with France and America. Therefore I say 
there is no hope for China ever becoming rich. 

Mr. Ko : Why is it that you say there Is no hope for China 
having a Constitutional Government? 

Mr. Hu : A true republic must be conducted by many people 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 153 

possessing general education, political experience and a certain 
political morality. Its president is invested with power by the 
people to manage the general affairs of the state. Should the 
people desire to elect Mr. A their president today and Mr. B 
tomorrow, it does not make much diiFerence; for the policy of 
the country may be changed together with the change of the 
president without there being any danger of disorder of chaos 
following such change. We have a very different problem to 
solve in China. The majority of our people do not know what 
the republic is, nor do they know anything about a Constitu- 
tion nor have they any true sense of equality and freedom. 
Having overthrown the Empire and established in its place a 
republic they believe that from now on they are subservient to 
no one, and they think they can do as they please. Ambitious 
men hold that any person may be president and if they cannot 
get the presidency by fair means of election they are prepared 
to fight for it with the assistance of troops and robbers. The 
second revolution is an illustration of this point. From the 
moment that the Emperor was deposed, the centralization of 
power in the government was destroyed ; and no matter who may 
be at the head of the country, he cannot restore peace except 
by the re-establishment of the monarchy. So at the time when 
the republic was formed, those who had previously advocated 
Constitutional Government turned into monarchists. Although 
we have a Provisional Constitution now and we have all kinds of 
legislative organs, which give to the country an appearance of 
a constitutional government, China has a constitutional gov- 
ernment in name only and is a monarchy in spirit. Had the 
government refrained from exercising monarchical power dur- 
ing the last four years, the people could not have enjoyed one 
day of peace. In short, China's republic must be governed by a 
monarchy through a constitutional government. If the con- 
stitutional government cannot govern the republic, the latter 
cannot remain. The question of constitutional government is 
therefore very important, but it will take ten or twenty years 
before it can be solved. 

Look at the people of China today ! They know that some- 
thing terrible is going to come sooner or later. They dare not 



154 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

think of the future. The corrupt official lines his pocket with 
unrighteous money, preparing to flee to foreign countries or at 
least to the Foreign Settlements for safety. The cautious work 
quietly and do not desire to earn merit but merely try to avoid 
giving offence. The scholars and politicians are grandilo- 
quent and discourse upon their subjects in a sublime vein, but 
they are no better than the corrupt officials. As for our Presi- 
dent, he can remain at the head of the State for a few years. 
At most he may hold office for several terms, — or perhaps for 
his whole life. Then questions must arise as to who shall suc- 
ceed him ; how to elect his successor ; how many rivals will there 
be; whether their policies will be different from his, etc., etc. 
He personally has no idea regarding the solution of these ques- 
tions. Even if the president is a sagacious and capable man, 
he will not be able to make a policy for the country or fix a 
Constitution which will last for a hundred years. Because of 
this he is driven merely to adopt a policy so as to maintain 
peace in his own country and to keep the nation intact so long 
as he may live. In the circumstances such a president can be 
considered the best executive head we can have. Those who are 
worshippers of the constitutional government cannot do more 
than he does. Here we find the reason for the silence of the 
former advocates of a constitutional administration. They 
have realized that by the formation of the republic the funda- 
mental problem of the country has been left unsolved. In this 
wise it happens that the situation is something like this. 
Whilst the country is governed by an able president, the people 
enjoy peace and prosperity. But once an incapable man as- 
sumes the presidency, chaos will become the order of the day. a 
state of affairs which will finally lead to the overthrow of the 
president himself and the destruction of the country. In such 
circumstances, how can you devise a general policy for the 
country which will last for a hundred years? I say that there 
is no hope for China establishing a truly constitutional govern- 
ment. 

Mr. Ko : In your opinion there is no hope for China becom- 
ing strong and rich or for her acquiring a constitutional gov- 
ernment. She has no choice save ultimately to disappear. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 155 

And yet is there no plan possible whereby she may be saved? 

Mr. Hu: If China wishes to save herself from ultimate dis- 
appearance from the face of the earth, first of all she must get 
rid of the republic. Should she desire wealth and strength, she 
must adopt a constitutional government. Should she want 
constitutional government she must first establish a monarchy. 

Mr. Ko: How is it that should China desire wealth and 
strength she must first adopt the constitutional form of gov- 
ernment ? 

Mr. Hu: Wealth and strength is the object of the coun- 
try, and a constitutional government is the means to realizing 
this object. In the past able rulers could accomplish their 
purpose without a constitutional government. We refer to 
Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty and Emperor Tai Chung of 
the Tang Dynasty. However, when these able rulers died their 
system of administration died with them. This contention 
can be supported by numerous historical instances ; but suf- 
fice to say that in China as well as in Europe, the lack of a con- 
stitutional government has been the cause of the weakness of 
most of the nations in ancient times. Japan was never known as 
a strong nation until she adopted a constitutional government. 
The reason is this : when there is no constitutional govern- 
ment, the country cannot continue to carry out a definite 
policy. 

Within comparatively recent times there was born in Eu- 
rope the constitutional form of government. European na- 
tions adopted it, and they became strong. The most danger- 
ous fate that can confront a nation is that after the death of 
an able ruler the system of administration he has established 
disappears with him ; but this the constitutional form of gov- 
ernment is able to avert. Take for instance William I of 
Germany who is dead but whose country continues to this day 
strong and prosperous. It is because of constitutional gov- 
ernment. The same is true of Japan, which has adopted con- 
stitutional government and which is becoming stronger and 
stronger every day. The change of her executive cannot af- 
fect her progress in respect of her strength. From this it is 
quite clear that constitutional goyernnient is a useful instru- 



156 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ment for building up a country. It is a government with a set 
of fixed laws which guard the actions of both the people and the 
president none of whom can overstep the boundary as specified in 
the laws. No ruler, whether be he a good man or a bad man, 
can change one iota of the laws. The people reap the benefit 
of this in consequence. It is easy to make a country strong 
and rich but it is diflScult to establish a constitutional govern- 
ment. When a constitutional government has been established, 
everything will take care of itself, prosperity following nat- 
urally enough. The adoption of a constitutional government 
at the present moment can be compared to the problem of a de- 
railed train. It is hard to put the train back on the track, 
but once on the track it is very easy to move the train. What 
we should worry about is not how to make the country rich and 
prosperous, but how to form a genuine constitutional govern- 
ment. Therefore I say that if China desires to be strong and 
prosperous, she should first of all adopt the constitutional 
form of government. 

Mr. Ko: I do not understand why it is that a monarchy 
should be established before the constitutional form of gov- 
ernment can be formed ? 

Mr. Hu: Because if the present system continues there 
will be intermittent trouble. At every change of the president 
there will be riot and civil war. In order to avert the possi- 
bility of such aweful times place the president in a position 
which is permanent. It follows that the best thing is to make 
him Emperor. When that bone of contention is removed, the 
people will settle down to business and feel peace in their hearts, 
and devote their whole energy and time to the pursuit of their 
Vocations. It is logical to assume that after the adoption of 
the monarchy they will concentrate their attention on securing 
a constitutional government which they know is the only salva- 
tion for their country. As for the Emperor, knowing that he 
derives his position from the change from a republic, and filled 
with the desire of pacifying the people, he cannot help sanction- 
ing the formation of the constitutional form of government, 
which in addition, will insure to his offspring the continuation 
of the Throne, Should he adopt any other course, he will be 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 157 

exposed to great personal danger. If he is broadminded, he 
will further recognize the fact that if no constitutional form 
of government is introduced, his policy will perish after his 
death. Therefore I say that before the adoption of the con- 
stitutional form of government, a monarchy should be estab- 
lished. William I of Germany and the Emperor Meiji of 
Japan both tried the constitutional form of government and 
found it a success. 

Mr. Ko : Please summarize your discussion. 

Mr. Hu: In short, the country cannot be saved except 
through the establishment of a constitutional form of govern- 
ment. No constitutional government can be formed except 
through the establishment of a monarchy. The constitutional 
form of government has a set of fixed laws, and the monarchy 
has a definite head who cannot be changed, in which matters lies 
the source of national strength and wealth. 

Mr. Ko : What you have said in regard to the adoption of 
the constitutional monarchy as a means of saving the country 
from dismemberment is quite true, but I would like to have 
your opinion on the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
a republic and a monarchy, assuming that China adopts the 
scheme of a monarchy. 

Mr. Hu: I am only too glad to give you my humble opin- 
ion on this momentous question. 

Mr. Ko : You have said that China would be devastated by 
contending armies of rival leaders trying to capture the presi- 
dency. At what precise moment will that occur? 

Mr. Hu: The four hundred million people of China now 
rely upon the President alone for the protection of their lives 
and property. Upon him likewise falls the burden of preserv- 
ing both peace and the balance of power in the Far East, 
There is no time in the history of China that the Head of the 
State has had to assume such a heavy responsibility for the 
protection of life and property and for the preservation of 
peace in Asia; and at no time in our history has the country 
been in greater danger than at the present moment. China 
can enjoy peace so long as His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai re- 
mains the President, and no longer. Should anything befall 



158 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the President, every business activity will at once be suspended, 
shops will be closed, disquietude will prevail, people will become 
panic-stricken, the troops uncontrollable, and foreign warship 
will enter our harbours. European and American newspapers 
will be full of special dispatches about the complicated events 
in China, and martial law will be declared in every part of the 
country. All this will be due to the uncertainty regarding the 
succession to the presidency. 

It will be seen from the first section of this long and 
extraordinaiy pamphlet how the author develops his 
argmnent. One of his major premises is the inherent 
unruliness of Republican soldiery, — the armies of re- 
publics not to be compared with the armed forces of 
monarchies, — and consequently constituting a perpetual 
menace to good government. Passing on from this, he 
lays down the proposition that China cannot hope to 
become rich so long as the fear of civil war is ever- 
present ; and that without a proper universal education 
a republic is an impossibility. The exercise of mo- 
narchical power in such circumstances can only be called 
an inevitable development, — the one goal to be aimed 
at being the substitution of Constitutional Government 
for the dictatorial rule. The author deals at great 
length with the background to this idea, playing on 
popular fears to reinforce his casuistry. For although 
constitutional government is insisted upon as the sole 
solution, he speedily shows that this constitutionalism 
will depend more on the benevolence of the dictator than 
on the action of the people. And should his advice be 
not heeded, when Fortune wills that Yuan Shih-kai's 
rule shall end, chaos will ensue owing to the "uncer- 
tainty" regarding the succession. 

Here the discussion reaches its climax — for the de- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 159 

mand that salvation be sought by enthroning Yuan 
Shih-kai now becomes clear and unmistakable. Let the 
author speak for himself. 

Mr. Ko: But it is provided in the Constitutional Compact 
that a president must be selected from among the three candi- 
dates whose names are now kept in a golden box locked in a 
stone Toom. Do you think this provision is not sufficient to 
avert the terrible times which you have just described? 

Mr. Hu: The provision you have mentioned is useless. 
Can you find any person who is able to be at the head of the 
state besides His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai? The man who can 
succeed President Yuan must enjoy the implicit confidence of 
the people and must have extended his influence all over the 
country and be known both at home and abroad. He must be 
able to maintain order, and then no matter what the consti- 
tution provides, he will be unanimously elected President. He 
must also be able to assure himself that the two other candi- 
dates for the presidency have no hope for success in the presi- 
dential campaign. The provision in the constitution, as well 
as the golden casket in which the names of the three candidates 
are kept which you have mentioned, are nothing but nominal 
measures. Moreover there is no man in China who answers the 
description of a suitable successor which I have just given. 
Here arises a difficult problem; and what has been specified in 
the Constitutional Compact is a vain attempt to solve it. It is 
pertinent to ask why the law-makers should not have made the 
law in such a way that the people could exercise their free 
choice in the matter of the presidential successor? The an- 
swer is that there is reason to fear that a bad man may be 
elected president by manipulations carried out with a masterly 
hand, thereby jeopardizing the national welfare. This fear 
has influenced the constitution-makers to settle upon three 
candidates from among whom the president must be elected. 
Then it may be asked why not fix upon one man instead of upon 
three since you have already deprived the people of part of 
their freedom? The answer is that: there is not a single 
man whose qualifications are high enough to be the successor. 



160 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

As it is, three candidates of equal qualifications are put for- 
ward for the people to their selection. No matter how one 
may argue this important question from the legal point of 
view, there is the fact that the law makers fixed upon three 
candidates for the presidency, believing that we do not possess 
a suitable presidential successor. The vital question of the 
day setting aside all paper talk, is whether or not China has a 
suitable man to succeed President Yuan Shih-kai. Whether or 
not the constitutional compact can be actually carried out in 
future I do not know ; but I do know that that instrument will 
eventually become ineffective. 

Mr^^ Ko: I desire a true picture of the chaos which you 
have hinted will ensue in this country. Can you tell me any- 
thing along that line? 

Mr. Hu: In a time of confusion, the soldiers play the 
most important part, virtuous and experienced and learned 
statesmen being unable to cope with the situation. The only 
qualification which a leader at such a time needs to possess is 
the control of the military, and the ability to suppress Parlia- 
ment. Should such a person be made the president, he can- 
not long hold his enviable post in view of the fact that he can- 
not possess sufficient influence to control the troops of the 
whole country. The generals of equal rank and standing will 
not obey each other, while the soldiers and politicians, seeing a 
chance in these differences for their advancement, will stir up 
their feelings and incite one another to fight. They will fight 
hard among themselves. The rebels, who are now exiles in for- 
eign lands, taking advantage of the chaos in China, will re- 
turn in very little time to perpetrate the worst crimes known 
in human history. The royalists who are in retirement will 
likewise come out to fish in muddy waters. Persons who have 
the qualifications of leaders will be used as tools to fight for the 
self-aggrandizement of those who use them. I do not wish to 
mention names, but I can safely predict that more than ten dif- 
ferent parties will arise at the psychological moment. Men 
who will never be satisfied until they become president, and 
those who know they cannot get the presidency but who are un- 
willing to serve others, will come out one after another. Con- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 161 

fusion and disturbance will follow with great rapidity. Then 
foreign countries which have entertained wild ambitions, avail- 
ing themselves of the distressful situation in China, will stir 
up ill-feelings among these parties and so increase the dis- 
turbances. When the proper time comes, various countries, 
unwilling to let a single country enjoy the privilege of con- 
trolling China, will resort to armed intervention. In conse- 
quence the eastern problem will end in a rupture of the inter- 
national peace. Whether China will be turned at that time 
into a battleground for the Chinese people or for the foreign 
Powers I cannot tell you. It is too dreadful to think of the 
future which is enshrouded in a veil of mystery. However, I 
can tell you that the result of this awful turmoil will be either 
the slicing of China like a melon or the suppression of in- 
ternal trouble with foreign assistance which will lead to dis- 
memberment. As to the second result some explanation is 
necessary. After foreign countries have helped us to suppress 
internal disturbances, they will select a man of the type of Li 
Wang of Korea, who betrayed his country to Japan, and make 
him Emperor of China. Whether this man will be the deposed 
emperor or a member of the Imperial family or the leader of 
the rebel party, remains to be seen. In any event he will be a 
figurehead in whose hand will not be vested political, financial 
and military power, which will be controlled by foreigners. All 
the valuable mines, various kinds of industries and our abun- 
dant natural resources will likewise be developed by others. 
China will thus disappear as a nation. 

In selecting a man of the Li Wang type, the aforesaid for- 
eign countries will desire merely to facilitate the acquisition of 
China's territory. But there can be easily found such a man 
who bears remarkable resemblance to Li Wang, and who will be 
willing to make a treaty with the foreigners whereby he un- 
patriotically sells his country in exchange for a throne which 
he can never obtain or keep without outside assistance. His 
procedure will be something like this : He will make an alli- 
ance with a foreign nation by which the latter will be given the 
power to carry on foreign relations on behalf of his country. 
In the eyes of foreigners, China will have been destroyed, but 



162 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the people will continue deceived and made to believe that their 
country is still in existence. This is the first step. The sec- 
ond step will be to imitate the example of Korea and make a 
treaty with a certain power, whereby China is annexed and the 
throne abolished. The imperial figure-head then flees to the 
foreign country where he enjoys an empty title. Should you 
then try to make him devise means for regaining the lost terri- 
tory it will be too late. For China will have been entirely de- 
stroyed by that time. This is the second procedure in the 
annexation of Chinese territory. The reason why that foreign 
country desires to change the republic into the monarchy is to 
set one man on the throne and make him witness the whole proc- 
ess of annexation of his country, thereby simplifying the mat- 
ter. When that time has come, the people will not be per- 
mitted to make any comment upon the form of government suit- 
able for China, or upon the destruction of their country. The 
rebels who raised the standard of the republic have no prin- 
ciples and if they now find that some other tactics will help to 
increase their power they will adopt these tactics. China's 
republic is doomed, no matter what happens. If we do not 
change it ourselves, others will do it for us. Should we under- 
take the change ourselves we can save the nation: otherwise 
there is no hope for China to remain a nation. It is to be re- 
gretted that our people now assume an attitude of indifference, 
being reluctant to look forward to the future, and caring not 
what may happen to them and their country. They are 
doomed to become slaves after the loss of their national inde- 
pendence. 

Mr. Ko : I am very much frightened by what you have said. 
You have stated that the adoption of a constitutional mon- 
archy can avert such terrible consequences ; but is , there _not 
likely to be disturbance during the change of the republic to 
monarchy, since such disturbance must always accompany the 
presidential election .^ 

Mr. Hu: No comparison can be formed between these two 
things. There may be tiunult during the change of the form 
of government, but it will be better in comparison with the 
chaos that will some day ensue in the republic. There is no 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 163 

executive head in the country when a republic endeavours to 
select a presidential successor. At such a time, the ambitious 
try to improve their future, while the patriotic are at a loss now 
to do anything which will assist in the maintenance of order. 
Those who are rebellious rise in revolt while those who are peace- 
loving are compelled by circumstances to join their rank and 
file. Should the form of government be transformed into a 
monarchical one, and should the time for change of the head of 
the state come, the successor having already been provided for, 
that will be well-known to the people. Those who are patriotic 
will exert their utmost to preserve peace, and as result the 
heir-apparent can peacefully step on the throne. There are 
persons who will contend for the office of the President, but 
not for the throne. Those who contend for the office of Presi- 
dent do not commit any crime, but those who try to seize the 
throne are rebels. Who dares to contend for the Throne? 

At the time of the change of the president in a republic, am- 
bitious persons arise with the intention of capturing this most 
honourable office, but not so when the emperor is changed. 
Should there be a body of persons hostile to the heir-apparent, 
that body must be very small. Therefore I say that the ene- 
mies of a succeeding Emperor are a few, whilst there are many 
in the case of a presidential successor. This is the first dif- 
ference. 

Those who oppose the monarchy are republican enthusiasts 
or persons who desire to make use of the name of the repubhc 
for their own benefit. These persons will raise trouble even 
without the change of the government. They do not mind dis- 
turbing the peace of the country at the present time when the 
republic exists. It is almost certain that at the first unfurling 
of the imperial flags they will at once grasp such an opportune 
moment and try to satisfy their ambition. Should they rise in 
revolt at the time when the Emperor is changed the Government, 
supported by the loyal statesmen and ofiicials, whose interests 
are bound up with the welfare of the imperial family and whose 
influence has spread far and wide, will be able to deal easily 
with any situation which may develop. Therefore I declare 
that the successor to the throne has more supporters while the 



164 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

presidential successor has few. This is the second difference 
between the republic and the constitutional monarchy. 

Why certain persons will contend for the office of the Presi- 
dent can be explained by the fact that there is not a single man 
in the country whose qualifications are above all the others. 
Succession to the throne is a question of blood-relation with 
the reigning Emperor, and not a question of qualifications. 
The high officials whose qualifications are unusually good are 
not subservient to others but they are obedient to the suc- 
ceeding Emperor, because of their gratitude for what the im- 
perial family has done for them, and because their well-being 
is closely associated with that of the imperial household. I 
can cite an historical incident to support my contention. 
Under the Manchu Dynasty, at one time General Chu Chung- 
tang was entrusted with the task of suppressing the Moham- 
medan rebellion. He appointed General Liu Sung San gen- 
eralissimo. Upon the death of General Liu, Chu Chung-tang 
appointed his subordinate officers to lead the army, but the 
subordinate officers competed for power. Chu Chung-tang 
finally made the step-son of General Liu the Commander-in- 
Chief and the officers and soldiers all obeyed his order as they 
did his father's. But it may be mentioned that this young man 
was not more able than any of his father's subordinate com- 
manders. Nevertheless prestige counted. He owed his suc- 
cess to his natural qualification, being a step-son to General 
Liu. So is the case with the emperor whose successor nobody 
dares openly to defy — to say nothing of actually disputing his 
right to the ttirone. This is the third difference between the 
republic and the monarchy. 

I will not discuss the question: as to whether there being no 
righteous and able heir-apparent to succeed his Emperor- 
father, great danger may not confront the nation. However, 
in order to provide against any such case, I advocate that the 
formation of a constitutional government should go hand in 
hand with the establishment of the monarchy. At first it is 
difficult to establish and carry out a constitutional government, 
but once it is formed it will be comparatively easy. When the 
constitutional government has been established, the Emperor 





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The "r"Ai Lou" on AIkmokiai. Akch, Which is a C'oxsfjc- 
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A Princely Bitrial^ground, the Memorial Tablets Being 
Placed on the Backs of Gl\nt Marble-tortoises 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA^ 165 

will have to seek his fame in such useful things as the defence 
of his country and the conquest of his enemy. Everything has 
to progress, and men possessing European education will be 
made use of by the reigning family. The first Emperor will 
certainly do all he can to capture the hearts of the people by 
means of adopting and carrying out in letter as well as in spirit 
constitutional government. The heir-apparent will pay atten- 
tion to all new reforms and new things. Should he do so, the 
people will be able to console themselves by saying that they 
will always be the people of a constitutional monarchy even 
after the succession to the throne of the heir-apparent. When 
the time comes for the heir-apparent to mount the throne the 
people will extend to him their cordial welcome, and there will 
be no need to worry about internal disturbances. 

Therefore, I conclude that the successor to the presidential 
chair has to prevent chaos by wielding the monarchical power, 
while the new emperor can avert internal disquietude forever 
by means of his constitutional government. This is the fourth 
difference between the republic and the monarchy. These four 
differences are accountable for the fact that there will not be 
as much disturbance at the time of the change of emperors as 
at the time when the president is changed. 

Mr. Ko : I can understand what you have said with regard 
to the advantages and disadvantages of the republic and the 
monarchy, but there are many problems connected with the 
formation of a constitutional monarchy which we have to solve. 
Why is it that the attempt to introduce constitutional govern- 
ment during the last years of the Manchu Dynasty proved a 
failure? 

Mr. Hu: The constitutional government of the Manchu 
Dynasty was one in name only, and as such the forerunner of 
the revolution of 1911. Towards the end of the Manchu 
Dynasty, the talk of starting a revolution to overthrow the 
imperial regime was in everybody's mouth, although the con- 
stitutional party endeavoured to accomplish something really 
useful. At that time His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai was the 
grand chancellor, and realizing the fact that nothing except the 
adoption of a constitutional government could save the throne 



166 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

of the Manchus, he assumed the leadership of the constitutional 
party, which surpassed in strength the revolutionary party as 
a result of his active support. The people's hearts completely 
turned to the constitutional party for salvation, while the 
revolutionary party lost that popular support which it had 
formerly enjoyed. Then it seemed that the imperial house- 
hold would soon adopt the constitutional monarchy and the 
threatening revolution could be averted. Unfortunately, the 
elaborate plans of His Excellency Yuan Shih-kai regarding the 
adoption of the constitutional government were not carried out 
by the imperial household. A great change took place: His 
Excellency retired to his native province ; and after losing this 
powerful leader the constitutional party was pitilessly shat- 
tered. A monarchist party suddenly made its appearance on 
the political arena to assist the imperial family, which pretended 
to do its very best for the development of a constitutional gov- 
ernment, but secretly exerted itself to the utmost for the pos- 
session and retention of the real power. This double-dealing 
resulted in bringing about the revolution of 1911. For in- 
stance, when the people cried for the convening of a parliament, 
the imperial family said "No." The people also failed to se- 
cure the abolition of certain official organs for the imperialists. 
They lost confidence in the Reigning House, and simultaneously 
the revolutionary party raised its banner and gathered its 
supporters from every part of the country. As soon as the 
revolt started at Wuchang the troops all over the country 
joined in the movement to overthrow the Manchu Dynasty. 
The members of the Imperial Senate, most of whom were mem- 
bers of the constitutional party, could not help showing their 
sympathy with the revolutionists. At last the imperial house- 
hold issued a proclamation containing Nineteen Articles — a 
veritable magna carta — but it was too late. The constitu- 
tional government which was about to be formed was thus laid 
aside. What the imperial family did was the mere organiza- 
tion of an advisory council. A famous foreign scholar aptly 
remarked: "A false constitutional government will eventually 
result in a true revolution." In trying to deceive the people by 
means of a false constitutional government the imperial house 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 167 

encompassed its own destruction. Once His Excellency Yuan- 
Shih-kai stated in a memorial to the throne that there were only 
two alternatives : to give the people a constitutional government 
or to have them revolt. What happened afterwards is a mat- 
ter of common knowledge. Therefore I say that the govern- 
ment which the imperial family attempted to form was not a con- 
stitutional government. 

Mr. Ko: Thank you for your discussion of the attempt of 
the imperial household to establish a constitutional government ; 
but how about the Provisional Constitution, the parliament 
and the cabinet in the first and second years of the Republic.'' 
The parliament was then so powerful that the government was 
absolutely at its mercy, thereby disturbing the peaceful condi- 
tion of the country. The people have tasted much of the bit- 
terness of constitutional government. Should you mention the 
name of constitutional government again they would be thor- 
oughly frightened. Is that true? 

Mr. Hu : During the first and second years of the Republic, 
in my many conversations with the members of the Kuo Ming 
Tang, I said that the republic could not form an efficient method 
of control, and that there would be an over centration of power 
through the adoption of monarchical methods of ruling, know- 
ing as well as I did the standards of our people. When the 
members of the Kuo Ming Tang came to draw up the Provi- 
sional Constitution they purposely took precisely the opposite 
course of action and ignored my suggestion. It may, however, 
be mentioned that the Provisional Constitution made in Nank- 
ing was not so bad, but after the government was removed to 
Peking, the Kuo Ming Tang people tied the hand and foot of the 
government by means of the Cabinet System and other re- 
strictions with the intention of weakening the power of the cen- 
tral administration in order that they might be able to start 
another revolution. From the dissolution of the Nanking gov- 
ernment to the time of the second revolution they had this one 
object in view, namely to weaken the power of the central ad- 
ministration so that they could contend for the office of the 
president by raising further internal troubles in China. Those 
members of the Kuo Ming Tang who made the constitution know 



168 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

as well as I that China's republic must be governed through a 
monarchical administration; and therefore the unreasonable 
restrictions in the Provisional Constitution were purposely 
inserted. 

Mr. Ko: What is the difference between the constitutional 
government which you have proposed and the constitutional gov- 
ernment which the Manchu Dynasty intended to adopt? 

Mr. Hu: The difference lies in the proper method of pro- 
cedure and in honesty of purpose, which are imperative if con- 
stitutional government expects to be successful. 

Mr. Ko : What do you mean by the proper method of pro- 
cedure? 

Mr. Hu: The Provisional Constitution made in Nanking, 
which was considered good, is not suitable for insertion in the 
future constitution, should a constitutional monarchy be estab- 
lished. In making a constitution for the future constitutional 
monarchy we have to consult the constitutions of the monarchies 
of the world. They can be divided into three classes which are 
represented by England, Prussia and Japan. England is ad- 
vanced in its constitutional government, which has been in ex- 
istence for thousands of years, (sic) and is the best of all in 
the world. The English king enjoys his empty title and the 
real power of the country is exercised by the parliament, which 
makes all the laws for the nation. As to Prussia, the consti- 
tutional monarchy was established when the people started a 
revolution. The ruler of Prussia was compelled to convene a 
parliament and submitted to that legal body a constitution. 
Prussia's constitution was made by its ruler together with the 
parliament. Its constitutional government is not so good as 
the English. As to the Japanese constitutional monarchy, the 
Emperor made a constitution and then convened a parliament. 
The constitutional power of the Japanese people is still less 
than that of the Prussian people. According to the standard 
of our people we cannot adopt the English constitution as our 
model, for it is too advanced. The best thing for us to do is 
to adopt part of the Prussian and part of the Japanese in our 
constitution-making. As our people are better educated now 
than ever before, it is decidedly unwise entirely to adopt the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 169 

Japanese method, that Is, for the Emperor to make a consti- 
tution without the approval of the parliament and then to con- 
voke a legislative body. In the circumstances China should 
adopt the Prussian method as described above with some modi- 
fications, which will be very suitable to our conditions. As to 
the cantents of the constitution we can copy such articles as 
those providing the right for the issue of urgent orders and 
appropriation of special funds, etc. from the Japanese Con- 
stitution, so that the power of the ruler can be increased with- 
out showing the slightest contempt for the legislative organ. 
I consider that this is the proper method of procedure for the 
formation of a constitutional monarchy for China. 

Mr. Ko : Can I know something about the contents of our 
future constitution in advance? 

Mr. Hu: If you want to know them In detail I recommend 
you to read the Constitutions of Prussia and Japan. But I 
can tell you this much. Needless to say that such stipulations 
as articles guaranteeing the rights of the people and the power 
of the parliament will surely be worked into the future consti- 
tution. These are found In almost every constitution in the 
world. But as the former Provisional Constitution has so pro- 
vided that the power of the parliament is unlimited, while that 
qf^ the president Is very small the Chief Executive, besides con- 
ferring decorations and giving Orders of Merit, having almost 
nothing to do without the approval of the Senate, it is certain 
that nothing will be taken from that Instrument for the future 
constitution. Nor will the makers of the future constitution 
take, anything from the nineteen capitulations offered by the 
Manchu Government, which gave too much power to the legis- 
lative organ. According to the Nineteen Articles the Advisory 
Council was to draw up the constitution, which was to be rati- 
fied by the parliament ; the Premier being elected by the parlia- 
ment ; whilst the use of the army and navy required the parlia- 
ment's sanction ; the making of treaties with foreign countries 
liave likewise to be approved by the parliament, etc., etc. Such 
strict stipulations which are not even known in such an ad- 
vanced country in matters constitutional as England were ex- 
torted from the imperial family by the advisory council. 



170 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Therefore it is most unlikely that the makers of the future 
constitution will take any article from the nineteen capitula- 
tions of "confidence." They will use the Constitutions of Japan 
and Prussia as joint model and will always have in their mind 
the actual conditions of this country and the standard of the 
people. In short, they will copy some of the articles in the 
Japanese constitution, and adopt the Prussian method of pro- 
cedure for the making of the constitution. 

Mr. Ko : What do you mean by honesty,? 

Mr. Hu: It is a bad policy to deceive the people. Indi- 
vidually the people are, simple.j but they cannot be deceived 
collectively. The Manchu Government committed an irretriev- 
able mistake by promising the people a constitutional govern- 
ment but never carrying out their promise. This attitude on 
the part of the then reigning house brought about the first 
revolution. As the standard of our people at the present time 
is not very high, they will be satisfied with less power if it is 
properly given to them. Should any one attempt to deceive 
them his cause will finally be lost. I do not know how much 
power the people and the parliament will get in the constitu- 
tional monarchy, but I would like to point out here that it is 
better to give them less power than to deceive them. If they 
are given less power, and if they want more, they will contend 
for it. Should the government deem it advisable to give them 
a little more, well and good. Should they be unfit for the pos- 
session of greater power, the government can issue a proclama- 
tion giving the reasons for not complying with their request, 
and they will not raise trouble knowing the true intention of 
the government. However, honesty is the most important ele- 
ment in the creation of a constitutional monarchy. It is easy 
and simple to practise it. The parliament must have the power 
to decide the laws and fix the budgets. Should its decision be 
too idealistic or contrary to the real welfare of the country, 
the Government can explain its faults and request it to recon- 
sider its decision. Should the parliament return the same de- 
cision, the Government can dissolve it and convoke another 
parliament. In so doing the Government respects the parlia- 
ment instead of despising it. But what the parliament has de- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 171 

cided should be carried out strictly by the Government, and 
thus we will have a real constitutional Government. It is easy 
to talk but difficult to act, but China like all other countries 
has to go through the experimental stage and face all kinds of 
difficulties before a genuine constitutional government can be 
evolved. The beginning is difficult but once the difficulty is 
over everything will go on smoothly. I emphasize that it is 
better to give the people less power at the beginning than to 
deceive them. Be honest with them is my policy. 

Mr. Ko: I thank you very much for what you have said. 
Your discussion is interesting and I can understand it well. 
The proper method of procedure and honesty of purpose which 
you have mentioned will tend to wipe out all former corruption. 

Mr. Ko, or the stranger, then departed. \ 

On this note the pamphleteer abruptly ends. Hav- 
ing discussed ad nauseam the inadequacy of all existing 
arrangements, even those made by Yuan Shih-kai him- 
self, to secure a peaceful succession to the presidency; 
and having again insisted upon the evil part soldiery 
cannot fail to play, he introduces a new peril, the cer- 
tainty that the foreign Powers will set up a puppet 
Emperor unless China solves this problem herself, the 
case of Korea being invoked as an example of the fate 
of divided nations. Fear of Japan and the precedent 
of Korea, being familiar phenomena, are given a capital 
in all this debate, being secondary only to the crucial 
business of ensuring the peaceful succession to the su- 
preme office. The transparent manner in which the 
history of the first three years of the Republic is handled 
in order to drive home these arguments will be very ap- 
parent. A fit crown is put on the whole business by 
the final suggestion that the Constitutional Government 
of China under the new empire must be a mixture of 



172 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the Prussian and Japanese systems, Yang Tu's last 
words being that it is best to be honest with the people ! 
No more damning indictment of Yuan Shih-kai's 
regime could possibly have been penned. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE MONAECHY PLOT 

THE MEMORANDUM OF DR. GOODNOW 

Although this extraordinary pamphlet was soon ac- 
cepted by Chinese society as a semi-official warning of 
what was coming, it alone was not sufficient to launch a 
movement which to be successful required the benign 
endorsement of foreign opinion. The Chinese pam- 
phleteer had dealt with the emotional side of the case : it 
was necessary to reinforce his arguments with an ap- 
peal which would be understood by Western statesmen 
as well as by Eastern politicians. Yuan Shih-kai, still 
pretending to stand aside, had kept his attention con- 
centrated on this very essential matter; for, as we have 
repeatedly pointed out, he never failed to understand 
the superlative value of foreign support in all his en- 
terprises, — that support being given an exaggerated 
value by the public thanks to China's reliance on for- 
eign money. Accordingly, as if still unconvinced, he 
now very naively requested the opinion of his chief 
legal adviser, Dr. Goodnow, an American who had been 
appointed to his office through the instrumentality of 
the Board of the Carnegie Institute as a most compe- 
tent authority on Administrative Law. 

Even in this most serious matter the element of com- 
edy was not lacking. Dr. Goodnow had by special ar- 
rangement returned to Peking at the psychological 
moment ; for having kicked his heels during many weary 

173 



174 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

months in the capital, he had been permitted in 1914 
to take up the appointment of President of an Ameri- 
can University on condition that he would be available 
for legal "advice" whenever wanted. The Summer va- 
cation gave him the opportunity of revisiting in the 
capacity of a transient the scenes of his former idle- 
ness ; and the holiday-task set him by his large-hearted 
patron was to prove in as few folios as possible that 
China ought to be a Monarchy and not a Republic — a 
theme on which every schoolboy could no doubt write 
with fluency. Consequently Dr. Goodnow, arming him- 
self with a limited amount of paper and ink, produced 
in very few days the Memorandum which follows, — a 
document which it is difficult to speak of dispassionately 
since it seems to have been deliberately designed to play 
into the hands of a man who was now openly set on 
betraying the trust the nation reposed in him, and who 
was ready to wade through rivers of blood to satisfy 
his insensate ambition. 

Nothing precisely similar to this Goodnow Memo- 
randum has ever been seen before in the history of Asia : 
it was the ultramodern spirit impressed into the service 
of mediaeval minds. In any other capital of the world 
the publication of such a subversive document, follow- 
ing the Yang Tu pamphlet, would have led to riot and 
tumult. In China, the home of pacifism, the politicians 
and people bowed their heads and bided their time. 
Even foreign circles in China were somewhat non- 
plussed by the insouciance displayed by the peripatetic 
legal authority; and the Memorandum was for many 
days spoken of as an unnecessary indiscretion.^ Fasten- 

1 It is perhaps of importance to note that Dr. Goodnow carried out all 
his studies in Germany. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 175 

ing at once on the point to which Yang Tu had ascribed 
such importance — the question of succession — Dr. 
Goodnow in his arguments certainly shows a detach- 
ment from received principles which has an old-world 
flavour about it, and which has damned him forever in 
the eyes of the rising generation in China. The ver- 
sion which follows is the translation of the Chinese 
translation, the original English Memorandum having 
been either mislaid or destroyed ; and it is best that this 
argument should be carefully digested before we add our 
comments. 

DR. GOODNOw's MEMOEANDUM 

A country must have a certain form of government, and 
usually the particular form of government of a particular coun- 
try is not the result of the choice of the people of that country. 
There is not any possibility even for the most intellectual to 
exercise any mental influence over the question. Whether it 
be a monarchy or republic, it cannot be the creation of human 
power except when it is suitable to the historical, habitual, so- 
cial and financial conditions of that country. If an unsuitable 
form of government is decided upon, it may remain for a short 
while, but eventually a system better suited wUl take its 
place. 

In short, the form of government of a country is usually the 
natural and only result of its circumstances. The reasons for 
such an outcome are many, but the principal one is Force. If 
we study the monarchical countries we will find that usually 
a dynasty is created by a person who is capable of controlling 
the force of the entire country and overthrowing other persons 
opposed to him, working towards his goal with an undaunted 
spirit. If this man is capable of ruling the nation and if he 
is a rare genius of the day, and the conditions of the country 
are suited for a monarchical government, he as a rule creates 
a new dynasty and his descendants inherit the same from gen- 
eration to generation. 

If this is so, then the solution of a difficult position of a coun- 



176 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

tr J is to be found in a monarchy rather than a republic. For 
on the death of a monarch no doubt exists as to who shall suc- 
ceed him, and there is no need of an election or other procedure. 
Englishmen say, "The King is dead, Long live the King." 
This expresses the point. But in order to attain this point it 
is necessary that the law of succession be definitely defined and 
publicly approved; otherwise there will not be lacking, on the 
death of the monarch, men aspiring to the throne ; and as no 
one is qualified to settle the dispute for power, internal dis- 
turbance will be the result. 

Historically speaking no law of succession is so permanently 
satisfactory as that used by the nations of Europe. Accord- 
ing to this system the right of succession belongs to the eldest 
son of the monarch, or failing him, the nearest and eldest male 
relative. The right of succession, however, may be voluntarily 
surrendered by the rightful successor if he so desires ; thus 
if the eldest son declines to succeed to the throne the second 
son takes his place. This is the rule of Europe. 

If instead of this law of a succession a system is adopted by 
which the successor is chosen by the monarch from among his 
sons or relatives without any provision being made for the 
rights of the eldest son, disturbance will be the inevitable re- 
sult. There will not be a few who would like to take posses- 
sion of the throne and they will certainly plot in the very con- 
fines of the palace, resulting in an increase of the sufferings of 
an aged monarch; and, even if the disaster of civil war be 
avoided, much dispute will arise owing to the uncertainty of 
the successor — a dangerous situation indeed. 

Such is the lesson we learn from history. The conclusion 
is, speaking from the viewpoint of the problem of transmission 
of .power, that the superiority of the monarchical system oyer 
the republican system is seen in the law of succession, — that is 
the eldest son of the ruler should succeed to the throne. 

Leaving out the nations of ancient times, the majority of 
countries in Europe and Asia have adopted the monarchical 
system. There are, however, exceptions such as Wen-ni-shih 
(Venice) and Switzerland, which adopted the republican form 
of government; but they are in the minority while most of the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 177 

great nations of the world have adopted the monarchical form 
of government. 

!Uuring the recent century and a half the attitude of Europe 
has undergone a sudden change and the general tendency is to 
discredit monarchism and adopt republicanism. The one great 
European power which first attempted to make a trial of re- 
publicanism is Great Britain. In the Seventeenth Century a 
revolution broke out in England and King Charles I was con- 
demned to death by Parliament and executed as a traitor to the 
nation. A republic was established and the administration was 
called republican with Cromwell as regent, i.e. President. 
Cromwell was able to control the power of government because 
at the head of the revolutionary army he defeated the King. 
This English republic however, only existed for a few years and 
was finally defeated in turn. The reason was that the problem 
of succession after the death of Cromwell was difficult to solve. 
Cromwell had a desire to place his son in his place as regent 
after his death, but as the English people were then unsuited 
for a republic and his son had not the ability to act as chief 
executive, the republic of England suddenly disappeared. The 
British people then abandoned the republican system and re- 
adopted the monarchical system. Thus Charles II, the son of 
Charles I, was made King not only with the support of the 
army but also with the general consent of the country. 

The second European race which attempted to have a repub- 
lic was the American. In the Eighteenth Century the United 
States of America was established in consequence of the success 
of a revolution. But the American revolution was not at first 
intended to overthrow the monarchy. What it sought to do was 
to throw off the yoke of the monarchy and become independent. 
The revolution, however, succeeded and the circumstances were 
such that there was no other alternative but to have a republic : 
for there was no royal or Imperial descendant to shoulder the 
responsibilities of the state. Another factor was the influence 
of the advocates of republicanism who came to America in the 
previous century from England and saturated the minds of the 
Americans with the ideas of republicanism. The minds of the 
American people were so imbued with the ideas of republicanism 



178 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

that a republican form of government was the ideal of the entire 
race. Had General Washington — the leader of the revolution- 
ary army — had the desire to become a monarch himself he 
would probably have been successful. But Washington's one 
aim was to respect republicanism and he had no aspiration to 
become King. Besides he had no son capable of succeeding him 
on the throne. Consequently on the day independence was won, 
the republican form of government was adopted without hesita- 
tion, and it has survived over a hundred years. 

There is no need to ask whether the result of the establish- 
ment of the American Republic has been good or bad. The 
republican form of government is really the making of the 
United States of America. But it should be remembered that 
long before the establishment of the republic, the American 
people had already learned the good laws and ordinances of 
England, and the constitution and parliamentary system of 
England had been long in use in America for over a hundred 
years. Therefore the change in 1789 from a colony into a 
Republic was not a sudden change from a monarchy to a re- 
public. Thorough preparations had been made and self- 
government was well practised before the establishment of the 
republic. Not only this, but the intellectual standard of the 
American people was then already very high ; for ever since the 
beginning of American history attention was given to universal 
education. No youth could be found who could not read, and 
the extent of education can thus be gauged. 

Soon after the formation of the American Republic, the 
French Republic followed in her footsteps. Now in France a 
monarchical government was in existence before the declaration 
of independence, and the supreme power of administration was 
in the hands of the King. The people, having never partici- 
pated in the administration and lacking experience in self- 
government, made a poor experiment of the republican system 
which they suddenly set up. The result was that for many 
years disorder reigned, and the tyranny of the military govern- 
ments held sway one after another. After the defeat of Na- 
poleon, the monarchical system was restored as a result of the 
intervention of other Powers. The second revolution in 1830 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 179 

again resulted in the restoration of the monarchy but the power 
of the common people was considerably increased. The 
monarchy was again overthrown in 1848 and a Republic formed 
in its stead — the nephew of Napoleon was then made President. 
This President, however, once more discarded republicanism and 
set up a monarchy for himself. It was not until after the 
Franco-Prussian war of 1870 that Napoleon III was over- 
thrown and the final Republic established which has lived for 
half a century now, there being every likelihood of its continu- 
ing in its present form. 

Indeed the Republic of France has every prospect of being 
permanent, but the permanency is only the result of a hundred 
years' political revolution. For a hundred years the founda- 
tions were being laid by means of an energetic and persistent 
campaign of education, which increased the political knowledge 
of the people. The people were also allowed to participate in 
political affairs, and so gained experience in self-government. 
This is why the French Republic is a success. Then in France 
and America they have found a solution for the difficult problem 
of the nation, that is the problem of succession of the govern- 
ment in power. The President of France is elected by the 
Parliament while the President of America is elected by the 
people. The people of these two countries are all experienced 
in self-government as a result of participation in political 
affairs. Furthermore, for the last fifty years these two coun- 
tries have all laid emphasis on universal education by having 
an extensive system of schools, subsidized by the Government. 
The intellectual standard of these two people is therefore fairly 
high. 

As a result of the examples set up by France and America, 
at the end of the Eighteenth Century the Spanish colonies in 
Central and South America also declared their independence 
one after the other. The conditions then prevailing in those 
countries were somewhat similar to those of America. When 
their independence was declared, it seemed that the republican 
system was best suited to their condition. For on the one 
hand there was no imperial house to direct the people, on the 
other hand the Republic of North America was a good example 



180 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to follow. Public opinion was at that time unanimous that 
since the republican form of government was the ideal form, 
it was suitable for any country and any people. The idea 
thus quickly spread and almost every country became a re- 
public. The independence of these countries, however, was 
secured only at the cost of a hard struggle and once the spirit 
of rebellion was aroused it became difficult to suppress in a 
short while. And since education was not then universal the 
intellect of the people was low. What they were expert in was 
in autocratic methods. No task is harder than to establish a 
republic in a country, the intelligence of whose people is low. 
These republics, therefore, reaped no good results although 
they tried to retain republicanism unnaturally. The conse- 
quence is that the republics of Central and South America have 
been a living drama of continuous internal disturbance. One 
after another their military leaders have grasped the power of 
administration. Occasionally there has been peace but this 
peace has only been secured by the iron hand of one or two 
powerful men holding the power. Such powerful men, however, 
seldom pay any attention to educational matters, and one never 
hears of their establishing any schools. As to the people under 
them, they are not allowed to participate in political affairs by 
which their experience in politics may be ripened. The result 
is, on the man in power becoming sick or dying — and the iron 
rule relaxed — that those who wish to usurp the power of the 
state rise at once ; and as the satisfactory solution of the 
problem of succession cannot be found, those undertakings 
which have made progress during the time of peace are swept 
away without a single exception. In extreme cases the dis- 
turbances continues to such an extent that the country falls 
into a state of anarchy. Thus the social and financial factors 
of the whole country are trodden on and destroyed under foot. 
The conditions now prevailing in Mexico have been many 
times duplicated in other republics in Central and South Amer- 
ica. For this can be the only result from adopting the republi- 
can form of government where the political and financial condi- 
tions are unsuited. Diaz, a military leader, once held the 
power of state in his own hand, and when he became the Presi- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 181 

dent of Mexico it looked as if the political problem was solved 
thereby. Diaz, however, did not push education but instead 
oppressed the people and did not allow them to participate in 
politics. When he was advanced in age and his influence de- 
creased, he lost entire control once the banner of rebellion was 
raised. Ever since the overthrow of Diaz, military leaders of 
that country have been fighting one another and the disturb- 
ance is developing even today. In the present circumstances 
there is no other means to solve the political problem of Mexico 
except by intervention from abroad. (Sic.) 

Among the republics of Central and South America, how- 
ever, there are some which have made fairly good progress, the 
most prominent of which are Argentina, Chili, and Peru. For 
some time there was disorder in the first two republics immedi- 
ately after the adoption of the republican system, but later 
peace was gradually restored and the people have been enjoying 
peace. As regards Peru, although some disturbances have oc- 
curred since the establishment of the republican government, 
the life of the Republic as a whole has been peaceful. All of 
these three countries, however, developed constitutional govern- 
ment with the utmost vigour. Even as far back as in the 
earlier part of the Nineteenth Century Argentina and Chili 
were already endeavouring to excel each other in their progress, 
and as for Peru, its people were encouraged even while under 
the Imperial regime, to participate in political affairs. The 
success of these three republics is, therefore, not a mere chance 
happening. 

The study of the experiences of these republics of Central 
and South America and the history of France and the United 
States brings forward two points which we should carefully con- 
sider : — 

1. In order to make a satisfactory solution of the problem 
of succession to the chief executive in a republican country, it is 
necessary that the country be in possession of an extensive sys- 
tem of schools ; that the intellect of its people has been brought 
up. to a high standard by means of a patient process of uni- 
versal education ; and that they be given a chance to participate 
in political affairs for the purpose of gaining the needed ex- 



182 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

perience, before the republican form can be adopted without 
harm; 

2. It is certain that the adoption of a republican form of 
government in a country where the people are low; in intellect 
and lack experience and knowledge in political affairs, will not 
yield any good result. For as the position of the President is 
not hereditary, and consequently the problem of succession can- 
not be satisfactorily solved, the result will be a military dic- 
tatorship. It might be possible to have a short-lived peace but 
such a period of peace is usually intermingled with periods of 
disturbances, during which the unduly ambitious people may 
rise and struggle with each other for the control of power, and 
the disaster which will follow will be irremediable. 

This is not all. The present tendency is that the European 
and other western Powers will not tolerate the existence of a 
military government in the world; for experience shows that 
the result of military government is anarchy. Now this is of 
vital importance to the interests of the European Powers. 
Since their financial influence has extended so far, their capital 
as well as their commercial undertakings of all branches and 
sorts have reached every corner of the world, they will not hesi- 
tate to express their views for the sake of peace, as to the sys- 
tem of government a country should adopt, although they 
have no right to interfere with the adoption of a form of gov- 
ernment by another nation. For unless this is done they can- 
not hope to get the due profit on the capital they have invested. 
If this view is carried to the extreme, the political independence 
of a nation may be interfered with or even the Government may 
be replaced with some other organ. If such steps are necessary 
to attain their views the Powers will not scruple to take them. 
Therefore no nation will be allowed hereafter to choose its own 
form of government if that results in constant revolution, as in 
the case of South America in the last century. The Govern- 
ments of the future should, therefore, carefully consider the 
system to be adopted for the maintenance of peace; otherwise 
control by foreigners will be unavoidable. 

We wUl now proceed to consider what significance these 
points reviewed above have for the political conditions of China. 




The Bas-relief in a Peking Temple, Well Illustrating 
Indo-Chinese Influences 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 183 

China, owing to the folly of an absolute monarchical system, 
has neglected the education of the masses, whose intellectual 
attainments have been consequently of a low standard. Then, 
there is the additional fact that the people have never had a 
voice in the doings of their government. Therefore thev have 
not the ability to discuss politics. Four years ago the absolute 
monarchy was suddenly changed into a Republic. This move- 
ment was all too sudden to expect good results. If the Man- 
chus had not been an alien race, which the country wished to 
overthrow, the best step which could then have been adopted 
was to retain the Emperor and gradually lead him to a con- 
stitutional government. What the Commissioners on Consti- 
tutional Government suggested was quite practical if carried 
out gradually until perfection was reached. Unfortunately 
the feeling of alien control was bitter to the people and the 
maintenance of the throne was an utter impossibility. Thus 
the monarchy was overthrown and the adoption of a republican 
system was the only alternative. 

Thus we see that China has during the last few years been 
progressing in constitutional government. The pioneering 
stage of the process was, however, not ideal. The results could 
have been much better if a person of royal blood, respected by 
the people, had come out and offered his service. Under the 
present conditions China has not yet solved the problem of the 
succession to the Presidency. What provisions we have now 
are not perfect. If the President should one day give up his 
power the difficulties experienced by other nations will manifest 
themselves again in China. The conditions in other countries 
are similar to those obtaining in China and the dangers are also 
the same. It is quite within the bounds of possibility that the 
situation might threaten China's independence if internal dis- 
turbance should occur in connection with this problem and not 
be immediately put down. 

What attitude then should those who have the good of the 
nation at heart, take under the present circumstances ? Should 
they advocate the continuance of the Republic or suggest a 
change for a monarchy? It is difficult to answer these ques- 
tions. But I have no doubt in saying that the monarchical 



184 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

system is better suited to China than the republican system. 
For, if China's independence is to be maintained, the govern- 
ment should be constitutional, and in consideration of China's 
conditions as well as her relations with other Powers, it will be 
easier to form a constitutional government by adopting a 
monarchy than a Republic. 

However, it must be remembered that in order to secure the 
best results from changing the Republic into a Monarchy not a 
single one of the following points can be dispensed with : 

1. Such a change must not arouse the opposition of the Chi- 
nese people or the Foreign Powers, which will cause the disturb- 
ances so energetically suppressed by the Republican Govern- 
ment to appear again in China. For the peace now prevailing 
in the country should be maintained at any price so that no 
danger may come therefrom. 

2. If the law of succession be not definitely defined in such a 
way that it will leave no doubts as to the proper successor, no 
good can come from the change from Republic to Monarchy. 
I have said enough about the necessity of not allowing the 
monarch to choose his own successor. Although the power of 
an Emperor is greater than that of a President, when the 
majority of the people know nothing, it is more respected by 
the people. But the reason for such a change will not be valid 
if the change is brought about merely to add to the power of 
the chief executive without the question of succession being 
definitely settled. For the definiteness about succession is the_ 
most prominent point of superiority of the monarchical system 
over the republican system. 

3. If the Government should fail to make provisions for the 
development of the constitutional government, no permanent 
benefit will result from the change of a republic into a mon- 
archy. For if China wishes to occupy a suitable place among 
the world powers, the patriotism of her people must be made to 
grow so that the government will be more than strong enough 
to cope with outside aggression. The patriotism of the people 
will not grow if they are not allowed to participate in political 
affairs, and without the hearty assistance of the people no gov- 
ernment can become strong. For the reason why the people 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 185 

will assist the government is because they feel they are a part 
of the government. Therefore the government should make 
the people realize that the government is the organ which aims 
at bringing blessing to the people, and make the people under- 
stand that they have the right to superintend the government 
before the government can achieve great things. 

Every one of the points mentioned above are indispensable 
for the change of the Republic into a monarchy. Whether the 
necessary conditions are present must be left to those who know 
China well and are responsible for her future progress. If 
these conditions are all present then I have no doubt that the 
change of the form of the government will be for the benefit of 
China. 

The first illuminating point, as we have already said, 
to leap up and lock attention to the exclusion of every- 
thing else in this memorandum, is that the chief diffi- 
culty which perplexes Dr. Goodnow is not the consoli- 
dation of a new government which had been recognized 
by all the Treaty Powers only two years previously 
but the question of succession to the supreme office in 
the land, a point which had already been fully provided 
for in the one chapter of the Permanent Constitution 
which had been legally passed prior to the Coup d'etat 
of the 4th November, 1913. But Yuan Shih-kai's first 
care after that coup d'etat had been to promulgate with 
the assistance of Dr. Goodnow and others, a bogus Law, 
resting on no other sanction than his personal volition, 
with an elaborate flummery about three candidates 
whose names were to be deposited in the gold box in the 
Stone House in the gardens of the Palace. Therefore 
since the provisional nature of this prestidigitation had 
always been clear, the learned doctor's only solution is 
to recornmend the overthrow of the government; the 
restoration of the Empire under the name of Consti- 



186 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

tutional Monarchy ; and, by means of a fresh plot to dg 
in China what all Europe has long been on the point of 
abandoning, namely;, to jsubstitute Family rule for Na- 
tional rule. 

Now had these suggestions been gravely made in any 
country but China by a person officially employed it 
is difficult to know what would have happened. Even 
in China had an Englishman published or caused to be 
published — especially after the repeated statements 
Yuan Shih-kai had given out that any attempt to force 
the sceptre on him would cause him to leave the coun- 
try and end his days abroad ^ — that Englishman, we 
say, would have been liable under the Orders in Coun- 
cil to summary imprisonment, the possibility of tumult 
and widespread internal disturbances being sufficient 
to force a British Court to take action. What are the 
forces which brought an American to say things which 
an Englishman would not dare to say — that in 1915 
there was a sanction for a fresh revolutionary move- 
ment in China? First, an interpretation of history so 

1 The most widely-quoted statement on this subject is the remarkable 
interview, published in the first week of July, 1915, throughout the metro- 
politan press, between President Yuan Shih-kai and General Feng Kuo-chang, 
commanding the forces on the lower Yangtsze. This statement was tele- 
graphed by foreign correspondents all over the world. Referring to the 
many rumours afloat that titles of nobility would be revived as a precursor 
to the monarchy the President declared that even if he seized the Throne 
that would not increase his powers, whilst as for transmitting the Imperial 
Yellow to his sons none were fitted for that honour which would mean the 
collapse of any new dynasty. Here General Feng Kuo-chang interrupted 
with the remark that the people of South China would not oppose such a 
change ultimately, though they thought it was too early to talk about it 
just now. Thereupon the president's features became stern and he de- 
clared in a heightened voice: "You and others seem still to believe that I 
harbour secret ambitions. I affirm positively that when I sent my sons to 
study in England, I privately ordered the purchase of a small estate there 
as a possible home. If the people of China insist upon my accepting the 
sceptre I shall leave this country and spend the remaining days of my life 
abroad." 

This interview, so far from being denied, has been affirmed to the present 
writer as being substantially correct. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 187 

superficial, combined with such an amazing suppression 
of contemporary poHtical thought, that it is difficult to 
believe that the requirements of the country were taken 
in the least bit seriously; secondly, in the comparisons 
made between China and the Latin republics, a delib- 
erate scouting of the all-important racial factor; and, 
lastly, a total ignorance of the intellectual qualities 
which are by far the most outstanding feature of Chi- 
nese civilization. 

Dr. Goodnow's method is simplicity itself. In order 
to prove the superiority of Monarchism over Repub- 
licanism—and thus deliberately ignoring the moral of 
the present cataclysmic war — he ransacks the dust-laden 
centuries. The English Commonwealth, which dis- 
appeared nearly three hundred years ago, is brought 
forward as an example of the dangers which beset a 
republic, though it is difficult to see what relation an 
experiment made before the idea of representative gov- 
ernment had been even understood bears to our times. 
But there is worse. The statement is deliberately made 
that the reason for the disappearance of that Common- 
wealth was * 'that the problem of succession after the 
death of Cromwell was difficult to solve." English his- 
torians would no doubt have numerous remarks to offer 
on this strange untruth which dismiss a remarkably in- 
teresting chapter of history in the most misleading way, 
and which tells Chinese political students nothing about 
the complete failure which military government — not 
republicanism — must always have among the Anglo- 
Saxon peoples and which is the sole reason why Crom- 
wellism disappeared. Even when treating the history 
of his own country Dr. Goodnow seems to take pleasure 
in being absurd. For he says : "The mind of the Amer- 



188 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ican people was so imbued with the idea of republic- 
anism that a republican form of government was the 
ideal of the whole race"; then adding as if to refute his. 
own statements, "Had General Washington— the 
leader of the revolutionary army — had the desire to be- 
come a monarch he would probably have been success- 
ful." We do not know how Americans will like this 
kind of interpretation of their history ; but at least they 
will not fail to note what dismal results it hastened on 
in China. With the experimental Eighteenth Century 
French Republic ; with the old Spanish Colonies of Cen- 
tral and South America; and above all with Mexico, 
Dr. Goodnow deals in the same vein. Vast move- 
ments, which can be handled only tentatively even la 
exhaustive essays are dismissed in misleading sentences 
framed so as to serve as mere introduction to the in- 
evitable climax — the Chinese Constitutional Monarchy 
of 1915 with Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor. 

Yet this is not all. As if in alarm at the very con- 
clusions he so purposely reaches, at the end of his Mem- 
orandum he reduces these conclusions to naught by 
stating that three impossible conditions are necessary 
to consummate the Restoration of the Monarchy in 
China, (1) no opposition should be aroused (2) the law 
of succession must be properly settled, (3) Full pro- 
vision must be made for the development of Constitu- 
tional Government. That these conditions were known 
to be impossible, everyone in the Far East had long 
admitted. Had Dr. Goodnow paid the slightest at- 
tention to the course of history in China he would have 
known (a) that any usurpation of the Throne would 
infallibly lead to rebellion in China and intervention 
on the part of Japan, (b) that Yuan Shi-kai's power 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 189 

was purely personal and as such could not be trans- 
mitted to any son by any means known to the human 
intellect, (c) that all Yuan Shih-kai's sons were worth- 
less, the eldest son being semi-paralyzed, (d) that con- 
stitutional government and the Eastern conception of 
kingship, which is purely theocratic, are so antithetical 
that they cannot possibly co-exist, any re-establishment 
of the throne being ipso facto the re-establislmient of a 
theocracy, (e) that although he so constantly speaks of 
the low political knowledge of the people, the Chinese 
have had a most complete form of local self-government 
from the earliest times, the political problem of the day 
being simply to gather up and express these local forms 
in some centralized system: (f) the so-called non-pa- 
triotism of the Chinese is non-existent and is an idea 
which has been spread abroad owing to the complete 
foreign misunderstanding of certain basic facts — for 
instance that under the Empire foreign affairs were the 
sole concern of the Emperors, provincial China prior 
to 1911 being a socio-economic confederation resembling 
mediaeval contrivances such as the Hanseatic League — 
a provincial confederation not concerning itself with 
any matter which lay outside its everyday economic 
life, such as territorial overlordship or frontier ques- 
tions or the regulation of sea-port intercourse etc., be- 
cause such matters were meaningless. It was only 
when foreign encroachment in the post-Jajyanese war 
period (i. e. after 1895) carried problems from the 
fringes of the Empire into the economic life of the peo- 
ple that their pride was touched and that in spite of 
"their lack of experience and knowledge in political 
affairs" they suddenly displayed a remarkable patri- 
otic feeling, the history of China during the past two 



190 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

decades being only comprehensible when this capital 
contention, namely the reality of Chinese patriotism, is 
given the central place. 

It is useless, however, to pursue the subject: we have 
said enough to disclose the utter levity of those who 
should have reahzed from the first that the New China 
is a matter of life and death to the people, and that the 
first business of the foreigner is to uphold the new 
beliefs. The Goodnow Memorandum, immediately it 
was published, was put to precisely those base uses 
which any one with an elementary knowledge of China 
might have foreseen: it was simply exploited in an un- 
scrupulous way, its recommendations being carried out 
in such a manner as to increase one's contempt for the 
men who were pushing the monarchist plot with any 
means that they could seize hold of, and who were not 
averse from makiilg responsible foreigners their tools. 



CHAPTER X 

THE MONAECHY MOVEMENT IS OPPOSED 

THE APPEAL OF THE SCHOLAR LIANG CH'I'CHAO 

We have already referred in several places to the ex- 
traordinary role scholarship and the literary appeal play 
in the governance of China. It is necessary to go back 
to the times of the birth of the Roman Empire, and to 
invoke the great figure of Cicero, to understand how 
greatly the voice of men of recognized intellectual quali- 
ties influences the nation. Liang Ch'i-chao, a man of 
some forty-five years, had long been distinguished for his 
literary attainments and for the skill vi^ith which, though 
unversed in any Western language, he had expounded 
the European theory and practice of government to his 
fellow-countrymen. To his brain is due the coining of 
many exact expressions necessary for parliamentary 
government, his mentality having grown with the mod- 
ern growth of China and adapted itself rather marvel- 
lously to the requirements of the Twentieth Century. 
A reformer of 1898 — that is one of the small devoted 
band of men who under Kang Yu Wei almost suc- 
ceeded in winning over the ill-fated Emperor Kwang 
Hsu to carrying out a policy of modernizing the coun- 
try in the teeth of fierce mandarin opposition, he pos- 
sessed in his armoury every possible argument against 
the usurpation Yuan Shih-kai proposed to practise. 
He knew precisely where to strike — and with what 
strength ; and he delivered himself over to his task with 
whole-hearted fervour. It having become known that 

191 



192 JHE FIGHT FOR THE 

he was engaged in preparing this brief for the people 
of China, every influence was brought to bear to pre- 
vent such a disastrous pubhcation. Influential deputa- 
tions were sent to him to implore him to remember the 
parlous international situation China found herself in, — 
a situation which would result in open disaster if sub- 
jected to the strain of further discords. For a time he 
hesitated launching his counter-stroke. But at length 
the Republican Party persuaded him to deal the tyrant 
the needed blow; and his now famous accusation of the 
Chief Executive was published. 

Its effect was immediate and very far-reaching. Men 
understood that armed revolt was in the air. The al- 
most Biblical fervour which pervades this extraordinary 
document shows an unusual sense of moral outrage. 
The masterly analysis of the Diaz regime in Mexico 
coupled with the manner in which — always pretending 
to be examining the conduct of the Mexican — he stabs 
at Yuan Shih-kai, won the applause of a race that de- 
lights in oblique attacks and was ample proof that great 
trouble was brewing. The document was read in every 
part of China and everywhere approved. Although it 
suffers from translation, the text remains singularly in- 
teresting as a disclosure of the Chinese mentality; whilst 
the exhaustive examination of political terms it con- 
tains shows that some day Chinese will carry their in- 
ventive genius into fields they have hitherto never 
openly invaded. Especially interesting is it to contrast 
the arguments of such a man with those of a decadent 
such as Yang Tu. 

FROM REPUBLIC TO MONARCHY 

Before I proceed with my argument I wish to make plain two 
points. One is that I am not one of those reformers whose ears 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 193 

are their brains, and who are intoxicated with the doctrine of 
republicanism. I have, therefore, no partiality for the repub- 
lican form of government nor any bias for or against other 
forms of government. This can be proved by my literary work 
during the last ten years. The second point is that I am not 
one of the veteran conservatives who lay so much stress on the 
importance of having a dynasty. For such are the thoughts of 
men who only seek to adjust themselves to existing conditions. 
If one wishes to consider the present situation of the country 
without bias or prejudice he must disregard the rise or fall of 
any particular family. Only those who bear in mind these two 
points can read my argument with real understanding. 

I. THE QUESTION OF KUO-TI 

Some time ago I said that, as political students, we should 
only care for Cheng-ti, i.e., the form of government and not for 
huo-ti, i.e., the form of state. Do not call this trifling with 
words, for it is a principle which all critics of politics should 
follow and never depart from. The reason is that critics of 
politics should not, because they cannot, influence the question 
of Kuo-ti. They should not influence the question of kuo-ti 
because so long as the question of kuo-ti remains unsettled the 
major portion of the administration remains at a stand-still. 
Thus there will be no political situation properly so called and 
there will be no political questions to discuss (here the term 
political means really administrative). If a critic of politics, 
therefore, interfere with the question of Kuo-ti, he will be lead- 
ing the nation into a condition of political instability, thus 
undermining the ground on which the people stand. Such 
critics can be likened unto a man trying to enter a house with- 
out ascending the steps or crossing a river without a boat. 

They cannot influence the question of Kuo-ti. The force 
which drives and steers the change of one form of State or vice 
•versa is generally not derived from mere politics. If the time 
is not ripe, then no amount of advocacy on the part of critics 
can hasten it. If the time is ripe, nothing the critics say can 
prevent it. He who indulges himself in the discussion of the 
problem of Kuo-ti — i.e., the form of States, as a political stu- 



194 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

dent, is ignorant of his own limitations and capacity. This is 
as true of the active politicians as of the critics ; for the first 
duty of an active politician is to seek for the improvement and 
progress of the administration of the existing foundation of 
government. A step beyond this line is revolution and intrigue, 
and such cannot be the attitude of a right-minded active poli- 
tician or statesman. This is looking at it from the negative 
side. 

From the positive, that is, the progressive point of view, 
there is also a boundary. Such actions under one form of 
government are political activities, and under the opposite 
form of government are also political activities. But these are 
not questions of political principle. For only when a man 
sacrifices the ideals which he has advocated and cherished dur- 
ing the whole of his life does the question of principle arise. 
Therefore the great principle of looking to the actual state of 
administration of the form of government and leaving the mere 
form of state in the back-ground is a principle that is appli- 
cable under all circumstances and should be followed by all 
critics of politics. 

n. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST CHANGE 

No form of government is ideal. Its reason of existence can 
only be judged by what it has achieved. It is the height of 
folly to rely on theoretical conclusions as a basis for artificial 
arbitration as to what should be accepted and what discarded. 
Mere folly, however, is not to be seriously condemned. But the 
danger and harm to the country will be unmeasurable if a per- 
son has prejudiced views respecting a certain form of govern- 
ment and in order to prove the correctness of his prejudiced 
views, creates artificially a situation all by himself. For this 
reason my view has always been not to oppose any form of 
government. But I am always opposed to any one who 
engages in a propaganda in favour of a form of government 
other than the one under which we actually live. In the past I 
opposed those who tried to spread the republican form of gov- 
ernment while the country was under monarchical government, 
and the arguments I advanced in support of my views were 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 195 

written in no fewer than 200,000 words. Even so late as the 
ninth month after the outbreak of the Revolution I issued a 
pamphlet entitled "The Problem of the Building of the New 
China," which was my last attempt to express my views respect- 
ing the maintenance of the old form of government. 

What obligations had I to the then Imperial House.'' Did it 
not heap persecution and humiliation on me to the utmost of its 
power and resources? I would have been an exile even to this 
day had it not been for the Revolution. Further, I was no 
child and I was fully aware of the disappointment which the 
then Government caused in the minds of the people. Yet I 
risked the opposition of the whole country and attempted to 
prolong the life of the dying dynasty. I had no other view in 
mind except that there would be some possibility of our hope 
being realized if the whole nation would unite in efforts to im- 
prove the administration under the then existing form of gov- 
ernment. I believed that because the people were not educated 
for a change. But if the status of the country should be 
changed before the people are educated and accustomed to the 
new order of things, the danger and hardship during the transi- 
tional period of several years would be incalculable. In certain 
circumstances this might lead to the destruction of the nation. 
Even if we are spared the tragedy of national extinction, the 
losses sustained by the retarding of the progress of the adminis- 
tration would be unredeemable. It is painful to recall past 
experiences ; but if my readers will read once more my articles 
in the Hsin Min Tung Pao during the years 1905 and 1906 
they will see that all the sufferings which the Republic has 
experienced bear out the predictions made then. The different 
stages of the sinister development have been unfolding them- 
selves one by one just as I said they would. It was unfortunate 
that my words were not heeded although I wept and pleaded. 
Such has been the consequence of the change of the state of the 
country — a change of Kuo-ti. 

Yet before we have hardly ceased panting, this talk of a 
second change is on us. I am not in a position to say exactly 
how this talk had Its beginning. Ostensibly it was started by 
the remarks of Dr. Goodnow. But I am unable to say whether 



196 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Dr. Goodnow actually gave out such a view or for what purpose 
he expressed such a view. From what he told the representa- 
tive of a Peking newspaper he never expressed the views at- 
tributed to him. Be this as it may, I cannot help having my 
doubts. AU Dr. Goodnow is alleged to have said bearing on the 
merits of the monarchical and republican system of government 
as an abstract subject of discussion, such as the necessity of the 
form of state (Kuo-ti) being suited to the general conditions of 
the country and the lessons we should learn from the Central 
and South American republics, are really points of a very simple 
nature and easily deduced. How strange that among all this 
large number of politicians and scholars, who are as numerous 
as the trees in the forest and the perch in the stream, should 
have failed for all these years to notice these simple points ; and 
now suddenly make a fetish of them because they have come out 
of the mouth of a foreigner. Is it because no one except a 
foreign doctor can discover such facts? Why even a humble 
learner like myself, though not so learned even to the extent of 
one ten-thousandth part of his knowledge, more than ten years 
ago anticipated what the good doctor has said ; and I said much 
more and in much more comprehensive terms. I have no desire 
to talk about my work, but let my readers glance through the 
copies of the Hsin Min Tsung Pao, Yin Ping Shih Wen Chi, the 
"Fight between Constitutional Advocates" and "Revolutionary 
Advocates," the "Question of the Building of the New China," 
etc., etc. My regret is that my eyes are not blue and my hair 
not brown, and hence my words were not acceptable to the 
nation ! 

ni. RES JUDICATA 

I do not say that the merits or otherwise of the republican 
system should not be discussed, but the time for such a discus- 
sion has passed. The most opportune time for such a discus- 
sion was in 1911 when the Revolution had just begun ; but since 
then further discussions should not be tolerated. There might 
have been some excuse if this subject had been brought up for 
discussion when the second revolution broke out at Hukow on 
the Yangtsze river or before the President was formally in- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 197 

augurated, or before the Powers formally recognized the Re- 
public; but the excuse even then would have been a weak one. 
Where were you then, advocates of monarchy? Could you not 
at that time have brought out an essay by one of the great 
scholars of the world as a subject for discussion? Could you 
not have cited the cases of American republics as a warning 
for us that these republic were by no means peaceful? Yet at 
that time when the heroes of discretion were daily pushing the 
progress of the republican cause, stating that repubhcanism 
was the panacea for all the world's administrations and that 
republicanism was not a new factor in Chinese history, a humble 
and ignorant man like myself, then a stranger in a foreign land, 
was burdened with the fear of the unsuitability of the republi- 
can system to China and wrote articles in support of his own 
views and wept till his eyes were dry. 

Do you not realize that the State is a thing of great import- 
ance and should not be disturbed carelessly? How can you 
then experiment with it and treat it as if you were putting a 
chest into a dead hole, saying "Let me place it here for the 
moment and I will see to it later." The status of the State can 
be likened to marriage between man and woman. The greatest 
care should be taken during courtship. The lady should then 
exercise care to see that the man whom she is taking to be a 
life companion is worthy of her. During this period it is the 
duty of her relatives and friends to point out to her any danger 
or misunderstanding even to the extent of offending her feel- 
ings. But if you leave her alone at this stage when there is 
plenty of time to change her course, and — what is more — urge 
her to tie the knot despite incompatibility, what right have you 
afterward to make the impudent suggestion to the wife that 
her husband is not a man to whom she should cling for life? Is 
such a course a charitable way of doing things ? 

If indeed the republican cause is enough to cause the destruc- 
tion of the nation then you, the advocates of monarchy, have 
placed the country in a position from which she has no hope of 
ever coming out independent. You are the men who — to the 
best of your ability — inculcated and pressed the adoption of 
the republican cause. The proverb says, "If now, why not 



198 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

then?" How many days can a person live that you, not satis- 
fied with one great sin, are again to commit another. It is not 
long since the Republic was first established; yet you, the vet- 
erans of republicanism, are the leaders today in advocating 
the overthrow of the Republic. Yes. It is indeed strange that 
I, a man who once opposed the republican cause, should now be 
opposing you. Nothing is stranger and nothing is so fateful. 

But our modern critics say we prefer a constitutional mon- 
archy to an autocratic republic. Now whether we are consti- 
tutional or not is a question concerning the administration, 
while the question whether we are republican or not is a question 
concerning the form or status of the country. We have always 
held that the question of Kuo-ti is above discussion and that 
what we should consider is the actual condition of administra- 
tion. If the administration (government) is constitutional, 
then it matters not whether the country is a Republic or a 
Monarchy. If the government is not constitutional then 
neither a republic nor a monarchy will avail. There is no 
connexion, therefore, between the question of Kuo-ti and the 
question of Cheng-ti. It is an absurd idea to say that in order 
to improve the administration we must change the Kuo-ti— ij^e 
status or form of the country — as a necessity. If this idea,.4S„ 
to be entertained for a single moment the changes even in con- 
stitutional countries will be endless. But the curious paradox 
is that in former days the critics said that only a republic, not 
a monarchy, could be constitutional; whereas, the critics now 
say that a monarchy, not a republic, can alone be constitu- 
tional ! 

IV. THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 

Let me therefore lay down a simple definition of what a Con- 
stitution is before discussing whether the contentions of the 
critics are reasonable. My opponents will agree with me that 
the main principle of a constitutional government is that the 
legislative organ should always balance the executive and that 
the exercising of the administrative power is always limited to 
a certain extent. They will also agree that the most important 
point of a so-called constitutional monarchy is that the mon- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 199 

arch should act as a figurehead, and that the estabhshment of a 
responsible cabinet is an. indispensable accompaniment. If 
these simple principles are recognized then we must put up the 
theory for discussion. Let us then raise the question who shall 
be the monarch. In plain words, is the person in our mind the 
President? or any other person? (In view of the repeated 
declarations of the President that he will never consent to be- 
come an Emperor, this suggestion on my part is a gross insult 
to his character, but I crave to excuse myself as this is only 
mere speculation and supposition.) What shall we do with the 
President if we find another man? The President, having so 
long borne the burdens of the State, will certainly be only too 
willing to vacate his post to live in retirement as far as his own 
person is concerned, but can we imagine that the country will 
allow the President to retire? If not, then are we going to ask 
the President to form a responsible cabinet under a figurehead 
monarch? Even if we take it for granted that the President, 
out of love for the country, would be willing to sacrifice his own 
principles and yield to the wish of the country, it will be dan- 
gerous indeed if he — a person on whom the whole nation de- 
pends — is placed in the path of parliament. Therefore the 
contention that a constitutional monarchy will be attained if a 
person other than the President be made a monarch is false and 
baseless. ^ 

Shall we then make the present President a monarch? Of 
course the President will not consent to this. But leaving this 
aside let us suppose that the President, in consideration of the 
permanent welfare of the country, is willing to sacrifice every- 
thing to satisfy the wish of the people, do we expect that he will 
become a mere figurehead? A figurehead monarch is, to adapt 
the saying of the west a fat porker, a guinea-pig, that is, good 
as an expensive ornament. Will it be wise to place so valuable 
a personage in so idle a position at a time when the situation 
is so extremely critical? 

Even if we are willing to suffer the President to become a 
figurehead it will remain a question whether a responsible cab- 
inet can ever be formed. I do not say that the President will 
not allow a responsible cabinet to exist under him. My conten- 



200 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

tion is that there is no one within my knowledge, who commands 
respect enough and is capable of taking over the responsibilities 
of President Yuan. For who can replace the Great President 
in coping with our numerous difficulties? If we select an ordi- 
nary man and make him bear the great burdens, we will find 
that in addition to his lack of ability rendering him unequal to 
the occasion, his lack of dominating influence will disqualify him 
from exercising authority. It was for the purpose of meeting 
the requirements of the existing conditions that the Cabinet sys- 
tem was changed into a Presidential system — an excellent sub- 
stitution for a weakened administration. Conditions in the 
next two or three years will not be very much different from 
what they are now. Therefore, the contention that the admin- 
istration will be changed overnight for the better after a 
change in the form of the State is, if not a wicked untruth to 
deceive the common people, the ridiculous absurdity of a book- 
worm. Thus the theory that a constitutional monarchy will 
immediately follow, if the President consents to become a mon- 
arch, is also fallacious. 

Can it be possible that those who are now holding up the con- 
stitutional principle as a shield for their monarchical views 
have a diff"erent definition for the term "constitution"? The 
Ching (Manchu) Dynasty considered itself as possessing a con- 
stitution in its last days. Did we recognize it as such? Let 
me also ask the critics what guarantee they have to offer that 
the constitution will be put into effect without hindrance as soon 
as the form of State is changed. If they cannot give any 
definite guarantee, then what they advocate is merely an abso- 
lute monarchy and not a constitutional monarchy. As it is 
not likely to be a constitutional monarchy, we may safely as- 
sume that it will be an imperial autocracy. I cannot regard it 
as a wise plan if, owing to dislike of its defects, the Republic 
should be transformed into an Imperial autocracy. Owing to 
various unavoidable reasons, it is excusable in spite of violent 
opposition to adopt temporarily autocratic methods in a repub- 
lican country. But if the plan proposed by present-day critics 
be put into effect, that on the promise of a constitution we 
should agree to the adoption of a monarchy, then the promise 




The Scholar Liang Chi-chao, Sometimes Minister of 
Justice, and the Foremost "Brain" in China 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 201 

must be definitely made to the country at the time of transition 
that a constitutional government will become an actuality. 
But if, after the promise is made, existing conditions are 
alleged to justify the continuance of autocratic methods, I am 
afraid the whole country will not be so tolerant towards the 
Chief Executive. To assume outwardly the role of constitu- 
tional government, but in reality to rule in an unconstitutional 
manner, was the cause of the downfall of the Ching Dynasty. 
Tlie object lesson is not obscure. Let us take warning by it. 

V. FALLACIES OF THE MONAKCHISTS 

If, on the other hand, the present day critics are really in 
earnest for a constitution, then I am unable to understand why 
they believe that this cannot be secured under the Republic but 
must be obtained in a roundabout way by means of a monarchy. 
In my view the real hindrances to the adoption of a constitution 
at the present day in China are the existing conditions, tiz. the 
attitude of the officials and the traditions and intellectual stan- 
dards of the people. But these hindrances have not resulted 
from the adoption of republicanism. Therefore they cannot 
be expected to disappear with the disappearance of the Re- 
public. For instance, from the President downward to the 
minor official of every official organ in the capital or in the 
provinces, every one inclines to be independent of the law, and 
considers it convenient to deal with affairs as he pleases. This 
is the greatest obstacle to constitutional government. Now 
has that anything to do with the change or not of the form of 
State? Again, the absence, on the part of the people, of inter- 
est in political affairs, of knowledge of politics, of political 
morality and strength, and their inability to organize proper 
political parties to make use of an inviolable parliament, are 
also hindrances to the attainment of a constitution. Now what 
have these things to do with a change in the form of the States? 
If I were to go on naming such hindrances one by one, I should 
count my fingers many times over and I should not be through. 
Yet it is quite plain that not a single one of these hindrances 
can be attributed to republicanism. 

To say that what we cannot get under the republic can be 



202 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

secured immediately upon accepting a monarchical regime, or 
to say that what can be secured under a monarchical regime 
can never be secured in a republican period is beyond the under- 
standing of a stupid man like myself, although I have searched 
my brain for a valid reason. 

My view is that if China is really in earnest for a constitu- 
tion, the President should set the example himself by treating 
the Constitutional Compact as sacredly inviolable and compel 
his subordinates to do the same. Every letter of the compact 
should be carried out and no attempt should be made to step 
beyond its limits. 

Meantime give the people as many opportunities as possible 
to acquaint themselves with political affairs, and do not 
stifle the aspirations of the people or weaken their strength or 
damp their interest or crush their self-respect. Then within a 
few years we shall be rewarded with results. If, instead of 
doing all these things, we vainly blame the form of State, we 
are, as Chu Tse says, like a boat that blames the creek for 
its curves. 

The most powerful argument of those who advocate a change 
to a monarchy is that there is every possibility of disturbance 
at the time of a Presidential election. This is a real danger. 
It is for this reason that ten years ago I did not dare to asso- 
ciate myself with the advocates of republicanism. If the critics 
want to attack me on this point to support of their conten- 
tions, I advise them not to write another article but to reprint 
my articles written some time ago, which, I think, will be more 
effective. Fortunately, however, we have discovered a compar- 
atively effective remedy. For, according to the latest Presi- 
dent Election Law the term of the President is to all Intents and 
purposes a term for life. It is therefore impossible for such 
dangers to appear during the life of the President. What con- 
cerns us is therefore what will happen after the departure of 
the present President for another world. This, of course,^s^ 
question that we do not wish to touch upon ; but since every one, 
even the patriarchs nvust die some day, let us face the matter 
openly. If Heaven blesses China and allows the Great Presi- 
dent to devote himself to the country for ten or more years — 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 203 

during which he will be able to assert the authority of the 
government, cleanse officialdom, store-up strength, consolidate 
the country, and banish all hidden dangers — then there will be 
nothing to choose between a republic or a monarchy. If, on 
the other hand. Heaven should not be pleased so to favour us 
and takes away our Great President before he is half through 
with his great task, then the fate of China is sealed. No 
changes in the form of State will avail under any circum- 
sTahces. Therefore the question whether China will be left in 
peace or not depends entirely on the length of years the Great 
President will live and what he will be able to accomplish 
in his lifetime. Whether the country is ruled as a republic or 
a monarchy, the consequences will be the same. 

Do you still doubt my words? Let me go deeper into the 
analysis. The difference between a republic and a monarchy 
lies only in the methods of succession of the head of the nation, 
it is evident that although a certain law of succession may be 
made during the life-time of the Head, it cannot take effect 
until his death ; and whether or not the effect thus intended will 
come up to expectations will depend on two factors : ( 1 ) 
whether or not the merits and personal influence of the prede- 
cessor will continue effective after his death, and (2) whether or 
not there will be unscrupulous and insubordinate claimants at 
the death of the Head, and, if any, the number of such men and 
whether the point of dispute they raise be well-founded. If 
these are taken as the basis for discerning the future we will 
arrive at the same conclusion whether the country be a republic 
or a monarchy. 

VI. THE PRESIDENTIAL, ELECTION LAW 

The Presidential Election Law, however, provides that the 
successor should be nominated by his predecessor, and the name 
of the successor so nominated is to be locked in the golden box 
in the stone strong-room. The President may now, on the one 
"hand, multiply his merits and strengthen his personal influence 
so that the whole country will gladly bow to his wishes to the 
extent that even after his death they will not want to disobey 
his last wish, and on the other hand, the President may quietly 



204 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ascertain the likely causes which would produce dissension, and 
take suitable steps to prevent and be rid of them. If the seed 
of dissension is in the ordinances, then alter the ordinances so 
that they may not be used as a tool by possible claimants. 
If the seed of dissension is in a person then cultivate that man, 
lead him to righteousness, place him in a suitable position so 
that he may be protected from temptation. Meanwhile let the 
President carefully select his successor on whom he may even- 
tually lay the responsibilities of State ( according to the Presi- 
dential Election Law the President is at liberty to suggest any 
one he likes, his own son or some one else). Let the nominee^ 
be placed in a responsible position so as to bring him to public 
notice. Give him real authority so that he may establish his 
influence. Place his name at the head of other men of little 
consequence in the golden box. Then there will be absolutely 
no ground for dispute when the time comes to open the box. 

If every President will do likewise this system can be used 
without fear of a break for hundreds of years. Otherwise we 
will have only the Imperial system on paper to rely on for 
assistance, which is not even to be thought of. A glance 
through the pages of Chinese history will show the numerous 
cases in the reign of Emperors when princes fought in the very 
confines of the Emperor's palace while the corpse of their royal 
father lay unburied in the hall. Thus it is seen that the hidden 
cause of the safety or otherwise of the country does not lie with 
the mere formality of a constitution either in a republic or a 
monarchy. 

VII. THE CASE OF DIAZ, THE DICTATOR 

The critics bring up the example of Mexico where live rivals 
have been struggling with each other for the presidency, and 
the internal confusion of the Central and South American re- 
pubhcs as well as Portugal, as an unquestionable proof of their 
contention that a republic is not so good as a monarchy. I 
imagine that the idea of these critics is that all these (disturb- 
ances can be avoided if all these republics were changed into 
monarchies. Let me tell them that Diaz ruled over Mexico for 
thirty years, and only died as an exile in May last (I am not 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 205 

quite sure of the exact month). If indeed the struggle in Mex- 
ico was a fight for succession then the fight should not have 
begun until this year. And indeed if it were necessary to have 
a monarch to avoid the disturbance, and supposing that Diaz, 
thirty years ago, had a man like Dr. Goodnow to make the 
suggestion, and men like the Chou An Hui to spread it, and 
suppose that Diaz boldly took the advice and set up an Imperial 
system for himself, would Mexico then have a peace that would 
last as long as the ages ? 

If Diaz had assumed the throne I am positive he would long 
ago have been an exile in a foreign country before his imperial 
system could have come into effect or he himself become the 
proud founder of a new dynasty. What he would have held as 
an imperial charter would have become a mere scrap of paper. 
If he could not prevent rebellion even during his life-time how 
can we expect an empty Imperial system to prevent it after his 
death. Even a child can see this. The disturbances in Mexico 
were unavoidable no matter under a republic or a monarchy. 
The reason? It is because Diaz, under the mask of a republic, 
actually played the role of a despot. During all the thirty 
years he held office he never devoted himself to the strengthening 
of the fundamental things of State, but diligently strengthened 
his own position. He massed an enormous number of troops 
for his own protection so that he might overawe the people. 
For fear that the troops might become arrogant and insubor- 
dinate, he provoked disagreement among them in order that he 
might play them round his fingers. He banished all those who 
opposed him, relying on force alone. In dealing with those who 
were really patriotic, he either corrupted their character by 
buying them with silver or removed them by assassination. He 
was a vainglorious man and spent money like water. From the 
foreign capitalists he borrowed in a most indiscriminate man- 
ner, while on the Mexican people he levied all sorts of cruel 
taxes. Thus the strength of the people was drained and the 
resources of the country were exhausted, creating a position 
over which he eventually had no control whatever. Ten years 
ago I wrote an article in the Hsin Min Tsung Pao remarking 
that Diaz was a matchless fraud. I said then that a nation- 



206 THE FIGHT FOU THE 

wide calamity would befall Mexico after his death and that the 
Mexican nation would be reduced to a mere shadow. (My 
friend Mr. Tang Chio-tun also wrote an article, before the 
internal strife in Mexico broke out, on the same subject and in 
an even more comprehensive way). Luckily for Diaz he ruled 
under the mask of republicanism, for only by so doing did he 
manage to usurp and keep the presidential chair for thirty 
years. He would long ago have disappeared had he attempted 
to assume the role of an emperor. This is also true of the 
other republics of Central and South America. Their presi- 
dents almost without a single exception used military force as 
a stepping-stone to the presidential chair. We have yet to see 
the last military aspirant. The unsuitability of the country 
to the republican system is of course one of the reasons 
but I cannot agree with those who say that this is the only 
reason. 

As to Portugal it is true that the change from the monarchy 
to republic has not stopped internal disturbance ; but is it not 
a fact that Portugal became a republic as a result of internal 
disturbance and was it not during the existence of the monarch 
that the disturbance started? It is ridiculous to suppose that 
a republic will surely court disturbance while a monarchy will 
surely ensure peace and order. Is not Persia a monarchy.'^ Is 
not Turkey a monarchy? Is not Russia a monarchy? 

Read their history in recent decades and see how many years 
of peace they have had. There have been no election of presi- 
dents in these countries. Why then such unrest? 

Again, why was the state of affairs during the Sixteen States 
of the Five Dynasty-Period and the Ten States of the Five Suc- 
cessions as deplorably miserable and disastrous as the state of 
affairs now prevailing in Mexico, although there was no election 
of Presidents then? In quoting objective facts as illustrations 
the critic should not allow his choice to be dictated by his 
personal like or dislike. Otherwise he will not be deceiving 
others than himself. Soberly speaking, ^nyj^orna^ of state is 
capable of either ensuring a successful government or causing 
rebellion. And nine cases out of ten the cause of rebellion lies 
in the conditions of the administration and not in the form of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 207 

state^ It cannot be denied, however, that the chances of re- 
bellion and dissension are more frequent and easier when the 
form of state does not suit the conditions of the people. That 
is whj^ I did not advocate republicanism; and even now I am 
not a blind believer in republicanism. In this I agree with jou, 
the Chou An Hui people. 

The reason why I have not decided to advocate boldly a 
change in the form of state is because for years my heart has 
been burdened with an unspeakable sorrow and pain, believing 
:^at ever since the mistake made in 1911 the hope for China's 
future has dwindled to almost nothing. On one hand I have 
been troubled with our inability to make the Republic a success, 
and on the other I have been worrying over the fact that it 
would be impossible to restore the monarchy. The situation 
has so worked on my troubled mind that at times I seemed to 
be beside myself. But as the whole country seemed to be al- 
ready in a state of desperation I have come to the conclusion 
that it would not do any good to add pain to sorrow. There- 
fore, instead of uttering pessimistic views I have been speaking 
words of encouragement to raise our spirits. In this, however, 
I have exhausted my own strength. My friend, Mr. Hsu 
Fo-su, told me some five or six years ago that it was impossible 
for China to escape a revolution, and as a resiilt of the revolu- 
tion could not escape from becoming a republic, and by becom- 
ing a republic China would be bound to disappear as a nation. 
I have been meditating on these words of ill omen and sought 
to help the country to escape from his prediction but I have 
not yet found the way. 

IX. "divinity doth hedge a king" 

Now my friends, you have stated in a worthy manner the 
reasons why the republican form of state cannot assist China 
to maintain her existence ; now let me state why it is impossible 
to restore the monarchical system. The maintenance of the 
dignityjof^a.mQnaxch depends on a sort of mystical, historical, 
traditional influence or belief. Such^n-iafluence, was capable 
of producing unconsciously and spontaneously a kind ojf effect 
to,,^sist directly or indirectly in maintaining order and im- 



208 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

parting blessing- to the country. In^this, lies the yalue^oLau 
monarchy. But dignity is a thing not to be trifled with. Once 
it is trodden down it can never rise again. We carve wood or 
mould clay into the image of a person and call it a god (idol). 
Place it in a beautiful temple, and seat it in a glorious shrine 
and the people will worship it and find it miraculously potent. 
But suppose some insane person should pull it down, tread it 
under foot and throw it into a dirty pond and suppose some one 
should discover it and carry it back to its original sacred abode, 
you will find the charm has gone from it. Ever since the_day^ 
of monarchical government the people have looked on the monr, 
arch with a sort of divine reverence^ and never dared to ques- 
tion or criticize his position. Afteria period of republicanism, 
however, this attitude on the part of the common people has 
been abruptly terminated with no possibility of resurrection. 
A survey of all the republics of the world will tell us that 
although a large number of them suffered under republican rule, 
not a single one succeeded in shaking itself free of the republi- 
can fetters. Among the world xepublics only France has had 
her monarchical system revived twice after the republic was 
first inaugurated. The monarchy, however, disappeared al- 
most immediately. Thus we may well understand how difficult 
it is for a country to return to its monarchical state after a 
republican regime. It may be said that China has had only a 
short experience of the republican regime; but it must also be 
remembered that the situation has been developing for more 
than ten years and in actual existence for about four years. 
During the period of development the revolutionists denounced 
the monarch in most extravagant terms and compared him to 
the devil. Their aim was to kill the mystic belief of the people 
in the Emperor ; for only by diminishing the dignity of the 
monarch could the revolutionary cause make headway. And 
during and after the change all the official documents, school 
textbooks, press views and social gossip have always coupled 
the word monarch with reprobation. Thus for a long while 
this glorious image has been lying in the dirty pond ! Leaving 
out the question that it is difficult to restore the monarchy at 
the present day, let us suppose that by arbitrary method we do 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 209 

succeed in^ restoring it. You will then find that it will be im- 
possible for it to regain in former dignity and influence. 

Turning to another aspect, the most natural course would 
seem to be a revival of the last dynasty. It might have been 
possible for a Charles II and Louis XVIII of China to appear 
again, jf not for the hatred of racial domination. But since 
tlje~lasj:.„dynasty was Manchu this is out of the question. If a 
new dynasty were set up it would require many years of hard 
labour and a great deal of organizing to succeed. Even then 
only a few have succeeded in this way in prolonging their dyn- 
asties by actually convincing the people of their merits. 
Therefore for several years I have been saying to myself that it 
would _be easier to strengthen the country and place it on a 
sounder basis if it were possible for us to return to our 
monarchical state. And tojevive the monarchical government 
tljgre are two ways. 

One is that after thoroughly reforming the internal admin- 
istration under the leadership of the present Great President, 
that isj^jyhen all the neglected affairs of the country have been 
well attended to, every family in the land made happy and 
prosperous, the army well-trained and all the necessary bitter- 
ness ^ "eaten," the President, when a suitable opportunity pre- 
sented itself, should have the rare fortune to gain a decisive 
victory over a foreign _foe; then his achievements would be such 
thatthe millions of people woiild compel TiinT to ascend the 
throne, and so he wpu]4 hMkd bis^^^^^^^ to his descendants 

for.endless ages. 

The second possibility is that after a second great internal 
disturbance, resulting in the whole country being thrown into a 
state, of utter confusion and cut up into small independent 
states, the President should suppress them and unite the coun- 
try into one empire. We will, of course, not pray for the 
second possibility to come about as then there will be little left 
of the, Chinese people. And no one can be certain whether the 
person who shall succeed in suppressing the internal strife will 
be a man of our ow^n race or not. Thus the result will not 
differ very much from- national extinction. As to the first pos- 
sibility, we know that an exceedingly capable man is now in a 



210 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

most^powerful position ; let him be^ven time and he will soon 
show himself to be a man of success. Does not the last xa^^-jaf 
hope for China depend on this? 

X. THE UNRIPE PEAR 

This is why I say we should not deliberately create trouble 
for the Republic at this time to add to the worries of the 
Great President so that he might devote his puissant thoughts 
and energies to the institution of great reforms. Then our 
final hope will be satisfied some day. But what a ye|ir-.^lld^ 
what a day we are now living in? The great crisis (Note: 
The reference is to the Japanese demands) has just passed and 
we have not yet had time for a respite. By.the pre§.s]sire^,9^^ 
powerful neighbour we have been compelled to sign a "certain" 
Treaty. Floods, drought, epidemics and locusts visit our 
country and the land is full of suffering while robbers plunder 
the people. In ancient times this would have been a day for 
the Imperial Court to remove their ornaments and live in 
humiliation. What do the j)eoplej3f our day mean by advising 
and urging the President to ascend the throne? To pluck the 
fruit before it is ripe, injures the roots of the tree; and to force 
the pxemature birth of a child kills the mother. If the last 
"ray of hope" for China should be extinguished by the failure 
of a premature attempt to force matters, how could the advo- 
cates of such a premature attempt excuse themselves before the 
whole country? Let the members of the Chou An Hui meditate 
on this point. 

The odes say, "The people are tired. Let them have a re- 
spite." In less than four years' time from the 8th moon of the 
year Hsin Hai we have had many changes. Like a bolt from 
the blue we had the Manchu Constitution, then "the Republic 
of Five Races," then the Provisional President, then the formal 
Presidency, then the Provisional Constitution was promulgated, 
then it was suddenly amended, suddenly the National Assembly 
was convoked, suddenly it was dissolved, suddenly we had a 
Cabinet System, suddenly it was changed to a Presidential 
System, suddenly it was a short-term Presidency, sud- 
denly it was a life-term Presidency, suddenly the Provisional 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 211 

Constitution was temporarily placed in a legal position as a 
Permanent Constitution, suddenly the drafting of the Perma- 
nent Constitution was pressed. Generally speaking the aver- 
age life of each new system has been less than six months, after 
which a new system quite contrary to the last succeeded it. 
Thus the whole country has been at a loss to know where it 
stood and how to act; and thus the dignity and credit of the 
Government in the eyes of the people have been lowered down 
to the dust. There are many subjects respecting internal and 
diplomatic affairs which we can profitably discuss. If you 
wish to serve the country in a patriotic way you have many 
ways to do so. Why stir the peaceful water and create a sea 
of troubles by your vain attempt to excite the people and sow 
seeds of discord for the State? 

XI. THE ASSEVERATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT 

One or two points more, and I am finished. These will be in 
the nature of a straight talk to the Chou An Hui. The ques- 
tion I would ask in plain words is, who is the person you have 
in^oiuLjmind as the future Empei:qr.'' Do you wish to select 
a^p_er50ii other than the Great President.? You know only too 
well that the moment Jhe President relieves his shoulder of the 
burdens of State the country will be thrown into confusion. If 
you entertain this plot with the deliberation of a person bent 
upon the destruction of the country, then the four hundred 
million of people will not excuse you. 

Is the man you have in mind the present President.'' Heaven 
and earth as well as all living creatures in China and other 
lands know what the President jswore to when he took the oath 
of_office_as._President. Rumours have indeed been circulated, 
but whenever they reached the ears of the President he has 
nev_er_l2esitatjji to^ express y^n^ mind, saying that no 

amount of pressure could compel him to change his determina- 
tion. All officials who have come into close contact with the 
President have heard such sentiments from the lips of the 
President on not a few occasions. To me his words are still 
ringing in my ears. General Feng Kuo-chang has conveyed to 
me what he was told by the President. He says that the Presi- 



212 THE FIGHT FOE THE 

ident has prepared a "few rooms" in England, and that if the 
people would not spare him he would flee to the refuge he has 
prepared. Thus we may clearly see how determined the Presi- 
dent is. Can it be possible that you have never heard of this 
and thus raise this extraordinary subject without any cause. 
If the situation should become such that the President should 
be compelled to carry out his threat and desert the Palace, what 
would jrou say and do then? 

Or, perhaps, you are measuring the lordly conduct of a gen- 
tleman with the heart of a mean man, saying to yourself that 
what the President has been saying cannot be the truth, but, 
as Confucius has said, "say you are not but make a point to 
do it," and that, knowing that he would not condemn you, y QU,. 
have taken the risk. If so, then what do you take the Presi- 
dent for? To go back on one's words is an act despised by a 
vagabond. To_suggest such an act as being capable .alJUjfi 
President is an insult, the hideousness of which cannot be 
equalled by the number of hairs on one's head. Any one guilty 
of such an insult should not be spared by the four hundred mil- 
lion of people. 

Xn. THE CHOU AN HUI AND THE LAW 

Next let me ask if you have read the Provisional Constitu- 
tion, the Provisional Code, the Meeting and Association Law, 
the Press Regulations, the various mandates bearing on the 
punishment of persons who dare conspire against the existing 
form of state? Do you not know that you, as citizens of the 
Republic, must in duty bound observe the Constitution and 
obey the laws and mandates? Yet you have dared openly to 
call together your partisans and incite a revolution (the rec- 
ognized definition in political science for revolution is "to 
change the existing form of state"). As the Judiciary have 
not been courageous enough to deal with you since you are 
all so closely in touch with the President, you have become 
bolder still and carry out your sinister scheme in broad day- 
light. I dp not wish to say what sort of peace you are planning 
for China ; but this much I know, that the law has been violated 
by you to the last letter. I will be silent if you believe that a 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 213 

nation ^cajijbe, governed without law. Otherwise tell me what 
jfiii_have got to say? 

It is quite apparent that you will not be satisfied with mere 
shouting and what you aim at is the actual fulfilment of your 
expectations. That is, jon wish that once the expected mon- 
archy is established it may continue for ever. Now._by what 
principle can such a monarchy continue for eYer> except that 
the laws and orders of that dynasty be obeyed, and obeyed im- 
plicitly by a,ll, from the Court down to the common people? 
For one to adopt methods that violate the law while engaged 
in creating a new dynasty is like a man, who to secure a wife, 
induces the virtuous virgin to commit fornication with him, on 
the plea that as a marriage will be arranged preservation of 
her virtue need not be insisted upon. Can such a man blame 
his wife for immorality after marriage? If, while still citizens 
of a republican country, one may openly and boldly call meet- 
ings and organize societies for the overthrow of the Republic, 
who shall say that we may not in due time openly and boldly 
call meetings and organize societies for the overthrow of the 
mon archy? What shall you say if in future there should be 
another foreign doctor to suggest another theory and another 
society to engage in another form of activity? The Odes have 
it, "To prevent the monkey from climbing a tree is like putting 
mud on a man in the mire." For a person to adopt such 
methods while engaged in the making of a dynasty is the height 
of folly. Mencius says, "a Chuntse when creating a dynasty 
aims at things that can be handed down as good examples." 
Is it not the greatest misfortune to set up an example that can- 
not be handed down as a precedent? The present state of af- 
fairs is causing me no small amount of anxiety. 

Xni. A POSTSCRIPT 

A copy of Yang Tu's pamphlet, "Constitutional Monarchy 
or the Salvation of China" reached me after I had finished 
jwriting the above discussion. On a casual glance through it I 
alighted upon the following passage : "What is known as a con- 
stitutional country is a country which has definite laws and in 
which no one, from the ruler down to the compion people, can 



214 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

takfi ai]j..i@Lction_that is not j)ermitted by law, Good jojenjcan^ 
not -do ^ood outside of the bounds of law; neither can bad,m,eii 
do evil in violation of it." This is indeed a passage that 
breathes the very spirit of constitutionalism. Let Jis ask Mr. 
Yang if the activities of the Chou An Hui, of which he„isJJie 
President, are acts within the bounds of law.^ Mr. Yangi^^a, 
good man. It is therefore possible for him to believe that he 
isjioj^doing evil in. violation of the la,w; but has..he Jftpt at Jej,st 
been doing good outside of the bounds of law? If an advocate 
of constitutional monarchy is capable of doing such unlawful 
acts, we may easily imagine what sort of a constitutional mon- 
archy he advocates ; and we may also easily imagine what the 
fate of his constitutional monarchy will be. 

Mencius says, "Am I argumentative.'^ I cannot help it." 
Who would have thought that a man, who cares not for the 
question of the form of state like myself and who opposed yon — 
Mr, Yang Tu — during your first campaign for the change in 
the form of State — you were a Republican then — would be 
opposing you again now that you are engaged in advocating 
another change in the form of state? A change in the form 
of government is a manifestation of progress while a change 
in the status of the State is a sign of revolution. The path of 
progress, leads to_ further ^progress, but the path of revolution 
leads to more revolution. This is a fact proved by theory as 
well as actual experience. Therefore a man who has a;nyJoye 
for his country, is afraid to mention revolution; andas-ica: 
myself I am always opposed to revolution. I am now opposing 
your theory of monarcliical revolution, just as I once opposed 
your theory of republican revolution, in the same spirit, and I 
am doing the same duty. My belief is that since the country 
is now in a most weakened state, we may yet fail even if we do 
all we can at all times to nurse its wound and gather up its 
scattered strength. How can any one devote his time and 
energy to the discussion of a question of no importance such 
as the form of state, and so obstruct the progress of the ad- 
ministration? But this is not all. The whole country is now 
stirred up to an excited state and is wondering how long this 
ever-changing situation is going to stop. The loss caused by 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 215 

this state of affairs, though unnoticed, is incalculable. In the 
Odes, it is written "Alas! my brethren. Befriended of the 
countrymen. No one wants rebellion. What has no parents .?" 
Let the critics remember this — let them remember. 

Sgnie will say to me that a revolution is an unavoidable thing. 
Of_ all_ things only the facts cannot be undone. Why then 
,skQuld I bother myself especially as my last effort fell on deaf 
^Ls. This I realize ; but it is not my nature to abandon what 
%- -in J^ conviction. Therefore, although aware of the futility 
of my words, I cannot refrain from uttering them all the same. 
Chu Yuan drowned himself in the Pilo and Chia Sheng died 
frgnLhjs horse. Ask them why they did these things, they will 
say they did not know. Once I wrote a piece of poetry con- 
taining the following lines: 

"Ten years after you will think of me. 

The country is excited. To whom shall I speak?" 

I have spoken much in my hfe, and all my words have become 
subjects for meditation ten years after they were uttered. 
Never, however, have any of my words attracted the attention 
of my own countrymen before a decade has spent itself. Is it 
a misfortune for my words or a misfortune to the Country.? 
My hope is that there will be no occasion for the country to 
think of my present words ten years hence. 



CHAPTER XI 

THE DREAM EMPIRE 

"the people's voice," and the action of the powers 

(from SEPTEMBER TO DECEMBER, 1915) 

The effect of Liang Ch'i-chao's appeal was noticeable 
at once: there were ominous mutterings among all the 
great class of "intellectuals" who form such a remark- 
able element throughout the country. Nevertheless 
there were no overt acts attempted against the authority 
of Peking. Although literary and liberal China was 
now thoroughly convinced that the usurpation which 
Yuan Shih-kai proposed to practise would be a na- 
tional disgrace and lead to far-reaching complications, 
this force were too scattered and too much under the 
power of the military to tender at once any active op- 
position as would have been the case in Western coun- 
tries. Yuan Shih-kai, measuring this situation very 
accurately, and aware that he could easily become an 
object of popular detestation if the people followed the 
lead of the scholars, decided to place himself outside 
and beyond the controversy by throwing the entire re- 
sponsibility on the Tsan Cheng Yuan, the puppet Sen- 
ate he had erected in place of the parliament destroyed 
by his coup d'etat of the 4th November, 1913. In a 
message issued to that body on the 6th September, 1915, 
he declared that although in his opinion the time was 
inappropriate for making any change in the form of 
State, the matter demanded the most careful and seri- 

216 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 217 

ous consideration which he had no doubt would be given 
to it. If a change of so momentous a character as was 
now_bejng pubhcly advocated were decided in too great 
a haste it might create grave complications: therefore 
the opinion of the nation should be consulted by the 
method of the ballot. And with this nunc dimittis he 
officially washed his hands of a plot in which he had been 
the prime mover. 

The Senate now openly delivered itself over to the 
accomplishment of the scheme which had been broached 
by Yang Tu, the monarchist pamphleteer. Although 
this individual still posed as the leader of the movement, 
in reality he was nothing but the tool of a remarkable 
man, one Liang Shih-yi, famous throughout the coun- 
try as the most unscrupulous and adroit poHtician the 
Revolution had thrown up. This person, who is known 
to have been gravely implicated in many assassina- 
tions, and who was the instrument used in 1912 by 
Yuan Shih-kai to persuade the Manchu Imperial Fam- 
ily to abdicate, had in a brief four years accumulated 
a vast fortune by the manipulations he had indulged in 
as Director-General of The Bank of Communications, 
an institution which, because it disposed of all the rail- 
way receipts, was always in funds even when the Cen- 
tral Treasury itself was empty. By making himself 
financially indispensable to Yuan Shih-kai he had be- 
come recognized as the power behind the Throne; for 
although, owing to foreign clamour, he had been dis- 
missed from his old office of Chief Secretary to the 
President (which he had utilized to effect the sale of 
offices far and wide) he was a daily visitor to the Presi- 
dential Palace and his creatures daily pulled all the 
numerous strings. 



218 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

\ The scheme now adopted by the Senate was to cause 
the provinces to flood Peking with petitions, sent up 
through the agency of "The Society for the Preserva- 
tion of Peace," demanding that the Repubhc be replaced 
by that form of government which the people alone 
understood, the name Constitutional Monarchy being 
selected merely as a piece of political window-dressing 
to please the foreign world. A vast amount of or- 
ganizing had to be done behind the scenes before the 
preliminaries were completed: but on the 6th October 
the scheme was so far advanced that in response to 
"hosts of petitions" the Senate, sitting in its capacity 
of Legislative Chamber (Li Fa Yuan) passed a so- 
called King-making bill in which elaborate regulations 
were adopted for referring the question under discus- 
sion to a provincial referendum. According to this 
naive document the provinces were to be organized into 
electoral colleges, and the votes of the electors, after 
being recorded, were to be sent up to Peking for scru- 
tiny. Some attempt was made to follow Dr. Good- 
now's advice to secure as far as possible that the vari- 
ous classes of the community should be specially rep- 
resented: and provision was therefore made in the vot- 
ing for the inclusion of "learned scholars," Chambers 
of Commerce, and "oversea merchants," whose votes 
were to be directly recorded by their special delegates. 
To secure uniformly satisfactory results, the whole elec- 
tion was placed absolutely and without restriction in 
the hands of the high provincial authorities, who were 
invited to bestow on the matter their most earnest- at- 
tention. 

In a Mandate, issued in response to this Bill, Yuan 
Shih-kai merely limits himself to handing over the con- 





Model Military Polick ix Peking Under the Command 
OF General Munthe, a Norwegian, Raised for the 
Protection of the Legation Quarter 



3j 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 219 

trol of the elections and voting to the local authorities, 
safe in the knowledge that every detail of the plot had 
been carefully worked out in advance. > By this time 
the fact that a serious and dangerous movement was 
being actively pushed had been well-impressed on the 
Peking Legations, and some anxiety was publicly mani- 
fested. It was known that Japan, as the active enemy 
of Yuan Shih-kai, could not remain permanently silent : 
andipn the 28th October in association with Great Brit- 
ain and Russia, she indeed made official inquiries at 
the Chinese Foreign Office regarding the meaning of 
the movement. She was careful, however, to declare 
that it was her solicitude for the general peace that alone 
dictated her action.^ Nevertheless, her warning had an 
unmistakable note about it and occasioned grave an- 
xiety, since the ultimatum of the previous May in con- 
f, action with the Twenty-one Demands had not been 
j^pTgotien. At the beginning of November the Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, replying verbally to these 
representations, alleged that the movement had gone 
too far for it to be stopped and insisted that no appre- 

-h^/i A very remarkable illustration of the manner in which Yuan Shih-kai 
was trapped by official Japan during the monarchist movement has re- 
cently been extensively quoted in the Far Eastern press. Here is the sub- 
stance of a Japanese (vernacular) newspaper account showing the uses to 
which Japanese politicians put the Press: 

"... When that question was being hotly discussed in China Marquis 
Okuma, interviewed by the Press, stated that monarchy was the right form 
of government for China and that in case a monarchical regime was re- 
vived Yuan Shih-kai was the only suitable person to sit on the Throne. 
When this statement by Marquis Okuma v/as published in the Japanese 
papers. Yuan Shih-kai naturally concluded that the Japanese Govern- 
ment, at the head of which Marquis Okuma was, was favourably disposed 
towards him and the monarchical movement. It can well be imagined, 
therefore, how intense was his surprise when he later received a warning 
from the Japanese Government against the resuscitation of the monarchy 
in C;hina. When this inconsistency in the Marquis's actions was called in 
qu jtion in the Japanese House of Representatives, the ex-Premier abso- 
lu+ '\y denied the truth of the statement attributed to him by the Japanese 
r> srs, without any show of hesitancy, and thus boldly shirked the re- 
s^ nsibility which, in reality, lay on him. . . ." 



220 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

hensions need be felt by the Foreign Powers regarding 
the pubhc safety. Dissatisfied by this reply all the En- 
tente Powers, now including France and Italy, re- 
newed their representations, receiving a few, days later 
a formal Note in which absolute guarantees were given 
that law and order would be sedulously preserved. 
Baffled by this firmness, and conscious that further in- 
tervention in such matter would be fraught with grave 
difficulties, the Entente Powers decided to maintain a 
watchful attitude but to do no more publicly. Conse- 
quently events marched forward so rapidlly that by 
December the deed was done, and Yuan Shih-kai had 
apparently been elected unanimously Emperor of China 
by the provincial ballot. J> 

The explanation of this extraordinary business was 
only made public months later with the outbreak of the 
Yunnan rebellion and the secession of the Southern 
provinces. In a remarkable publication, entitled satir- 
ically "The People's Will," the Southern Republican 
Party, which now possessed access to all the confi- 
dential archives of the provinces, published in full the 
secret instructions from Peking which had brought 
about this elaborate comedy. Though considerations 
of space prevent all documents being included in our 
analysis, the salient ones are here textually quoted so 
as to exhibit in its proper historical light the character 
of the chief actor, and the regime the Powers had sup- 
ported — until they were forced by Japan to be more 
honest. These documents, consisting mainly of tele- 
graphic despatches sent from Peking to the provinces, 
do more to explain the working of the Government of 
China than a dozen treatises; for they drag into the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 221 

garish light of day the most secret Yamen machinery 
and show precisely how it is worked. 
^' The play was set in motion by a circular code tele- 
gram sent out on the 30th August by Tuan Chih-kuei, -0/^ 
Governor of Moukden and one of Yuan Shih-kai's yi^UAxA 
most trusted lieutenants, the device of utilizing a centre 
other than the capital to propagate revolutionary ideas 
being a familiar one and looked upon as a very discreet 
procedure. This initial telegram is a document that 
speaks for itself: 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED AUGUST SO, 1915, FROM TUAN CHI-KUEI, 
MILITARY GOVERNOR OP MOUKDEN, ET ALIA, CONTAINING IN- 
STRUCTIONS FOR PRESENTING PETITIONS TO PEKING IN THE 
NAME OF THE CITIZENS OF THE PROVINCES 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces: — 
(To be deciphered personally with the Council of State Code) 

The proposal of changing the form of the State into a mon- 
archy having been unanimously agreed to by the provinces, the 
first step to be taken has now to be decided. We propose that 
petitions be sent in the name of the citizens of the respective 
provinces to the Senate acting in the capacity of Legislative 
Chamber, so as to demonstrate the wish of the people to have a 
monarchy. The acting Legislative Chamber will then decide 
upon the course to be adopted. 

The plan suggested is for each province to send in a separate 
petition, the draft of which will be made in Peking and wired 
to the respective provinces in due course. If you approve, 
you will insert your name as well as those of the gentry and 
merchants of the province who agree to the draft. These peti- 
tions are to be presented one by one to the Legislative Chamber, 
as soon as it is convoked. At all events, the change in the 
form of the State will have to be effected under the colour of 
carrying out the people's will. 

As leading members of political and military bodies, we should 
wait till the opportune moment arrives when we will give col- 



222 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

lateral support to the movement. Details of the plan wIU be 
made known to you from time to time. 

This method of circular telegrams, which had bee.n 
inherited from the last days of the Manchus, and vastly 
extended during the 2?o^^-revolutionary period, was now 
to be used to the very utmost in indoctrinating the prov- 
inces with the idea that not only was the Republic 
doomed but that prompt steps must be taken to erect 
the Constitutional Monarchy by use of fictitious legal 
machinery so that it should not be said that the whole 
enterprise was a mere plot. Accordingly, on the 10th 
September, as a sequel to the telegram we have just 
quoted, an enormous circular message of several thou- 
sand words was sent in code from Peking to all the 
Military and Civil Governors in the provinces instruct- 
ing them precisely how to act in order to throw a cloak 
over the nefarious deed. After explaining the so-called 
"Law on the General Convention of the Citizens' Rep- 
resentatives" (i. e. national referendum) the following 
illuminating sentences occur which require no comment 
showing as they do what apt pupils reactionary Chinese 
are in the matter of ballot-fraud. 

. . . (1) The fact that no fewer than one hundred petitions 
for a change in the form of State have been received from peo- 
ple residing in all parts of the country shows that the people 
are of one mind concerning this matter. Hence the words in the 
"General Convention Law" : "to be decided by the General Con- 
vention of the Citizens' Representatives," refer to nothing 
more than the formal approval of the Convention and are by 
no means intended to give room for discussion of any kind. 
Indeed, it was never intended that the citizens should have any 
choice between a republic and a monarchy. For this reason at- 
the time of voting all the representatives must be made unani- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 



223 



mously to advocate a change of the Republic into a Monarchy. 

It behooves you, therefore, prior to the election and voting, 
privately to search for such persons as are willing to express 
the people's will in the sense above indicated. You will also 
make the necessary arrangements beforehand, andjdeyise^every 
means to have^such^persons elected, so that there may be no 
divergence of opinion when the time arrives for putting the 
form of the State to the vote. 

(2) Article 2 provides: "The citizens' representatives shall 
be elected by separate ballot signed by the person voting. The 
person who obtains the greatest nujaber. of ,;y^ cast shall be 
^cT^ed elected." 

The citizens' representatives, though nominally elected by 
the electors, are really appointed beforehand by you acting in 
the capacity of Superintendent of Election. The principle of 
separate signed ballot is adopted in this article with the object 
of preventing the voters from casting their votes otherwise 
than as directed, and of awakening in them a sense of responsi- 
bility for their votes. . . . 

These admirable principles having been officially laid 
down by Peking, it is not hard to understand that the 
Military and Civil Governors in the provinces, being 
anxious to retain their posts and conciliate the great 
personage who would be king, gave the problem their 
most earnest attention, and left no stone unturned to 
secure that there should be no awkward contretemps. 
On the 28th September, the Peking Government, be- 
ing now entirely surrendered into the hands of the plot- 
ters, thought it advisable to give the common people a 
direct hint of what was coming, by sending circular in- 
structions regarding the non-observance of the Repub- 
lican anniversary (10th October). The message in 
question is so frankly ingenuous that it merits inclusion 
in this singular dossier: 









224 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED SEPTEMBER 26, 1915, FROM THE COUNCIL 
OF STATE TO THE MILITARY AND CIVIL GOVERNORS OF THE 
PROVINCES RESPECTING THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THE AN- 
NIVERSARY OF THE REPUBLIC 

To the Military and Civil Governors and the Military Commis- 
sioners of the Provinces and the Intendant of Shanghai : — 

(Code Telegram) 

Now that a monarchical form of government has been advo- 
cated, the National Anniversary in commemoration of the Re- 
public should, of course, be observed with least possible dis- 
play, under the pretext either of the necessity for economy 
owing to the impoverished condition of the people, or of the 
advisability of celebrating the occasion quietly so as to prevent 
disturbances arising in consequence of the many rumours now 
afloat. In this way public peace and order may be maintained 
on the one hand, money and trouble saved on the other. How 
to put this suggestion into practice will be left to your dis- 
cretion. (Signed) Council of State. 

By October such progress had been made in Peking 
in the general work of organizing this coup d'etat that 
as we have seen, the Senate had passed on the 6th of 
that month the so-called "King-making Bill." The 
very next day, so that nothing should be left in doubt, 
the following circular telegram was dispatched to all 
the provinces : 

code telegram dated OCTOBER 7, 1915, FROM CHU CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, DEVISING PLANS FOE. 
NOMINATING YUAN SHIH-KAI AS EMPEROR 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces : — 

(To be deciphered with the Hua Code) 

Our telegram of the 12th ult. must have reached you by this 
time. 

The Administrative Council, at a meeting held on the 4th 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 225 

inst., passed the Bill for a General Convention of the Citizens' 
Representatives. Article 12 of the Bill was amended so as to 
contain the following clause: — "The Superintendent of Elec- 
tion may, in case of necessity, delegate his functions to the 
several district magistrates." This will soon be communicated 
officially to the provinces. You are therefore requested to 
make the necessary preparations beforehand in accordance 
with the instructions contained in our telegram of the 29th 
September. 

We propose that the following steps be taken after the votes 
have been duly polled: — 

(1) After the form of the state has been put to the vote, 
the result should be reported to the sovereign (meaning Yuan- 
shihkai) and to the Administrative Council in the name of the 
General Convention of the Citizens' Representatives. 

(2) In the telegrams to be sent by the General Convention 
of the Citizens' Representatives for nominating the emperor, 
the following words should be specifically used : "We respect- 
fully nominate the present President Yuan Shih-kai as Em- 
peror of the Chinese Empire." 

(3) The telegrams investing the Administrative Council with 
general powers to act on behalf of the General Convention of 
the Citizens' Representatives should be dispatched in the name 
of the General Convention of the Citizens of the Provinces. 

The drafts of the dispatches under the above-mentioned three 
heads will be wired to you beforehand. As soon as the votes 
are cast, these are to be shown to the representatives, who will 
sign them after perusal. Peking should be immediately in- 
formed by telegram. 

As for the telegrams to be sent by the commercial, military, 
and political bodies, they should bear as many signatures as 
possible, and be wired to the Central Government within three 
days after the voting. 

When the enthronement is promulgated by edict, letters of 
congratulation from the General Convention of the Citizens' 
Representatives, as well as from the commercial, military, and 
political bodies, will also have to be sent in. You are therefore 
requested to draw up these letters in advance. 



226 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

This is specially wired for your information beforehand. 
The details will be communicated by letter. 

In ordinary circumstances it would have been thought 
that sufficiently implicit instructions had ah'eady been 
given to permit leaving the matter in the hands of the 
provincial authorities. Great anxiety, however, was 
beginning to reign in Peking owing to continual 
rumours that dangerous opposition, both internal and 
external, was developing. It was therefore held neces- 
sary to chnch the matter in such a way that no possible 
questions should be raised later. Accordingly, before 
the end of October — and only two days before the "ad- 
vice" was tendered by Japan and her Allies, — ^the fol- 
lowing additional instructions were telegraphed whole- 
sale to the provinces, being purposely designed to make 
it absolutely impossible for any slip to occur between 
cup and lip. The careful student will not fail to no- 
tice in these remarkable messages that as the game de- 
velops, all disguise is thrown to the four winds, and 
the central and only important point, namely the 
prompt election and enthronement of Yuan Shih-kai as 
Emperor, insisted on with almost indecent directness, 
every possible precaution being taken to secure that 
end: 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED OCTOBER 26, 1915, FROM CHF CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, RESPECTING THE NOM- 
INATION OF YUAN SHIH-KAI AS EMPEROR 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces : — 

(To be deciphered with the Hua Code) 

Your telegram of the 24th inst. came duly to hand. 
After the form of the state has been put to the vote, the 
nomination of Yuan Shih-kai as emperor should be made forth- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 227 

with without further voting. You should address the repre- 
sentatives and tell them that a monarchy having been decided 
on, not even a single day should pass without an emperor ; that 
the citizens' representatives present should nominate Yuan Shih- 
kai as the Great Emperor of the Chinese Empire; and that if 
they are in favour of the proposal, they should signify their 
assent by standing up. This done, the text of the proposed 
letter of nomination from the citizens should be handed to the 
representatives for their signatures ; after which you should 
again address them to the effect that in all matters concerning 
the nomination and the petition for immediate enthronement, 
they may, in the name of the citizens' representatives, invest 
the acting Legislative Council with general powers to act on 
their behalf and to do the necessary things until their petition 
is granted. The text (already prepared) of the proposed 
telegram from the citizens' representatives to the acting Leg- 
islative Council should then be shown to the representatives 
for approval. Whereupon three separate telegrams are to be 
drawn up : one giving the number of votes in favour of a change 
in the form of the state, one containing the original text of the 
letter of nomination, and the third concerning the vesting of 
the acting Legislative Council with general powers to act on 
behalf of the citizens' representatives. These should be sent 
officially to the acting Legislative Council in the name of the 
citizens' representatives. You should at the same time wire to 
the President all that has taken place. The votes and the 
letter of nomination are to be forwarded to Peking in due 
course. 

As for the exact words to be inserted in the letter of nomina- 
tion, they have been communicated to you in our telegram of 
the 23rd inst. These characters, forty-five in all, must on no 
account be altered. The rest of the text is left to your dis- 
cretion. 

We may add that since the letter of nomination and the 
vesting of the acting Legislative Council with general powers 
to act on behalf of the citizens' representatives are matters 
which transgress the bounds of the law, you are earnestly re- 
quested not to send to the National Convention Bureau any 



228 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

telegraphic enquiry concerning them, so that the latter may not 
find itself in the awkward position of having to reply. 

Two days after this telegram had been dispatched 
the long-feared action on the part of Japan had been 
taken and a new situation had been created. The Japa- 
nese "advice" of the 28th October was in fact a veritable 
bombshell playing havoc with the house of cards which 
had been so carefully erected. But the intrigue had 
gone so far, and the prizes to be won by the monarchical 
supporters were so great that nothing could induce 
them to retrace their footsteps. For a week and more 
a desperate struggle went on behind the scenes in the 
Presidential Palace, since Yuan Shih-kai was too astute 
a man not to understand that a most perilous situation 
was being rapidly created and that if things went wrong 
he would be the chief victim. But family influences 
and the voice of the intriguers proved too strong for him, 
and in the end he gave his reluctant consent to a fur- 
ther step. The monarchists, boldly acting on the prin- 
ciple that possession is nine points of the law, called 
upon the provinces to anticipate the vote and to sub- 
stitute the title of Emperor for that of President in all 
government documents and petitions so that morally 
the question would be chose jugee. 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1915, FROM CHU CHI-CHUN, 
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, ET ALIA, ENJOINING A STRONG 
ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERFERENCE ON THE PART OF A CER- 
TAIN FOREIGN POWER 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces : — 

(To be deciphered personally with the Council of State Code) 

A certain foreign power, under the pretext that the Chinese 
people are not of one mind and that troubles are to be appre- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 229 

hended, has lately forced England and Russia to take part in 
tendering advice to China. In truth, all foreign nations know- 
perfectly well that there will be no trouble, and they are obliged 
to follow the example of that power. If we accept the advice 
of other Powers concerning our domestic affairs and postpone 
the enthronement, we should be recognizing their right to in- 
terfere. Hence action should under no circumstance be de- 
ferred. When all the votes of the provinces unanimously rec- 
ommending the enthronement shall have reached Peking, the 
Government will, of course, ostensibly assume a wavering and 
compromising attitude, so as to give due regard to international 
relations. The people, on the other hand, should show their 
firm determination to proceed with the matter at all costs, so 
as to let the foreign powers know that our people are of one 
mind. If we can only make them believe that the change of the 
republic into a monarchy will not in the least give rise to 
trouble of any kind, the effects of the advice tendered by Japan 
will ipso facto come to nought. 

At present the whole nation is determined to nominate Yuan 
Shih-kai Emperor. All civil and military officers, being the 
natural leaders of the people, should accordingly give effect 
to the nomination. If this can be done without friction, the 
confidence of both Chinese and foreigners in the Government 
will be greatly strengthened. This is why we suggested to you 
in a previous telegram the necessity of immediately substitut- 
ing the title of "Emperor" for "President." We trust you will 
concur in our suggestion and carry it out without delay. 

We may add that this matter should be treated as strictly 
confidential. 

A reply is requested. (Signed) 

The die now being cast all that was left to be done 
was to rush through the voting in the Provinces. Ob- 
sequious officials returned to the use of the old Imperial 
phraseology and Yuan Shih-kai, even before his "elec- 
tion," was memorialized as though he were the legiti- 
mate successor of the immense line of Chinese sover- 



230 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

eigns who stretch back to the mythical days of Yao and 

Shun (2,800 B. C). The beginning of December saw 
the voting completed and the results telegraphed to Pe- 
king; and on the 11th December, the Senate hastily 
meeting, and finding that "the National Convention _of 
Citizens" had unanimously elected Yuan Shih-kai Em- 
peror, formally offered him the Throne in a humble pe- 
tition. Yuan Shih-kai modestly refused: a second peti- 
tion was promptly handed to him, which he was pleased 
to accept in the following historic document: 

YUAN SHIH-KAl's ACCEPTANCE OF THE IMPERIAL, THRONE 

The prosperity and decline of the country is a part of the 
responsibility of every individual, and my love for the country 
is certainly not less than that of others. But the task imposed 
on me by the designation of the millions of people is of extraor- 
dinary magnitude. It is therefore impossible for one without 
merit and without virtue like myself to shoulder the burdens of 
State involved in the enhancing of the welfare of the people, the 
strengthening of the standing of the country, the reformation 
of the administration and the advancement of civilization. My 
former declaration was, therefore, the expression of a sincere 
heart and not a mere expression of modesty. My fear was such 
that I could not but utter the words which I have expressed. 
The people, however, have viewed with increasing impatience 
that declaration and their expectation of me is now more press- 
ing than ever. Thus I find myself unable to offer further argu- 
ment just as I am unable to escape the position. The laying of 
a great foundation is, however, a thing of paramount impor- 
tance and it must not be done in a hurry. I, therefore, order 
that the different Ministries and Bureaux take concerted action 
in making the necessary preparations in the affairs in which 
they are concerned; and when that is done, let the same be re- 
ported to me for promulgation. Meanwhile all our citizens 
should go on peacefully in their daily vocations with the view 
to obtain mutual benefit. Let not your doubts and suspicions 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 231 

hinder you in your work. All the officials should on their part 
be faithful at their posts and maintain to the best of their ability 
p^ace and order in their localities, so that the ambition of the 
Great President to work for the welfare of the people may 
thus be realized. Besides forwarding the memorial of the prin- 
cipal representatives of the Convention of the Representatives 
of Citizens and that of the provinces and special administrative 
area to the Cheng Shih Tang and publishing the same by a 
mandate, I have the honour to notify the acting Li Fan Yuan 
as the principal representatives of the Convention of the Rep- 
resentatives of Citizens, to this effect. 

Cautious to the end, it will be seen that Yuan Shi- 
kai's very acceptance is so worded as to convey the idea 
that he is being forced to a course of action which is 
against his better instincts. There is no word of what 
came to be called the Grand Ceremony i. e. the enthrone- 
ment. That matter is carefully left in abeyance and 
the government departments simply told to make the 
necessary preparations. The attitude of Peking offi- 
cialdom is well-illustrated in a circular telegram dis- 
patched to the provinces three days later, the analysis 
of Japan's relationship to the Entente Powers being 
particularly revealing. The obsequious note which 
pervades this document is also particularly noticeable 
and shows how deeply the canker of sycophancy had now 
eaten in. 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 14, 1915, FROM THE OFFICE OF 
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE LAND AND NAVAL FORCES, RE- 
SPECTING china's attitude TOWARDS FOREIGN NATIONS 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces : — 

(To be deciphered with the Hua Code) 

On the 11th inst. the acting Legislature Council submitted 
a memorial to the Emperor, reporting on the number of votes 
cast by the people in favour of a monarchy and the letters of 



232 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

nomination of Yuan Shih-kai as Emperor received from all parts 
of the country, and begged that he would ascend the Throne at 
an early date. His Majesty was, however, so modest as to de- 
cline. The Council presented a second memorial couched in the 
most entreating terms, and received an order to the effect that 
all the ministries and departments were to make the necessary 
preparations for the enthronement. The details of this de- 
cision appeared in the Presidential Orders of the past few days, 
so need not be repeated now. 

The people are unanimously of the opinion that in a republic 
the foundation of the state is very apt to be shaken and .the 
policy of the government to be changed ; and that consequently 
there is no possibility of enjoying everlasting peace and pros- 
perity, nor any hope for the nation to become powerful. Now 
that the form of the state has been decided in favour of a mon- 
archy and the person who is to sit on the Throne agreed upon^ 
the country is placed on a secure basis, and the way to national 
prosperity and strength is thus paved. 

Being the trustworthy ministers and, as it were, the hands 
and feet of His Majesty, we are united to him by more ties 
than one. On this account we should with one mind exert our 
utmost efforts in discharging our duty of loyalty to the coun- 
try. This should be the spirit which guides us in our action 
at the beginning of the new dynasty. As for the enthronement, 
it is purely a matter of ceremony. Whether it takes place 
earlier or later is of no moment. Moreover His Majesty has 
always been modest, and does everything with circumspection. 
We should all appreciate his attitude. 

So far as our external relations are concerned, a thorough 
understanding must be come to with the foreign nations, so that 
recognition of the new regime may not be delayed and diplomatic 
intercourse interrupted. Japan, has, in conjunction with the 
Entente Powers, tendered advice to postpone the change of the 
Republic into an empire. As a divergence of opinion exists 
between Japan and the Entente Powers, the advice is of no 
great effect. Besides, the Elders and the Military Party In 
Japan are all opposed to the action taken by their Govern- 
ment. Only the press In Tokyo has spread all sorts of threat- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 233 

ening rumours. This Is obviously the upshot of ingenious plots 
on the part of irresponsible persons. If we postpone the 
change we shall be subject to foreign interference, and the coun- 
try will consequently cease to exist as an independent state. 
On the other hand, if we proclaim the enthronement forthwith, 
we shall then be flatly rejecting the advice, — an act which, we 
apprehend, will not be tolerated by Japan. As a result, she 
will place obstacles in the way of recognition of the new order 
of things. 

Since a monarchy has been decided to be the future form of 
the state, and His Majesty has consented to accept the Throne, 
the change may be said to be an accomplished fact. There is 
no question about it. All persons of whatever walk of life 
can henceforth continue their pursuits without anxiety. In the 
meantime we will proceed slowly and surely with the enthrone- 
ment, as it involves many ceremonies and diplomatic etiquette. 
In this way both our domestic and our foreign policies will re- 
main unchanged. 

We hope you will comprehend our ideas and treat them as 
strictly confidential. 

(Signed) Office of the Commander-in-Chief of 
the Land and Naval Force. 



After this one last step remained to be taken — it was 
necessary to burn all the incriminating evidence. On 
the 21st December, the last circular telegram in connec- 
tion with this extraordinary business was dispatched 
from Peking, a delightful naivete being displayed re- 
garding the possibility of certain letters and telegrams 
having transgressed the bounds of the law. All such 
delinquencies are to be mercifully wiped out by the sim- 
ple and admirable method of invoking the help of the 
kitchen-fires. And in this appropriate way does the 
monster-play end. 



234 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

CODE TELEGRAM DATED DECEMBER 21, 1915, FROM THE NATIONAL 
CONVENTION BUREAU, ORDERING THE DESTRUCTION OF DOCU- 
MENTS CONNECTED WITH THE ELECTIONS 

To the Military and Civil Governors of the Provinces, the Mili- 
tary Commissioners at Foochow and Kweiyang; the Mili- 
tary Commandants at Changteh, Kweihuating, and Kal- 
gan ; and the Commissioner of Defence at Tachienlu : — 

(To be deciphered with the Hua Code) 

The change In the form of the state is now happily accom- 
plished. This is due not only to the unity of the people's 
minds, but more especially to the skill with which, in realizing 
the object of saving the country, you have carried out the prop- 
aganda from the beginning, managed affairs according to the 
exigencies of the occasions, and adapted the law to suit the 
circumstances. The people have, to be sure, become tired of 
the Republic; yet unless you had taken the lead, they would 
not have dared to voice their sentiments. We all appreciate 
your noble efforts. 

Ever since the monarchical movement was started, the people 
as well as the high officials in the different localities have re- 
peatedly petitioned for the change, a fact which proves that 
the people's will is in favour of it. In order to enable the 
people to express their will through a properly constituted 
organ, the General Convention of the Citizens' Representatives 
has been created. 

Since the promulgation of the Law on the Organization of 
the Citizens' Representatives, we, who are devoted to the wel- 
fare of the state, desire to see that the decisions of that Con- 
vention do not run counter to the wishes of the people. We are 
so anxious about the matter that we have striven so to apply 
the law to meet the circumstances as to carry out our designs. 
It is out of patriotic motives that we have adopted the policy 
of adliering to the law, whenever possible, and, at the same 
time, of yielding to expediency, whenever necessary. During 
the progress of this scheme there may have been certain letters 
and telegrams, both official and private, which have transgressed 
the bounds of the law, They will become absolutely useless 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 235 

after the affair is finished. Moreover, no matter how carefully 
their secrets may have been guarded, still they remain as per- 
manent records which might compromise us ; and in the event 
of their becoming known to foreigners, we shall not escape 
severe criticism and bitter attacks, and, what is worse, should 
they be handed down as part of the national records, they will 
stain the opening pages of the history of the new dynasty. 
The Central Government, after carefully considering the mat- 
ter, has concluded that it would be better to sort out and burn 
the document so as to remove all unnecessary records and pre- 
vent regrettable consequences. For these reasons you are 
hereby requested to sift out all telegrams, letters, and dispatches 
concerning the change in the form of the state, whether official 
or private, whether received from Peking or the provinces (ex- 
cepting those required by law to be filed on record), and cause 
the same to be burnt in your presence. As for those which 
have already been communicated to the local officials, you are 
likewise requested to order them to be returned immediately ; 
to commit them to the flames ; and to report to this Bureau 
for future reference the total number of documents so de- 
stroyed. 

The present change in the. form of the state constitutes the 
most glorious episode of pur national history. Not only is this 
far superior to the succession of dynasties by right of conquest 
or in virtue of voluntary transfer (as in the da3^s of Yao and 
Shun), but it compares favourably with all the peaceful changes 
that have taken place in western politics. Everything will be 
perfect if whatever mars it (meaning the documents) is done 
away with. 

All of you have acquired greatness in founding the dynasty. 
You will doubtless concur with us, and will, we earnestly hope, 
lose no time in cautiously and secretly carrying out our request. 

We respectfully submit this to your consideration and wait 
for a reply. (Signed) National Convention Bureau. ^-'^' 



CHAPTER XII 

"the third revolution" 

THE REVOLT OF YUNNAN 

In all the circumstances it was only natural that the 
extraordinary chapter of history we have just narrated 
should have marched to its appointed end in just as ex- 
traordinary a manner as it had commenced. Yuan 
Shih-kai, the uncrowned king, actually enjoyed in peace 
his empty title only for a bare fortnight, the curious 
air of unreality becoming more and more noticeable 
after the first burst of excitement occasioned by his ac- 
ceptance of the Throne had subsided. Though the 
year 1915 ended with Peking brightly illuminated in 
honour of the new regime, which had adopted in con- 
formity with Eastern precedents a new calendar under 
the style of Hung Hsien or "glorious Constitution- 
alism," that official joy was just as false as the rest had 
been and awakened the incredulity of the crowd. 

On Christmas Day ominous rumours had spread in the 
diplomatic circle that dramatic developments in South 
China had come which not only directly challenged the 
patient plotting of months but made a debacle appear 
inevitable. \ Very few days afterwards it was generally 
known that the southernmost province of China, Yun- 
nan — on the borders of French-Indo- China — had tele- 
graphed the Central Government a thinly veiled ulti- 
matum, that either the monarchy must be cancelled and 
the chief monarchists executed at once or the province 

236 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 237 

would take such steps as were deemed advisable. The 
text of these telegrams which follows was published by 
the courageous editor of the Peking Gazette on the 
81st December and electrified the capital. The reader 
will not fail to note how richly allegorical they are in 
spite of their dramatic nature : 

FIRST TELEGRAM 

To the Great President : 

Since the question of Kuo-ti (form of State) was raised con- 
sternation has seized the public mind; and on account of the 
interference of various Powers the spirit of the people has 
been more and more aroused. They have asked the question : — 
*'Who has invited the disaster, and brought upon us such great 
disgrace?" Some one must be responsible for the alien insults 
heaped on us. 

We have learned that each day is given to rapid preparations 

for the Grand Ceremony ; and it is now true that, internally, n Pi e I i 

,T •• 1. r r 1,4- J J V n • OUfJx.Hj,^. 

public opmion has been slighted, and, externally, occasions v //) ^ 

have been offered to foreigners to encroach on our rights. Our ^\ p-ti-f'tfJ^f^ 
blood runs cold when we face the dangers at the door. Not Swi'C^wvr, 
once but twice hath the President taken the oath to observe 
and obey the Constitution and protect and maintain the Repub- 
lic. The oath was sworn before Heaven and Earth; and it is 
on record in the hearts of millions of people and the words 
therei)f still echo in the ears of the people of all nations. In 
the Classics it is said that "in dealing with the people of the 
country, faith is of the essence of great rule." Again it is 
written that "without faith a people cannot endure as a na- 
tion/" How then can one rule the people when he "eats" his 
own words and tears his own oath? Principle has now been 
cast to the winds and the Kuo-ti has been changed. We know 
not how the country can be administered. 

Since the suspension of the National Assembly and the re- 
yision of the Constitution, the powers of Government have been 
centred in one person, with the implied freedom to do whatever 
seems meet without let or hindrance. If the Government were 



238 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to use this power in order to reform the administration and 
consolidate the foundations of the nation, there would be no 
fear of failure. For the whole country would submit to the 
measures of the Central Government. Thus there is not the 
least necessity to commit treason by changing the Kuo-ti. 

But although the recent decision of the Citizens' Representa- 
tives in favour of a monarchy and the request of the high local 
officials for the President's accession to the Throne have been 
represented as inspired by the unanimous will of the people, it 
is well known that the same has been the work of ignoble men 
whose bribery and intimidation have been sanctioned by the 
authorities. Although inept efforts have been made to disguise 
the deceit, the same is unhidden to the eyes of the world. 

Fortunately it is said that the President has from the very 
beginning maintained a calm attitude, speaking not his mind 
on the subject. It is now as easy to turn the tide as the re- 
versing of the palm. It may be objected that if the "face" 
of the nation is not preserved in view of the interference of For- 
eign Powers, there will be great danger in future. But it must 
be observed that official declaration can only be made in accord- 
ance with the will of the people, the tendency of which can easily 
be ascertained by searching for the facts. If the will of the 
people that the country should be the common property of the 
Nation be obeyed and the idea of the President that a Dynasty 
is as cheap as a worn-out shoe is heeded, the latter has it in his 
power to loosen the string that suspends the bell just as much 
as the person who has hung it. If the wrong path is not for- 
saken, it is feared that as soon as the heart of the people is 
gone, the country will be broken to pieces and the dismember- 
ment of the Nation will take place when alien pressure is 
applied to us. We who have hitherto received favours from 
the President and have received high appointments from him 
hereby offer our faithful advice in the spirit of men who are 
sailing in common in a boat that is in danger; we speak as do 
those who love sincerity and cherish the unbroken word. We 
hope that the President will, with courage, refuse to listen to 
the speech of evil counsellors and heed the voice of conscience 
and of honour. We further hope that he will renew his prom- 




Courtesy Miijor Isaac Newt'll, IT. S. Military Attaelie 

The Yitnman Rebellion of 1915-16, Which Led to the 
Downfall of Yuan Shih-kai. A Big Junk Loaded 
WITH Supplies Passing Up the Rapids of the Upper 
Yangtsze 





^^^ 




Courtesy Major Isaac Newell, U. 8. Military Attache 

The Rapids of the Upper Yangtsze 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 239 

ise to protect the Republic ; and will publicl;;^ swear that a 
monarchical system will never again appear. 

Thus the heart of the people will be settled and the f ounda- 
tipJis, jof the Nation will be consolidated. Then by enlisting 
the services of sagacious colleagues in order to surmount 
the difficulties of the time and sweeping away all corruption 
and beginning anew with the people, it may be that the welfare 
and interest of the Nation will be furthered. In sending this 
telegram our eyes are wet with tears knowing not what more 
to say. We respectfully await the order of the President with 
our troops under arms. 

(Signed) The Governors of Yunnan. 

SECOND TEI^GRAM 

For the Perusal of the Great President : — 

In our himible opinion the reason why the people^ — Chinese 
and foreign — cannot excuse the President is because the move- 
ment for the change of Kuo-ti has been inspired, and indeed 
actually originated in Peking, and that the ringleaders of the 
plot against the Min Kuo are all "bosom-men" of the President. 
The T^hou An Hui, organized by Yang Tu and five other men, 
set the fire ablaze and the circular telegram sent by Chu Chi- 
chien and six other persons precipitated the destruction of 
the Republican structure. The President knew that the bad 
deed was being done and yet he did nothing to arrest the same 
or punish the evil-doers. The people therefore, are suspicious. 
A mandate was issued on the 24th of the 11th month of the 
^rd year in which it is affirmed : "Democracy and republican- 
ism, are laid down in the Constitutional Compact ; and there is 
also a law relating to the punishment of those who spread sedi- 
tion in order to disturb the minds of the people. If any one 
shall hereafter dare to advance strange doctrines and miscon- 
strue the meaning of the Constitution, he will be punished 
severely in accordance with the law of sedition." 

Yang Tu for having publicly organized the said Society and 
Chu Chi-chien for having directly plotted by telegram are tlie 
principal offenders in the present flagrant case of sedition. As 
their crimes are obvious and the subject of abundant proof, 



240 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

we hereby ask the President to carry out at once the terms of 
the said mandate and publicly execute Yang Tu, Sun Yu-yun, 
Yen Fu, Liu Shih-pei, Li Hsieh-ho, Hu Ying, Chu Chi-chien, 
Tuan Chih-kuei, Chow Tze-chi, Liang Shih-yi, Chang Cheng- 
fang and Yuan Nai-kuan to the end that the whole nation 
may be pacified. Then, and not till then, will the world be- 
lieve in the sincerity of the President, in his love for the 
country and his intention to abide by the law. All the troops 
and people here are in anger ; and unless a substantial proof 
froni the Central Authorities is forthcoming, guaranteeing 
the maintenance of the Republic, it will be impossible to sup- 
press or pacify them. We await a reply within twenty -four 
hours. 

(Signed) The Governors of Yunnan Province. 1 

It was evident from the beginning that pride pre- 
vented Yuan Shih-kai from retreating from the false 
position he had taken up. Under his instructions the 
State Department sent a stream of powerful tele- 
graphic messages to Yunnan attempting to dissuade the 
Republican leaders from revolt. But the die had been 
cast and very gravely the standard of rebellion was 
raised in the capital city of Yunnan and the people ex- 
horted to shed their blood. Everything pointed to the 
fact that this rising was to be very different from the 
abortive July outbreak of 1913. There was a soberness 
and a deliberation about it all which impressed close 
observers with a sense of the ominous end which was 
now in sight. 

(Still Peking remained purblind. During the month 
of January the splendour of the dream empire, which 
was already dissolving into thin air, filled the news- 
papers. It was reported that an Imperial Edict 
printed on Yellow Paper announcing the enthronement 
was ready for universal distribution : that twelve new Im- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 241 

perial Seals in jade or gold were being manufactured: 
that a golden chair and a magnificent State Coach m 
the styk of Louis XV were ahnost ready. Homage' 
to the portrait of Yuan Shih-kai by all officials through- 
out the country was soon to be ordered; sycophantic 
scholars were busily preparing a volume poetically en- 
titled "The Golden Mirror of the Empire," in which 
the virtues of the new sovereign were extolled in high- 
sounding language. A recondite significance, it was 
said, was to be given to the old ceremonial dress, which 
was to be revived, from the fact that every official would 
carry a Hu or Ivory Tablet to be held against the breast. 
The very mention of this was sufficient to make the local 
price of ivory leap skywards! In the privacy of draw- 
ing-rooms the story went the rounds that Yuan Shih-kai, 
now completely deluded into beheving in the success of 
his great scheme, had held a full-dress rehearsal of a cere- 
mony which would be the first one at his new Court when 
he would invest the numerous ladies of his establishment 
with royal rank. Seated on his Throne he had been 
engaged in instructing these interested females, already 
robed in magnificent costumes, in the parts they were 
to play, when he had noticed the absence of the Korean 
Lady— a consort he had won, it is said, in his Seoul days 
in competition against the Japanese Envoy accredited 
to Korea, thereby precipitating the war of 1894-95.^ 
The Korean Lady had refused to enter the Throne- 
room, he was told, because she was dissatisfied with the 
rank he proposed to confer on her. Sternly he sent 
for her and told her to take her place in the circle. But 
no sooner had she arrived than hysterically she screamed, 

1 This story is firmly believed by many, namely that a beautiful woman 
caused the loss of Korea. 



; -I 

242 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

"You told me when you wedded me that no wife would 
be my superior; now I am comited only a secondary 
consort." With that she hurled herself at the eldest 
wife who was occupying the post of honour and assailed 
her bitterly. Amidst the general confusion the would- 
be-Emperor hastily descended from his Throne and 
vainly intervened, but the women were not to be parted 
until their robes were in tatters. "^ 

In such childishnesses did Peking indulge when a 
great disaster was preparing. To explain what had 
occurred in Yunnan it is necessary to go back and tell 
the story of a remarkable young Chinese — General 
Tsao-ao, the soul of the new revolt. 
'C In the revolution of 1911 each province had acted on 
the assumption that it possessed inherent autonomous 
rights and could assume sovereignty as soon as local 
arrangements had allowed the organization of a com- 
plete provisional government. Yunnan had been one 
of the earliest provinces to follow the lead of the Wu- 
chang rebels and had virtually erected itself into a 
separate republic, which attracted much attention be- 
cause of the iron discipline which was preserved. Pos- 
sessing a fairly well-organized military system, largely 
owing to the proximity of the French frontier and the 
efforts which a succession of Viceroys had made to pro- 
vide adequate frontier defence, it was amply able to 
guarantee its newly won autonomy. General Tsao-ao, 
then in command of a division of troops had been 
elected Generalissimo of the province ; and bending him- 
self to his task in very few weeks he had driven into exile 
all officials who adhered to the Imperialist cause and 
made all local institutions completely self-supporting. ^ 
Even in 1911 it had been reported that this young man 



REPUBLIC IN CHIISTA 243 

dreamed of founding a dynasty for himself in the moun- 
tains of South China — an ambition by no means impos- 
sible of realization since. he had received a first-class 
military education in the Tokio Military Schools and 
was thoroughly up-to-date and conversant with modern 
theories of government. > 

These reports had at the time greatly concerned 
Yuan Shili-kai who heard it stated by all who knew him 
that the Yunnan leader was a genius in his own way. 
<In conformity with his policy of bringing to Peking all 
who might challenge his authority, he had induced Gen- 
eral Tsao-ao, since the latter had played no part in the 
rebellion of 1913, to lay down his office of Yunnan 
Governor- General and join him in the capital at the 
beginning of 1914 — another high provincial appoint- 
ment being held out to him as a bait,> 

\ Once in Peking, however, General Tsao-ao had been 
merely placed in charge of an office concerned with the 
reorganization of the land-tax, nominally a very impor- 
tant piece of work long advocated by foreign critics. 
But as there were no funds available, and as the pur- 
pose was plainly merely to keep him under observation, 
he fretted at the restraint, and became engaged in 
secret political correspondence with men who had been 
exiled abroad. As he was soon an open suspect, in 
order to avoid arrest he had taken the bold step at the 
very inception of the monarchy movement of heading 
the list of Generals in residence in Peking who peti- 
tioned the Senate to institute a Monarchy, this act se- 
curing him against summary treatment. But owing to 
his secret connection with the scholar Liang Chi-chao, 
who had thrown up his post of Minister of Justice and 
left the capital in order to oppose the new movement. 



244 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

he was watched more and more carefully — his death be- 
ing even hinted at. 

He was clever enough to meet this ugly development 
with a masterly piece of trickery conceived in. the East- 
ern vein. One day a carefully arranged dispute took 
place between him and his wife, and the police were 
angrily called in to see that his family and all their 
belongings were taken away to Tientsin as he refused 
any longer to share the same roof with them. Being 
now alone in the capital, he apparently abandoned him- 
self to a life of shameless debauch, going nightly to the 
haunts of pleasure and becoming a notorious figure in 
the great district in the Outer City of Peking which is 
filled with adventure and adventuresses and which is 
the locality from which Haroun-Al Raschid obtained 
through the medium of Arab travellers his great story of 
"Aladdin and the Wonderful Lamp." When govern- 
mental suspicions were thoroughly lulled, he arranged 
with a singing-girl to let him out by the backdoor of her 
house at dawn from whence he escaped to the railway- 
station, rapidly reaching Tientsin entuxly unob- 
served. 

The morning was well-advanced before the detectives 
who nightly watched his movements became suspicious. 
Then finding that his whereabouts were unknown to the 
coachman dozing on the box of his carriage, they 
roughly entered the house where he had passed the 
night only to find that the bird had flown. Hastj^ tele- 
grams were dispatched in every direction, particularly 
to Tientsin — the great centre for political refugees — 
and his summary arrest ordered. But fortune favoured 
hiui. A bare quarter-of-an-hour before the police be- 
gan their search he had embarked with his family on a 




General Tsai-ao, the Hero of the Yuxxan Rebellion 
OF 1915-16, Who Died from the Effects of the Campaign 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 245 

Japanese steamer lying in the Tientsin river and could 
snap his fingers at Yuan Shih-kai. 

Once in Japan he lost no time in assembling his revo- 
lutionary friends and in a body they embarked for South 
China. As rapidly as possible he reached Yunnan 
province from Hongkong, travelling by way of the 
French Tonkin railway. Entering the province early 
in December he found everything fairly ready for re- 
volt, though there was a deficiency in arms and muni- 
tions which had to be made good. Yuan Shih-kai, furi- 
ous at this evasion, had telegraphed to confidential 
agents in Yunnan to kill him at sight, but fortunately 
he was warned and spared to perform his important 
work. Had a fortnight of grace been vouchsafed him, 
he would have probably made the most brilliant modern 
campaign that has been witnessed in China, for he was 
an excellent soldier. Acting from the natural fortress ^^:^ec^ *'; 
of Yunnan it was his plan to descend suddenly on the ^^^4 K^-i; 
Yangtsze Valley by way of Chungking and to capture fj.js^^k 
the upper river in one victorious march thus closing the aj^p\jS^ 
vast province of Szechuan to the Northern troops. But M^*5*H^ " 
circumstances had made it imperative for him and his 
friends to telegraph the Yunnan ultimatum a fortnight 
sooner than it should have been dispatched, and the 
warning thus conveyed to the Central Government 
largely crippled the Yunnan offensive. 

The circumstances which had made instant action 
necessary were as follows. As we have seen from the -fcf-l. 0^^ 
record of the previous risings, the region of the Yangtsze .. ^ ^^-^^ 
river has superlative value in Chinese politics. Offer- J'^^^^^U^^ 
ing as it does an easy road into the heart of the country 
and touching more than half the Provinces, it is indeed a 
priceless means of communication, and for this reason 



246 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Yuan Shih-kai had been careful after the crushing of the 
rebellion of 1913 to load the river-towns with his troops 
under the command of Generals he believed incorrupt- 
ible. Chief of these was General Feng Kuo-chang at 
Nanking who held the balance of power on the great 
river, and whose politics, though not entirely above sus- 
picion, had been proof against all the tempting offers 
South China made to him until the ill-fated monarchy 
movement had commenced. But during this movement 
General Feng Kuo-chang had expressed himself in such 
contemptuous terms of the would-be Emperor that or- 
ders had been given to another high official — Admiral 
Tseng, Garrison Commissioner at Shanghai — to have 
him assassinated. Instead of obeying his instructions, 
Admiral Tseng had conveyed a warning to his proposed 
victim, the consequence being that the unfortunate ad- 
miral was himself brutally murdered on the streets of 
Shanghai by revolver-shots for betraying the confidence 
of his master. After this denouement it was not very 
strange that General Feng Kuo-chang should have inti- 
Inated to the Republican Party that as soon as theyenj- 
tered the Yangtsze Valley he would throw his lot with 
them together with all his troops. Of this Yuan Shih- 
kai became aware through his extraordinary system of 
intelligence ; and following his usual practice he had or- 
dered General Feng Kuo-chang to Peking as Chief of 
the General Staff — an appointment which would place 
him under direct surveillance. First on one excuse, then 
on another, General Feng Kuo-chang had managed to 
delay his departure from day to day without actually 
coming under the grave charge of refusing to obey 
orders. But finally the position was such that he tele- 
graphed to General Tsao-ao that unless the Yunnan 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 247 

arrangements were hastened he would have to leave 
Nanking — and abandon this important centre to one 
of Yuan Shih-kai's own henchmen — which meant the 
end of all hopes of the Yangtsze Valley rising e7i masse. 

It was to save Feng Kuo-chang, then, that the young 
patriot Tsao-ao caused the ultimatum to be dispatched 
fourteen days too soon i.e., before the Yunnan troops 
had marched over the mountain-barrier into the neigh- 
bouring province of Szechuan and seized the city of 
Chungking — which would have barred the advance of 
the Northern troops permanently as the river defiles even 
when lightly defended are impassable here to the strong- 
est force. It was largely due to the hardships of forced 
marches conducted over these rugged mountains, which 
raise their precipitous peaks to the heavens, that Tsao-ao 
subsequently lost his life, his health being undermined 
by exposure, tuberculosis finally claiming him. But 
one thing at least did his resolute action secure. With 
Yunnan in open revolt and several other provinces 
about to follow suit. General Feng IS^uo-chang was able 
to telegraph Peking that it was impossible for him to 
leave his post at Nanking without rebellion breaking 
out. This veiled threat was understood by Yuan Shih- 
kai. Grimly he accepted the checkmate. 

Yet all the while he was acting with his customary 
energy. Troops were dispatched towards Szechuan in 
great numbers, being tracked up the rapids of the upper 
river on board fleets of junks which were ruthlessly com- 
mandeered. Now commenced an extraordinary race 
between the Yunnan mountaineers and the Northern 
plainsmen for the strategic city of Chungking. For 
some weeks the result was in doubtj Tor although 
Szechuan province was held by Northern garrisons, they 



248 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

were relatively speaking weak and surrounded by hos- 
tile Szechuan troops whose politics were doubtful. In 
the end, however, Yuan Shih-kai's men reached their 
goal first and Chungking was saved. Heavy and con- 
tinuous mountain-fighting ensued, in which the South- 
ern troops were only partially successful. Being less 
well-equipped in mountain artillery and less well-found 
in general supplies they were forced to rely largely on 
guerilla warfare. There is little accurate record of the 
desperate fighting which occurred in this wild region but 
it is known that the original Yunnan force was nearly 
annihilated, and that of the remnant numbers perished 
from disease and exposure. 

Other events were, however, hastening the debacle. 
Kueichow province had almost at once followed the 
example of Yunnan. A third province, Kwangsi, un- 
der a veteran who was much respected. General Lu Yun 
Ting, was soon added; and gradually as in 1911 it 
became clear that the army was only one chessman in a 
complicated and very ingenious game. ^ 



CHAPTER XIII 

"the third revolution" (Continued) 

THE DOWNFALL AND DEATH OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 

As had been the case during the previous revolts, it 
was not pubhcly or on the battlefield that the most 
crucial work was performed: the decisive elements in 
this new and conclusive struggle were marshalled behind 
the scenes and performed their task unseen. Though 
the mandarinate, at the head of which stood Yuan Shih- 
kai, left no stone unturned to save itself from its im- 
pending fate, all was in vain. Slowly but inexorably it 
was shown that a final reckoning had to be faced. 

The reasons are not far to seek. Too long had the 
moral sense of educated men been outraged by common 
fraud and deceit for any continuance of a regime which 
had disgraced China for four long years to be humanly 
possible. Far and wide the word was rapidly passing 
that Yuan Shih-kai was not the man he had once been : 
he was in reality feeble and choleric — prematurely old 
from too much history-making and too many hours 
spent in the harem. He had indeed become a mere Co- 
lossus with feet of clay, — a man who could be hurled 
to the ground by precisely the same methods he had 
used to destroy the Manchus. Even his foreign sup- 
porters were becoming tired and suspicious of him, end- 
less trouble being now associated with his name, there 
being no promise that quieter times could possibly come 
so long as he hved. A very full comprehension of the 

249 



250 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

general position is given by perusing the valedictory let- 
ter of the leader of the Chinese intellectuals, that re- 
markable man — Liang Chi-ch'ao, who in December had 
silently and secretly fled from Tientsin on information 
reaching him that his assassination was being planned. 
On the eve of his departure he had sent the following 
brilliant document to the Emperor-elect as a reply to an 
attempt to entrap him to Peking, a document the mean- 
ing of which was clear to every educated man. Its ex- 
quisite irony mixed with its bluntness told all that was 
necessary to tell — and forecasted the inevitable fall. 
It runs : — 

For the Kind Perusal of the Great President: — 

A respectful reading of your kind instructions reveals to me 
your modesty and the brotherly love which you cherish for your 
humble servant, who is so moved by your heart-touching sym- 
pathy that he does not know how to return your kindness. 
A desire then seized him to submit his humble views for your 
wise consideration ; though on the one hand he has thought that 
he might fail to express what he wishes to say if he were to do 
so in a set of brief words, while on the other hand he has no 
desire to trouble the busy mind of one on whose shoulders fall 
myriads of affairs, with views expressed in many words. 
Furthermore, what Ch'i-chao desires to say relates to what can 
be likened to the anxiety of one who, fearing that the heavens 
may some day fall on him, strives to ward oif the catastrophe. 
If his words should be misunderstood, it would only increase 
his offence. Time and again he has essayed to write ; but 
each time he has stopped short. Now he is going South to 
visit his parents ; and looking at the Palace-Gate from afar, 
he realizes that he is leaving the Capital indefinitely. The 
thought that he has been a protege of the Great President and 
that dangers loom ahead before the nation as well as his sense 
of duty and friendly obligations, charge him with the responsi- 
bility of saying something. He therefore begs to take the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 251 

liberty of presenting his humble but extravagant views for 
the kind consideration of the Great President. 

The problem of Kuo-ti (form of State) appears to have 
gone too far for reconsideration: the position is like unto a 
man riding on the back of a wild tiger. . . . Ch'i-chao there- 
fore at one moment thought he would say no more about it, 
since added comment thereon might make him all the more 
open to suspicion. But a sober study of the general situa- 
tion and a quiet consideration of the possible future make him 
tremble like an autumn leaf; for the more he meditates, the 
more dangerous the situation appears. It is true that the 
minor trouble of ''foreign advice" and rebel plotting can be 
settled and guarded against ; but what Ch'i-chao bitterly de- 
plgres,is^that the original intention of the Great President to 
devote his life and energy to the interest of the country — an 
intention he has fulfilled during the past four years — will be 
difficult to explain to the world in future. The trust of the 
world in the Great President would be shattered with the result 
that the foundation of the country will be unsettled. Do not 
the„ S^ages. SAy; ''In dealing with the people aim at faithful- 
Tjaaa?" If faithfulness to promises be observed by those in 
authority, then the people will naturally surrender themselves. 
Once,_hawfiV£r, a promise is broken, it will be as hard to win 
back the people's trust as to ascend to the very Heavens. Sev- 
eral times have oaths of office been uttered ; yet even before the 
]Sps^~§JC&4ryv action hath falsified the words of promise. In 
these circumstances, how can one hope to send forth his orders 
to the country in the future, and expect them to be obeyed? 
The.people wjll say "he started in righteousness but ended in 
^elf -seeking : how can we trust our lives in his hands, if he 
should choose to pursue even further his love of self-enrlch- 
^ment?" It is possible for Ch'i-chao to believe that the Great 
President has no desire to make profit for himself by the sac- 
rifice of the country, but how can the mass of the people — 
who believe only what they are told — understand what Ch'i- 
chao may, perchance, believe? 

The Great President sees no one but those who are always 
near him; and these are the people who have tried to win his 



252 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

favour and gain rewards by concocting the alleged unanimous 
petitions of the whole country urging his accession to the 
Throne. In reality, however, the will of the people is pre- 
cisely the opposite. Even the high officials in the CapifaltaTK 
about the matter in a jeering and sarcastic way. As for the 
tone of the newspapers outside Peking, that is better left un- 
mentioned. And as for the "small people" who crowd the 
streets and the market-places, they go about as if something 
untoward might happen at any moment. If a kingdom caii be 
maintained by mere force, then the disturbance at the time of 
Ch'in Chih-huang and Sui Yang Ti could not have been suc- 
cessful. If, on the other hand, it is necessary to secure the 
co-operation and the willing submission of the hearts of the 
people, then is it not time that our Great President bethinks 
himself and boldly takes his own stand? 

Some argue that to hesitate in the middle of a course after 
indulging in much pomp and pageantry at the beginning will 
result in ridicule and derision and that the dignity of the 
Chief Executive will be lowered. But do they even know 
whether the Great President has taken the least part in con- 
nection with the phantasies of the past four months.'' Do they 
know that the Great President has, on many occasions, sworn 
fidelity before high Heaven and the noon-day sun.'* Now if he 
carries out his sacrosanct promise and is deaf to the unright- 
eous advice of evil counsellors, his high virtue will be made even 
more manifest than ever before. Wherein then is there need 
of doubt or fear? 

Others may even suggest that since the proposal was initiated 
by military men, the tie that has hitherto bound the latter to 
the Great President may be snapped in case the pear fails to 
ripen. But in the humble opinion of Ch'i-chao, the troops 
are now all fully inspired with a sense of obedience to the 
Chief Executive. Who then can claim the right to drag our 
Great President into unrighteousness for the sake of vanity and 
vainglory? Who will dare disobey the behests of the Great 
President if he should elect to open his heart and follow the 
path of honour and unbroken vows ? If today, as Head of the 
nation, he is powerless to silence the riotous clamour of the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 253 

soldiery as happened at Chen-chiao in ancient time, then be 
sure in the capacity of an Emperor he will not be able to 
suppress an outbreak of troops even as it happened once at 
Yuyang in the Tang dynasty.^ To give them the handle 
of the sword is simply courting trouble for the future. But 
can we suspect the troops — so long trained under the Great 
President — of such unworthy conduct? 

The ancients say "However a thing is done, do not hurt the 
feelings of those who love you, or let your enemy have a 
chance to rejoice," Recently calamities in the forms of 
drought and flood have repeatedly visited China; and the an- 
cients warn us that in such ways does Heaven manifest its Will 
regarding great movements in our country. In addition to 
these we must remember the prevailing evils of a corrupt official- 
dom, the incessant ravages of robbers, excesses in punishment, 
the unusually heavy burdens of taxation, as well as the irregu- 
larity of weather and rain, which all go to increase the naur- 
murs and complaints of the people. Internally, the rebels are 
accumulating strength against an opportune time to rise; ex- 
ternally, powerful neighbouring countries are waiting for an 
opportunity to harass us. Why then should our Great Presi- 
dent risk his precious person and become a target of public 
criticism ; or "abandon the rock of peace in search of the tiger's 
tail" ; or discourage the loyalty of faithful ones and encourage 
the sinister ambitions of the unscrupulous? Ch'i-chao sincerely 
hopes that the Great President will devote himself to the estab- 
lishment of a new era which shall be an inspiration to heroism 

1 The incident of Chen-chiao is very celebrated in Chinese annals. A yel- 
low robe, the symbol of Imperial authority, was thrown around General 
Chao Kuang-ying, at a place called Chen-chiao, by his soldiers and officers 
when he commanded a force ordered to the front. Chao returned to the 
Capital immediately to assume the Imperial Throne, and was thus " com- 
pelled " to become the founder of the famous Sung dynasty. 

The " incident of Yuyang " refers to the execution of Yang Kuei-fei, the 
favourite concubine of Emperor Yuan Tsung of the Tang dynasty. The 
Emperor for a long time was under the alluring influence of Yang Kuei-fei, 
who had a paramour named An Lo-hsan. The latter finally rebelled against 
the Emperor. The Emperor left the capital and proceeded to another place 
together with his favourite concubine, guarded by a large force of troops. 
Midway, however, the soldiers threatened to rebel unless the concubine was 
killed on the spot. The clamour was such that the Emperor was forced to 
sacrifice the favourite of his harem, putting her to death in the presence of 
his soldiers. 



254 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

and thus escape the fate of those who are stigmatized in our 
annals with the name of Traitor. He hopes that the renown 
of the Great President will long be remembered in the land 
of Chung Hua (China) and he prays that the fate of China 
may not end with any abrupt ending that may befall the Great 
President. He therefore submits his views with a bleeding 
heart. He realizes that his words may not win the approval 
of one who is wise and clever ; but Ch'i-chao feels that unless he 
unburdens what is in his heart, he will be false to the duty 
which bids him speak and be true to the kindness that has 
been showered on him by the Great President. Whether his 
loyalty to the Imperative Word will be rewarded with approval 
or with reproof, the order of the Great President will say. 

There are other words of which Ch'i-chao wishes to tender 
to the Great President. To be an independent nation today, 
we must need follow the ways of the present age. One who 
opposes the current of the world and protects himself against 
the enriching influence of the world-spirit must eventually share 
the fate of the unselected. It Js^sincer ely hoped tha,t the 
Great President will refrain to some extent from restoring„the 
old and withal work for real reform. ^ Law can only be made, a 
living force by both the ruler and the people obeying it with 
sincerity. When the law loses its strength, the people will not 
know how to act ; and then the dignity of Government will dis- 
appear. It is hoped that the Great President will keep him- 
self within the bounds of law and not lead the officials, and 
the people to juggle with words. Participation in politics and 
patriotism are closely related. Bear well in mind that it is 
impossible to expect the people to share the responsibilities 
of the country, unless they are given a voice in the transac- 
tion of public business. The hope is expressed that the Great 
President will establish a real organ representing the true wil] 
of the people and encourage the natural growth of the free 
expression of public opinion. Let us not become so arrogant 
and oppressive that the people will have no chance to express 
their views, as this may inspire hatred on the part of the people. 
The relation between the Central Government and the pro- 
vincial centres is like that between the trunk and branches of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 255 

a tree. If the branches are all withered, how can tl;ie trunk 
continue to grow? It is hoped that the Great President, while 
giving due consideration to the maintenance of the dignity of 
the Central Government, j^ijl at the same time allow the local 
life of the provinces to develop. Ethics, Righteousness, Purity 
and Conscientiousness are four great principles. When these 
four principles are neglected, a country dies. If the whole 
country should come in spirit to be like "concubines and 
women," weak and open to be coerced and forced along with 
whomsoever be on the stronger side, how can a State be estab- 
lished.? May the Great President encourage principle, and 
virtue, stimulate purity of character, reject men of covetous 
and mean character, and grant wise tolerance to those who 
know no fear in defending the right. Only then will the vitality 
of the country be retained in some degree ; and in time of 
emergency, there will be a reserve of strength to be drawn 
upon in support of the State. All these considerations are of 
the order of obvious truths and it must be assumed that the 
Great President, who is greatly wise, is not unaware of the 
same. The reason why Ch'i-chao ventures to repeat them is 
this. He holds it true that a duty is laid on him to submit 
whatever humble thoughts are his, and at the same time he 
believes that the Great President will not condemn a proper 
physic even though it may be cheap and simple. How fortu- 
nate will Ch'i-chao be if advice so tendered shall meet with 
approval. He is proceeding farther and farther away from the 
Palace every day and he does not know how soon he will be 
able to seek an audience again. He writes these words with 
tears dropping into the ink-slab and he trusts that his words 
may receive the attention of the Great President. - 

So ends this remarkable missive which has become an 
historic document in the archives of the Republic. Once 
again it was whispered that so great an impression did 
this fateful warning produce on the Emperor-elect that 
he was within an ace of cancelling the disastrous scheme 
which now enmeshed him. But in the end family influ- 



256 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ence won the day; and stubbornly and doggedly the 
doomed man pushed on with his attempt to crush revolt 
and consolidate his crumbling position. 
V Every possible effort was made to minimize the effect 
of international influence on the situation. As the syco- 
phantic vernacular press of the capital, long drilled to 
blind subservience, had begun to speak of his enthrone- 
ment as a certainty on the 9th February, a Circular 
Note was sent to the Five Allied Powers that no sucH 
date had been fixed, and that the newspaper reports to 
that effect were inventions. In order specially to con- 
ciliate Japan, a high official was appointed to proceed 
on an Embassy to Tokio to grant special industrial con- 
cessions — a manoeuvre which was met with the official 
refusal of the Tokio Government to be so placated. 
Peking was coldly informed that owing to "court en- 
gagements" it would be impossible for the Emperor of 
Japan to receive any Chinese Mission. After this open 
rebuff attention was concentrated on "the punitive ex- 
pedition" to chastise the disaffected South, 80,000 men 
being put in the field and a reserve of 80,000 mobilized 
behind them* An attempt was also made to win over 
waverers by an indiscriminate distribution of patents of 
nobility. Princes, Dukes, Marquises, Viscounts and 
Barons were created in great batches overnight only to 
be declined in very many cases, one of the most precious 
possessions of the Chinese race being its sense of hu- 
mour. Every one, or ahnost every one, knew that the 
new patents were not worth the paper they were written 
on, and that in future years the members of this spurious 
nobility would be exposed to something worse than con- 
tempt. France was invited to close the Tonkin frontier, 
but this request also met with a rebuff, and revolution- 




LiAXG Shih-yi, Who was the Powek Behind Yuan Shih- 
KAi, Now Proscribed and Living in Exile at Hongkong 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 257 

ists and arms were conveyed in an ever-more menacing 
manner into the revolted province of Yunnan by the 
French railways. > A Princedom was at length con- 
ferred on Lung Chi Kwang, the Military Governor of 
Canton, Canton being a pivotal point and Lung Chi 
Kwang, one of the most cold-blooded murderers in 
China, in the hope that this would spur him to such an 
orgy of crime that the South would be crushed. Pre- 
cisely the opposite occurred, since even murderers are 
able to read the signs of the times. Attempts were 
likewise made to enforce the use of the new Imperial 
Calendar, but little success crowned such efforts, no one 
outside the metropolis believing for a moment that this 
innovation possessed any of the elements of permanence. 
/Meanwhile the monetary position steadily worsened, 
the lack of money becoming so marked as to spread 
panic. Still, in spite of this, the leaders refused to 
take warning, and although the political impasse was 
constantly discussed, the utmost concession the mon- 
archists were willing to make was to turn China into 
a Federal Empire with the provinces constituted into 
self-governing units. The over-issue of paper cur- 
rency to make good the gaps in the National Finance, 
now slowly destroyed the credit of the Central Gov- 
ernment and made the suspension of specie payment a 
mere matter of timei By the end of February the prov- 
ince of Kueichow was not only officially admitted by the 
Peking Government to be in open revolt as well as 
Yunnan, but rebel troops were reported to be invading 
the neighbouring province of Hunan. Kwangsi was 
also reported to be preparing for secession whilst in 
Szechuan local troops were revolting in increasing num- 
bers. Rumours of an attempted assassination of Yuan 



258 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Shih-kai by means of bombs now circulated, — and there 
were many arrests and suicides in the capital. Though 
by a mandate issued on the 23rd February, the enthrone- 
ment ceremony was indefinitely postponedi, that move 
came too late. The whole country was plainly trem- 
bling on the edge of a huge outbreak when, less than 
four weeks later, Yuan Shih-kai reluctantly and pub- 
licly admitted that the game was up. It is understood 
that a fateful interview he had with the British Minister 
greatly influenced him, though the formal declaration 
of independence of Kwangsi on the 16th March, whither 
the scholar Liang Ch'i-chao had gone, was also a power- 
ful argument. On the 22nd March the Emperor-elect 
issued the mandate categorically cancelling the entire 
monarchy scheme, it being declared that he would now 
form a Responsible Cabinet. Until that date the Gov- 
ernment Gazette had actually perpetrated the folly of 
publishing side by side Imperial Edicts and Presidential 
Mandates — the first for Chinese eyes, the second for 
foreign consumption. Never before even in China had 
such a farce been seen. A rapid perusal of the Man- 
date of Cancellation will show how lamely and poorly 
the retreat is made : 

DECREE CANCELUNG THE EMPIRE (22d MARCh) 

After the establishment of the Min Kuo (i.e. the Republic), 
disturbances rapidly followed one another; and a man of little 
virtue like me was called to take up the vast burden of the 
State. Fearing that disaster might befaU us any day, all those 
who had the welfare of the country at heart advocated the 
relnstitution of the monarchical system of government to the 
end that a stop be put to all strife for power and a regime of 
peace be inaugurated. Suggestions in this sense have unceas- 
ingly been made to me since the days of Kuei Chou (the year 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA ^59 

of the first Revolution, 1911) and each time a sharp rebuke 
has been administered to the one making the suggestion. But 
the situation last year was indeed so different from the circum- 
stances of preceding years that it was impossible to prevent 
the spread of such ideas. 

It was said that China could never hope to continue as a 
nation unless the constitutional monarchical form of state were 
adopted; and if quarrels like those occurring in Mexico and 
Portugal were to take place in China, we would soon share the 
fate of Annam and Burmah. A large number of people then 
advocated the restoration of a monarchy and advanced argu- 
ments which were reasonable. In this proposal all the mili- 
tary and civil officials, scholars and people concurred; and 
prayers were addressed to me in most earnest tone by telegram 
and in petitions. Owing to the position I was at the time hold- 
ing, which laid on me the duty of maintaining the then existing 
situation, I repeatedly made declarations resisting the adoption 
of the advice ; but the people did not seem to realize my em- 
barrassment. And so it was decided by the acting Li Fa Yuan 
(i.e. the Senate) that the question of Kuo-ti (form of State) 
should be settled by the Convention of Citizens' Representatives. 
As the result, the representatives of the Provinces and of the 
Special Administrative Areas unanimously decided in favour 
of a constitutional monarchy, and in one united voice elected 
me as the Emperor. Since the sovereignty of the country has 
been vested in the citizens of China and as the decision was 
made by the entire body of the representatives, there was no 
room left to me for further discussion. Nevertheless, I con- 
tinued to be of the conviction that my sudden elevation to the 
Great Seat would be a violation of my oath and would compro- 
mise my good faith, leaving me unable to explain myself; I, 
therefore, declined in earnest words in order to make clear the 
view which hath always been mine. The said Senate however, 
stated with firmness that the oath of the Chief Executive rested 
on a peculiar sanction and should be observed or discarded 
according to the will of the people. Their argmnents were 
so irresistible that there was in truth no excuse for me further 
to decline the offer. 



260 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Therefore I took refuge behind the excuse of "preparations" 
in order that the desire of the people might be satisfied. But 
I took no steps actually to carry out the program. When the 
trouble in Yunnan and Kueichow arose, a mandate was officially 
issued announcing the decision to postpone the measure and 
forbidding further presentation of petitions praying for the 
enthronement. I then hastened the convocation of the LiJFa_ 
Yuan (i.e., a new Parliament) in order to secure the views of 
that body and hoping thus to turn back to the original state of 
affairs, I, being a man of bitter experiences, had at once given up 
all ideas of world affairs ; and having retired into the obscurity 
of the river Yuan (in Honan), I had no appetite for the politi- 
cal aff'airs of the country. As the result of the revolution in 
Hsin Hai, I was by mistake elected by the people. _ Reluctantly 
I came out of my retirement and endeavoured to prop up the 
tottering structure. I cared for nothing, but the salvation of 
tlie country. A perusal of our history of several thousand 
years will reveal in vivid manner the sad fate of the descendants 
of ancient kings and emperors. What then could have 
prompted me to aspire to the Throne? Yet while the repre- 
sentatives of the people were unwilling to believe in the sincerity 
of my refusal of the offer, a section of the people appear to 
have suspected me of harbouring the desire of gaining more 
power and privileges. Such difference In thought has resulted 
in the creation of an exceedingly dangerous situation. As my 
sincerity has not been such as to win the hearts of the people 
and my judgment has not been sound enough to appraise 
every man, I have myself alone to blame for lack of virtue. 
Why then should I blame others.? The people have been 
thrown into misery and my soldiers have been made to bear 
hardships; and further the people have been cast Into panic 
and commerce has rapidly declined. When I search my own 
heart a measure of sorrow fills It. I shall, therefore, not be 
umvilling to suppress myself in order to yield to others. 

I am still of the opinion that the "designation petitions" 
submitted through the Tsan Cheng Yuan are unsulted to the 
demands of the time ; and the official acceptance of the Imperial 
Throne made on the 11th day of the 12th month. pf last year 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 261 

(11th December, 1915) is hereby cancelled. The ''designation 
petitions" of the Provinces and of the Special Administrative 
Areas are hereby all returned through the State Department 
to the Tsan Cheng Yuan, i.e., the acting Li Fa Yuan (Parlia- 
ment), to be forwarded to the petitioners for destruction; and 
all the preparations connected therewith are to cease at once. 
In this wise I hope to imitate the sincerity of the Ancients by 
taking on myself all the blame so that my action may fall in 
line with Jfche spint of humanity which'is™thF expression of the 
will of Heaven. I now cleanse my heart and wash my thoughts 
to the end that trouble may be averted and the people may 
have peace. Those who advocated the monarchical system 
were prompted by the desire to strengthen the foundation of 
the country ; but as their methods have proved unsuitable their 
patriotism might harm the country. Those who have opposed 
the monarchy have done so out of their desire to express their 
political views. It may be therefore presumed that they would 
not go to the extreme and so endanger the country. They 
should, therefore, all hearken to the voice of their own con- 
science and sacrifice their prejudices, and with one mind and 
one purpose unite in the effort of saving the situation so that 
the glorious descendants of the Sacred Continent may be spared 
the horrors of internal warfare and the bad omens may be 
changed into lucky signs. 

In brief I now confess that all the faults of the country are 
the result of my own faults. Now that the acceptance of the 
Imperial Throne has been cancelled every man will be respon- 
sible for his own action if he further disturbs the peace of the 
locality and thus give an opportunity to others. I, the Great 
President, being charged with the duty of ruling over the whole 
country, cannot remain idle while the country is racing to per- 
dition. At the present moment the homesteads are in misery, 
discipline has been disregarded, administration is being neg- 
lected and real talents have not been given a chance. \\Tien I 
think of such conditions I awake in the darkness of midnight. 
How can we stand as a nation If such a state of affairs is 
allowed to continue? Hereafter all officials should thoroughly 
get rid of their corrupt habits and endeavour to achieve merits. 



262 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

They should work with might and main in their duties, whether 
in introducing reforms or in abolishing old corruptions. Let 
all be not satisfied with empty words and entertain no bias 
regarding any affair. They should hold up as their main 
principle of administration the policy that only reality will 
count and deal out reward or punishment with strict prompt- 
ness. Let all our generals, officials, soldiers and people all, 
all, act in accordance with this ideal. ^ 

This attempt at an Amende honourable, so far from 
being well-received, was universally looked upon as an 
admission that Yuan Shih-kai had almost been beaten 
and that a little more would complete his ruin. Though, 
as we have said, the Northern troops were fighting well 
in his cause on the upper reaches of the great Yangtsze, 
the movement against him was now spreading as though 
it had been a dread contagious disease, the entire South 
uniting against Peking. His promise to open a proper 
Legislative Chamber on 1st May was met with derision. 
By the middle of April five provinces — Yunnan, Kuei- 
chow, Kwangsi, Kwangtung and Chekiang — had de- 
clared their independence, and eight others were prepar- 
ing to follow suit. A Southern Confederacy, with a 
Supreme Military Council sitting at Canton, was or- 
ganized, the brutal Governor Lung Chi Kwang having 
been won over against his master, and the scholar Liang 
Ch'i-chao flitting from place to place, inspiring move 
after move. The old parliament of 1913 was reported 
to be assembling in Shanghai, whilst terrorist methods 
against Peking officials were bruited abroad precipitat- 
ing a panic in the capital and leading to an exodus of 
well-to-do families who feared a general massacre. 

An open agitation to secure Yuan Shih-kai's com- 
plete retirement and exile now commenced. From 




The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai — the CAXAFALauE Over 
THE Coffin on Its Way to the Railway Station 




k'"^''^l,.. ^^ 



It 




The Funeral of Yuan Shih-kai — the Procession Passing 
Down the Great Palace Approach with the Famous 
Ch'ien Men (Gate) in the Distance 



REPUBLIC m CHINA 263 

every quarter notables began telegraphing him that he 
must go, — including General Feng Kuo-chang who still 
held the balance of power on the Yangtsze. Every 
enemy Yuan Shih-kai had ever had was also racing back 
to China from exile. By the beginning of May the situ- 
ation was so threatening that the Foreign Legations 
became alarmed and talked of concerting measures to 
insure their safety. On the 6th May came the coup de 
gr'ace. The great province of Szechuan, which has a 
population greater than the population of France, de- 
clared its independence; and the whole Northern army 
on the upper reaches of the Yangtsze was caught in a 
trap. The story is still told with bated breath of the 
terrible manner in which Yuan Shih-kai sated his rage 
when this news reached him — Szechuan being governed 
by a man he had hitherto thoroughly trusted — one Gen- 
eral Chen Yi. Arming himself with a sword and beside 
himself with rage he burst into the room where his 
favourite concubine was lying with her newly-delivered 
baby. With a few savage blows he butchered them 
both, leaving them lying in their gore, thus relieving the 
apoplectic stroke which threatened to overwhelm him. 
Nothing better illustrates the real nature of the man 
who had been so long the selected bailiff of the Powers. 
X On the 12th May it became necessary to suspend 
specie payment in Peking, the government banks hav- 
ing scarcely a dollar of silver left, a last attempt to 
negotiate a loan in America having failed. Meanwhile 
under inspiration of General Feng Kuo-chang, a con- 
ference to deal with the situation was assembling at 
Nanking; but on the 11th May, the Canton Military 
Government, representing the Southern Confederacy, 
had already unanimously elected Vice-President Li 



2U THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Yuan Hung as president of the Republic, it being held 
that legally Yuan Shih-kai had ceased to be President 
when he had accepted the Throne on the previous 13th 
December. The Vice-President, who had managed to 
remove his residence outside the Palace, had already re- 
ceived friendly offers of protection from certain Powers 
which he declined, showing courage to the end. Even 
the Nanking Conference, though composed of trimmers 
and wobblers, decided that the retirement of Yuan 
Shih-kai was a political necessity. General Feng Kuo- 
chang as chairman of the Conference producing at the 
last moment a telegram from the fallen Dictator de- 
claring that he was willing to go if his life and property 
were guaranteed. ^> 

A more dramatic collapse was, however, in store. As 
May drew to an end it was plain that there was no 
government at all left in Peking. The last phase had 
been truly reached. Yuan Shih-kai's nervous collapse 
was known to all the Legations which were exceedingly 
anxious about the possibility of a soldiers' revolt in the 
capital. The arrival of a first detachment of the savage 
hordes of General Chang Hsun added Byzantine 
touches to a picture already lurid with a sickened ruler 
and the Mephistophelian figure of that ruler's dme 
damnee, the Secretary Liang Shih-yi, vainly striving to 
transmute paper into silver, and find the wherewithal 
to prevent a sack of the capital. It was said at the 
time that Liang Shih-yi had won over his master to 
trying one last throw of the dice. The troops of the 
remaining loyal Generals, such as Ni Shih-chung of 
Anhui, were transported up the Yangtsze in an attempt 
to restore the situation by a savage display, — but that 
effort came to nought. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 265 

The situation had become truly appaUing in Peking. 
It was even said that the neighbouring province of 
Shantung was to become a separate state under Japan- 
ese protection. Although the Peking administration 
was still nominally the Central Government of China, 
it was amply clear to observers on the spot that by a 
process of successive collapses all that was left of gov- 
ernment was simply that pertaining to a city-state of the 
antique Greek type — a mal-administration dominated 
by the enigmatic personality of Liang Shih-yi. The 
writ of the capital no longer ran more than ten miles 
beyond the city walls. The very Government Depart- 
ments, disgusted with, and distrustful of, the many hid- 
den influences at work, had virtually declared their 
independence and went their own way, demanding for- 
eign dollars and foreign banknotes from the public, and 
refusing all Chinese money. The fine residium of undis- 
puted power left in the hands of the Mal-administrator- 
in-Chief, Liang Shih-yi, was the control of the copper 
cash market which he busily juggled with to the very 
end netting a few last thousands for his own purse, and 
showing that men hke water inevitably find their true 
level. In all China's tribulations nothing similar had 
ever been seen. Even in 1900, after the Boxer bubble 
had been pricked and the Court had sought safety in 
flight, there was a certain dignity and majesty left. 
Then an immense misfortune had fallen across the cap- 
ital; but that misfortune was like a cloak which hid the 
nakedness of the victim; and there was at least no 
pretence at authority. In the Summer of 1916, had it 
not been for the fact that an admirable police and 
gendarmerie system, comprising 16,000 men, secured 
the safety of the people, there can be little doubt that 



266 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

firing and looting would have daily taken place and no 
woman been safe. It was the last phase of political 
collapse with a vengeance : and small wonder if all Chi- 
nese officials, including even high police officers, sent 
their valuables either out of the city or into the Legation 
Quarter for safe custody. Extraordinary rumours cir- 
culated endlessly among the common people that there 
would be great trouble on the occasion of the Dragon 
Festival, the 5th June; and what actually took place 
was perhaps more than a coincidence. 
^ Early on the 6th June an electric thrill ran through 
Peking — Yuan Shih-kai was dead! ' At first the news 
was not believed, but by eleven o'clock it was definitely 
known in the Legation Quarter that he had died a few 
minutes after ten o'clock that morning from uraemia 
of the blood — the surgeon of the French Legation being 
in attendance almost to the last. A certificate issued 
later by this gentleman immediately quieted the rumours 
of suicide, though many still refused to believe that he 
was actually dead. "I did not wish this end," he is 
reported to have whispered hoarsely a few minutes be- 
fore he expired, "I did not wish to be Emperor. Those 
around me said that the people wanted a king and 
named me for the Throne. I believed and was misled." 
And in this way did his light flicker out. If there are 
sermons in stones and books in the running brooks surely 
there is an eloquent lesson in this tragedy ! Before ex- 
piring the wretched man issued the following Death 
Mandate in accordance with the ancient tradition, at- 
tempting as the long night fell on him to make his peace 
with men: — 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 267 

LAST MANDATE OF YUAN SHIH-KAI 

The Min Kuo has been established for five years. Un- 
worthily have I, the Great President, been entrusted with the 
great task by the citizens. Owing to my lack of virtue and 
ability I have not been able fully to transform into deeds 
what I have desired to accomplish; and I blush to say that I 
have not realized one ten-thousandth part of my original inten- 
tion to save the country and the people. I have, since my 
assumption of the office, worked in day and thought in the 
night, planning for the country. It is true that the founda- 
tion of the country is not yet consolidated, the hardships of the 
people not yet relieved, and innumerable reforms are still un- 
attended to. But by the valuable services of the civil officials 
and militarymen, some semblance of peace and order has been 
maintained in the provinces and friendly relations with the 
Powers upl\eld till now. 

While on the one hand I comfort myself with such things 
accomplished, on the other hand I have much to blame myself 
for. I was just thinking how I could retire into private life 
and rest myself in the forest and near the springs in fulfilment 
of my original desire, when illness has suddenly overtaken me. 
As the affairs of the State are of gravest importance, the right 
man must be secured to take over charge of the same. In 
accordance with Article 29 of the Provisional Constitution, 
which states that in case the office of the Great President should 
be vacated for certain reasons or when the Great President is 
incapacitated from doing his duties, the Vice-President shall 
exercise authority and power in his stead. I, the Great Presi- 
dent, declare in accordance with the Provisional Constitution 
that the Vice-President shall exercise in an acting capacitj^ 
the authority and power of the Great President of the Chung 
Hua Min Kuo. 

The Vice-President being a man of courtesy, good nature, 
benevolence and wisdom, will certainly be capable of greatly 
lessening the difficulties of the day and place the country on the 
foundation of peace, and so remedy the defects of me, the Great 
President, and satisfy the expectations of the people of the 
whole country. The civil and military officials outside of the 



268 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Capital as well as the troops, police and scholars and people 
should doubly keep in mind the difficulties and perils of the 
nation, and endeavour to maintain peace and order to the best 
of their ability, placing before everything else the welfare of 
the country. The ancients once said: "It is only when the 
living do try to become strong that the dead are not dead." 
This is also the wish of me, the Great President. 
(Signed) Tuan Chi-jui, 

Secretary of State and 
Minister of War. 
TSAO Ju-UN, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Communications, 
Wang Yi-tang, 

Minister of Interior. 
Chow Tzu-chi, 

Minister of Finance. 
Liu-kuan-hsiung, 

Minister of Navy. 
Chang Tsung-hsiang, 

Minister of Justice and 

Agriculture and Commerce. 
Chang Ktjo-kan, 

Minister of Education. 
6th day of the 6th month of the 5th year of Chung Hua 
Min Kuo. '\ 

This tragic denouement did not fail to awaken within 
very few days among thinking minds a feeling of pro- 
found sympathy for the dead man coupled with sharp 
disgust for the part that foreigners had played — not all, 
of course — but a great number of them. Briefly, when 
all the facts are properly grouped it can be said that 
Yuan Shih-kai was killed by his foreign friends — by the 
sort of advice he has been consistently given in Consti- 
tutional Law, in Finance, in Politics, in Diplomacy. It 
is easy to trace step by step the broad road he had been 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 269 

tempted to travel, and to see how at each turning-point 
the men who should have taught him how to be true and 
loyal to the Western things the country had nominally 
adhered to from the proclamation of the Republic, 
showed him how to be disloyal and untrue. The 
tragedy is one which is bound to be deeply studied 
throughout the whole world when the facts are prop- 
erly known and there is time to think about them, and 
if there is anything today left to poetic justice the West 
will know to whom to apportion the blame. 

Yuan Shih-kai, the man, when he came out of retire- 
ment in 1911, was in many ways a wonderful Chinese: 
he was a fount of energy and of a physical sturdiness 
rare in a country whose governing classes have hitherto 
been recruited from attenuated men, pale from study 
and the lotus life. He had a certain task to which to 
put his hand, a huge task, indeed, since the reforma- 
tion of four hundred millions was involved, yet one 
which was not beyond him if wisely advised. He was 
an ignorant man in certain matters, but he had had much 
political experience and apparently possessed a marvel- 
lous aptitude for learning. The people needed a leader 
to guide them through the great gateway of the West, 
to help them to acquire those jewels of wisdom and 
experience which are a common heritage. An almost 
Elizabethan eagerness filled them, as if a New World 
they had never dreamed of had been suddenly discovered 
for them and lay open to their endeavours. China, 
hitherto derided as a decaying land, had been born 
anew; and in single massive gesture had proclaimed that 
she, too, would belong to the elect and be governed 
accordingly. 

What was the foreign response — the official response? 



270 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

In every transaction into which it was possible to import 
them, reaction and obscurantism were not only com- 
monly employed but heartily recommended. Not one 
trace of genuine statesmanship, not one flash of altru- 
ism, was ever seen save the American flash in the pan 
of 1913, when President Wilson refused to allow 
American participation in the gi^eat Reorganization 
Loan because he held that the terms on which it was 
to be granted infringed upon China's sovereign rights. 
Otherwise there was nothing but a tacit endorsement of 
the very policy which has been tearing the entrails out 
of Europe — namely militarism. That was the fine fruit 
which was offered to a hopeful nation — something that 
would wither on the branch or poison the people as they 
plucked it. They were taught to believe that political 
instinct was the ability to misrepresent in a convincing 
way the actions and arguments of your opponents and 
to profit by their mistakes — not that it is a mighty 
impulse which can re-make nations. The Republic was 
declared by the actions of Western bureaucrats to be a 
Republic pour rire, not a serious thing; and by this false 
and cruel assumption they killed Yuan Shih-kai. 

If that epitaph is written on his political tombstone, 
it will be as full of blinding truth as is only possible 
with Last Things. 



CHAPTER XIV 

THE NEW REGIME, — FROM 1916 TO 1917 

Within an hour of the death of Yuan Shih-kai, the 
veteran General Tuan Chi-jui, in his capacity of Secre- 
tary of State, had called on Vice-President Li Yuan- 
hung — the man whom years before he had been sent 
to the Yangtsze to bring captive to Peking — and wel- 
comed him as President of the Republic. At one 
o'clock on the same day the Ministers of the Allied 
Powers who had hastily assembled at the Waichiaopu 
(Foreign Office) , were informed that General Li Yuan- 
hung had duly assumed office and that the peace and 
security of the capital were fully guaranteed. No un- 
rest of any sort need be apprehended ; for whilst rumours 
would no doubt circulate wildly as soon as the populace 
realized the tragic nature of the climax which had come, 
the Gendarmerie Corps and the Metropolitan Police — 
two forces that numbered 18,000 armed men — were tak- 
ing every possible precaution. 

In spite of these assurances great uneasiness was felt. 
The foreign Legations, which are very imperfectly in- 
formed regarding Chinese affairs although living in the 
midst of them, could not be convinced that internal 
peace could be so suddenly attained after five years of 
such fierce rivalries. Among the many gloomy predic- 
tions made at the time, the most common to fall from 
the lips of Foreign Plenipotentiaries was the remark 
that the Japanese would be in full occupation of the 
country within three months — ^the one effective barrier 

271 



272 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to their advance having been removed. No better illus- 
tration could be given of the inadequate grasp of politics 
possessed by those whose peculiar business it should be 
to become expert in the science of cause and effect. In 
China, as in the Balkans, professional diplomacy errs 
so constantly because it has in the main neither the desire 
nor the training to study dispassionately from day to 
day all those complex phenomena which go to make up 
modern nationalism. Guided in its conduct almost en- 
tirely by a policy of personal predilections, which is 
fitfully reinforced by the recollection of precedents, it is 
small wonder if such mountains of mistakes choke every 
Legation dossier. Determined to having nothing what- 
ever to do, save in the last resort, with anything that 
savours of Radicalism, and inclining naturally towards 
ideals which have long been abandoned in the workaday 
world, diplomacy is the instinctive lover of obscurantism 
and the furtive enemy of progress. Distrusting all 
those generous movements which spring from the popu- 
lar desire to benefit by change, it follows from this that 
the diplomatic brotherhood inclines towards those truly 
detestable things — secret compacts. In the present in- 
stance, having been bitterly disappointed by the com- 
plete collapse of the strong man theory, it was only 
natural that consolation should be sought by casting 
doubt on the future. Never have sensible men been so 
absurd. The life-story of Yuan Shih-kai, and the part 
European and Japanese diplomacy played in that story, 
form a chapter which should be taught as a warning to 
all who enter politics as a career, since there is exhibited 
in this history a complete compendium of all the more 
vicious traits of Byzantinism. 

The first acts of President Li Yuan-hung rapidly 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 273 

restored confidence and advertised to the keen-eyed that 
the end of the long drawn-out Revolution had come. 
Calling before him all the generals in the capital, he 
told them with sincerity and simplicity that their coun- 
try's fortunes rested in their hands ; and he asked them 
to take such steps as would be in the nature of a perma- 
nent insurance against foreign interference in the af- 
fairs of the Republic. He was at once given fervent 
support. A mass meeting of the military was fol- 
lowed by the whole body of commissioned men volun- 
teering to hold themselves personally responsible for the 
maintenance of peace and order in the capital. The 
dreadful disorders which had ushered in the Yuan Shih- 
kai regime were thus made impossible; and almost at 
once men went about their business as usual. 

The financial wreckage left by the mad monarchy 
adventure was, however, appalling. Not only was 
there no money in the capital but hardly any food as 
well ; for since the suspension of specie payments coun- 
try supplies had ceased entering the city as farmers 
refused to accept inconvertible paper in payment for 
their produce. It became necessary for the govern- 
ment to sell at a nominal price the enormous quantities 
of grain which had been accumulated for the army and 
the punitive expedition against the South ; and for many 
days a familiar sight was the endless blue-coated queues 
waiting patiently to receive as in war-time their stipu- 
lated pittance. 

Meanwhile, although the troops remained loyal to the 
new regime, not so the monarchist politicians. Seeing 
that their hour of obliteration had come, they spared 
no effort to sow secret dissensions and prevent the prov- 
inces from uniting again with Peking. It would be 



274 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

wearisome to give in full detail the innumerable schemes 
which were now hourly formulated, to secure that the 
control of the country should not be exercised in a law- 
ful way. Finding that it was impossible to. conquer the 
general detestation felt for them, the monarchists, led 
by Liang Shih-yi, changed their tactics and exhausted 
themselves in attempting to secure the issue of a general 
annesty decree. But in spite of every argument Pres- 
ident Li Yuan-hung remained unmoved and refused ab- 
solutely to consider their pardon. A just and merciful 
man, it was his intention to allow the nation to speak 
its mind before issuing orders on the subject; but to 
show that he was no advocate of the terrorist methods 
practised by his predecessor, he now issued a Mandate 
summarily abolishing the infamous Chih Fa Chu, or 
Military Court, which Yuan Shih-kai had turned into 
an engine of judicial assassination, and within whose 
gloomy precincts many thousands of unfortunate men 
had perished practically untried in the period 1911- 
1916.) 

: Meanwhile the general situation throughout the coun- 
try only slowly amehorated. The Northern Military 
party, determined to prevent political power from pass- 
ing solely into the hands of the Southern Radicals, bit- 
terly opposed the revival of the Nanking Provisional 
Constitution, and denounced the re-convocation of the 
old Parliament of 1913, which had already assembled in 
Shanghai, preparatory to coming up to the capital. It 
needed a sharp manoeuvre to bring them to their senses. 
The Chinese Navy, assembled in the waters near 
Shanghai, took action; and in an ultimatum communi- 
cated to Peking by their Admiral, declared that so long 
as the government in the hands of General Tuan Chi- 




rourtesy Major Iwaae New<'ll. l'. S. Military Attaclii' 

An Excampment of "the Punitive Expedition" of 1916 
ON thl; Upper Yangtsze 




Revival of the Impekialistic Worship of Heaven by 
Yuan Shih-kai in 1914. Scene on the Altar of 
Heaven, with Sacrificial Officers Clothed in Cos- 
tumes Dating from 2,000 Years Ago 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 275 

jui refused to conform to popular wishes by reviving the 
Nanking Provisional Constitution and resummoning the 
old Parliament, so long would the Navy refuse to recog- 
nize the authority of the Central Government. With 
the fleet in the hands of the Southern Confederacy, 
which had not yet been formally dissolved, the Peking 
Government was powerless in the whole region of the 
Yangtsze ; consequently, after many vain manoeuvres to 
avoid this reasonable and proper solution, it was at last 
agreed that things should be brought back precisely 
where they had been before the coup d'etat of the 4th 
November, 1913 — the Peking Government being re- 
constituted by means of a coalition cabinet in which there 
would be both nominees of the North and South — the 
premiership remaining in the hands of General Tuan 
Chi- jui. ) 

On the 28th June a long funeral procession wended 
its way from the Presidential Palace to the railway sta- 
tion ; it was the remains of the great dictator being taken 
to their last resting-place in Honan. ^Conspicuous in 
this cortege was the magnificent stagecoach which had 
been designed to bear the founder of the new dynasty to 
his throne but which only accompanied him to his grave. 
The detached attitude of the crowds and the studied 
simplicity of the procession, which was designed to be 
republican, proved more clearly than reams of argu- 
ments that China — despite herself perhaps — had become 
somewhat modernized, the oldest country in the world 
being now the youngest republic and timidly trying to 
learn the lessons of youth. 

Once Yuan Shih-kai had been buried, a Mandate 
ordering the summary arrest of all the chief monarch- 
ist plotters was issued; but the gang of corrupt men 



276 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

had already sought safety in ignominious flight ; and it 
was understood that so long as they remained on soil 
under foreign jurisdiction, no attempt would be made 
even to confiscate their goods and chattels as would cer- 
tainly have been done under former governments. The 
days of treachery and double-dealing and cowardly 
revenge were indeed passing away and the new regime 
was committed to decency and fairplay. The task of 
the new President was no mean one, and in all the 
circumstances if he managed to steer a safe middle 
course and avoid both Ceesarism and complete efface- 
ment, that is a tribute to his training, v Bom in 1864 
in Hupeh, one of the most important mid-Yangtsze 
provinces. President Li Yuan-hung was now fifty-two 
years old, and in the prime of life ; but although he had 
been accustomed to a military atmosphere from his 
earliest youth his policy had never been militaristic. 
His father having been in command of a force in North 
China for many years, rising from the ranks to the post 
of Tsan Chiang (Lieutenant- Colonel), had been con- 
strained to give him the advantage of a thoroughly 
modern training. At the age of 20 he had entered the 
Naval School at Tientsin ; whence six years later he had 
graduated, seeing service in the navy as an engineer 
officer during the Chino-Japanese war of 1894. After 
that campaign he had been invited by Viceroy Chang 
Chih-tung, then one of the most distinguished of the 
older viceroys, to join his staff at Nanking, and had been 
entrusted with the supervision of the construction of the 
modern forts at the old Southern capital, which played 
such a notable part in the Revolution. When Chang 
Chih-tung was transferred to the Wuchang viceroyalty, 
General Li Yuan-hung had accompanied him, actively 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 277 

participating in the training of the new Hupeh army, 
and being assisted in that work by German instructors. 
In 1897 he had gone to Japan to study educational, 
mihtary and administrative methods, returning to China 
after a short stay, but again proceeding to Tokyo in 
1897 as an officer attached to the Imperial Guards. In 
the autumn of the following year he had returned to 
Wuchang and been appointed Commander of the Cav- 
alry. Yet another visit was paid by him to Japan in 
1902 to attend the grand military manoeuvres, these 
journeys giving him a good working knowledge of Jap- 
anese, in addition to the English which had been an 
important item in the curriculum of the Naval School, 
and which he understands moderately well. In 1903 he 
was promoted Brigadier General, being subsequently 
gazetted as the Commander of the 2nd Division of Reg- 
ulars (Chang Pet Chun) of Hupeh. He also con- 
stantly held various subsidiary posts, in addition to his 
substantive appointment, connected with educational 
and administrative work of various kinds, and has there- 
fore a sound grasp of provincial government. He was 
Commander-in-Chief of the 8th Division during the 
famous military manoeuvres of 1906 at Changtehfu in 
Honan province, which are said to have been given birth 
to the idea of a universal revolt against the Manchus by 
using the army as the chief instrument. 

On the memorable day of October 11, 1911, when 
the standard of revolt was raised at Wuchang, some- 
what against his will as he was a loyal officer, he was 
elected military Governor, thus becoming the first real 
leader of the Republic. Within the space of ten days 
his leadership had secured the adhesion of fourteen prov- 
inces to the Republican cause; and though confronted 



278 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

by grave difficulties owing to insufficiency of equipment 
and military supplies, he fought the Northern soldiery 
for two months around Wuchang with varying success. 
He it was, when the Republic had been formally estab- 
lished and the Manchu regime made a thing of the past, 
who worked earnestly to bring about better relations 
between the armies of North and South China which 
had been arrayed against one another during many bit- 
ter weeks. It was he, also, who was the first to advocate 
the complete separation of the civil and military admin- 
istration — the administrative powers in the early days of 
the Republic being entirely in the hands of the mihtary 
governors of the provinces who recruited soldiery in total 
disregard to the wishes of the Central Government. 
Although this reform has even today only been partially 
successful, there is no reason to doubt that before the 
Republic is many years older the idea of the military dic- 
tating the policy and administration of the country will 
pass away. The so-called Second Revolution of 1913 
awakened no sympathy in General Li Yuan-hung, be- 
cause he was opposed to internal strife and held that all 
Chinese should work for unity and concerted reform 
rather than indulge in fruitless dissensions. His dis- 
approval of the monarchy movement had been equally 
emphatic in the face of an ugly outlook. He was 
repeatedly approached by the highest personages to give 
in his adhesion to Yuan Shih-kai becoming emperor, but 
he persistently refused although grave fears were pub- 
licly expressed that he would be assassinated. Upon 
the formal acceptance of the Throne by Yuan Shih-kai, 
he had had conferred on him a princedom which he 
steadfastly refused to accept; and when the allowances 
of a prince were brought to him from the Palace he re- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 279 

turned them with the statement that as he had not 
accepted the title the money was not his. Every effort 
to break his will proved unavailing, his patience 
and calmness contributing very materially to the vast 
moral opposition which finally destroyed Yuan Shih- 
kai. ^' 

Such was the man who was called upon to preside over 
the new government and parliament which was now 
assembling in Peking; and certainly it may be counted 
as an evidence of China's traditional luck which brought 
him to the helm. General Li Yuan Hung knew well 
that the cool and singular plan which had been pursued 
to forge a national mandate for a revival of the empire 
would take years completely to obliterate, and that the 
octopus-hold of the Military Party — the army being the 
one effective organization which had survived the Revo- 
lution — could not be loosened in a day, — m_facLwoukl 
have to be tolerated until the nation asserted itself and 
showed that it could and would be master. In the cir- 
cumstances his authority could not but be very limited, 
disclosing itself in passive rather than in active ways. 
Wishing to be above all a constitutional President, he 
quickly saw that an interregnum must be philosophically 
accepted during which the Permanent Constitution 
would be worked out and the various parties forced to 
a general agreement; and thanks to this decision the 
year which has now elapsed since Yuan Shih-kai's death 
has been almost entirely eventless, with the exception of 
the crisis which arose over the war-issue, a matter which 
is fully discussed elsewhere. 

.{Meanwhile, in the closing months of 1916, the posi- 
tion was not a little singular. Two great political 
parties had arisen through the Revolution — the Kuo 



280 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

Ming Tang or Nationalists, who included all the Kadical 
elements, and the Chinputang or Progressives, whose 
adherents were mainly men of the older official classes, 
and therefore conservative. The Yunnan movement, 
which had led to the overthrow of Yuan Shih-kai, had 
been inspired and very largely directed by the scholar 
Liang Ch'i-chao, a leader of the Chinputang. To this 
party, then, though numerically inferior to the__Kuo 
Ming Tang, was due the honour and credit of re-estab- 
lishing the Republic, the Kuo Ming Tang being under a 
cloud owing to the failure of the Second Revolution of 
1913 which it had engineered. Nevertheless, owing to 
the Kuo Ming Tang being more genuinely republican, 
since it was mainly composed of younger and more mod- 
ern minds, it was from its ranks that the greatest check to 
militarism sprang; and therefore although its work was 
necessarily confined to the Council-chamber, its moral 
influence was very great and constantly representative 
of the civilian element as opposed to the militarist. By 
staking everything on the necessity of adhering to the 
Nanking Provisional Constitution until a permanent 
instrument was dravni up, the Kuo Ming Tang rapidly 
established an ascendancy; for although the Nanking 
Constitution had admittedly failed to bring representa- 
tive government because of the difficulty of defining 
powers in such a way as to make a practical autocracy 
impossible, it had at least established as a basic principle 
that China could no longer be ruled as a family posses- 
sion, which in itself marked a great advance on all 
previous conceptions. - President Li Yuan-hung's pol- 
icy, in the circumstances, was to play the part of a 
moderator and to seek to bring harmony to a mass of 
heterogeneous elements that had to carry out the prac- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 281 

tical work of government over four hundred millions 
of people. 

His success was at the outset hampered by the appeal 
the military were quick in making to a new method — ■ 
to offset the power of Parhament in Peking. We have 
abeady dealt with the evils of the circular telegram in 
China — surely one of the most unexpected results of 
adapting foreign inventions to native life. By means 
of these telegraphic campaigns a rapid exchange of 
views is made possible among the provincial governors ; 
and consequently in the autumn of 1916, inspired by the 
Military Party, a wholly illegal Conference of generals 
was organized by the redoubtable old General Chang 
Hsun on the Pukow railway for the purpose of over- 
awing parliament, and securing that the Military Party 
retained a controlling hand behind the scenes. It is 
perhaps unnecessary today to do more than note the fact 
that the peace of the country was badly strained by this 
procedure ; but thanks to moderate counsels and the wis- 
dom of the President no open breach occurred and there 
is reason to believe that this experiment will not be 
repeated, — at least not in the same way.^ 

The difficulty to be solved is of an unique nature. It 
is not that the generals and the Military Party are 
necessarily reactionary: it is that, not belonging to the 
intellectual-literary portion of the ruling elements, they 
are less advanced and less accustomed to foreign ways, 
and therefore more in touch with the older China which 
lingers on in the vast agricultural districts, and in all 
those myriad of townships which are dotted far and wide 
across the provinces to the confines of Central Asia. 

1 Although the events dealt with in Chapter XVI have brought China 
face to face with a new crisis the force of the arguments used here is in 
no wise weakened. 



282 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Naturally it is hard for a class of men who hold the 
balance of power and carry on much of the actual work 
of governing to submit to the paper decrees of an insti- 
tution they do not accept as being responsible and rep- 
resentative: but many indications are available that 
when a Permanent Constitution has been promulgated, 
and made an article of faith in all the schools, a change 
for the better will come and the old antagonisms gradu- 
ally disappear. 

i It is on this Constitution that Parliament has been at 
work ever since it re-assembled in August, 1916, and 
which is now practically completed. Sitting together 
three times a week as a National Convention, the two 
Houses have subjected the Draft Constitution (which 
was prepared by a Special Parliamentary Drafting 
Committee) to a very exhaustive examination and dis- 
cussion. Many violent scenes have naturally marked 
the progress of this important work, the two great par- 
ties, the Kuo Ming Tang and the Chinputang, coming 
to loggerheads again and again. But in the main the 
debates and the decisions arrived at have been satisfac- 
tory and important, because they have tended to express 
in a concrete and indisputable form the present state 
of the Chinese mind and its immense underlying com- 
monsense. Remarkable discussions and fierce enmities, 
for instance, marked the final decision not to make the 
Confucian cult the State Religion; but there is not the 
slightest doubt that in formally registering this veritable 
revolution in the secret stronghold of Chinese political 
thought, a Bastille has been overthrown and the ground 
left clear for the development of individualism and per- 
sonal responsibility in a way which was impossible under 
the leaden formulae of the greatest of the Chinese sages. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 283 

In defining the relationship which must exist between 
the Central Government and the provinces even more 
formidable difficulties have been encountered, the apos- 
tles of decentralization and the advocates of centraliza- 
tion refusing for many months to agree on the so-called 
Provincial system, and then fighting a battle a outrance 
on the question of whether this body of law should form 
a chapter in the Constitution or be simply an annexure 
to the main instrument. The agreement which was 
finally arrived at — to make it part and parcel of the 
Constitution — ^was masterly in that it has secured that 
the sovereignty of the people will not tend to be ex- 
pressed in the provincial dietines which have now been 
re-erected (after having been summarily destroj^ed by 
Yuan Shih-kai) the Central Parliament being left the 
absolute master. This for a number of years will no 
doubt be more of a theory than a practice; but there is 
every indication that parliamentary government will 
within a limited period be more successful in China 
than in some European countries ; and that the Chinese 
with their love of well-established procedure and cau- 
tious action, will select open debate as the best method 
of sifting the grain from the chaff and deciding every 
important matter by the vote of the majority. Already 
in the period of 1916-1917 Parliament has more than 
justified its re-convocation by becoming a National 
Wa,tch Committee. Interpellations on every conceiv- 
able subject have been constant and frequent; fierce 
verbal assaults are delivered on Cabinet Ministers; and 
slowly but inexorably a real sense of Ministerial respon- 
sibility is being created, the fear of having to run the 
gaun^et of Parliament abating, if it has not yet entirely 
destroyed, many malpractices. In the opinion of the 



284 THE FIGHT FOE THE 

writer in less than ten years Parliament will have suc- 
ceeded in coalescing the country into an organic whole, 
and will have placed the Cabinet in such close daily rela- 
tions with it that something very similar to the Anglo- 
Saxon theory of government will be impregnably en- 
trenched in Peking. That such a miracle should be 
possible in extreme Eastern Asia is one more proof 
that there are no victories beyond the capacity of the 
human mind. 

Meanwhile, for the time being, in China as in coun- 
tries ten thousand miles away, ministerial irresponsi- 
bility is the enemy; that is to say that so-called Cabinet- 
rule, with the effacement of the Chief Executive, has 
tended to make Cabinet Ministers removed from effec- 
tive daily control. All sorts of things are done which 
should not be done and men are still in charge of port- 
folios who should be summarily expelled from the capi- 
tal for malpractices.^ But although Chinese are slow 
to take action and prefer to delay all decisions until 
they have about them the inexorable quality which is 
associated with Fate, there is not the slightest doubt 
that in the long run the dishonest suffer, and an increas- 
ingly efficient body of men take their place. From 
every point of view then there is reason for congratu- 
lation in the present position, and every hope that the 
future will unroll peacefully. 

A visit to Parliament under the new regime is a 
revelation to most men: the candid come away with an 
impression which is never effaced from their minds. 
There is a peculiar suggestiveness even in the location 
of the Houses of the National Assembly. They are 

1 Since this was written two Cabinet Ministers have been summarily ar- 
rested. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 285 

tucked away in the distant Western city immediately 
under the shadow of the vast Tartar Wall as if it had 
been fully expected when they were called into being 
that they would never justify their existence, and that 
the crushing weight of the great bastion of brick and 
stone surrounding the capital would soon prove to them 
how futile it was for such palpable intruders to aspire 
to national control. Under Yuan Shih-kai, as under 
the Manchus, they were an exercise in the arm of gov- 
ernment, something which was never to be allowed to 
harden into a settled practice. They were first cousins 
to railways, to electrical power, to metalled roadways 
and all those other modern instances beginning to 
modify an ancient civilization entirely based on agri- 
culture; and because they were so distantly related to 
the real China of the farm-yard it was thought that they 
would always stand outside the national life. 

That was what the fools believed. Yet in a copy of 
the rules of procedure of the old Imperial Senate 
(Tzuchengyuan) the writer finds this note written in 
1910: "The Debates of this body have been remarkable 
during the very first session. They make it seem clear 
that the first National Parliament of 1913 will seize 
control of China and nullify the power of the Throne. 
Result, revolution — " Though the dating is a little 
confused, the prophecy is worthy of record. 

The watchfulness of the special police surrounding 
the Parliament of 1916-1917 and the great number of 
these men also tells a story as eloquent as the location of 
the building. It is not so much that any contemplated 
violence sets these guardians here as the necessity to 
advertise that there has been unconstitutional violence 
in the past which, if possible, will be rigidly defeated in 



286 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

the future. Probably no National Assembly in the 
world has been held up to greater contempt than the 
Parliament of Peking and probably no body deserves it 
less. An afternoon spent in the House of Represen- 
tatives would certainly surprise most open-minded men 
who have been content to beheve that the Chinese ex- 
periment was what some critics have alleged it to 
be. The Chinese as a people, being used to guild-house 
proceedings, debates, in which the welfare of the ma- 
jority is decided after an examination of the princi- 
ples at stake, are a very old and well-established custom ; 
and though at present there are awkwardnesses and 
gaucheries to be noted, when practice has become better 
fixed, the common sense of the race will abundantly 
disclose itself and make a lasting mark on contempo- 
rary history. There can be no doubt about this at all.^ 

Take your seat in the gallery and see for yourself. 
The first question which rises to the lips is — where are 
the young men, those crude and callow youths mas- 
querading as legislators which the vernacular press has 
so excessively lampooned? The majority of the mem- 
bers, so far from being young, are men of thirty or 
forty, or even fifty, with intelligent and tired faces 
that have lost the Spring of youth. Here and there 
you will even see venerable greybeards suffering from 
rheumy coughs who ought to be at home ; and though oc- 
casionally there is a lithe youngster in European clothes 
with the veneer he acquired abroad not yet completely 
rubbed off, the total impression is that of oldish men who 
have reached years of maturity and who are as repre- 
sentative of the countrj^ and as good as the country is in a 
position today to provide. ISTo one who knows the real 
China can deny that. 




si cc 



'fl 






u 

n 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 287 

The Continental arrangement of the Members' desks 
and the raised tribune of the Speaker, with its rows of 
clerks and recorders, make an impression of orderliness, 
tinged nevertheless with a faint revolutionary flavour. 
Perhaps it is the straight black Chinese hair and the 
rich silk clothing, set on a very plain and unadorned 
background, which recall the pictures of the French 
Revolution. It is somehow natural in such circum- 
stances that there should occasionally be dramatic out- 
bursts with the blood of offenders bitterly demanded as 
though we were not living in the Twentieth Century 
when blood alone is admittedly no satisfaction. The 
presence of armed House police at every door, and 
in the front rows of the strangers' gallery as well, con- 
tributes to this impression which has certain qualities 
of the theatre about it and is oddly stimulating. China 
at work legislating has already created her first tradi- 
tions: she is proceeding deliberately armed — with the 
lessons of the immediate past fully noted. 

This being the home of a literary race, papers and 
notebooks are on most Members' desks. As the elec- 
tric bells ring sharply an unending procession of men 
file in to take their seats, for there has been a recess 
and the House has been only half -filled. Nearly every 
one is in Chinese dress (pien-yi) with the Member's 
badge pinned conspicuously on the breast. The idea 
speedily becomes a conviction that this after all is not 
extraneous to the nation but actually of the living flesh, 
a vital and imperative thing. The vastness and au- 
dacity of it all cannot fail to strike the imaginative 
mind, for the four or five hundred men who are gath- 
ered here typify, if they do not yet represent, the four 
or five hundred millions who make up the country. 



288 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

You see as it were the nation in profile, a ponderous, 
slow-moving mass, quickly responsive to curious sub- 
conscious influences — suddenly angry and suddenly 
calm again because Reason has after all always been 
the great goddess which is perpetually worshipped. 
All are scholarly and deliberate in their movements. 
When the Speaker calls the House in order and the 
debate commences, deep silence comes save for the move- 
ment of hundreds of nervous hands that touch papers 
or fidget to and fro. Every man uses his hands, par- 
ticularly when he speaks, not clenched as a European 
would do, but open, with the slim figures speaking a 
language of their own, twisting, turning, insinuating, 
deriding, a little history of compromises. It would be 
interesting to write the story of China from a study 
of the hands. 

Each man goes to the rostrum to speak, and each has 
much to say. Soon another impression deepens — that 
the Northerners with their clear-cut speech and their 
fuller voices have an advantage over the Southerners 
of the kind that all public performers know. The man- 
darin language of Peking is after all the mother-lan- 
guage of officialdom, the madre linqua, less nervous and 
more precise than any other dialect and invested with a 
certain air of authority which cannot be denied. The 
sharp-sounding, high-pitched Southern voice, though it 
may argue very acutely and rapidly, appears at an 
increasing disadvantage. There seems to be a tendency 
inherent in it to become querulous, to make its pleading 
sound specious because of over-much speech. These 
are curious little things which have been not without 
influence in other regions of the world. 

The applause when it comes proves the same thing 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 289 

as applause does everywhere; that if you want to drive 
home your points in a large assembly you must be con- 
densed and simple, using broad, slashing arguments. 
This is precisely what distinguishes melodrama from 
drama, and which explains why excessive analysis is 
no argument in the popular mind. Generally, however, 
there is not much applause and the voice of the speaker 
wanders through the hall uninterrupted by signs of 
content or discontent. Sometimes, although rather 
rarely, there is a gust of laughter as a point is scored 
against a hated rival. But it dies away as suddenly as 
it arose — almost before you have noted it, as if it were 
superfluous and must make room for more serious 
things. 

With the closing of a debate there is the vote. An 
electric bell rings again, and with a rough hand the 
House police close all the exits. The clerks come down 
into the aisles. They seem to move listlessly and in- 
differently; yet very quickly they have checked the 
membership to insure that the excessively large quorum 
requisite is present. Now the Speaker calls for the 
vote. Massively and stiffly, as at a word of command 
the "ayes" rise in their seats. There is a round of ap- 
plause; the bill has been carried almost unanimously. 
That, however, is not always so. When there is an 
obstreperous mood abroad, the House will decline to 
proceed with the agenda, and a dozen men will rise at 
a time and speak from behind their desks, trying to talk 
each other down. The Speaker stands patiently wres- 
tling with the problem of procedure — and often failing 
since practice is still in process of being formed. 
Years must elapse before absolutely hard-and-fast 
rules are estabhshed. Still the progress already made 



290 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

since August, 1916, is remarkable, and something is be- 
ing learned every day. The business of a Parliament is 
after all to debate — ^to give voice to the uppermost 
thoughts in the nation's mind; and how those thoughts 
are expressed is a continual exposition of the real state 
of the nation's political beliefs. Parliament is — or 
should be — a microcosm of the race ; parliament is never 
any better or any worse than the mass of the people. 
The rule of the majority as expressed in the voting of 
the National Assembly must be taken as a fundamental 
thing; China is no exception to the rule — ^the rule of 
the majority must be decisive. 

But here another complexity of the new Chinese po- 
litical life enters into the problem. The existence of a 
responsible Cabinet, which is not yet linked to the Leg- 
islative body in any well-understood way, and which 
furthermore has frequently acted in opposition to the 
President's office, makes for a daily struggle in the ad- 
ministration of the country which is strongly to be con- 
demned and which has already led to some ugly clashes. 
But nevertheless there are increasing indications that 
parliamentary government is making steady headway 
and that when both the Permanent Constitution and the 
Local Government system have been enforced, a new 
note will be struck. No doubt it will need a younger 
generation in office to secure a complete abandonment of 
all the old ways, but the writer has noted with aston- 
ishment during the past twelve-month how eager even 
viceroys belonging to the old Manchu regime have be- 
come to fall in with the new order and to lend their 
help, a sharp competition to obtain ministerial posts 
being evident in spite of the fact that the gaiuitlet of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 291 

Parliament has to be run and a majority vote recorded 
before any appointment is valid. 

/ One last anomaly has, however, yet to be done away 
with in Peking. The deposed boy Emperor still re- 
sides in the Winter Palace surrounded by a miniature 
court, — a state of affairs which should not be tolerated 
any longer as it no doubt tends to assist the rumours 
which every now and again are mysteriously spread by 
interested parties that a Restoration is imminent. The 
time has arrived when not only must the Manchu Im- 
perial Family be removed far from the capital but a 
scheme worked out for commuting the pension-system 
of so-called Bannerman families who still draw their 
monthly allowances as under the Manchus, thanks to 
the articles of Favourable Treatment signed at the 
time of abdication of 1912. When these two important 
questions have been settled, imperialism in China wiU 
tend rapidly to fade into complete oblivion, j 



CHAPTER XV 

THE REPUBLIC IN COLLISION WITH EEALITY: TWO 
TYPICAL INSTANCES OF "FOREIGN AGGRESSION" 

Such, then, were the internal conditions which the new 
administration was called upon to face with the death 
of Yuan Shih-kai. With very little money in the Na- 
tional Treasury and with the provinces unable or un- 
willing to remit to the capital a single dollar, it was 
fortunate that at least one public service, erected under 
foreign pressure, should be brilHantly justifying its ex- 
istence. The Salt Administration, efficiently reorgan- 
ized in the space of three years by the great Indian au- 
thority. Sir Richard Dane, was now providing a 
monthly surplus of nearly five million dollars; and it 
was this revenue which kept China alive during a 
troubled transitional period when every one was declar- 
ing that she must die. By husbanding this hard cash 
and mixing it liberally with paper money, the Central 
Government has been able since June, 1916, to meet its 
current obligations and to keep the general machinery 
from breaking down. 

But in a country such as China new dangers have to 
be constantly faced and smoothed away — the interests 
of the outer world pressing on the country and conflict- 
ing with the native interest at a myriad points. And in 
order to illustrate and make clear the sort of daily ex- 
acerbation which the nation must endure because of the 
vastness of its territory and the octopus-hold of the for- 
eigner we give two typical cases of international trouble 

292 



REPUBLIC IX CHINA 293 

which have occurred since Yuan Shih-kai's death. The 
first is the well-known Chengchiatun incident which oc- 
curred in Manchuria in August, 1916: the second is the 
Laohsikai affair which took place in Tientsin in Novem- 
ber of the same year and created a storm of rage against 
France throughout North China which at the moment 
of writing has not yet abated. 

The facts about the Chengchiatun incident are incredi- 
bly simple and merit being properly told. Chengchia- 
tun is a small Mongol-Manchurian market-down lying 
some sixty miles west of the South Manchurian railway 
by the ordinary cart-roads, though as the crow flies the 
distance is much less. The country round about is 
"new country," the prefecture in which Chengchiatun 
lies being originally purely Mongol territory on which 
Chinese squatted in such numbers that it was necessary 
to erect the ordinary Chinese civil administration. 
Thirty or forty miles due west of the town cultivation 
practically ceases; and then nothing meets the eye but 
the rolling grasslands of Mongolia, with their sparse 
encampments of nomad horsemen and shepherds which 
stretch so monotonously into the infinities of High Asia. 

The region is strategically important because the 
trade-routes converge there from the growing marts of 
the Taonanfu administration, which is the extreme west- 
ernly limit of Chinese authority in the IVIongolian bor- 
derland. A rich exchange in hides, furs, skins, cattle 
and foodstuffs has given this frontier-town from year 
to year an increasing importance in the eyes of the 
Chinese who are fully aware of the dangers of a laissez 
aller policy and are determined to protect the rights 
they have acquired by pre-emption. The fact that no- 
torious Mongol brigand-chiefs, such as the famous 



294 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

Babachapu who was allied to the Manchu Restoration 
Party and who was said to have been subsidized by the 
Japanese Military Party, had been making Chengchia- 
tun one of their objectives, brought concern early in 
1916 to the Moukden Governor, the energetic General 
Chang Tso-hn, who in order to cope with the danger 
promptly established a military cordon round the dis- 
trict, with a relatively large reserve based on Cheng- 
chiatun, drawn from the 28th Army Division. A cer- 
tain amount of desultory fighting months before any 
one had heard of the town had given Chengchiatun 
the odour of the camp; and when in the summer the 
Japanese began military manoeuvres in the district with 
various scattered detachments, on the excuse that the 
South Manchuria railway zone where they alone had the 
right under the Portsmouth Peace Treaty to be, was too 
cramped for field exercises, it became apparent that 
dangerous developments might be expected — particu- 
larly as a body of Japanese infantry was billeted right 
in the centre of the town. 

On the 13th August a Japanese civilian at Cheng- 
chiatun — ^there is a small Japanese trading community 
there — approached a Chinese boy who was selling fish. 
On the boy refusing to sell at the price offered him, the 
Japanese caught hold of him and started beating him. 
A Chinese soldier of the 28th Division who was pass- 
ing intervened; and a scuffle commenced in which other 
Chinese soldiers joined and which resulted in the Jap- 
anese being severely handled. After the Chinese had 
left him, the man betook himself to the nearest Japanese 
post and reported that he had been grievously assaulted 
by Chinese soldiers for no reason whatsoever. A Jap- 
anese gensdarme made a preliminary investigation in 




Presidext Li Yuax-huxg 



^^// 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 295 

company with the man ; then returning to the Japanese 
barracks, declared that he could find no one in author- 
ity; that his attempts at discovering the culprits had 
been resisted; and that he must have help. The Jap- 
anese officer in command, who was a captain, detailed 
a lieutenant and twenty men to proceed to the Chinese 
barracks to obtain satisfaction from the Chinese Com- 
mander — using force if necessary. It was precisely in 
this way that the play was set in motion. 

The detachment marched off to the headquarters of 
the offending Chinese detachment, which was billeted in 
a pawnshop, and tried to force their way past a sentry 
who stood his ground, into the inner courtyards. A 
long parley ensued with lowered bayonets; and at last 
on the Chinese soldier absolutely refusing to give way, 
the lieutenant gave orders to cut him down. There 
appears to be no doubt about these important facts — 
that is to say, that the act of war was the deliberate at- 
tack by a Japanese armed detachment on a Chinese 
sentry who was guarding the quarters of his Com- 
mander. 

A frightful scene followed. It appears that scat- 
tered groups of Chinese soldiers, some with their arms, 
and some without, had collected during this crisis and 
point-blank firing at once commenced. The first shots 
appear to have been fired — though this was never proved 
— by a Chinese regimental groom, who was standing 
with some horses some distance away in the gateway of 
some stabling and who is said to have killed or wounded 
the largest number of Japanese. In any case seven 
Japanese soldiers were killed outright, five more mor- 
tally wounded and four severely so, the Chinese them- 
selves losing four killed, besides a number of wounded. 



296 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

The remnant of the Japanese detachment after this 
rude reverse managed to retreat with their wounded offi- 
cer to their own barracks where the whole detachment 
barricaded themselves in, firing for many hours at every- 
thing that moved on the roads though absolutely no at- 
tempt was made by the Chinese soldiery to advance 
against them. 

The sound of this heavy firing, and the wild report 
that many Japanese had been killed, had meanwhile 
spread panic throughout the town, and there was a 
general sauve qui pent, a terrible retribution being 
feared. The local Magistrate finally restored some 
semblance of order ; and after dark proceeded in person 
with some notables of the town to the Japanese bar- 
racks to tender his regrets and to arrange for the re- 
moval of the Japanese corpses which were lying just 
as they had fallen, and which Chinese custom demanded 
should be decently cared for, though they constituted 
important and irrefragible evidence of the armed in- 
vasion which had been practised. The Japanese Com- 
mander, instead of meeting these conciliatory attempts 
half-way, thereupon illegally arrested the Magistrate 
and locked him up, being impelled to this action by the 
general fear among his men that a mass attack would 
be made in the night by the Chinese troops in garrison 
and the whole command wiped out. Nothing, however, 
occurred and on the 14th instant the Magistrate was 
duly released on his sending for his son to take his place 
as hostage. On the 16th the Magistrate had success- 
fully arranged the withdrawal of all Chinese troops five 
miles outside the town to prevent further clashes. On 
the 15th Japanese cavalry and infantry began to arrive 
in large numbers from the South Manchuria railway 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 297 

zone (where they alone have the Treaty right to be) and 
the town of Chengchiatun was arbitrarily placed by 
them in a state of siege. 

Here is the stuff of which the whole incident was 
made : there is nothing material beyond the facts stated 
which illustrate very glaringly the manner in which a 
strong Power acts towards a weak one. 

Meanwhile the effect in Tokyo of these happenings 
had been electrical. Relying on the well-known Jap- 
anese police axiom, that the man who gets in his story 
first is the prosecutor and the accused the guilty party, 
irrespective of what the evidence may be, the news- 
papers all came out with the same account of a calcu- 
lated attack by "ferocious Chinese soldiers" on a Jap- 
anese detachment and the general public were asked to 
believe that a number of their enlisted nationals had been 
deliberately and brutally murdered. It was not, how- 
ever, until more than a week after the incident that an 
official report was published by the Tokyo Foreign Of- 
fice, when the following garbled account was distributed 
far and wide as the Japanese case : — 

"When one Kiyolcishy Yoshimoto, aged 27, an employe of a 
Japanese apothecary at Chengchiatun, was passing the head- 
quarters of the Chinese troops on the 13th instant, a Chinese 
soldier stopped him, and, with some remarks, which were un- 
intelligible to the Japanese, suddenly struck him on the head. 
Yoshimoto became enraged, but was soon surrounded by a 
large number of Chinese soldiers and others, who subjected 
him to all kind of humiliation. As a result of this lawless- 
ness on the part of the Chinese, the Japanese sustained injuries 
in seven or eight places, but somehow he managed to break away 
and reach a Japanese police box, where he applied for help. 
On receipt of this news, a policeman, named Kowase, hastened 
to the spot, but by the time he arrived there all the offenders 



298 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

had fled. He therefore repaired to the headquarters of the 
Chinese to lay a complaint, but the sentry stopped him, and 
presented a pistol at him, and under these circumstances he 
was obliged to apply to the Japanese Garrison headquarters, 
where Captain Inone instructed Lieutenant Matsuo with 
twenty men to escort the policeman to the Chinese head- 
quarters. When the party approached the Chinese headquar- 
ters, Chinese troops began to fire, and the policemen and others 
were either killed or wounded. Despite the fact that the Jap- 
anese troops retired, the Chinese troops did not give up firing, 
but besieged the Japanese garrison, delivering several severe 
attacks. Soon after the fighting ceased, the Chinese authori- 
ties visited the Japanese barracks, and expressed the desire 
that the affair be settled amicably. It was the original inten- 
tion of the Japanese troops to fight it out, but they were com- 
pletely out-numbered, and lest the safety of the Japanese resi- 
dents be endangered, they stopped fighting. On examination 
of the dead bodies of seven Japanese soldiers, who were attacked 
outside the barracks, it was discovered that they had been all 
slain by the Chinese troops, the bodies bearing marks of vio- 
lence." 

Without entering again into the merits of the case, 
we would ask those who are acquainted with recent his- 
tory whether it is likely that Chinese soldiers, knowing 
all the pains and penalties attaching to such action, 
would deliberately attack a body of twenty armed Japa- 
nese under an officer as the Japanese official account 
states? We believe that no impartial tribunal, investi- 
gating the matter on the spot, could fail to point out the 
real aggressors and withal lay bare the web of a most 
amazing state of affairs. For in order to understand 
what occurred, on the 13th August, 1916, it is necessary 
to turn far away from Chengchiatun and see what lies 
behind it all. 

At the back of the brain of the Japanese Military 



KEPUBLIC IN CHINA 299 

Party, which by no means represents the Japanese na- 
tion or the Japanese Government although it exercises 
a powerful influence on both, is the fixed idea that South 
JManchuria and Inner Mongolia must be turned into a 
strongly held and fortified Japanese enclave, if the bal- 
ance of power in Eastern Asia is to be maintained. 
Pursuant to this idea, Japanese diplomacy was induced 
many months ago to concentrate its efforts on winning 
■ — if not wringing — from Russia the strategically im- 
portant strip of railway south of the Sungari River, 
because (and this should be carefully noted) with the 
Sungari as the undisputed dividing-line between the 
Russian and Japanese spheres in Manchuria, and with 
Japanese shallow-draft gun-boats navigating that wa- 
terway and entering the Nonni river, it would be easily 
possible for Japan to complete a "Continental quadri- 
lateral" which would include Korea, South Manchuria 
and Inner Mongolia, the extreme western barrier of 
which would be the new system of Inner Mongolian 
railways centring round Taonanfu and terminating 
at Jehol, for which Japan ah-eady holds the building 
rights.^ Policing rights — ^in the outer zone of this en- 
clave, — ^with a total exclusion of all Chinese garrisons, 
is the preliminary goal towards which the Japanese 
Military Party has been long plainly marching; and 
long before anybody had heard of Chengchiatun, a 
scheme of reconnoitring detachments had been put in 
force to spy out the land and form working alliances 
with the Mongol bands in order to harass and drive away 
all the representatives of Chinese authority. What oc- 
curred, then, at Chengchiatun might have taken place 

1 Russian diplomats now deny that the Japanese proposals regarding the 
cession of the railway south of the Sungari river have ever been formally 
agreed to. 



300 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

at any one of half-a-dozen other places in this vast and 
little-known region whither Japanese detachments have 
silently gone ; and if Chinese diplomacy in the month of 
August, 1916, was faced with a rude surprise, it was only 
what political students had long been expecting. For 
though Japan should be the real defender of Chinese 
liberties, it is a fact that -in Chinese affairs Japanese 
diplomacy has been too long dictated to by the Military 
Party in Tokio and attempts nothing save when violence 
allows it to tear from China some fresh portion of her 
independence. 

And here we reach the crux of the matter. One of 
the little known peculiarities of the day lies in the fact 
that Japan is the land of political inaction because there 
is no tradition of action save that which has been built up 
by the military and naval chiefs since the Chinese war 
of 1894-95. Having only visualized the world in inter- 
national terms during two short decades, there has been 
no time for a proper tradition to be created by the civil 
government of Japan ; and because there is no such tra- 
dition, the island empire of the East has no true foreign 
poHcy and is at the mercy of manufactured crises, being 
too often committed to petty adventures which really 
range her on the side of those in Europe the Allies have 
set themselves to destroy. It is for this reason that the 
Chinese are consistently treated as though they were 
hewers of wood and drawers of water, helots who are 
occasionally flattered in the columns of the daily press 
and yet are secretly looked upon as men who have been 
born merely to be cuffed and conquered. The Moukden 
Governor, General Chang Tso-ling, discussing the 
Chengchiatun affair with the writer, put the matter in a 
nutshell. Striking the table he exclaimed: "After all 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 301 

we are not made of wood like this, we too are flesh and 
blood and must defend our own people. A dozen times 
I have said, 'Let them come and take Manchuria openly 
if they dare, but let them cease their childish intrigues.' 
Why do they not do so? Because they are not sure 
they can swallow us — not at all sure. Do you under- 
stand? We are weak, we are stupid, we are divided, 
but we are innumerable, and in the end, if they persist, 
China will burst the Japanese stomach." 

Such passionate periods are all very well, but when 
it comes to the sober business of the council chamber it 
is a regrettable fact that Chinese, although foreign 
friends implore them to do so, do not properly use the 
many weapons in their armoury. Thus in this particu- 
lar case, instead of at once hurrying to Chengchiatun 
some of the many foreign advisers who sit kicking their 
heels in Peking from one end of the year to the other and 
who number competent jurisconsults, China did next to 
nothing. No proper report was drawn up on the spot ; 
sworn statements were not gathered, nor were witnesses 

4rought to Peking; and it therefore happened that when 
apan filed her demands for redress, China had not in 
her possession anything save an utterly inadequate de- 
fence. Mainly because of this she was forced to agree 
to foregoing any direct discussion of the rights and 
wrongs of the case, proceeding directly to negotiations 
based on the various claims which Japan filed and which 
were as follows : — 

1. Punishment of the General commanding the 28th Division. 

2. The dismissal of officers at Chengchiatun responsible for 
the occurrence as well as the severe punishment of those who 
took direct part in the fracas. 

3. Proclamations to be posted ordering all Chinese soldiers 



302 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

and civilians in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
to refrain from any act calculated to provoke a breach of the 
peace with Japanese soldiers or civilians. 

4«. China to agree to the stationing of Japanese police offi- 
cers in places in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
where their presence was considered necessary for the protec- 
tion of Japanese subjects. China also to agree to the engage- 
ment by the officials of South Manchuria of Japanese police 
advisers. 

And in addition: — 

1. Chinese troops stationed in South Manchuria and East- 
ern Inner Mongolia to employ a certain number of Japanese 
Military officers as advisers. 

2. Chinese Military Cadet schools to employ a certain num- 
ber of Japanese Military officers as instructors. 

3. The Military Governor of Moukden to proceed person- 
ally to Port Arthur to the Japanese Military Governor of 
Kwantung to apologize for the occurrence and to tender sim- 
ilar personal apologies to the Japanese Consul General in 
Moukden. 

4. Adequate compensation to be paid by China to the Japan- 
ese sufferers and to the families of those killed. 

The merest tyro will see at once that so far from 
caring very much about the killing of her soldiery, Japan 
was bent on utilizing the opportunity to gain a certain 
number of new rights and privileges in the zone of 
^ Southern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia — 
notably an extension of her police and military-super- 
vision rights. In spite, however, of the faulty proced- 
ure to which she had consented, China showed consider- 
able tenacity in the course of negotiations which lasted 
nearly half a year, and by the end of January, 1917, 
had whittled down the question of Japanese compensa- 
tion to fairly meagre proportions. To be precise the 





X 



EEPUBLIC IN CHINA 303 

two governments agreed to embody by the exchange of 
Notes the five following stipulations: 

1. The General commanding the 28th Division to be repri- 
manded. 

2. Officers responsible to be punished according to law. If 
the law provides for severe punishment, such punishment will 
be inflicted. 

3. Proclamations to be issued enjoining Chinese soldiers and 
civilians in the districts where there is mixed residence to 
accord considerate treatment to Japanese soldiers and civilians. 

4. The Military Governor of Moukden to send a representa- 
tive to Port Arthur to convey his regret when the Military 
Governor of Kwantung and Japanese Consul General at 
Moukden are there together. 

5. A solatium of $500 (Five Hundred Dollars) to be given 
to the Japanese merchant Yoshimoto. 

But though the incident was thus nominally closed, 
and amicable relations restored, the most important 
point — the question of Japanese police-rights in South- 
ern Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia — was left 
precisely where it had been before, the most vigorous 
Chinese protests not having induced Japan to abate in 
the slightest her pretensions. During previous years a 
number of Japanese police-stations and police-boxes had 
been established in defiance of the local authorities in 
these regions, and although China in these negotiations 
recorded her strongest possible objection to their pres- 
ence as being the principal cause of the continual friction 
between Chinese and Japanese, Japan refused to with- 
draw from her contention that they did not constitute 
any extension of the principle of extraterritoriality, and 
that indeed Japanese police, distributed at such points 
as the Japanese consular authorities considered neces- 



304 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

sary, must be permanently accepted. Here then is a 
matter which will require careful consideration when the 
Powers meet to revise their Chinese Treaties as they 
must revise them after the world-war; for Japan in 
Manchuria is fundamentally in no different a position 
from England in the Yangtsze Valley and what applies 
to one must apply to the other. The new Chinese police 
which are being distributed in ever greater numbers 
throughout China form an admirable force and are su- 
perior to Japanese police in the performance of nearly 
all their duties. It is monstrous that Japan, as well as 
other Powers, should act in such a reprehensible manner 
when the Chinese administration is doing all it can to 
provide efficient guardians of the peace. 

The second case was one in which French officialdom 
by a curious act of folly gravely alienated Chinese sym- 
pathies and gave a powerful weapon to the German 
propaganda in China at the end of 1916. The Lao-hsi- 
kai dispute, which involved a bare 333 acres of land in 
Tientsin, has now taken its place beside the Chengchia- 
tun affair, and has become a leading case in that great 
dossier of griefs which many Chinese declare make up 
the corpus of Euro-Chinese relations. Here again the 
facts are absolutely simple and absolutely undisputed. 
In 1902 the French consular authorities in Tientsin filed 
a request to have their Concession extended on the 
ground that they were becoming cramped. The Chi- 
nese authorities, although not wishing to grant the re- 
quest and indeed ignoring it for a long time, were finally 
induced to begin fitful negotiations; and in October, 
1916, after having passed through various processes of 
alteration, reduction, and re-statement during the inter- 
val of fourteen years, the issue had been so fined down 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 305 

that a virtual agreement regarding the administration 
of the new area had been reached — an agreement which 
the Peking Government was prepared to put into force 
subject to one reasonable stipulation, that the local 
opposition to the new grant of territory which was very 
real, as Chinese feel passionately on the subject of the 
police-control of their land-acreage, was first overcome. 
The whole essence or soul of the disputes lay therein: 
that the lords of the soil, the people of China, and in 
this case more particularly the population of Tientsin, 
should accept the decision arrived at which was that a 
joint Franco-Chinese administration be established un- 
der a Chinese Chairman. 

When the terms of this proposed agreement were 
communicated to the Tientsin Consulate by the French 
Legation the arrangement did not please the French 
Consul-General, who was under transfer to Shanghai 
and who proposed to settle the case to the satisfaction 
of his nationals before he left. There is absolutely no 
dispute about this fact either — namely that the main 
pre-occupation of a consular officer, charged primarily 
under the Treaties with the simple preservation of law 
and order among his nationals, was the closing-up of a 
vexatious outstanding case, by force if necessary, before 
he handed over his office to his successor. It was with 
this idea that an ultimatum was drawn up by the French 
Consul General and, having been weakly approved by 
the French Legation, was handed to the Chinese local 
authorities. It gave them a time-limit of twenty-four 
hours in which to effect the complete police evacuation 
of the coveted strip of territory on the ground that the 
delay in the signature of a formal Protocol had been 
wilful and deliberate and had closed the door to further 



306 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

negotiations ; and as no response came at the end of the 
time-limit, an open invasion of Chinese territory was 
practised by an armed French detachment; nine uni- 
formed Chinese constables on duty being forcibly re- 
moved and locked up in French barracks and French 
sentries posted on the disputed boundary. 

The result of this misguided action was an enormous 
Chinese outcry and the beginning of a boycott of the 
French in North China, — and this in the middle of a 
war when France has acted with inspiring nobility. 
Some 2,000 native police, servants and employes 
promptly deserted the French Concession en masse; 
popular unions were formed to keep alive resentment; 
and although in the end the arrested police were set at 
liberty, the friendly intervention of the Allies proved 
unable to effect a settlement of the case which at the 
moment of writing remains precisely where it was a 
year ago.^ 

Here you have the matter of foreign interests in 

1 A further illustration of the action of French diplomacy in China has 
just been provided (April, 1917) in the protest lodged by France against the 
building of a railway in Kwangsi Province by American engineers with 
American capital, — France claiming exclusive rights in Kwangsi by virtue 
of a letter sent by the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the French 
Legation in 1914- as settlement for a frontier dispute in that year. The 
text of the letter is as follows: 

"The dispute that rose in consequence of the disturbance at the border 
of Annam and Kwangsi has been examined into by the Joint Committee 
detailed by both parties concerned, and a conclusion has been reached to 
the effect that all matters relating to the solution of the case would be car- 
ried out in accordance with the request of Your Excellency. 

"In order to demonstrate the especially good friendly relations existing 
between the two countries, the Republican Government assures Your Ex- 
cellency that in case a railway construction or a mining enterprise being 
undertaken in Kwangsi Province in the future, for which foreign capital is 
required, France would first be consulted for a loan of the necessary capital. 
On such an occasion, the Governor of Kwangsi will directly negotiate with 
a French syndicate and report to the Government." 

It is high time that the United States raises the whole question of the 
open door in China again, and refuses to tolerate any longer the old dis- 
ruptive and dog-in-the-manger policy of the Powers. America is now hap- 
pily in a position to inaugurate a new era in the Far East as in the Far 
West and to stop exploitation. 



REPUBLIC IN" CHIlSrA 307 

China explained in the sense that they appear to Chinese. 
It is not too much to sslj that this illustration of the de- 
liberate lawlessness, which has too often been practised 
in the past by consuls who are simply Justices of the 
Peace, would be incredible elsewhere; and yet it is this 
lawlessness which has come to be accepted as part and 
parcel of what is called "policy" in China because in the 
fifty years preceding the establishment of the Republic 
a weak and effeminate mandarinate consistently sought 
safety in surrenders. It is this lawlessness which must 
at all costs be suppressed if we are to have a happy fu- 
ture. The Chinese people have so far contented them- 
selves by pacific retaliation and have not exploded into 
rage ; but those who see in the gospel of boycott an ugly 
manifestation of what hes slumbering should give 
thanks nightly that they live in a land where reason 
is so supreme. Think of what might not happen in 
China if the people were not wholly reasonable! 
Throughout the length and breadth of the land you have 
small communities of foreigners, mere drops in a 
mighty ocean of four hundred millions, living abso- 
lutely secure although absolutely at the mercy of their 
huge swarms of neighbours. All such foreigners — or 
nearly all — have come to China for purposes of profit; 
they depend for their livelihood on co-operation with the 
Chinese; and once that co-operation ceases they might 
as well be dead and buried for all the good residence will 
do them. In such circumstances it would be reasonable 
to suppose that a certain decency would inspire their 
attitude, and that a policy of give-and-take would al- 
ways be sedulously practised; and we are happy to say 
that there is more of this than there used to be. It is 
only when incidents such as the Chengchiatun and 



308 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Laihsikai affairs occur that the placid population is 
stirred to action. Even then, instead of turning and 
rending the many httle defenceless communities — as 
European mobs would certainly do — they simply con- 
fine themselves to boycotting the offenders and hoping 
that this evidence of their displeasure will finally induce 
the world to believe that they are determined to get 
reasonable treatment. The Chinese as a people may be 
very irritating in the slowness with which they do certain 
things — though they are as quick in business as the 
quickest Anglo-Saxon — but that is no excuse why men 
who call themselves superior should treat them with con- 
tempt. The Chinese are the first to acknowledge that 
it will take them a generation at least to modernize 
effectively their country and their government ; but they 
believe that having erected a Republic and having de- 
clared themselves as disciples of the West they are justi- 
fied in expecting the same treatment and consideration 
which are to be given after the war even to the smallest 
and weakest nations of Europe. 



CHAPTER XVI 

CHINA AND THE WAR 

The question of Chinese sentiments on the subject of 
the war, as well as the precise relations between the Chi- 
nese Government and the two groups of belligerents, are 
matters which have been totally misunderstood. To 
those who have grasped the significance of the exhaus- 
tive preceding account of the Republic in travail, this 
statement should not cause surprise ; for China has been 
in no condition to play anything but an insignificant and 
unsatisfactory role in world-politics. 

When the world-war broke out China was still in the 
throes of her domestic troubles and without any money 
at all in her Central Treasury ; and although Yuan Shih- 
kai, on being suddenly confronted with an unparalleled 
international situation, did initiate certain negotiations 
with the German Legation with a view to securing a 
cancellation of the Kiaochow lease, the ultimatum which 
Japan dispatched to Germany on the 15th August, 1914!, 
completely nullified his tentative proposals. Yuan 
Shih-kai had, indeed, not been in the slightest degree 
prepared for such a sensational development as war be- 
tween Japan and Germany over the question of a 
cruiser-base established on territory leased from China ; 
and although he considered the possibility of sending a 
Chinese force to co-operate in the attack on the German 
stronghold, that project was never matured, whilst his 
subsequent contrivances, notably the establishment of a 

309 



310 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

so-called war-zone in Shantung, were without interna- 
tional value, and attracted no attention save in Japan. 

Chinese, however, did not remain blind to the trend 
of events. After the fall of Tsingtao and the subse- 
quent complications with Japan, which so greatly served 
to increase the complexities of a nebulous situation, cer- 
tain lines of thought insensibly developed. That the 
influential classes in China should have desired that Ger- 
many should by some means rehabilitate herself in Eur- 
ope and so be placed in a position to chastise a nation 
that for twenty years had brought nothing but sorrow 
to them was perhaps only natural; and it is primarily 
to this one cause that so-called sympathy with Germany 
during the first part of the war has been due. But it 
must also be noticed that the immense German propa- 
ganda in China during the first two years of the war, 
coupled with the successes won in Russia and elsewhere, 
powerfully impressed the population — not so much be- 
cause they were attracted by the feats of a Power that 
had enthroned militarism, but because they wrongly 
supposed that sooner or later the effects of this mih- 
tary display would be not only to secure the relaxation 
of the Japanese grip on the country but would compel 
the Powers to re-cast their pre-war policies in China 
and abandon their attempts at placing the country un- 
der financial supervision. Thus, by the irony of Fate, 
Germany in Eastern Asia for the best part of 1914, 
1915 and 1916, stood for the aspirations of the oppressed 
— a moral which we may very reasonably hope will not 
escape the attention of the Foreign Offices of the world. 
Nor must it be forgotten that the modern Chinese army, 
being like the Japanese, largely Germany-trained and 



KEPUBLIC IN CHINA 311 

Germany- armed, had a natural predilection for Teuton- 
ism; and since the army, as we have shown, plays a 
powerful role in the politics of the Republic, public 
opinion was gi^eatly swayed by what it proclaimed 
through its accredited organs. 

Be this as it may, it was humanly impossible for such 
a vast country with such vast resources in men and raw 
materials to remain permanently quiescent during an 
universal conflagration when there was so much to be 
salvaged. Slowly the idea became general in China 
that something had to be done; that is that a state of 
technical neutrality would lead nowhere save possibly to 
Avernus. 

As early as November, 1915, Yuan Shih-kai and his 
immediate henchmen had indeed realized the internal 
advantages to be derived from a formal war-partnership 
with the signatories of the Pact of London, the impulse 
to the movement being given by certain important ship- 
ments of arms and ammunition from China which were 
then made. A half-surreptitious attempt to discuss 
terms in Peking caused no little excitement, the matter 
being, however, only debated in very general terms. 
The principal item proposed by the Peking government 
was characteristically the stipulation that an immediate 
loan of two million pounds should be made to China, in 
return for her technical belligerency. But when the 
proposal was taken to Tokio, Japan rightly saw that its 
main purpose was simply to secure an indirect foreign 
endorsement of Yuan Shih-kai's candidature as Em- 
peror; and for that reason she threw cold-water on the 
whole project. To subscribe to a formula, which be- 
sides enthroning Yuan Shih-kai would have been a 



312 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

grievous blow to her Continental ambitions, was an 
unthinkable thing; and therefore the manoeuvre was 
foredoomed to failure. 

The death of Yuan Shih-kai in the Summer of 1916 
radically altered the situation. Powerful influences 
were again set to work to stamp out the German cult 
and to incline the minority of educated men who control 
the destinies of the country to see that their real interests 
could only lie with the Allies, who were beginning to 
export Chinese man-power as an auxiliary war-aid and 
who were very anxious to place the whole matter on a 
sounder footing. Little real progress was, however, 
made in the face of the renewed German efforts to 
swamp the country with their propaganda. By means 
of war-maps, printed in English and Chinese, and also 
by means of an exhaustive daily telegraphic service 
which hammered home every possible fact illustrative of 
German invincibility, the German position in China, so 
far from being weakened, was actually strengthened 
during the period when Rumania was being overrun. 
By a singular destiny, any one advocating an alliance 
with the Allies was bitterly attacked not only by the 
Germans but by the Japanese as well — this somewhat 
naive identification of Japan's political interest with 
those of an enemy country being an unique feature of 
the situation worthy of permanent record. 

It was not until President Wilson sent out his Peace 
offering of the 19th December, 1916, that a distant 
change came. On this document being formally com- 
municated to the Chinese Government great interest 
was aroused, and the old hopes were revived that it 
would be somehow possible for China to gain entry at 
the definitive Peace Congress which would settle beyond 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 313 

repeal the question of the disposal of Kiaochow and the 
whole of German interests in Shantung Provinces, — a 
subject of bui'ning interest to the country not only be- 
cause of the harsh treatment which had been experienced 
at the hands of Japan, but because the precedent estab- 
lished in 1905 at the Portsmouth Treaty was one which 
it was felt must be utterly shattered if China was not 
to abandon her claim of being considered a sovereign 
international State. On that occasion Japan had simply 
negotiated direct with Russia concerning all matters 
affecting Manchuria, dispatching a Plenipotentiary to 
Peking, after the Treaty of Peace had been signed, to 
secure China's adhesion to all clauses en bloc without 
discussion. True enough, by filing the Twenty-one 
Demands on China in 1915 — when the war was hardly 
half-a-year old — and by forcing China's assent to all 
Shantung questions under the threat of an Ultimatum, 
Japan had reversed the Portsmouth Treaty procedure 
and apparently settled the issues at stake for all time; 
nevertheless the Chinese hoped when the facts were 
properly known to the world that this species of diplom- 
acy would not be endorsed, and that indeed the Shan- 
tung question could be reopened. 

Consequently great pains were taken at the Chinese 
Foreign Office to draft a reply to the Wilson Note 
which would tell its own story. The authorized transla- 
tion of the document handed to the American Legation 
on the 8th January has therefore a peculiar political 
interest. It runs as follows: — 

"I have examined with the care which the gravity of the 
question demands the note concerning peace which President 
Wilson has addressed to the Governments of the Allies and the 
Central Powers now at war and the text of which Your Excel- 



314 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

lencj has been good enough to transmit to me under instruc- 
tions of your Government. 

"China, a nation traditionally pacific, has recently again 
manifested her sentiments in concluding treaties concerning 
the pacific settlement of international disputes, responding 
thus to the voeux of the Peace Conference held at the Hague. 

"On the other hand, the present war, by its prolongation, 
has seriously ajffected the interests of China, more so perhaps 
than those of other Powers which have remained neutral. She 
is at present at a time of reorganization which demands eco- 
nomically and industrially the co-operation of foreign coun- 
tries, a co-operation which a large number of them are unable 
to accord on account of the war in which they are engaged. 

"In manifesting her sympathy for the spirit of the President's 
Note, having in view the ending as soon as possible of the 
hostilities, China is but acting in conformity not only with her 
interests but also with her profound sentiments. 

"On account of the extent which modern wars are apt to 
assume and the repercussions which they bring about, their 
effects are no longer limited to belligerent States. All coun- 
tries are interested in seeing wars becoming as rare as possible. 
Consequently China cannot but show satisfaction with the views 
of the Government and people of the United States of America 
who declare themselves ready, and even eager, to co-operate 
when the war is over, by all proper means to assure the respect 
of the principle of the equality of nations, whatever their power 
may be, and to relieve them of the peril of wrong and violence. 
China is ready to j oin her efforts with theirs for the attainment 
of such results which can only be obtained through the help 
of all." 

Already, then, before there had been any question of 
Germany's ruthless submarine war necessitating a de- 
cisive move, China had commenced to show that she 
could not remain passive during a world-conflict which 
was indirectly endangering her interests. America, by 
placing herself in direct communication with the Peking 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 315 

Government on the subject of a possible peace, had 
given a direct hint that she was sohcitous of China's fu- 
ture and determined to help her as far as possible. All 
this was in strict accordance with the traditional policy 
of the United States in China, a policy which although 
too idealistic to have had much practical value — being 
too little supported by battleships and bayonets to be 
respected — has nevertheless for sixty years tempered the 
wind to the shorn lamb. The ground had consequently 
been well prepared for the remarkable denouement 
which came on the 9th February, 1917, and which sur- 
prised all the world. 

On the fourth of that month the United States for- 
mally communicated with China on the subject of the 
threatened German submarine war against neutral ship- 
ping and invited her to associate herself with America 
in breaking-off diplomatic relations with Germany. 
China had meanwhile received a telegraphic communica- 
tion from the Chinese Minister in Berlin transmitting 
a Note from the German Government making known 
the measures endangering all merchant vessels navigat- 
ing the prescribed zones. The effect of these two com- 
munications on the mind of the Chinese Government 
was at first admittedly stunning and very varied expres- 
sions of opinion were heard in Peking. For the first 
time in the history of the country the government had 
been invited to take a step which meant the inauguration 
of a definite Foreign policy from which there could be 
no retreat. For four days a discussion raged which 
created the greatest uneasiness ; but by the 8th February, 
President Li Yuan-hung had made up his mind — the 
final problem being simply the "conversion" of the Mili- 
tary Party to the idea that a decisive step, which would 



316 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

forever separate them from Germany, must at last be 
taken. It is known that the brilKant Scholar Liang 
Ch'i-chao, who was hastily smnmoned to Peking, proved 
a decisive influence and performed the seemingly impos- 
sible in a few hours' discussion. Realizing at once the 
advantages which would accrue from a single masculine 
decision he advised instant action in such a convincing 
way that the military leaders surrendered. Accord- 
ingly on the 9th February the presence of the German 
Minister was requested at the Chinese Foreign Office 
when the following Note was read to him and subse- 
quently transmitted telegraphically to Berlin. 

Your Excellency: 

A telegraphic communication has been received from the Chi- 
nese Minister at Berlin transmitting a note from the German 
Government dated February 1st, 1917, which makes known that 
the measures of blockade newly adopted by the Government of 
Germany will, from that day, endanger neutral merchant ves- 
sels navigating in certain prescribed zones. 

The new measures of submarine warfare, inaugurated by 
Germany, imperilling the lives and property of Chinese citizens 
to even a greater extent than the measures previously taken 
which have already cost so many human lives to China, con- 
stitute a violation of the principles of public international 
law at present in force; the tolerance of their application 
would have as a result the introduction into international law 
of arbitrary principles incompatible with even legitimate com- 
mercial intercourse between neutral states and between neutral 
states and belligerent powers. 

The Chinese Government, therefore, protests energetically 
to the Imperial German Government against the measures 
proclaimed on February 1st, and sincerely hopes that with a 
view to respecting the rights of neutral states and to maintain- 
ing the friendly relations between these two countries, the said 
measures will not be carried out. 

In case, contrary to its expectations, its protest be ineffec- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 317 

tual the Government of the Chinese Republic will be constrained, 
to its profound regret, to sever the diplomatic relations at 
present existing between the two countries. It is unnecessary 
to add that the attitude of the Chinese Government has been 
dictated purely by the desire to further the cause of the 
world's peace and by the maintenance of the sanctity of inter- 
national law. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel- 
lency the assurance of my highest consideration. 

At the same time the following reply was handed to 
the American Minister in Peking thus definitely clinch- 
ing the matter: 

Your Excellency: 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excel- 
lency's Note of the 4th February, 1917, informing me that the 
Government of the United States of America, in view of the 
adoption by the German Government of its new policy of sub- 
marine warfare on the 1st of February, has decided to take 
certain action which it judges necessary as regards Ger- 
many. 

The Chinese Government, like the President of the United 
States of America, is reluctant to believe that the German 
Government will actually carry into execution those measures 
which imperil the lives and property of citizens of neutral states 
and jeopardize the commerce, even legitimate, between neutrals 
as well as between neutrals and belligerents and which tend, if 
allowed to be enforced without opposition, to introduce a new 
principle into public international law. 

The Chinese Government being in accord with the principles 
set forth in Your Excellency's note and firmly associating itself 
with the Government of the United States, has taken similar 
action by protesting energetically to the German Government 
against the new measures of blockade. The Chinese Govern- 
ment also proposes to take such action in the future as will be 
deemed necessary for the maintenance of the principles of 
international law. 



318 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel- 
lency the assurance of my highest consideration. 
His Excellency Paul S. Reinsch, 

Envoy Extraordinary & Minister Plenipotentiary of | 
The United States of America. 

When these facts became generally known an extraor- 
dinary ferment was noticeable. What efforts had to be 
made to overcome the not inconsiderable opposition of 
the Military Party who were opposed to any departure 
from a policy of passive neutrality need not now be set 
down ; but it is sufficient to state that the decision arrived 
at was in every sense a victory of the younger intel- 
lectual forces over the older mandarinate, whose tradi- 
tions of laissez faire and spineless diplomacy had hitherto 
cost the country so dear. A definite and far-reaching 
Foreign Policy had at last been inaugurated. By re- 
sponding rapidly and firmly to the invitation of the 
United States to associate herself with the stand taken 
against Germany's piratical submarine warfare, China 
has undoubtedly won for herself a new place in the 
world's esteem. Both in Europe and America the news 
of this development awakened well-understandable en- 
thusiasm, and convinced men that the Republic at last 
stood for something vital and real. Until the 9th Feb- 
ruary, 1917, what China had been doing was not really 
to maintain her neutrality, since she had been unable 
to defend her territory from being made a common 
battleground in 1914: she had been engaged in guarding 
and perpetuating her traditional impotency. For whilst 
it may be accurate to declare — a fact which few West- 
erners have realized — that to the mass of the Chinese 
nation the various members of the European Family are 
undistinguishable from one another, there being little to 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 319 

choose in China between a Russian or a German, an 
Enghshman or an Austrian, a Frenchman or a Greek, 
the trade-contact of a century had certainly taught to a 
great many that there was profit in certain directions 
and none in certain others. It was perfectly well- 
known, for instance, that England stood for a sea- 
empire ; that the sea was an universal road ; that British 
ships, both mercantile and military, were the most nu- 
merous; and that other things being equal it must 
primarily be Britain more than any other European 
country which would influence Chinese destinies. But 
the British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened 
the trust which originally existed ; and this added to the 
fact that Germany, although completely isolated and im- 
prisoned by the sea, still maintained herself intact by rea- 
son of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed 
forward with such horrible results in a number of direc- 
tions, had made inaction seem the best policy. And 
yet, although the Chinese may be pardoned for not form- 
ing clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs of 
the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that 
it was absolutely essential for them not to remain out- 
side the cii'cle of international friendships when a direct 
opportunity was offered them to step within. 

It was a sudden inkling of these things which now 
dawned on the public mind and slowly awakened en- 
thusiasm. For the first time since Treaty relations 
with the Powers had been established Chinese diplo- 
matic action had swept beyond the walls of Peking and 
embraced world-politics within its scope. The Con- 
fucianist conception of the State, as being simply a 
regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all 
sufficient because it was locked to the past and indiffer- 



320 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ent to the future, had hitherto been supreme, foreign 
affairs being the result of unwilhng contact at sea-j)orts 
or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. 
To find Chinese — five years after the inauguration of 
their Republic — ^ready to accept literally and loyally in 
the western way all the duties and obligations which 
their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and 
fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a 
powerful role was played in this business by the tempta- 
tion to benefit materially by an astute move: that is 
that China was greatly influenced in her decision by the 
knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties 
would instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity 
and pour into the depleted Central Treasury a monthly 
surplus of nearly two million Mexican dollars. Para- 
doxical as it may sound in a country notoriously hard- 
pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no 
part whatever in convincing the Peking Government 
that the hour for action had arrived ; nor again was there 
any question of real hostility to a nation which is so far 
removed from the East as to be meaningless to the 
masses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was 
simply expediency — the most subtle of all political rea- 
sons and the hardest to define. But just as Britain de- 
clared war because the invasion of Belgium brought to 
a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German 
policy; and just as America broke off relations because 
the scrapping of undertaking after undertaking regard- 
ing the sea-war made it imperative for her to act, so 
did China choose the right moment to enunciate the 
doctrine of her independence by voicing her determina- 
tion to hold to the whole corpus of international sanc- 
tions on which her independence finally rests. In the 







\ 



..i* .. 



»*?l.w, 




If 



Assault of the Republican Troops ox the Imperial Pal- 
ace IN Peking, July 12, 1917. Scaling the Palace 
Walls 




Eastern Palace Entuance, Peking, After Assault of 
THE Republican Troops, July 12, 1917 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 321 

last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th Febru- 
ary to the German Government was a categorical and 
umiiistakable reply to all the insidious attempts which 
had been made since the beginning of the war to place 
her outside and beyond the operation of the Public Law 
pi Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light that 
her future actions must be judged. The leaders who 
direct the destinies of China became fully prepared for 
a state of belligerency from the moment they decided 
to speak; but they could not but be supremely anxious 
concerning the expression of that belligerency, since 
their international position had for years been such that 
a single false move might cripple them. 

Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from 
the first fully prepared to co-operate with friendly 
Powers in the taking of war-measures which would ulti- 
mately improve her world-position, she has not been 
prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into 
foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization 
of her resources could only be effectively dealt with by 
specially designated foreigners, for instance, has always 
been repellent to her because she knows from bitter 
experience that although Japan has played little or no 
part in the war, and indeed classifies herself as a semi- 
belligerent, the Tokio Government would not hesitate 
to use any opportunity which presented itself in China 
for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the 
spot she is the most competent to insure the effective- 
ness of Chinese co-operation, attempt to tighten her 
hold on the country. It is a fact which is self-evident 
to observers on the spot that ever since the coup of the 
Twenty-one Demands, many Japanese believe that 
their country has succeeded in almost completely infeo- 



322 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

dating China and has became the sovereign arbitrator 
of all quarrels, as well as the pacificator of the Eastern 
World. Statements which were incautiously allowed 
to appear in the Japanese Press a few days prior to 
the Chinese Note of the 9th February disclose what 
Japan really thought on the subject of China identify- 
ing herself with the Allies. For instance, the follow- 
ing, which bears the hall-mark of official inspiration, 
reads very curiously in the light of after-events : 

. . . "Dispatches from Peking say that England and France 
have already started a flanking movement to induce China to 
join the anti-German coalition. The intention of the Chinese 
Government has not yet been learned. But it is possible that 
China will agree, if conditions are favourable, thus gaining the 
right to voice her views at the coming peace conference. 
Should the Entente Powers give China a firm guarantee, it is 
feared here that China would not hesitate to act. 

"The policy of the Japanese Government toward this ques- 
tion cannot yet be learned. It appears, however, that the 
Japanese Government is not opposed to applying the resolu- 
tions of the Paris Economic Conference, in so far as they con- 
cern purely economic questions, since Japan desires that Ger- 
man influence in the commerce and finance of the Orient should 
be altogether uprooted. But should the Entente Powers of 
Europe try to induce China to join them, Japan may object 
on the ground that it will create more disturbances in China 
and lead to a general disturbance of peace in the Orient." 

Now there is not the slightest doubt in the writer's 
mind — and he can claim to speak as a student of twenty 
years' standing — that this definition of Japanese aims 
and objects is a very true one; and that the subsequent 
invitation to China to join the Allies which came from 
Tokyo after a meeting between the Japanese Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the Allied Ambassadors was 



KEPUBLIC IN CHINA 323 

simply made when a new orientation of policy had been 
forced by stress of circumstances. Japan has certainly 
always wished German influence in the Far East to be 
uprooted if she can take the place of Germany; but 
if she cannot take that place absolutely and entirely 
she would vastly prefer the influence to remain, since it 
is in the nature of counterweight to that of other Euro- 
pean Powers and of America — foreign influence in 
China, as Mr. Hioki blandly told the late President 
Yuan Shih-kai in his famous interview of the 18th Janu- 
ary, 1915, being a source of constant irritation to the 
Japanese people, and the greatest stumbling-block to 
a permanent understanding in the Far East. 

Chinese suspicion of any invitation coming by way of 
Tokyo has been, therefore, in every way justified, 
if it is a reasonable and legitimate thing for a nation of 
four hundred millions of people to be acutely concerned 
about their independence; for events have already 
proved up to the hilt that so far from the expulsion of 
Germany from Shantung having resulted in the hand- 
ing-back of interests which were forcibly acquired from 
China in 1898, that expulsion has merely resulted in 
Japan succeeding to such interests and thereby obliterat- 
ing all trace of her original promise to the world in 1914 
that she would restore to China what was originally 
taken from her. Here it is necessary to remark that not 
only did Japan in her negotiations over the Twenty-one 
Demands force China to hand over the twelve million 
pounds of German improvements in Shantung province, 
but that Baron Hayashi, the present Japanese Minister 
to China, has recently declared that Japan would 
demand from China a vast settlement or concession 
at Tsingtao, thus making even the alleged handing-back 



324 THE FIGHT FOU THE 

of the leased territory — ^Avhich Japan is pledged to force 
from Germany at the Peace Conference — wholly illus- 
ory, the formula of a Settlement being adopted because 
twelve years' experience of Port Arthur has shown that 
territorial "leases," with their military garrisons and 
administrative offices, are expensive and antiquated 
things, and that it is easier to push infiltration by means 
of a multitude of Settlements in which police-boxes and 
policemen form an important element, than to cut off 
slices of territory under a nomenclature which is a 
clamant advertisement of disruptive aims. 

Now although these matters appear to be taking us 
far from the particular theme we are discussing, it is 
not really so. Like a dark thunder-cloud on the hori- 
zon the menace of Japanese action has rendered frank 
Chinese co-operation, even in such a simple matter as 
war-measures against Germany, a thing of supreme 
difficulty. The mere rumour that China might dispatch 
an Expeditionary Force to Mesopotamia was sufficient 
to send the host of unofficial Japanese agents in Peking 
scurrying in every direction and insisting that if the 
Chinese did anything at all they should limit them- 
selves to sending troops to Russia where they would 
be "lost" — a suggestion made because that was what 
Japan herself offered to do when she declined in 1915 
the Allies' proposal to dispatch troops to Europe. 
Nor must the fact be lost sight of that as in other 
countries so in China, foreign affairs provide an ex- 
cellent opportunity for influencing the march of in- 
ternal events. Thus, as we have clearly shown, the 
<^ Military Party, although original^ averse to any action 
at all, saw that a strong foreign policy would greatly 
enhance its reputation and allow it to influence the im- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 325 

portant elections for the Parliament of 1918 which, sit- 
ting as a National Convention, will elect the next Presi- 
dent. Thus, in the extraordinary way which happens 
throughout the world, the whole of February was con- 
sumed in the rival political parties manoeuvring for po- 
sition, the Vice-President, General Feng Kuo-chang, 
himself coming hastily to Peking from Nanking to take 
part in this elaborate game in which many were now 
participating merely for what they could get out of it. 

On the 4th March matters were brought to a climax 
by an open breach between President Li Yuan-hung 
and the Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, at a Cabinet 
meeting regarding the procedure to be observed in 
breaking off diplomatic relations with Germany. Al- 
though nearly a month had elapsed, no reply had been 
received from Berlin; and of the many plans of action 
proposed nothing had been formally decided. Owing 
to the pressm-e Japan was exerting from Tokio to get 
China to come to a definite arrangement, popular anxi- 
ety was growing. Over the question of certain tele- 
grams to be communicated to the Japanese Govern- 
ment, of which he had been kept in ignorance. Presi- 
dent Li Yuan-hung took a firm stand; with the result 
that the Premier, deeply offended, abruptly left the 
Council Chamber, handed in his resignation and left 
the capital — a course of action which threatened to pro- 
voke a national crisis. 

Fortunately in President Li Yuan-hung China had a 
cool and dispassionate statesman. At the first grave 
crisis in his administration he wished at all costs to 
secure that the assent of Parliament should be given to 
all steps taken, and that nothing so speculative as a 
policy which had not been publicly debated should be 



326 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

put into force. He held to this point doggedly; and 
after some negotiations, the Premier was induced to 
return to the capital and resume office, on the under- 
standing that nothing final was to be done until a popu- 
lar endorsement had been secured. 

On the 10th March the question was sent to Parlia- 
ment for decision. After a stormy debate of several 
hours in the Lower House the policy of the Government 
was upheld by 330 votes to 87 : on the following day the 
Senate endorsed this decision by 158 votes to 37. By 
a coincidence which was too extraordinary not to have 
been artificially contrived, the long-awaited Germany 
reply amved on the morning of this 10th March, copies 
of the document being circulated wholesale by German 
agents among the Members of Parliament in a last ef- 
fort to influence their decision. The actual text of 
the German reply was as follows, and it will be seen how; 
transparently worded it is: 

To the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China: 
Your Excellency: By the instructions of my home Gov- 
ernment — which reached me on the 10th inst. — I beg to forward 
you the following reply to China's protest to the latest blockade 
policy of Germany: — 

"The Imperial German Government expresses its great sur- 
prise at the action threatened by the Government of the Re- 
public of China in its Note of protest. Many other countries 
have also protested, but China, which has been in friendly rela- 
tions with Germany, is the only State which has added a threat 
to its protest. The surprise is doubly great, because of the 
fact that, as China has no shipping interests in the seas of the 
barred zones, she will not suffer thereby. 

"The Government of the Republic of China mentions that 
loss of life of Chinese citizens has occurred as the results of 
the present method of war. The Imperial German Government 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 327 

wishes to point out that the Government of the Republic of 
China has never communicated with the Imperial Government 
regarding a single case of this kind nor has it protested in this 
connexion before. According to reports received by the Impe- 
rial Government, such losses as have been actually sustained by 
Chinese subjects have occurred in the firing line while they were 
engaged in digging trenches and in other war services. While 
thus engaged, they were exposed to the dangers inevitable to 
all forces engaged in war. The fact that Germany has on 
several occasions protested against the employment of Chinese 
citizens for warlike purpose is evident that the Imperial Gov- 
ernment has given excellent proof of its friendly feelings toward 
China. In consideration of these friendly relations the Im- 
perial Government is willing to treat the matter as if the threat 
had never been uttered. It is reasonable for the Imperial 
Government to expect that the Government of the Republic of 
China will revise its views respecting the question. 

"Germany's enemies were the first to declare a blockade on 
Germany and the same is being persistently carried out. It is 
therefore difficult for Germany to cancel her blockade policy. 
The Imperial Government is nevertheless willing to comply with 
the wishes of the Government of the Republic of China by 
opening negotiations to arrive at a plan for the protection of 
Chinese life and property, with the view that the end may be 
achieved and thereby the utmost regard be given to the ship- 
ping rights of China. The reason which has prompted the 
Imperial Government to adopt this conciliatory policy is the 
knowledge that, once diplomatic relations are severed with Ger- 
many, China will not only lose a truly good friend but wiU also 
be entangled in unthinkable difficulties." 

In forwarding to Your Excellency the above instructions 
from my home Government, I beg also to state that — if the 
Government of China be willing — I am empowered to open ne- 
gotiations for the protection of the shipping rights of China. 

I have the honour to be. . . . 

(Signed by the German Minister.) 

March 10, 1917. 



328 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

With a Parliamentary endorsement behind them 
there remained nothing for the Peking Govermnent but 
to take the vital step of severing diplomatic relations. 
Certain details remained to be settled but these were 
expeditiously handled. Consequently, without any 
further discussion, at noon on the 14th March the Ger- 
man Minister was handed his passports, with the fol- 
lowing covering dispatch from the Chinese Foreign Of- 
fice. It is worthy of record that in the interval between 
the Chinese Note of the 9th February and the German 
reply of the 10th March the French mail-steamer 
Athos had been torpedoed in the Mediterranean and 
five hundred Chinese labourers proceeding to France 
on board her drowned. 

Your Excellency: — 

With reference to the new submarine policy of Germany, the 
Government of the Republic of China, dictated by the desire to 
further the cause of world's peace and to maintain the sanctity 
of International Law, addressed a protest to Your Excellency 
on February 9th and declared that in case, contrary to its 
expectations its protest be ineffectual, it would be constrained 
to sever the diplomatic relations at present existing between the 
two countries. 

During the lapse of a month no heed has been paid to the 
protest of the Government of the Republic in the activities of 
the German Submarines, activities which have caused the loss 
of many Chinese lives. On March 10, a reply was received 
from Your Excellency. Although it states that the Imperial 
German Government is wilhng to open negotiations to arrive 
at a plan for the protection of Chinese life and property, yet 
it declares that it is difficult for Germany to cancel her block- 
ade policy. It is therefore not in accord with the object of 
the protest and the Government of the Chinese Republic, to its 
deep regret, considers its protest to be ineffectual. The Gov- 
ernment of the Republic is constrained to sever the diplomatic 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 329 

relations at present existing with the Imperial German Gov- 
ernment. I have the honour to send herewith to Your Ex- 
cellency, the passport for Your Excellency, the members of the 
German Legation and their families and retinue for protection 
while leaving Chinese territory. With regard to the Consular 
Officers of Germany in China, this Ministry has instructed the 
different Commissioners of Foreign Affairs to issue to them 
similarly passports for leaving the country. 

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excel- 
lency the assurance of my highest consideration. 

March JJith, 1917. 

It was not until eleven days later — on the 25th March 
— that the German Minister and his suite reluctantly 
left Peking for Germany via America. Meanwhile the 
Chinese Government remained undecided regarding the 
taking of the final step as a number of important mat- 
ters had still to be settled. Not only had arrangements 
to be made with the Allies but there was the question of 
adjusting Chinese policy with American action. A 
special commission on Diplomatic affairs daily debated 
the procedure to be observed, but owing to the conflict 
of opinion in the provinces further action was greatly 
delayed. As it is necessary to show the nature of this 
conflict we give two typical opinions submitted to the 
Government on the question of a formal declaration of 
war against Germany ( and Austria ) . The first Mem- 
orandum was written for the Diplomatic Commission 
by the scholar Liang Ch'i-chao and is singularly lucid : — 

THE NECESSITY FOR WAR 

"Those who question the necessity for war can only quote 
the attitude of America as example. The position of China 
is, however, different from that of America in two points. 
First, actual warfare will follow immediately after America's 
declaration of war, so it is necessary for her to make the 



330 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

necessary preparations before taking the step. For this pur- 
pose, America has voted several hundred million dollars for an 
increase of her naval appropriations. America therefore can- 
not declare war until she has completed every preparation. 
With China it is different. Even after the declaration of war, 
there will be no actual warfare. It is therefore unnecessary 
for us to wait. 

"Secondly, America has no such things as foreign settlements, 
consular jurisdiction or other un-equal treaties with Germany. 
Under the existing conditions America has no difficulties in 
safeguarding herself against the Germans residing in America 
after the severance of diplomatic relations even though war has 
not yet been actually declared, and as to future welfare, Amer- 
ica will have nothing to suffer even though her old treaties 
with Germany should continue to be operative. It is impos- 
sible for China to take the necessary steps to safeguard the 
country against the Germans residing in China unless the old 
treaties be cancelled. For unless war is declared it is impos- 
sible to cancel the consular jurisdiction of the Germans, and 
so long as German consular jurisdiction remains in China we 
will meet with difficulties everywhere whenever we wish to deal 
with the Germans. If our future is to be considered, unless 
war is declared, the old treaties will again come into force upon 
the resumption of diplomatic relations, in which case we shall 
be held responsible for all the steps which we have taken in 
contravention of treaties during the rupture. It will be ad- 
vantageous to China if the old treaties be cancelled by a 
declaration of war and new treaties be negotiated after the 
conclusion of peace. 

"In short by severing diplomatic relations with Germany 
China has already incurred the ill-feelings of that country. 
We shall not be able to lessen the hostile feelings of the Ger- 
mans even if we refrain from declaring war on them. It is 
therefore our obligation to choose the course that will be 
advantageous to us. This is not reluctantly yielding to the 
request of the Entente AUies. It is the course we must take 
in our present situation. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 331 

THE REASON FOR DECLARING WAR 

"The presumptuous manner in which Germany has replied to 
our demand is an open affront to our national integrity. Re- 
cently Germany has deliberately shown hostility to our advice 
by reiterating her determination to carry out the ruthless sub- 
marine policy with increased vigour. All these are reasons for 
diplomatic rupture as well as for declaration of war. Further- 
more, the peace of the Far East was broken by the occupation 
of Kiachow by Germany. This event marked the first step of 
the German disregard for international law. In the interests 
of humanity and for the sake of what China has passed through, 
she should rise and punish such a country, that dared to dis- 
regard international law. Such a reason for war is certainly 
beyond criticism. 

THE TIME TO DECLARE WAR 

"War should be declared as soon as possible. The reason 
for the diplomatic rupture is sufficient reason for declaring 
war. This has already been explained. It would be impos- 
sible for us to find an excuse for declaring war if war be de- 
clared now. According to usual procedure war is declared 
when the forces of the two countries come into actual conflict. 
Now such a possibility does not exist between China and Ger- 
many. Since it is futile to expect Germany to declare war on 
us first, we should ask ourselves if war is necessary. If not, 
then let us go on as we are, otherwise we must not hesitate 
any more. 

"Some say that China should not declare war on Germany 
until we have come to a definite understanding with the Entente 
Allies respecting certain terms. This is indeed a wrong con- 
ception of things. We declare war because we want to fight 
for humanity, international law and against a national enemy. 
It is not because we are partial towards the Entente or against 
Germany or Austria. International relations are not com- 
mercial connexions. Why then should we talk about exchange 
of privileges and rights? As to the revision of Customs tariff, 
it has been our aspiration for more than ten years and a fore- 



332 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

most diplomatic question, for which we have been looking for 
a suitable opportunity to negotiate with the foreign Powers. 
It is our view that the opportunity has come because foreign 
Powers are now on very friendly terms with China. It is dis- 
tinctly a separate thing from the declaration of war. Let no 
one try to confuse the two. 

THE aUESTION OF AUSTRIA 

"If China decides to declare war on Germany the same atti- 
tude should be taken towards Austria. We have severed diplo- 
matic relations with Germany but retain the status quo with 
Austria. This is fraught with danger. German intrigue is to 
be dreaded. What they have done in America and Mexico is 
enough to shock us. The danger can easily be imagined when 
we remember that they have in China the Austrian Legation, 
Austrian Consulates and Austrian concessions as their bases of 
operation for intrigue and plotting. Some say we should fol- 
low America, which has not yet severed diplomatic relations 
with Austria. This is a great mistake. America can afford 
to ignore Austria because there are no Austrian concessions 
and Austrian consular jurisdiction in America. 

"The question is then what steps should be taken to sever 
diplomatic relations with and declare war on Austria. The 
solution is that since Austria has also communicated to our 
Minister regarding her submarine policy we can serve her with 
an ultimatum demanding that the submarine policy be cancelled 
within twenty-four hours. If Austria refuses, China may sever 
diplomatic relations and declare war at the same time immedi- 
ately upon the expiry of the twenty-four hour limit. 

"In conclusion I wish to say that whenever a policy is 
adopted we should carry out the complete scheme. If we should 
hesitate in the middle and become afraid to go ahead we vnll 
soon find ourselves in an embarrassing position. The Govern- 
ment and Parliament should therefore stir up courage and 
boldly make the decision and take the step. 

Unanswerable as seem these arguments to the West- 
ern mind, they were by no means so to the mass of 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 333 

Chinese who are always fearful lest some sudden re- 
shuffling in the relationships existing between foreign 
Powers exposes them to new and greater calamities. 
This Chinese viewpoint, with its ignorance of basic con- 
siderations, is well-illustrated by the Second Memoran- 
dum, which follows. Written by the famous reformer 
of 1898 Kang Yu-wei, it demonstrates how greatly the 
revolutionists of 1911 are in advance of a school which 
was the vogue less than twenty years ago and which is 
completely out of touch with the thought which the war 
has made world-wide. Nevertheless the line of argu- 
ment which characterizes this utterance is still a politi- 
cal factor in China and must be understood. 

MEMOKANDUM 

. . . "The breach between the United States and Germany is 
no concern of ours. But the Government suddenly severed 
diplomatic relations with Germany and is now contemplating 
entry into the war. This is to advance beyond the action of 
the United States which continues to observe neutrality. And 
if we analyse the public opinion of the country, we find that all 
peoples — high and low, well-informed and ignorant — betray 
great alarm when informed of the rupture and the proposal to 
declare war on Germany, fearing that such a development may 
cause grave peril to the country. This war-policy is being 
urged by a handful of politicians, including a few members 
of Parliament and several party men with the view of creating 
a diplomatic situation to serve their political ends and to reap 
great profits. 

"Their arguments are that China — ^by siding with the En- 
tente — may obtain large loans, the revision of the Customs 
Tariff and the suspension of the Boxer indemnity to Germany, 
as well as the recovery of the German concessions, mining 
and railroad rights and the seizure of German commerce. 
Pray, how large is Germany's share of the Boxer indemnity? 
Seeing that German commerce is protected by international 



334 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

law, will China be able to seize it ; and does she not know that 
the Kaiser may in the future exact restitution? 

PERILS OF WAE. 

"News from Holland tells of a rumoured secret understand- 
ing between Germany, Japan and Russia. The Japanese Gov- 
ernment is pursuing a policy of friendship toward Germany. 
This is very disquieting news to us. As to foreign loans and 
the revision of the Customs Tariff, we can raise these matters 
at any time. Why then should we traffic for these things at 
the risk of grave dangers to the nation? My view is that 
what we are to obtain from the transaction is far less than 
what we are to give. If it be argued that the policy aims at 
securing for China her right to live as an unfettered nation, 
then we ought to ask for the cancellation of the entire Boxer 
Indemnities, the abolition of exterritoriality, the retrocession 
of the foreign concessions and the repeal or amendment of all 
unjust treaties after the war. But none of these have we 
demanded. If we ourselves cannot improve our internal ad- 
ministration in order to become a strong country, it is absurd 
to expect our admission to the ranks of the first-class Powers 
simply by being allowed a seat at the Peace Conference and by 
taking a side with the Entente! 

"Which side will win the war? I shall not attempt to pre- 
dict here. But it is undoubted that all the arms of Europe 
— and the industrial and financial strength of the United 
States and Japan — ^have proved unavailing against Germany. 
On the other hand France has lost her Northern provinces and 
Belgium, Serbia and Rumania are blotted off the map. Should 
Germany be victorious, the whole of Europe — not to speak of 
a weak country like China — would be in great peril of extinc- 
tion. Should she be defeated, Germany still can — after the 
conclusion of peace — send a fleet to war against us. And as 
the Powers will be afraid of a second world-war, who will come 
to our aid? Have we not seen the example of Korea? There 
is no such thing as an army of righteousness which will come 
to the assistance of weak nations. I cannot bear to think of 
hearing the angry voice of German guns along our coasts ! 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 335 

"If we allow the Entente to recruit labour in our country 
without restriction, thousands upon thousands of our fellow 
countrymen will die for no worthy cause ; and if we allow free 
exportation of foodstuff, in a short time the price of daily 
necessaries will mount ten to a hundredfold. This is calculated 
to cause internal troubles. Yea, all gains from this policy will 
go to the politicians but the people will suffer the evil conse- 
quences through no fault of theirs. 

DIPLOMACY OF CONFUCIUS 

*'In the matter of diplomacy, we do not need to go to the 
West for the apt learning on the point at issue. Confucius 
had said: 'Be truthful and cultivate friendship — this is the 
foundation of human happiness.' Our country being weak and 
undeveloped, if we strive to be truthful and cultivate friend- 
ship, we can still be a civilized nation, albeit hoary with age. 
But we are now advised to take advantage of the difficulties of 
Germany and abandon honesty in order that we may profit 
thereby. Discarding treaties is to be unfaithful, grasping for 
gains is not the way of a gentleman, taking advantage of an- 
other's difficulties is to be mean and joining the larger in num- 
bers is cowardice. How can we be a nation, if we throw away 
air these fundamental qualities. 

"Even in the press of England and the United States, there 
is opposition to America entering the war. If we observe 
neutrality, we are not bound to any side; and when the time 
comes for peace — as a friend to both sides — we may be able 
to bring about the ends of the war. Is this not a service to 
humanity and the true spirit of civilization? 

"Now it is proposed to take the existence of this great nation 
of five thousand years and four hundred million people in order 
to serve the interests of politicians in their party struggles. 
We are now to be bound to foreign nations, without freedom to 
act for ourselves and running great risks of national destruc- 
tion. Can you gentlemen bear to see this come to pass? China 
has severed relations with Germany but the decision for war 
has not yet been reached. The whole country is telegraphing 
opposition to the Government's policy and wants to know 



336 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

whether Germany will not in the future take revenge on ac- 
count of our rupture with her ; and if we are not secured against 
this eventuality, what are the preparations to meet with a con- 
tingency? The Government must not stake the fate of the 
nation as if it be a child's toy, and the people must not be cast 
into the whirlpool of slaughter. The people are the backbone 
of a country, and if the people are all opposed to war on Ger- 
many, the Government — in spite of the support of Parliament 
- — must call a great citizens' convention to decide the question. 
We must persist in our neutrality. You gentlemen are pa- 
triotic sons of this country and must know that the existence 
of China as a nation depends upon what she does now in this 
matter. In tears, I appeal to you. Kang Yu-wei." 

March and April were consumed in this fruitless dis- 
cussion in which everybody participated. The Premier, 
General Tuan Chi-jui, in view of the alleged provincial 
opposition, now summoned to Peking a Conference of 
Provincial Military Governors to endorse his policy^ 
but this action although crowned with success so far as 
the army chiefs were concerned — the conference voting 
solidly for war — was responsible for greatly alarming 
Parliament which saw in this procedure a new attempt 
to undermine its power and control the country by ex- 
tra-legal means. Furthermore, publication in the Met- 
ropolitan press of what the Japanese were doing behind 
the scenes created a fear that extraordinary intrigues 
were being indulged in with the object of securing by 
means of secret diplomacy certain guarantees of a 
personal nature. Apart from being associated with 
the semi-official negotiations of the Entente Powers 
in Peking, Japan was carrjang on a second set of ne- 
gotiations partly by means of a confidential agent 
named Kameio Nishihara dispatched from Tokio spe- 
cially for that purpose by Count Terauchi, the Japanese 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 337 

Premier, a procedure which led to the circulation of 
highly sensational stories regarding China's future 
commitments. When the Premier, General Tuan Chi- 
jui, had made his statement to Parliament on the 10th 
March, regarding the necessity of an immediate rup- 
ture with Germany, he had implied that China had 
already received assurances from the Allies that there 
would be a postponement of the Boxer Indemnities for 
a term of years, an immediate increase in the Customs 
Tariff, and a modification of the Peace Protocol of 
1901 regarding the presence of Chinese troops near 
Tientsin. Suddenly all these points were declared to 
be in doubt. Bound the question of the length of time 
the Indemnities might be postponed, and the actual 
amount of the increase in the Customs Tariff, there 
appeared to be an inexplicable muddle largely owing 
to the intervention of so many agents and to the fact 
that the exchange of views had been almost entirely 
verbal, unofficial, and secret. It would be wearisome 
to analyse a dispute which belongs to the peculiar at- 
mosphere of Peking diplomacy; but the vast difficulties 
of making even a simple decision in China were glar- 
ingly illustrated by this matter. With a large sec- 
tion of the Metropolitan press daily insisting that the 
future of democracy in China would be again imperilled 
should the Military Party have its own way, small 
wonder if the question of a formal declaration of war 
on Germany (and Austria) now assumed an entirely 
different complexion. 

On the 1st May, in spite of all these trials and tribu- 
lations, being pressed by the Premier to do so, the Cab- 
inet unanimously decided that a declaration of war was 
imperative; and on the 7th May, after an agreement 



338 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

with the President had been reached, Parhament re- 
ceived the following dispatch — this method of com- 
munication being the usual one between the executive 
and legislative branches of the Government : 

The President has the honour to communicate to the House 
of Representatives the followmg proposal. Since the sever- 
ance of diplomatic relations with Germany, Germany has con- 
tinued to violate the rights of the neutral nations and to damage 
and cause losses in life and property to our people as well as to 
trample on international law and disregard principles of hu- 
manity. For the purpose of hastening peace, upholding inter- 
national law and protecting the life and property of our people, 
the President is of the view that it is necessary to declare war 
on the German Government. In accordance with Article 35 
of the Provisional Constitution, he now asks for the approval 
of the House, and demands — in accordance with Article 21 of 
the Provisional Constitution — that the meeting in the House 
be held in secret. 

On 8th May, after hearing a statement made in per- 
son by the Premier, the House of Representatives in 
secret session referred the question for examination to 
the House sitting as a Committee in order to gain time 
to make up its mind. On the same day the Senate sat 
on the same question. A very heated and bitter dis- 
cussion followed in the upper House, not because of 
any real disagreement regarding the matter at issue, 
but because a large section of Senators were extremely 
anxious regarding the internal consequences. This is 
well-explained by the following written interpellation 
which was addressed to the government by a large num- 
ber of parliamentarians: 

We, the undersigned, hereby address this interpellation to 
the Government. As a declaration of war on Germany has 
become an object of the foreign policy of the Government, the 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 339 

latter has held informal meetings to ascertain the views of 
parliament on the question ; and efforts are being" made by the 
Government to secure the unanimous support of both Houses 
for its war policy. In pursuing this course, the Government 
appears to believe that its call for support will be readily com- 
plied with by the Houses. But in our view there are quite a 
number of members in both Houses who fail thoroughly to un- 
derstand the war decision of the Government. The reason for 
this is that, according to recent reports, both foreign and 
vernacular, the Government has entered into secret treaties 
with a "neighbouring country." It is also reported that se- 
cret agents on both sides are active and are travelling between 
the two countries. The matter seems to be very grave ; and it 
has already attracted the attention of Parliament, which in the 
near future will discuss the war-issue. 

Being in doubt as to the truth of such a report, we hereby 
request the Government for the necessary information in the 
matter. We also beg to suggest that, if there is any secret 
diplomatic agreement, we consider it expedient for the Govern- 
ment to submit the matter to Parliament for the latter's con- 
sideration, This will enable the members in Parliament to 
study the question with care and have a clear understanding of 
the matter. When this is done, Parliament will be able to 
support the Government in the prosecution of its war policy 
according to the dictates of conscience. In this event both 
Parliament and Government will be able to co-operate with 
each other in the solution of the* present diplomatic problem. 
Troubled not a little with the present diplomatic situation of 
the country, we hereby address this interpellation to the Gov- 
ernment in accordance with law. It is hoped that an answer 
from the Government will be dispatched to us within three days 
from date. 

On the 10th May Parliament met in secret session 
and it was plain that a crisis had come. Members of 
the House of Representatives experienced great diffi- 
culties in forcing their way through a mob of several 
thousand roughs who surrounded the approaches to 



340 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Parliament, many members being hustled if not struck. 
The mob was so plainly in control of a secret organiza- 
tion that the House of Representatives refused to sit. 
Urgent messages were sent to the Police and Gend- 
armerie headquarters for reinforcements of armed men 
as a protection, whilst the presence of the Premier was 
also demanded. Masses of police were soon on the 
ground, but whilst they prevented the mob from en- 
tering Parliament and carrying out their threat of burn- 
ing the buildings, and murdering the members, they 
could not — or would not — disperse the crowds, it trans- 
piring subsequently that half-a-battalion of infantry in 
plain clothes under their officers formed the backbone 
of the demonstrators. 

It was not until nearly dark, after six or seven hours 
of these disorderly scenes, that the Premier finally ar- 
rived. Cavalry had meanwhile also been massed on 
the main street ; but it was only when the report spread 
that a Japanese reporter had been killed that the or- 
der was finally given to charge the mob and disperse 
it by force. This was very rapidly done, as apart from 
the soldiers in plain clothes the mass of people belonged 
to the lowest class, and had no stomach for a fight, 
having only been paid to shout. It was nearly mid- 
night, after twelve hours of isolation and a foodless 
day, that the Representatives were able to disperse 
without having debated the war-question. The up- 
shot was that with the exception of the Minister of Edu- 
cation, the Premier found that his entire Cabinet had 
resigned, the Ministers being unwilling to be associ- 
ated with what had been an attempted coercion of Par- 
liament carried out by the Military. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 341 

The. Premier, General Tuan Chi-jui, however, re- 
mained determined to carry his point, jtnd within . a 
week a second dispatch was sent to the House of Rep- 
resentatives demanding, in spite of what had happened, 
that the declaration of war be immediately brought up 
fox. debate. Meanwhile publication in a leading Peking 
newspaper of further details covering Japan's subter- 
ranean activities greatly inflamed the public, and made 
the Liberal political elemets more determined than ever 
to stand firm. It was alleged that Count Terauchi was 
reviving in a more subtle form Group V of the Twenty- 
one Demands of 1915, the latest Japanese proposal 
taking the form of a secret Treaty of twenty articles of 
which the main stipulations were to be a loan of twenty 
million yen to China to reorganize the three main 
Chinese arsenals under Japanese guidance, and a fur- 
ther loan of eighty million yen to be expended on the 
Japanization of the Chinese army. As a result of this 
publication, which rightly or wrongly was declared to 
be without foundation, the editor of The Peking Ga- 
zette was seized in the middle of the night and thrown 
into goal; but Parhament so far from being intimidated 
passed the very next day (19th May) a resolution re- 
fusing to consider in any form the declaration of war 
against Germany until the Cabinet had been reorgan- 
ized — which meant the resignation of General Tuan 
Chi-jui. A last effort was made by the reactionary 
element to jockey the President into submission by 
presenting to the Chief Executive a petition from the 
Military Governors assembled in Peking demanding the 
immediate dissolution of Parhament. On this pro- 
posal being absolutely rejected by the President as 



342 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

wholly unconstitutional, and the Military Governors 
soundly rated for their interference, an ominous calm 
followed. 

Parliament, however, remained unmoved and con- 
tinued its work. Although the draft of the Perma- 
nent Constitution had been practically completed, im- 
portant additions to the text were now proposed, such 
additions being designed to increase parliamentary con- 
trol and provide every possible precaution against ar- 
'Bitrary acts in the future. Thus the new proyisign 
that a simple vote of want of confidence in the Cabinet 
must be followed by the President either dismissing 
the Cabinet or dissolving the House of Representa- 
tives — but that the dissolution of the Lower House 
could not be ordered without the approval of the Sen- 
ate — ^was generally recognized as necessary to destroy 
the last vestiges of the Yuan Shih-kai regime. Fur- 
thermore a new article, conferring on the President the 
right to dismiss the Premier summarily by Presidential 
Mandate without the counter-signature of the other 
Cabinet Ministers, completed the disarray of the con- 
servatives who saw in this provision the dashing of their 
last hopes.^ 

By the 21st May, the last remaining Cabinet Minis- 
ter — the Minister of Education — had resigned and the 
Premier was left completely isolated. On the 23rd 
May the President, relying on the general support of 
the nation, summarily dismissed General Tuan Chi-jui 
from the Premiership and appointed the veteran diplo- 
mat Dr. Wu Ting-fang to act during the interim period 
in his stead, at the same time placing the metropolitan 

1 The final text of the Permanent Constitution as it stood on the 28th 
May, 1917, will be found in the appendix. Its accuracy has been guar- 
anteed to the writer by the speakers of the two Houses, 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 343 

districts under four trustworthy Generals who were 
vested with provost-marshals' powers under a system 
which gave them command of all the so-called "pre- 
cautionary troops" holding the approaches to the capi- 
tal. The Militar}^ Governors, who a few hours before 
these events had left Peking precipitately in a body 
on the proclaimed mission of allying themselves with 
the redoubtable General Chang Hsun at Hsiichowfu, 
and threatening the safety of the Republic were, how- 
ever, coolly received in the provinces in spite of all their 
most bitter attempts to stir up trouble. This, however, 
as will be shown, had no influence on their subsequent 
conduct. The quiet disappearance of the ex-Premier 
in the midst of this upheaval caused the report to spread 
that all the members of the corrupt camarilla which had 
surrounded him were to be arrested, but the President 
soon publicly disclaimed any intention of doing so, — 
which appears to have been a fatal mistake. It is dis- 
heartening to have to state that nearly all the Allied 
Legations in Peking had been in intimate relations with 
this gang — always excepting the American Legation 
whose attitude is uniformly correct — ^the French Min- 
ister going so far as to entertain the Military Gov- 
ernors and declare, according to reports in the native 
press, that Parliament was of no importance at all, 
the only important thing being for China promptly to 
declare war. That some sort of public investigation 
into Peking diplomacy is necessary before there can be 
any hope of decent relations between China and the 
Powers seems indisputable.^ 

Before the end of May the militarists being now des- 
perate, attempted the old game of inciting the provin- 

1 Since this was written certain diplomatists in Peking have been forced 
to resign. 



344 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

cial capitals "to declare their independence," although 
the mass of the nation was plainly against them. Some 
measm-e of success attended this move, since the sol- 
diery of the northern provinces obediently followed their 
leaders and there was a sudden wild demand for a march 
on Peking. A large amount of rolling-stock on the 
main railways was seized with this object, the confusion 
being made worse confounded by the fierce denuncia- 
tions which now came from the southernmost provinces, 
coupled with their threats to attack the Northern troops 
all along the line as soon as they could mobilize. 

The month of June opened with the situation more 
threatening than it had been for years. Emissaries of 
the recalcitrant Military Governors, together with all 
sorts of "politicals" and disgruntled generals, gathered 
m Tientsin — which is 80 miles from Peking — and 
openly established a Military Headquarters which they 
declared would be converted into a Provisional Govern- 
ment which would seek the recognition of the Powers. 
Troops were moved and concentrated against Peking; 
fresh demands were made that the President should 
dissolve Parliament; whilst the Metropolitan press 
was suddenly filled with seditious articles. The Presi- 
dent, seeing that the situation was becoming cata- 
clysmic, was induced, through what influences is not 
known, to issue a mandate summoning General Chang 
Hsun to Peking to act as a mediator, which was another 
fatal move. He arrived in Tientsin with many troops 
on the 7th June where he halted and was speedily 
brought under subversive influences, sending at once 
up to Peking a sort of ultimatum which was simply the 
old demand for the dissolution of Parliament. 

Meanwhile on the 5th June, the United States, which 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 345 

had been alarmed by these occurrences, had handed 
China the following Note hoping thereby to steady the 
situation : 

The Government of the United States learns with the most 
profound regret of the dissension in China and desires to ex- 
press the most sincere desire that tranquilhty and pohtical 
co-ordination may be forthwith re-established. 

The entry of China into war with Germany — or the con- 
tinuance of the status quo of her relations with that Govern- 
ment — are matters of secondary consideration. 

The principal necessity for China is to resume and continue 
her political entity, to proceed along the road of national de- 
velopment on which she has made such marked progress. 

With the form of Government in China or the personnel 
which administers that Government, the United States has an 
interest only in so far as its friendship impels it to be of service 
to China. But in the maintenance by China of one Central 
United and alone responsible Government, the United States 
is deeply interested, and now expresses the very sincere hope 
that China, in her own interest and in that of the world, will 
immediately set aside her factional political disputes, and that 
all parties and persons will work for the re-establishment of a 
co-ordinate Government and the assumption of that place 
among the Powers of the World to which China is so justly 
entitled, but the full attainment of which is impossible in the 
midst of internal discord. 

The situation had, however, developed so far and so 
rapidly that this expression of opinion had little weight. 
The Vice-President of the RepubHc, General Feng 
Kuo-chang, unwilling or unable to do anything, had al- 
ready tendered his resignation from Nanking, declar- 
ing that he would maintain the "neutrality" of the im- 
portant area of the lower Yangtsze during this extraor- 
dinary struggle ; and his action, strange as it may seem, 
typified the vast misgivings which filled every one's 



346 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

mind regarding the mad course of action which the re- 
beUious camarilla had decided upon. 

Until Saturday the 9th June, the President had 
seemed adamant. On that day he personally saw for- 
eign press correspondents and assured them that, in 
spite of every threat, he would in no conceivable cir- 
cumstances attempt the unconstitutional step of dis- 
solving Parliament, — unconstitutional because the Nan- 
king Provisional Constitution under which the country 
was still governed pending the formal passage of the 
Permanent Constitution through Parliament, only 
provided for the creation of Parliament as a grand con- 
stitutional Drafting Committee but gave no power to 
the Chief Executive to dissolve it during its "lif e";v^hich 
was three years. As we have already shown, the period 
between the coup d'etat of 4th November, 1913, and 
the re-convocation of Parliament on 1st August, 1916, 
had been treated as a mere interregnum : therefore until 
1918, if the law were properly construed, no power in 
the land could interrupt the Parliamentary sessions ex- 
cept Parliament itself. Parliament, in vievv^ of these 
threatening developments, had already expressed its 
willingness (a) to re-consider certain provisions of the 
draft constitution in such a conciliatory manner as to 
insure the passage of the whole instrument through both 
houses within two weeks (b) to alter the Election Law 
in such fashion as to conciliate the more conservative 
elements in the country (c) to prorogue the second 
session (1916-1917) immediately these things were done 
and after a very short recess to open the third session 
(1917-1918) and close it within three months allow- 
ing new elections to be held in the early months _of 
1918, — the new Parhament to be summoned in April, 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 347 

1918, to form itself into a National Convention and 
elect the President for the quinquennial period 1918- 
1923. 

Ail these reasonable plans were knocked on the head 
on Sunday, the 10th June, by the sudden report that 
the President having been peremptorily told that the 
dissolution of Parliament was the sole means of sav- 
ing the Republic and preventing the sack of Peking, 
as well as an open armed attempt to restore the boy- 
emperor Hsuan Tung, had at last made up his mind 
to surrender to the inevitable. He had sealed a Man- 
date decreeing the dissolution of Parliament which 
would be promulgated as soon as it had received the 
counter-signature of the acting Premier, Dr. Wu Ting- 
fan^, such counter-signature being obligatory under 
Article 45 of the Provisional Constitution. 

At once it became clear again, as happens a thousand 
times during every year in the East, that what is not 
nipped in the bud grows with such malignant swiftness 
as finally to blight all honest intentions. Had steps 
been taken on or about the 23rd May to detain forcibly 
in Peking the ringleader of the recalcitrant Military 
Governors, one General Ni Shih-chung of Anhui, his- 
tory would have been very different and China spared 
much national and international humiliation. Six years 
of stormy happenings had certainly bred in the nation 
a desire for constitutionalism and a detestation of mili- 
tary domination. But this desire and detestation re- 
quired firm leadership. Without that leadership it was 
inchoate and powerless, and indeed made furtive by the 
constant fear of savage reprisals. A great opportunity 
had come and a great opportunity had been lost. Presi- 
dent Li Yuan-hung's personal argument, communicated 



348 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

to the writer, was that in sealing the Mandate dissolving 
Parliament he had chosen the lesser of two evils, for 
although South China and the Chinese Navy declared 
they would defend Parliament to the last,, they were 
far away whilst large armies were echeloned along the 
railways leading into Peking and daily threatening ac- 
tion. The events of the next year or so must prove con- 
clusively, in spite of what has happened in this month 
of June, 1917, that the corrupt power of the sword can 
no longer even nominally rule China. 

Meanwhile the veteran Dr. Wu Ting-fang, true to his 
faith, declared that no power on earth would cause him 
to sign a Mandate possessing no legality behind it; and 
he indeed obstinately resisted every attempt to seduce 
him. Although his resignation was refused he stood his 
ground manfully, and it became clear that some other 
expedient would have to be resorted to. In the small 
hours of the 13th June what this was was made clear: by 
a rapid reshuffling of the cards Dr. Wu Ting-fang's res- 
ignation was accepted and the general officer command- 
ing the Peking Gendarmerie, a genial soul named Gen- 
eral Chiang Chao-tsung, who had survived unscathed 
the vicissitudes of six years of revolution, was appointed 
to act in his stead and duly counter-signed the fateful 
Mandate which was at once printed and promulgated at 
four o'clock in the morning. It has been stated to the 
writer that had it not been so issued four battalions of 
Chang Hsun's savage pigtailed soldiery, who had been 
bivouacked for some days in the grounds of the Temple 
of Heaven, would have been let loose on the capital. 
The actual text of the Mandate proves conclusively that 
the President had no hand in its drafting — one argu- 
ment being sufficient to prove that, namely the delib- 



HEPUBLIC IN CHINA 349 

erate ignoring of the fact that Parliament had been 
called into being by virture of article 53 of the Nanking 
I'^rovisional Constitution and that under article 54 its 
specific duty was to act as a grand constitutional confer- 
ence to draft and adopt the Permanent Constitution, 
article 55 furthermore giving Parliament the right sum- 
marily to amend the Provisional Constitution before the 
Promulgation of the permanent instrument, should that 
be necessary. Provisions of this sort would naturally 
carry no weight with generals of the type of Chang 
Hsun, of whom it is said that until recent years he pos- 
sessed only the most elementary education ; but it is a dis- 
mal thing to have to record that the Conservative Party 
in China should have adopted a platform of brute force 
in the year of grace, 1917. 

MANDATE DISSOLVING PARLIAMENT 

In the 6th month of last year I promulgated a Mandate stat- 
ing that in order to make a Constitution it was imperative that 
Parliament should be convened. The Republic was inaugu- 
rated five years ago and yet there was no Constitution, which 
should be the fundamental law of a nation, therefore it was 
ordered that Parliament be re-convened to make the Consti- 
tution, etc., at once. 

Therefore the main object for the re-convocation of Parlia- 
ment was to make a formal constitution for the country. Re- 
cently a petition was received from Meng En-yuen, Tu-chun of 
Kirin, and others, to the effect that "in the articles passed by 
the Constitution Conference there were several points as fol- 
lows : 'when the House of Representatives passes a vote of want 
of confidence against the Cabinet Ministers, the President may 
dismiss the Cabinet Ministers, or dissolve the said House, but 
the dissolution of the House shall have the approval of the Sen- 
ate.' Again, 'When the President dismisses his Prime Min- 
ister, it is unnecessary for him to secure the counter-signature 
of the Cabinet Ministers.' Again 'when a bill is passed by the 



350 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Two Houses it shall have the force of the law.' We were sur- 
prised to read the above provisions. 

'^According to the precedents of other nations the Constitu- 
tion has never been made by Parliament. If we sliould desire" 
a good and workable Constitution, we should seek a fundamental 
solution. Indeed Parliament is more important than any other 
organ in the country; but when the national welfare is im- 
perilled, we.,must take action. As the present Parliament does 
not care about the national welfare, it is requested that in 
view of the critical condition of the country, drastic measures 
be taken and both the House of Representatives and the Sen- 
ate be dissolved so that they may be reorganized and the Con- 
stitution may be made without any further delay. Thus the 
form, of the Republican Government be preserved.,-„etc." 

Of late petitions and telegrams have been received from the 
military and civil officials, merchants, scholars, etc., containing 
similar demands. The Senate and the House of Representa- 
tives have held the Constitution Conference for about one year, 
and the Constitution has not yet been completed. Moreover 
at this critical time most of the M. P's. of both Houses have 
tendered their resignation. Hence it is impossible to secure 
quorums to discuss business. There is therefore no chance to 
revise the articles already passed. Unless means be devised to 
hasten the making of the Constitution, the heart of the people 
will never be satisfied. 

I, the President, who desire to comply with the will of the 
populace and to consolidate the foundation of the nation, grant 
the request of the Tuchuns and the people. It is hereby or- 
dered that the Senate and the House of Representatives be dis- 
solved, and that another election be held immediately. Thus a 
Constitutional Government can be maintained. It must be 
pointed out that the object for the reorganization of Parlia- 
ment is to hasten the making of the Constitution, and not to 
abolish the Legislative Organ of the Republic. I hope all the 
citizens of the Republic will understand my motives. 

A great agitation and much public uneasiness fol- 
lowed the publication of this document ; and the parlia- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 351 

mentarians, who had already been leaving Peking in 
small numbers, now evacuated the capital en masse for 
the South. The reasonable and wholly logical attitude 
of the Constitutionalists is well-exhibited in the last 
Memorandum they submitted to the President some 
days prior to his decision to issue the Mandate above- 
mioted; and a perusal of this document will show what 
may be expected in the future. It will be noted that the 
revolting Military Governors are boldly termed rebels 
and that the constitutional view of everything they may 
contrive as from the 13th June, 1917, is that it will be 
bereft of all legality and simply mark a fresh inter- 
regnum. Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
situation is brought back by the Mandate of the 13th 
June to^where it was on the 6th June, 1916, with the 
death of Yuan Shih-kai, and that a period of civil com- 
motion seems inevitable. 

MEMORANDUM 

To the President : Our previous memorandum to Your Ex- 
cellency must have received jour attention. We now beg fur- 
ther to inform you that the rebels are now practically in an 
embarrassing predicament on account of internal differences, 
the warning of the friendly Powers, and the protest of the 
Southwestern provinces. Their position is becoming daily more 
and more untenable. If Your Excellency strongly holds out 
for another ten days or so, their movement will collapse. 

Some one, however, has the impudence to suggest that with 
the entry of Chang Hsun's troops into the Capital, and delay 
in the settlement of the question will mean woe and disaster. 
But to us, there need be no such fear. As the troops in the 
Capital have no mind to oppose the rebels, Tsao Kun and his 
troops alone will be adequate for their purposes in the Capital. 
But now the rebels troops have been halting in the neighbour- 
hood of the Capital for the last ten days. This shows that they 




352 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

dare not open hostilities against the Government, which step 
will certainly bring about foreign intervention and incur the 
strong opposition of the Southwestern provinces. Having re- 
fused to participate in the rebellion at the invitation of Ni Shih- 
chung and Chang Tso-lin, Chang Hsun will certainly not do 
what Tsao Kun has not dared to do. But the rebels have secret 
agents in the Capital to circulate rumours to frighten the pub- 
lic and we hope that the President will remain calm and unper- 
turbed, lest it will give an opportunity for the rebel agents to 
practise their evil tricks. 

Respecting Parliament, its re-assembly was one of the two 
most important conditions by means of which the political dif- 
ferences between the North and the South last year were healed, 
^he dissolution of Parliament would mean the violation of the 
terms of settlement entered into between the North and the 
South last year and an open challenge to the South. Would 
the South remain silent respecting this outrageous measure? 
If the South rises in arms against this measure, what explana- 
tion can the Central Government give? , It will j)n]y_serve to 
hasten the split between the North and the South. From a 
legal point of "^view, the Power of Government is vested in the_ 
Provisional Constitution. When the Government exercises 
power which is not provided for by the Constitution, it simply 
means high treason. 

Some one has suggested that it would not be an illegal act 
for the Government to dissolve Parliament, since it is not pro- 
vided in the Provisional Constitution as to how Parliament 
should be dissolved, nor does that instrument specifically pro- 
hibit the Government from dissolving Parliament. But this 
is a misinterpretation. For instance, the Provisional Consti- 
tution has not provided that the President shall not proclaim 
himself Emperor, nor does it prohibit him from so doing. Ac- 
cording to such interpretation, it would not be illegal, if the 
President were to proclaim himself Emperor of the country. 

In short, the action taken by Ni Shih-chung and others is 
nothing short of open rebellion. From the legal point of view, 
any suggestion of compromise would be absurd. It has already 
been a fatal mistake for the President to have allowed them to 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 353 

do what they like, and if he again yields to their pressure 
by dissolving Parliament, he will be held responsible, when 
the righteous troops rise and punish the rebels. If the Presi- 
dent, deceived by ignoble persons, take upon himself to dis- 
solve the assembly, his name will go down in history as one 
committing high treason against the Government, and the 
^!uIhor"of the Break between the North .j^jnd^^the South. The 
President has been known as the man by whose hands the Re- 
public was built. We have special regard for his benevolent 
character and kind disposition. We are reluctant to see him 
intimidated and misled by evil counsels to take a step which will 
undo all his meritorious services to the country and shatter the 
unique reputation he has enjoyed. 

The unrolling of these dramatic events was the signal 
for the greatest subterranean activity on the part of the 
Japanese, who were now everywhere seen rubbing their 
hands and congratulating themselves on the course his- 
tory was taking. General Tanaka, Vice-Chief of the 
Japanese General Staff, who had been on an extensive 
tour of inspection in China, so planned as to include 
every arsenal north of the Yangtsze had arrived at the 
psychological moment in Peking and was now deeply 
engaged through Japanese field-officers in the employ 
of the Chinese Government, in pulling every string and 
in trying to commit the leaders of this unedif ying plot in 
such a way as to make them puppets of Japan. The 
Japanese press, seizing on the American Note of the 5th 
June as an excuse, had been belabouring the United 
States for some days for its "interference" in Chinese 
affairs, and also for having ignored Japan's "special po- 
sition" in China, which according to these publicists 
demanded that no Power take any action in the Far 
East, or give any advice, without first consulting Japan. 
That a stern correction will have to be offered to this 



354 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

presumption as soon as the development of the war 
permits it is certain. But not only Japanese military 
officers and journalists were endlessly busy: so-called 
Japanese advisers to the Chinese Government had done 
their utmost to assist the confusion. Thus Dr. Ariga, 
the Constitutional expert, when called in at the last mo- 
ment for advice by President Li Yuan-hung had, flatly 
contradicted Dr. Morrison, who with an Englishman's 
love of justice and constitutionalism had insisted that 
there was only one thing for the President to do— to be 
bound by legality to the last no matter what it might 
cost him. Dr. Ariga had falsely stated that the issue 
was a question of expediency, thus deliberately assisting 
the forces of disruption. This is perhaps only what was 
to be expected of a man who had advised Yuan Shih-kai 
to make himself Emperor — ^knowing full well that he 
could never succeed and that indeed the whole enter- 
prise from the point of view of Japan was an elaborate 
trap. 

The provincial response to the action taken on the 
13th June became what every one had expected: the 
Southwestern group of provinces, with their military 
headquarters at Canton, began openly concerting meas- 
ures to resist not the authority of the President, who was 
recognized as a just man surrounded by evil-minded 
persons who never hesitated to betray him, but to destroy 
the usurping generals and the corrupt camarilla behind 
them; whilst the Yangtsze provinces, with their head- 
quarters at Nanking, which had hitherto been pledged to 
"neutrality," began secretly exchanging views with the 
genuinely Republican South. The group of Tientsin 
generals and "politicals," confused by these develop- 
ments, remained inactive; and this was no doubt re- 





The Premier General Tuax Chi-jui, Head of the Cab- 
inet Which Decided to Declare War on Germany 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 355 

sponsible for the mad coup attempted by the semi-iUiter- 
ate General Chang Hsun. In the small hom-s of July 
Igt General Chang Hsun, relying on the disorganiza- 
tion in the capital which we have dealt with in our pre- 
ceding account, entered the Imperial City with his 
troops by prearrangement with the Imperial Family 
and at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 1st July the 
Manchu boy-emperor Hsuan Tung, who lost the Throne 
on the 12th February, 1912, was enthroned before a 
small assembly of Manchu nobles, courtiers and syco- 
phantic Chinese. The capital woke up to find military 
patrols everywhere and to hear incredulously that the 
old order had returned. The police, obeying instruc- 
tions, promptly visited all shops and dwelling-houses 
and ordered every one to fly the Dragon Flag. In the 
afternoon of the same day the following Restoration 
Edict was issued, its statements being a tissue of false- 
hoods, the alleged memorial from President Li Yuan 
Hung, which follows the principal document, being a 
bare-faced forgery, whilst no single name inserted in 
the text save that of Chang Hsun had any right to be 
there. There is also every reason to believe that the 
Manchu court party was itself coerced, terror being felt 
from the beginning regarding the consequences of this 
mad act which was largely possible because Peking is a 
Manchu city. 

IMPERIAL EDICT 

Issued the ISth day of the 5th Moon of the 9th year of 
Hsuaii Tung, 

While yet in our boyhood the inheritance of the great 
domain was unfortunately placed in our possession ; and since 
we were then all alone, we were Unable to weather the numerous 
difficulties. Upon the outbreak of the uprisiiig in the year of 



356 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Hsin Hai, (1911) Our Empress, Hsiao Ting Chin, owing to her 
Most High Virtue and Most Deep Benevolence was unwilling to 
allow the people to suffer, and courageously placed in the hands 
of the late Imperial Councillor, Yuan Shih-kai, the great dor 
minion which our forefathers had built up, and with it the 
lives of the millions of Our People, with orders to establish a 
provisional government. 

The power of State was thus voluntarily given to the whole 
country with the hope that disputes might disappear, disturb- 
ances might stop and the people enabled to live in peace. But 
ever since the form of State was changed into a Republic, con- 
tinuous strife has prevailed and several wars have taken place. 
Forcible seizure, excessive taxation and bribery have been of 
everyday occurrence. Although the annual revenue has in- 
creased to 400 millions this amount is still insufficient to meet 
the needs. The total amount of foreign obligations has 
reached a figure of more than ten thousand millions yet more 
loans are being contracted. The people within the seas are 
shocked by this state of affairs and interest in life has forsaken 
them. The step reluctantly taken by Our Empress Hsiao 
Ting Chin for the purpose of giving respite to tlie people has 
resulted untowardly in increasing the burdens of Our People. 
This indeed Our Empress Hsiao Ting Chin was unable to fore- 
see, and the result must have made her Spirit in Heaven to 
weep sorely. And it is owing to this that we have been praying 
to Heaven day and night in the close confines of the palace, 
meditating and weeping in silent suffering. 

Recently party strife has resulted in war and the country 
has remained too long in an unsettled condition. The Republic 
has fallen to pieces and means of remedy have been exhausted. 

Chang Hsun, Feng Kuo-chang and Lu Yung-ting have 
jointly memorialized the Throne stating that the minds of 
people are disturbed and they are longing to see the old regime 
restored, and asking that the throne be reoccupied in order to 
comfort the people. 

Chu Hung-chi and others have also memorialized us stating 
that the country is in imminent danger and that the people 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 357 

have lost their faith in the Republic, and asking that we ascend 
the _Throne in obedience to the mandate of Heaven and man. 

Li Yuan Hung has also memorialized the throne, returning 
the great power of State to us in order to benefit the country 
and save the people. 

A persual of the said memorials, which are worded in earnest 
terms, has filled our heart with regret and fear. On the one 
hand We, being yet in Our boyhood, are afraid to assume the 
great responsibilities for the existence of the country but on 
the other hand We are unwilling to turn our head away from 
the welfare of the millions simply because the step might affect 
Our own safety. 

After weighing the two sides and considering the mandates of 
Heaven and man, we have decided reluctantly to comply with 
the prayers, and have again occupied the Court to attend to the 
affairs of State after resuming possession of the great power 
on the 13th day of the 5th moon of the 9th year of Hsuan 
Tung. 

A new beginning will be made with our people. Hereafter 
the principles of morality and the sacred religion shall be our 
constitution in spirit, and order, righteousness, honesty and 
conscience will be practised to rebind the minds of the people 
who are now without bonds. People high and low will be uni- 
formly treated with sincerity, and will not depend on obedience 
of _law alone as the means of co-operation. Administration 
and orders will be based on conscientious realization and no 
one will be allowed to treat the form of State as material for 
experiment. At this time of exhaustion when its vitality is 
being wasted to the last drop and the existence of the country is 
hanging in the balance, we, as if treading on thin ice over deep 
waters, dare not in the slightest degree indulge in license on 
the principle that the Sovereign is entitled to enjoyment. It is 
our wish therefore that all officials, be they high or low, should 
purify their-Jiearts and cleanse themselves of all forms of old 
corruption, constantly keeping in mind the real interests of the 
people. Every bit of vitality of the people they shall be able 
tojpreserve shallgo to strengthen the life of the country for 



358 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

whatever it is. worth. Only by doing so can the danger be 
averted and Heaven moved by our sincerity. 

THE NINE ARTICLES 

Herewith we promulgate the following principal things, 
which we must either introduce as reforms or abolish as un- 
desirable in restoration. 

1. We shall obey the edict of Emperor Teh Tsung Chin 
(Kuang Hsu), namely, that the sovereign power shall be con- 
trolled by the Court (state) but the detailed administration 
shall be subject to public opinion. The country shall be called 
The Empire of Ta Ching; and the methods of other constitu- 
tional monarchies shall be carefully copied, 

2. The allowance for the Imperial House shall be the same 
as before, namely, $4,000,000 per year. The sum shall be 
paid annually and not a single cent is to be added. 

3. We shall strictly obey the instructions of our forefathers 
to the extent that no member of the imperial family shall be 
allowed to interfere with administrative affairs. 

4. The line of demarcation between Man (Manchu) and 
Han (Chinese) shall be positively obliterated. All Manchurian 
and Mongolian posts which have already been abolished shall 
not be restored. As to intermarrige and change of customs 
the officials concerned are hereby commanded to submit their 
views on the points concerning them respectively. 

5. All treaties and loan agreements, money for which has 
already been paid, formally concluded and signed with any 
eastern and western countries before this 13th day of the 5th 
Moon of the 9th year of Hsuan Tung, shall continue to be 
valid. 

6. The stamp duty which was introduced by the Republic is 
hereby abolished so that the people may be relieved of their 
burdens. As to other petty taxes and contributions the Vice- 
roys and Governors of the provinces are hereby commanded 
to make investigations and report on the same for their aboli- 
tion. 

7. The criminal code of the Republic is unsuited to this 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 359 

country. It is hereby abolished. For the time being the pro- 
visional criminal code as adopted in the first year of Hsuan 
Tung shall be observed. 

8. The evil custom of political parties is hereby forbidden. 
Old political offenders are all pardoned. We shall, however, 
not be able to pardon those who deliberately hold themselves 
aloof and disturb peace and order. 

9. All of our people and officials shall be left to decide for 
themselves the custom of wearing or cutting their queues as 
commanded in the 9th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung. 

We swear that we and our people shall abide by these articles. 
The Great Heaven and Earth bear witness to our words. Let 
this be made known to all. 

Counter-signed by Chang Hsun, 

Member of the Imperial Privy Council. 

ALIiEGED MEMOEIAL BY PRESIDENT LI YUAN HUNG 

In a memorial submitted this day, offering to return the 
sovereign power of State and praying that we agan ascend the 
throne to control the great empire, Li Yuan Hung states that 
some time ago he was forced by mutinous troops to steal the 
great throne and falsely remained at the head of the adminis- 
tration but failed to do good to the difficult situation. He 
enumerates the various evils in the establishment of a Republic 
and prays that we ascend the throne to again control the Em- 
pire with a view that the people may thereby be saved. As to 
himself he awaits punishment by the properly instituted author- 
ities, etc. As his words are so mournful and full of remorse 
they must have been uttered from a sincere heart. Since it 
was not his free choice to follow the rebellion, the fact that he 
has returned the ^reat power of administration to us shows 
that he knows the great principle of righteousness. At this 
time of national danger and uncertainty, he has taken the lead 
of the people in obeying their sovereign, and decided before 
others the plan to save the country from ruin. The merit is 
indeed great, and we are highly pleased with his achievement. 
Li Yuan-hung is hereby to have conferred on him the dignity of 



360 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

Duke of the first class so as to show our great appreciation. 
Let him accept our Edict and forever receive our blessings. 
Counter-signed by Chang Hsun, 

Member of the Privy Council. 

PRIVY COUNCIL, 

At this time of restoration a Privy Council is hereby estab- 
lished in order that we may be assisted in our duties and that 
responsibility may be made definite. Two Under-secretaries of 
the Council are also created. Other officials serving outside 
of the capital shall remain as under the system in force during 
the first year of Hsuan Tung. All civil and military officials 
who are now serving at their various posts are hereby com- 
manded to continue in office as hitherto. 

Counter-signed by Chang Hsun. 

(Hereafter follow many appointments of reaction- 
ary Chinese officials.) 

The general stupefaction at the madness of this act 
and the military occupation of all posts and telegraph- 
offices in Peking allowed 48 hours to go by before the 
reaction came. On the 2nd July Edicts still continued 
to appear attempting to galvanize to life the corpse of 
Imperialism and the puzzled populace flew the Dragon 
Flag. On the morning of the 3rd, however, the news 
suddenly spread that President Li Yuan-hung, who had 
virtually been made a prisoner in the Presidential Pal- 
ace, had escaped at nine o'clock the night before by 
motorcar accompanied by two aides-de-camp, and after 
attempting to be received at the French Hospital in the 
Legation Quarter, had proceeded to the Japanese Lega- 
tion where he was offered a suitable residence. On the 
evening of the 3rd the Japanese Legation issued the fol- 
lowing official communique (in French) defining its 
attitude : 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 361 

TRANSLATION 

President Li, accompanied by two members of his staff, came 
at 9.30 on the evening of July 2 to the residence of General 
Saito, Mihtary Attache of the Japanese Legation, and asked 
protection from him. He arrived in a spontaneous manner and 
without previous notice. 

Under these circumstances, the Imperial Japanese Legation, 
following international usage, has decided to accord him the 
necessary protection and has placed at his disposal a part of 
the military barracks. 

The Legation further declares that as long as President Li 
remains there, it will not permit any political action on his 
part. 

Following this sensational development it became 
known that President Li Yuan Hmig had completely- 
frustrated the efforts of the Imperialists by sending 
away a number of important telegraphic Mandates by 
courier to Tientsin as well as the Presidential Seal. By 
a masterly move in one of these Mandates General Tuan 
Chi-jui was reappointed Premier, whilst Vice-Presi- 
dent Feng Kuo-chang was asked to officiate as Presi- 
dent, the arrangements being so complete as at once to 
catch .QiangHsiin in his own net. 

Here is the text of these four historically important 
messages: 

(1) Dated July 1. Today Inspector General Chang Hsun 
entered the city with his troops and actually restored the 
monarchy. He stopped traffic and sent Liang Ting-fen and 
others to my place to persuade me. Yuan-hung refused in firm 
language and swore that he would not recognize such a step. 
It is his hope that the Vice-President and others will take 
effective means to protect the Republic. Li Yuan Hung. 

(2) Dated July 1. As Heaven does not scorn calamity so 
has the monarchy been restored. It is said that in an edict 



362 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

issued by the Ching House it is stated that Yuan-hung had 
actually memorialized to return the power of State to the said 
House. This is an extraordinary announcement. JJ^hina 
changed from autocracy to a Republic by the unanimous .wish 
of the five races of the country. Since Yuan-hung was en- 
trusted by the people with the great responsibilities it is his 
natural duty to maintain the Republic to the very end. Noth- 
ing more or less than this will he care to say. He is sending 
this in order to avoid misunderstanding. 

\ Li Yuan HuNa. 

(3) The President to the Vice-President. 

To the Vice-President Feng at Nanking — It is to be pre- 
sumed that the two telegrams sent on the 1st have safely 
reached you. I state with deepest regret and greatest sor- 
row that as the result of my lack of ability to handle the situa- 
tion the political crisis has eventually affected the form of gov- 
ernment. For this Yuan-hung realizes that he owes the coun- 
try apology. The situation in Peking is daily becoming more 
precarious. Since Yuang-hung is now unable to exercise his 
power the continuity of the Republic may be suddenly inter- 
rupted. You are also entrusted by the citizens with great 
responsibilities ; I ask you to temporarily exercise the power 
and functions of the President in your own office in accordance 
with the provisions of Article 42 of the Provisional Constitu- 
tion and Article 5 of the Presidential Election Law. As the 
means of communication is effectively blocked it is feared that 
the sending of my seal will meet with difficulty and obstruction. 
Tuan Chih-chuan (Tuan Chi-jui) has been appointed Premier, 
and is also ordered to temporarily protect the seal, and later to 
devise a means to forward it on to you. Hereafter every thing 
pertaining to the important question of saving the country 
shall be energetically pushed by you and Chih-chuan with ut- 
most vigour. The situation is pressing and your duty is clear. 
In great anxiety and expectation I am sending you this tele- 
gram. Li Yuan Hung. 

(4) Dated July 3. To Vice-President Feng, Tu Chuns and 
Governors of the Provinces, Provincial Assemblies, Inspector 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 363 

General Lu: — I presume that the two telegrams dated 1st 
and one dated 3rd inst. have safely reached your place. With 
bitter remorse to myself I now make the statement that the 
political crisis has resulted in affecting the form of government. 
Tuan Chih-chuan has been appointed on the 1st inst. as Pre- 
mier ; and the Vice-President has been asked to exercise the 
power and functions of the President in accordance of office by 
the Vice-President. Premier Tuan is authorized to act at his 
discretion. All the seal and documents have been sent to Tient- 
sin, and Premier Tuan has been told to keep and guard the 
same for the time being. He has also been asked to forward 
the same to the Vice-President. The body guards of the Presi- 
dent's Office have suddenly been replacd and I have been 
pressed to give up the Three Lakes. Yuan-hung has therefore 
removed to a sanctuary. As regards the means to save the 
country I trust that you will consult and work unitedly with 
Vice-President Feng and Premier Tuan, In great expectation, 
and with much of my heart not poured out. 

Li Yuan Hung. 

Meanwhile, whilst these dramatic events were oc- 
curring in Peking, others no less sensational were tak- 
ing place in the provinces. The Tientsin group, sud- 
denly realizing that the country was in danger, took 
action very swiftly, disclosing that in spite of all dis- 
putes Republicanism had become very dear to every 
thinking man in the country, and that at last it was 
possible to think of an united China. The Scholar 
Liang Chi Chao, spokesman of Chinese Liberalism, in 
an extraordinarily able message circularized the prov- 
inces in terms summarizing everything of importance. 
Beginning with the fine literary flight that "heaven 
has refused to sympathize with our difficulties by allow- 
ing traitors to be born" he ends with the astounding 
phrase that although he had proposed to remain silent 
to the end of his days, "at the sight of the fallen nest 



364 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

he has, however, spat the stopper Qut of his throat," 
and he calls upon all China to listen to his words which 
are simply that the Republic must be upheld or disso- 
lution will come. ^ — —— ^™-^, - ^ 

Arms now united with Literature. General Tuan 

X ♦,g«^'*'''Chi-jui, immediately accepting the burden placed on 

'|. jw/jjhim, proceeded to the main entrenched camp outside 

^ !• A Tientsin and assumed command of the troops massed 

• , there, issuing at the same time the following manifesto : 



"ri i(^ 



TUAN CHI-JUI S MANIFESTO 



To Vice-President Feng Kuo-chang, Inspector General of 
?; ^(i-* ^ Wumin, Tu Chuns, Governors, Tu-tungs. . . . 

Heaven is chastening this country by the series of disturb- 
ances that have taken place. Chang Hsun, filled with sinister 
designs, has occupied the capital by bringing up his troops 
under the pretext of effecting a compromise with the astound- 
ing result that last night the Republican form of government 
was overthrown. The question of the form of Government is 
the very fundamental principle on which the national existence 
depends. It requires assiduous efforts to settle the form of 
government and once a decision has been reached on the sub- 
ject, any attempt to change the same is bound to bring on 
unspeakable disasters to the country. Today the people of 
China are much more enlightened and democratic in spirit 
than ever before. It is, therefore, absolutely impossible to 
subjugate the millions by holding out to the country the maj- 
esty of any one family. 

When the Republic of China was being founded, the Ching 
House, being well aware of the general inclinations of modern 
peoples, sincerely and modestly abdicated its power. Believing 
that such spirit deserved handsome recognition the people 
were willing to place the Ching House under the protection of 
special treatment and actually recorded the covenant on paper, 
whereby contentment and honour were vouchsafed the Ching 
House. Of the end of more than 20 dynasties of Chinese his- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 365 

tory, none can compare with the Ching dynasty for peace and 
safety. 

Purely for sake of satisfying his ambitions of self-elevation 
Chang Hsun and others have audaciously committed a crime of 
inconceivable magnitude and are guilty of high treason. Like 
Wang Mang and Tung Tso he seeks to sway the whole nation 
by utilizing a young and helpless emperor. Moreover he has 
given the country to understand that Li Yuan-hung has me- 
morialized the Ching House that many evils have resulted from 
republicanism and that the ex-emperor should be restored to 
save the masses. That Chang Hsun has been guilty of usurpa- 
tion and forging documents is plain and the scandal is one 
that shocks all the world. 

Can it be imagined that Chang Hsun is actuated by a patri- 
otic motive.'' Surely despotism is no longer tolerated in this 
stage of modern civilization. Such a scheme can only provoke -\^{lJ 
universal opposition. Five years have already passed since the 
friendly Powers accorded their recognition of the Chinese Re- 
public and if we think we could afford to amuse ourselves with 
changes in the national fabric, we could not expect foreign 
powers to put up with such childishness. Internal strife is 
bound to invite foreign intervention and the end of the country 
will then be near^ 

Can it be possible that Chang Hsun has acted in the interest 
of the Ching House? The young boy-emperor lives in peace 
and contentment and has not the slightest idea of ever ruling 
China again. It is known that his tutors have been warning 
him of the dangers of intriguing for power. That the boy- 
emperor has been dragged on the throne entirely against his 
own wishes is undeniable. History tells us that no dynasty can 
live for ever. It is an unprecedented privilege for the Ching 
dynasty to be able to end with the gift of special treatment. 
How absurd to again place the Tsing house on the top of a 
high wall so that it may fall once more and disappear for ever. 

Chi-jui, after his dismissal, resolved not to participate in 
political affairs, but as he has had a share, however insignifi- 
cant, in the formation of the Chinese Republic, and having 



366 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

served the Republic for so long he cannot bear to see its de- 
struction without stretching out a helping hand. Further, he 
has been a recipient of favours from the defunct dynasty, and 
he can not bear to watch unmoved, the sight of the Ching 
House being made the channel of brigandage with suicidal re- 
sults. Wherever duty calls, Chi-jui will go in spite of the dan- 
ger of death. You, gentlemen, are the pillars of the Republic 
of China and therefore have your own duties to perform. In 
face of this extraordinary crisis, our indignation must be one. 
For the interest of the country we should abide by our oath of 
unstinted loyalty ; and for the sake of the Tsing House let us 
show our sympathy by sane and wise deeds. I feel sure you 
will put forth every ounce of your energy and combine your 
efforts to combat the great disaster. Though I am a feeble 
old soldier, I will follow you on the back of my steed. 

(Sgd) TuAN Chi-jui. 

Following the publication of this manifesto a gen- 
eral movement of troops began. On the 5th July the 
important Peking-Tientsin railway was reported in- 
terrupted forty miles from the capital — at Langfang 
which is the station where Admiral Seymour's relief ex- 
pedition in 1900 was nearly surrounded and exterm- 
inated. Chang Hsun, made desperate by the swift 
answer to his coup, had moved out of Peking in force 
stiffening his own troops with numbers of Manchu sol- 
diery, and announcing that he would fight it out to the 
bitter end, although this proved as false as the rest had 
been. The first collision occurred on the evening of 
the 5th July and was disastrous for the King-maker. 
The whole Northern army, with the exception of a 
Manchu Division in Peking, was so rapidly concen- 
trated on the two main railways leading to the capital 
that Chang Hsun's army, hopelessly outnumbered and 
outmanoeuvred, fell back after a brief resistance. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 367 

Chang Hsun himself was plainly stupefied by the dis- 
covery that imperialism of the classic type was as much 
out of date in the North as in the South ; and within one \^f-^t^«*«* 
week of his coup he was prepared to surrender if his '^^ X<«Jv.|, 
life and reputation were spared. By the 9th July the ,^*^UW«"|a-*v 
position was this : the Republican forces had surrounded 'w^ %^hs 
Peking: Chang Hsun had resigned every appointment 
save the command of his own troops : the Mancliu Court 
party had drafted a fresh Edict of Renunciation, but 
being terrorized by the pigtailed troops surrounding the 
Palace did not dare to issue it. 

The usual bargaining now commenced with the Le- 
gation Quarter acting as a species of middleman. No 
one was anxious to see warfare carried into the streets 
of Peking, as not only might this lead to the massacres 
of innocent people, but to foreign complications as well. 
The novelty had already been seen of a miniature air- 
raid on the Imperial city, and the panic that exploding 
bombs had carried into the hearts of the Manchu Im- 
perial Family made them ready not only to capitulate 
but to run away. The chief point at issue was, how- 
ever, not the fate of the monarchy, which was a dead 
thing, but simply what was going to happen to Chang 
Hsun's head — a matter which was profoundly distress- 
ing Chang Hsun. The Republican army had placed a 
price of £10,000 on it, and the fii'cbrands were advo- 
cating that the man must be captured, dead or alive, 
and suffer decapitation in front of the Great Dynastic 
Gate of the Palace as a revenge for his perfidy. Round 
this issue a subtle battle raged which was not brought 
to a head until the evening of the 11th July, when all 
attempts at forcing Chang Hsun to surrender uncon- 
ditionally having failed, it was announced that a gen- 



368 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

eral attack would be made on his forces at daylight the 
next morning. 

Promptly at dawn on the 12th July a gun-signal 
heralded the assault. Large Republican contingents 
entered the city through various Gates, and a storm 
of firing aroused terror among the populace. The 
main body of Chang H sun's men, entrenched in the 
great walled enclosure of the Temple of Heaven, were 
soon surrounded, and although it would have been pos- 
sible for them to hold out for several days, after a few 
hours' firing a parley began and they quietly surren- 
dered. Similarly in the Imperial city, where Chang 
Hsun had taken up his residence, this leader, in spite of 
his fire-eating declarations, soon fled to the Legation 
Quarter and besought an asylum. His men held out 
until two in the afternoon, when their resistance col- 
lapsed and the cease-fire sounded. The number of casu- 
alties on both sides was infinitesimal, and thus after 
eleven days' farce the Manchu dynasty found itself 
worse off than ever before. It is necessary, however, 
not to lose sight of the main problem in China, which is 
the establishment of a united government and a cessation 
of internecine warfare, — issues which have been some- 
what simplified by Chang Hsun's escapade, but not 
solved. That a united government will ultimately be 
established is the writer's belief, based on a knowledge of 
all the facts. But to attain that further provincial 
struggles are inevitable, since China is too large a unit 
to find common ground without much suffering and bit- 
terness. President Li Yuan Hung having declared 
that nothing would induce him to resume office, Vice- 
President Feng Kuo-chang has become the legal suc- 
cessor and has quietly assumed office. Chang Hsun's 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 869 

abortive coup has already cleared the air in North 
China to this extent : that the Manchu Imperial Family 
is to be removed from Peking and the Imperial allow- 
ance greatly reduced, whilst the proscription of such 
out-and-out imperialists as Kang Yu-wei has destroyed 
the last vestiges of public support. Finally the com- 
pletion of China's foreign policy, i. e. the declaration of 
war against Germany and Austria, has at last been made 
on the 14th August, 1917, and a consistent course of 
action mapped out. ,- 



CHAPTER XVII 

THE FINAL PROBLEM: — REMODELLING THE POLITICO- 
ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINA 
AND THE WORLD 

The careful narrative we have made — supported as it is 
by documents — of the history of China since the incep- 
tion of the Hepubhc six years ago should not fail to 
awaken profound astonishment among those who are in- 
terested in the spread of good government throughout 
the world. Even casual readers will have no difficulty 
in realizing how many lives have been lost and how 
greatly the country has been crippled both owing to the 
blind foreign support given to Yuan Shih-kai during 
four long and weary years and to the stupid adhesion to 
exploded ideas, when a little intelligence and a little gen- 
erosity and sympathy would have guided the nation 
along very different paths. To have to go back, as 
China was .forced to do in 1916, and begin over again 
the work which should have been performed in 1912 is 
a handicap which only persistent resolution can over- 
come; for the nation has been so greatly improverished 
that years must elapse before a complete recovery from 
the disorders which have upset the internal balance can 
be chronicled; and when we add that the events of the 
period May-July, 1917, are likely still further to in- 
crease the burden the nation carries, the complicated 
nature of the outlook will be readily understood. 

Happily foreign opinion has lately taken turn for the 
better. Whilst the substitution of a new kind of rule in 

370 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 371 

place of the Yuan Shih-kai regime, with its thinly dis- 
guised Manchuism and its secret worship of fallen gods, 
was at first looked upon as a political collapse tinged 
with tragedy — most foreigners refusing to believe in an 
Asiatic Republic — the masculine decision of the 9th 
February, 1917, which diplomatically ranged China 
definitely on the side of the Liberal Powers, has caused 
something of a volte face. Until this decision had been 
madejt was the fashion to declare that China was not 
only not fit to be a Republic but that her final dissolu- 
tion was onty a matter of time. Though the empire dis- 
appeared because it had become an impossible rule in 
the modern world — being womanish, corrupt, and 
mediaeval — to the foreign mind the empire remained the 
acme of Chinese civilization; and to kill it meant to lop 
off the head of the Chinese giant and to leave lying on 
the ground nothing but a corpse. It was in vain to 
insist that this simile was wrong and that it was pre- 
cisely because Chinese civilization had exhausted itself 
that a new conception of government had to be called 
in to renew the vitality of the people. Men, and par- 
ticularly diplomats, refused to understand that this em- 
bodied the heart and soul of the controversy, and that 
the sole mandate for the Republic, as well as the su- 
preme reason why it had to be upheld if the country 
was not to dissolve, has always lain in the fact that it 
postulates something which is the very antithesis of the 
system it has replaced and which should be wholly suc- 
cessful in a single generation, if courage is shown and 
the whip unflinchingly used. 3 

The chief trouble, in the opinion of the writer, has 
been the simplicity of the problem and not its com- 
plexity. By eliminating the glamour which surrounded 



372 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

the Throne, and by kicking away all the pomp and cir- 
cumstance which formed the age-old ritual of govern- 
ment, the glaring simplicity and barrenness of Chinese 
life — when contrasted with the complex West — has 
been made evident. Bathed in the hard light of modern 
realities, the poetic China which Haroun-al-Raschid 
painted in his Aladdin, and which still lives in the beau- 
tiful art of the country, has vanished forever and its 
place has been taken by a China of prose. To those 
who have always pictured Asia in terms of poetry 
this has no doubt been a very terrible thing — a thing 
synonymous with political death. And yet in point of 
fact the elementary things remain much as they have 
always been before, and if they appear to have acquired 
new meaning it is simply because they have been moved 
into the foreground and are no longer masked by a 
gaudy superstructure. 

For if you eliminate questions of money and sup- 
pose for a moment that the national balance-sheet is 
entirely in order, China is the old China although she 
is stirred by new ideas. Here you have by far the 
greatest agricultural community in the world, living 
just as it has always lived in the simplest possible man- 
ner, and remitting to the cities (of which there are not 
ten with half -a-million inhabitants ) the increment which 
the harvests yield. These cities have made much 
municipal progress and developed an independence 
which is confessedly new. Printing presses have 
spread a noisy assertiveness, as well as a very critical 
and litigious spirit, which tends to resent and oppose 
authority.^ Trade, although constantly proclaimed to 

1 The growth of the Chinese press is remarkable. Although no complete 
statistics are available there is reason to believe that the number of peri- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 373 

be in a bad way, is steadily growing as new wants are 
created and fashions change. An immense amount of 
new building has been done, particularly in those 
regions which the Revolution of 1911 most devastated. 
The archaic fiscal system, having been tumbled into 
open ruin, has been partially replaced bj^ European con- 
ceptions which are still only half-understood, but which 
are not really opposed. The country, although boast- 
ing a population which is only some fifty millions less 
than the population of the nineteen countries of Europe, 
has an army and a police-force so small as to allow one 
to say that China is virtually disarmed since there are 
only 900,000 men with weapons in their hands. Cast- 
ing about to discover what really tinges the outlook, that 
must simply be held to be the long delay the world has 
made in extending the same treatment to China as is 
now granted to the meanest community of Latin 
America. It has been almost entirely this, coupled 
with the ever-present threat of Japanese chauvinism, 
which has given China the appearance of a land that 
is hopelessly water-logged, although the National Debt 
is relatively the smallest in the world and the people 
the most industrious and law-abiding who have ever 
lived. In such circumstances that ideas of collapse 
should have spread so far is simply due to a faulty esti- 
mate of basic considerations. 

For we have to remember that in a country in which 
the thoroughly English doctrine of laissez faire has been 

odicals in China now approximates 10,000, the daily vernacular newspapers 
in Peking alone exceeding 60. Althougli no newspaper in China prints 
more than 20,000 copies a day, the reading public is growing at a phe- 
nomenal rate, it being estimated that at least 50 million people read the 
daily publications, or hear what they say, — a fact which is deemed so politi- 
cally important that all political parties and groups have their chains of 
organs throughout the country. 



374 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

so long practised that it has become second nature, and 
in which the philosophic spirit is so undisputed that the 
pillars of society are just as much the beggars who beg 
as the rich men who support them, influences of a pecu- 
liar character play an immense role and can be only 
very slowly overcome. Passivity has been so long en- 
throned that of the Chinese it may be truly said that 
they are not so much too proud to fight as too indiffer- 
ent, — which is not a fruitful state of affairs. Looking 
on the world with callous detachment the masses go 
their own way, only pausing in their work on their an- 
cient Festival days which they still celebrate just as 
they have always celebrated them since the beginning 
of their history. The petty daily activities of a vast 
legion of people grouped together in this extraordinary 
way, and actuated by impulses which seem sharply to 
conflict with the impulses of the other great races of 
the world, appear incredible to Westerners who know 
what the outer perils really are, and who believe that 
<^China is not only at bay but encircled — caught in a 
network of political agreements and commitments which 
have permanently destroyed her power of initiative and 
reduced her to inanition.> To find her lumbering on 
undisturbed, ploughing the fields, marrying and giving 
in marriage, buying, selling, cursing and laughing, 
carrying out rebellions and Httle plots as though the 
centuries that stretch ahead were still her willing slaves, 
has in the end become to onlookers a veritable night- 
mare. Puzzled by a phenomenon which is so discon- 
certing as to be incapable of any clear definition, they 
have ended by declaring that an empty Treasury is an 
empty rule, adding that as it is solely from this monetary 
yiewpoirit that the New China ought to be judged, their 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 375 

opinion is the one which will finally be accepted as 
authoritative. The situation is admittedly dangerous; 
and it is imperative that a speedy remedy be sought; 
for the heirs and assigns of an estate which has been 
mismanaged to the brink of bankruptcy must secure at 
all costs that no public receivership is made. 

What is the remedy? That must consist simply 
enough in attacking the grand simplicities directly; in 
recognizing, as we have clearly shown that the bases 
of Chinese life having collapsed through Euro-Japanese 
pressure, the politico-economic relationship between the 
Republic and the world must be remodelled at the 
earliest possible opportunity, every agreement which 
has been made since the Treaties of 1860 being care- 
fully and completely revised.^ 

To say this is to give utterance to nothing very new 
or brilliant: it is the thought which has been present in 
every one's mind for a number of years. So far back as 
1902, when Great Britain negotiated with China the in- 
operative Mackay Commercial Treaty, provision was 
not only made for a complete reform of the Tariff — im- 
port duties to be made two and a half times as large in 
retm^n for a complete abolition of likin or inter-provin- 
cial trade-taxation — but for the abolition of extraterri- 
toriality when China should have erected a modern and 
efficient judicial system. And although matters 
equally important, such as the funding of all Chinese in- 

1 The mediaeval condition of Chinese trade taxation is well illustrated by 
a Memorandum which the reader will find in the appendix. One example 
may be quoted. Timber shipped from the Yalu river, i.e. from Chinese 
territory, to Peking, pays duties at five diflferent places, the total amount 
of which aggregates 20 per cent of its market value; whilst timber from 
America, with transit dues and Peking Octroi added, only pays 10 per cent! 
China is probably the only country that has ever existed that discriminates 
against its own goods and gives preference to the foreigner, — through the 
operation of the Treaties. 



376 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

demnities and loans into one Consolidated Debt, as well 
as the withdrawal of the right of foreign banks to make 
banknote issues in China, were not touched upon, the 
same principles would undoubtedly have been applied 
in these instances, as being conductive to the re-estab- 
lishment of Chinese autonomy, had Chinese negotiators 
been clever enough to urge them as being of equal im- 
portance to the older issues. For it is primarily debt, 
and the manipulation of debt, which is the great enemy. 

Three groups of indebtedness and three groups of 
restrictions, corresponding with the three vital periods 
in Chinese history, lie to-day like three great weights on 
the body of the Chinese giant. First, there is the im- 
broglio of the Japanese war of 1894-5; second, the 
settlement following the Boxer explosion of 1900; and 
third, the cost of the revolution of 1911-1912. We have 
already discussed so exhaustively the Boxer Settle- 
ment and the finance of the Revolutionary period that it 
is necessary to deal With the first period only. 

In that first period China, having been rudely handled 
by Japan, recovered herself only by indulging in the 
sort of diplomacy which had become traditional under 
the Manchus. Thankful for any help in her distress, 
she invited and welcomed the intervention of Russia, 
which gave her back the Liaotung Peninsula and pre- 
served for her the shadow of her power when the sub- 
stance had already been so sensationally lost. Men are 
apt to forget to-day that the financial accommodation 
which allowed China to liquidate the Japanese war- 
debt was a remarkable transaction in which Russia 
formed the controlling element. In 1895 the Tsar's 
Government had intervened for precisely the same mo- 
tives that animate every State at critical times in his- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 37T 

tory, that is, for reasons of self-interest. The rapid 
victory which Japan had won had revived in an acute 
form the whole question of the future of the vast block 
of territory which lies south of the Amur regions and 
is bathed by the Yellow Sea. Russian statesmen sud- 
denly became conscious that the policy of which Mura- 
vieff-Amurski in the middle of the nineteenth cen- 
tury had been the most brilliant exponent — the policy 
of reaching "warm water" — was in danger of being 
crucified, and the work of many years thrown away. 
Action on Russia's part was imperative ; she was great 
enough to see that; and so that it should not be 
said that she was merely depriving a gallant nation 
of the fruits of victory and thereby issuing to her a 
direct challenge, she invited the chief Powers in Treaty 
relations with China to co-operate with her in readjust- 
ing what she described as the threatened balance. 
France and Germany responded to that invitation; 
England demurred. France did so because she was 
already the devoted Ally of a nation that was a guar- 
antee for the security of her European frontiers: Ger- 
many because she was anxious to see that Russia should 
be pushed into Asiatic commitments and drawn away 
from the problems of the Near East. England on 
her part very prudently declined to be associated with 
a transaction which, while not opposed to her interests, 
was filled with many dubious elements. 

It was in Petrograd that this account was liquidated. 
The extraordinary chapter which only closed with the 
disastrous Peace of Portsmouth opened for Russia in a 
very brilliant way. The presence in Moscow of the 
veteran statesman Li Hung-chang on the occasion of 
the Tsar's Coronation afforded an opportunity for ex- 



378 THE FIGHT FOE THE 

haustively discussing the whole problem of the Far 
East. China required money: Russia required the ac- 
ceptance of plans which ultimately proved so disastrous 
to her. Under Article IV of the Treaty of Shimono- 
seki (April, 1895) China had agreed to pay Japan as 
a war-indemnity 200 million Treasury taels in eight in- 
stalments: that is 50 million taels within six months, a 
further 50 millions within twelve months, and the re- 
maining 100 millions in six equal instalments spread 
over seven years, as well as an additional sum of 50 
millions for the retrocession of the Liaotung Peninsula. 

China, therefore, needed at once 80 million taels. 
Russia undertook to lend her at the phenomenally low 
rate of 4 per cent the sum of £16,000,000 sterling — ■ 
the interest and capital of which the Tsar's Government 
guaranteed to the French bankers undertaking the flo- 
tation. In return for this accommodation, the well- 
known Russo-Chinese Declaration of the 24th June 
(6th July) 1895 was made in which the vital article IX 
states that — "In consideration of this Loan the Chinese 
Government declares that it will not grant to any for- 
eign Power any right or privilege of no matter what 
description touching the control or administration 'of 
the revenues of the Chinese Empire. Should, how- 
ever, the Chinese Government grant to any foreign 
Power rights of this nature, it is understood that the 
mere fact of having done so will extend those rights to 
the Russian Government." 

This clause has a monumental significance: it started 
the scramble in China: and all the history of the past 
22 years is piled like a pyramid on top of it. Now that 
the Romanoffs have been hurled from the throne, Russia 
must prove eager to reverse the policy which brought 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 379 

Japan to her Siberian frontiers and which pinned a 
brother democracy to the ground. 

For China, instead of being nearly bankrupt as so 
many have asserted, has, thanks to the new scale of 
indebtedness which the war has established, become one 
of the most debt-free countries in the world, her entire 
national debt (exclusive of railway debt) amounting to 
less than 150 millions sterling, or seven shillings per head 
of population, which is certainly not very terrible. No 
student who has given due attention to the question 
can deny that it is primarily on the proper handling 
of this nexus of financial interests, and not by establish- 
ing any artificial balance of power between foreign na- 
tions, that the peace of the Far East really hinges. 
The method of securing national redemption is ready- 
made; Western nations should use the Parliament of 
China as an instrument of reform, and by limiting 
themselves to this one method secure that civil author- 
ity is reinforced to such a point that its behests have 
behind them all the wealth of the West. In questions 
of currency, taxation, railways and every other vexa- 
tious problem, it is solely by using this instrument that 
satisfactory results can be attained.^ For once Chinese 

1 We need only give a single example of what w^ mean. If, in the 
matter of the reform of the currency, instead of authorizing trade-agencies, 
i.e. the foreign Exchange Banks, to make a loan to China, which is neces- 
sarily hedged round with conditions favourable to such trade-agencies, the 
Powers took the matter directly in their own hands; and selecting the Bank 
of China — the national fiscal agent — as the instrument of reform agreed 
to advance all the sums necessary, provided a Banking Law was passed by 
the Parliament of China of a satisfying nature, and the necessary guar- 
antees were forthcoming, it would soon be possible to have a uniform Na- 
tional Currency which would be everywhere accepted and lead to a phe- 
nomenal trade expansion. It should" be noted that China is still on a 
Copper Standard basis, — the people's buying and selling being conducted 
in multiples of copper cent-pieces of which there has been an immense 
over-issue, the latest figures showing that there are no less than 29,000,000,- 
000 1-cent, ten cash) pieces in circulation or 63 coins per head of popula- 
tion — roughly twenty-five millions sterling in value, — or 160,000 tons of 



380 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

realize that parliamentary government is not merely 
an experimental thing but the last chance the country 
is to be given to govern itself, they will rally to the 
call and prove that much of the trouble and turmoil 
of past years has been due to the misunderstanding of 
the internal problem by Western minds, which has in- 
cited the population to intrigue against one another and 
remain disunited. And if we insist that there is urgent 
need for a settlement of these matters in the terms we 
have indicated, it is because we know very prcisely what 
Japanese thought on this subject really is. 

What is that thought — whither does it lead? 

It may be broadly said that Japanese activities 
throughout the Far East are based on a thorough 
and adequate appreciation of the fact that apart from 
the winning of the hegemony of China, there is the far 
more difficult . and knotty problem of overshadowing 
and ultimately dislodging the huge network of foreign 
interests — particularly British interests — which sev- 
enty-five years of Treaty intercourse have entwined 
about the country. These interests, growing out of the 
seed planted in the early Canton Factory days, had 
their origin in the termination by the act of the British 
Government of the trading monopoly enjoyed until the 
thirties of last century by the East India Company. 
Left without proper definition until the Treaty of Nan- 
king in 1842 had formally won the principle of trading- 
copper! The number of silver dollars and subsidiary silver coins is not 
accurately known, — nor is the value of the silver bullion; but it certainly 
cannot greatly exceed this sum. In addition there is about £15,000,000 of 
paper money. A comprehensive scheme of reform, placed in the hands of 
the Bank of China, would require at least £15,000,000; but this sum would 
be sufficient to modernize the currency and establish a universal silver 
dollar standard. 

The Bank of China requires at least 600 branches throughout the coun- 
try to become a true fiscal agent. It has today one-tenth of this number. 




The Famous, or Infamous General Chang Hsun, the 
Leading Reactionary in China To-day, Who Still 
Commands a Force of 30,000 Men Astride of the 
PuKow Railway 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 381 

rights at five open ports, and thus estabhshed a first 
basis of agreement between England and China (to 
which all the trading powers hastened to subscribe), 
these interests expanded in a half-hearted way until 
1860, when in order to terminate friction, the principle 
of extraterritoriality was boldly borrowed from the 
Turkish Capitulations, and made the rock on which the 
entire fabric of international dealings in China was 
based. These treaties, with their always-recurring 
"most-favoured nation" clause, and their implication of 
equal treatment for all Powers alike, constitute the 
Pubhc Law of the Far East, just as much as the 
Treaties between the Nations constitute the Public Law 
of Europe; and any attempt to destroy, cripple, or 
limit their scope and function has been very generally 
deemed an assault on all the High Contracting Parties 
alike. By a thoroughly Machiavellian piece of reason- 
ing, those who have been responsible for the framing of 
recent Japanese policy, have held it essential to their 
plan to keep the world chained to the principle of ex- 
traterritoriality and Chinese Tariff and economic sub- 
jection because these things, imposing as they necessa- 
rily do restrictions and limitations in many fields, leave 
it free to the Japanese to place themselves outside and 
beyond these restrictions and limitations ; and, by means 
of special zones and secret encroachments, to extend their 
influence so widely that ultimately foreign treaty-ports 
and foreign interests may be left isolated and at the 
mercy of the "Higher machinery" which their hegemony 
is installing. The Chinese themselves, it is hoped, will 
be gradually cajoled into acquiescing in this very ex- 
traordinary state of affairs, because being unorganized 
and split into suspicious groups, they can be manipu- 



382 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

lated in such a way as to offer no effective mass resist- 
ance to the Japanese advance, and in the end may be 
induced to accept it as inevitable. 

If the reader keeps these great facts carefully in 
mind, a new light will dawn on him and the urgency 
of the Chinese question will be disclosed. The Jap- 
anese Demands of 1915, instead of being fantastic and 
far-fetched, as many have supposed, are shown to be 
very intelligently drawn-up, the entire Treaty posi- 
tion in China having been most exhaustively studied, 
and every loophole into the vast region left untouched 
by the exterritorialized Powers marked down for in- 
vasion. For Western nations, in spite of exorbitant 
demands at certain periods in Chinese history, having 
mainly limited themselves to acquiring coastal and com- 
munication privileges, which were desired more for 
genuine purposes of trade than for encompassing the 
destruction of Chinese autonomy, are to-day in a dis- 
advantageous position which the Japanese have shown 
they thoroughly understand by not only , tightening 
their hold on Manchuria and Shantung, but by going 
straight to the root of the matter and declaring on 
every possible occasion that they alone are responsible 
for the peace and safety of the Far East, — and this in 
spite of the fact that their plan of 1915 was exposed 
and partially frustrated. But the chief force behind 
the Japanese Foreign Office, it should be noted, is mili- 
tarist ; and it is a point of honour for the Military Party 
to return to the charge in China again and again until 
there is definite success or definite failure. 

Now in view of the facts which have been so volum- 
inously set forth in preceding chapters, it is imperative 
for men to realize that the struggle in the Far East is 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 383 

like the Balkan Question a thing rooted in geography 
and peoples, and cannot be brushed aside or settled by 
compromises. The whole future of Chinese civilization 
is intimately bound up with the questions involved, and 
the problem instead of becoming easier to handle must 
bcome essentially more difficult from day to day. 
Japan's real objective being the termination of the im- 
plied trusteeship which Europe and America still exer- 
cise in the Far East, the course of the European war 
must intimately effect the ultimate outcome. If that 
end is satisfactory for democracies, China uislj reason- 
ably claim to share in the resulting benefits; if on the 
other hand, the Liberal Powers do not win an over- 
whelming victory which shall secure the sanctity of 
Treaties for all time, it will go hard for China. Out- 
wardly, the immediate goal which Japan seeks to attain 
is merely to become the accredited spokesman of Eastern 
Asia, the official representative ; and, using this attorney- 
ship as a cloak for the advancement of objects which 
other Powers would pursue on different principles, so 
impregnably to entrench herself where she was no busi- 
ness to be that no one will dare to attempt to turn her 
out. For this reason we see revived in Manchuria on 
a modified scale the Eighteenth Century device, once 
so essential a feature of Dutch policy in the struggle 
against Louis XIV, namely the creation of "barrier- 
cities" for closing and securing a frontier by giving 
them a special constitution which withdraws them from 
ordinary jurisdiction and places foreign garrisons in 
them. This is precisely what is going on from the Yalu 
to Eastern Mongolia, and this procedure no doubt will 
be extended in time to other regions as opportunities 
arise. Already in Shantung the same policy is being 



384 THE FIGHT FOK THE 

pursued and there are indications that it is being 
thought of in Fuhkien; whilst the infantry garrison 
which was quietly installed at Hankow — 600 miles up 
the Yangtsze river — at the time of the Revolution of 
1911 is apparently to be made permanent. Allowing 
her policy to be swayed by men who know far too little 
of the sea, Japan stands in imminent danger of forget- 
ting the great lesson which Mahan taught, that for is- 
land-peoples sea-power is everything and that land con- 
quests which diminish the efficacy of that power are 
merely a delusion and snare. Plunging farther and 
farther into the vast regions of Manchuria and Mon- 
golia which have been the graves of a dozen dynasties, 
Japan is displaying increasing indifference for the one 
great lesson which the war has yielded — the overwhelm- 
ing importance of the sea.^ Necessarily guardian of 
the principles on which intercourse in Asia is based, be- 
cause she framed those principles and fought for them 
and has built up great edifices under their sanction, 
British sea-power — now allied forever, let us hope, with 
American power — nevertheless remains and will con- 
tinue to remain, in spite of what may be half -surrep- 
titiously done to-day, the dominant factor in the Far 
East as it is in the Far West. Withdrawn from view 

lit should be carefully noted that not only has Japan no unfriendly feel- 
ings for Germany but that German Professors have been appointed to 
office during the war. In the matter of enemy trading Japan's policy has 
been even more extraordinary. Until there was a popular outcry among 
the Entente Allies, German merchants were allowed to trade more or less 
as usual. They were not denied the use of Japanese steamers, shipping 
companies being simply "advised" not to deal with them, the two German 
banks in Yokohama and Kobe being closed only in the Autumn of 1916. 
It was not until April, 1917, that Enemy Trading Regulations were for- 
mally promulgated and enforced, — that is when the war was very far ad- 
vanced — the action of China against Germany being no doubt largely re- 
sponsible for this step. 

That the Japanese nation greatly admires the German system of govern- 
ment and is in the main indifferent to the results of the war has long heeif 
evident to observers on the spot. 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 885 

for the time being, because of the exigencies of the hour, 
and because the Anglo-Japanese AUiance is still 
counted a binding agreement. Western sea-power 
nevertheless stands there, a heavy cloud in the offing, 
full of questionings regarding what is going on in the 
Orient, and fully determined, let us pray, one day to re- 
ceive frank answers. For the right of every race, no 
matter how small or weak, to enjoy the inestimable 
benefits of self-government and independence may be 
held to have been so absolutely estabHshed that it is a 
mere question of time for the doctrine not only to be 
universally accepted but to be universally applied. In 
many cases, it is true, the claims of certain races are as 
yet incapable of being expressed in practical state- 
forms; but where nationalities have long been well- 
defined, there can be no question whatsoever that a 
properly articulated autonomy must be secured in such 
a way as to preclude the possibility of annexations. 

Now although in their consideration of Asia it is 
notorious that Western statesmen have not cared to 
keep in mind political concepts which have become en- 
throned in Europe, owing to the fact that an active 
element of opposition to such concepts was to be found 
in their own policies, a vast change has undoubtedly 
been recently worked, making it certain that the claims 
of nationalism are soon to be given the same force and 
value in the East as in the West. But before there 
can be any question of Asia for the Asiatics being 
adopted as a root principle by the whole world, it will 
have to be established in some unmistakable form that 
the surrender of the policy of conquest which Europe 
has pursued for four centuries East of the Suez Canal 
will not lead to its adoption by an Asiatic Power under 



386 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

specious forms which hide the ghttering sword. If 
that can be secured, then the present conflict will have 
truly been a War of Liberation for the East as well as 
for the West. For although Japan has been engaged 
for some years in declaring to all Asiatics under her 
breath that she holds out the hand of a brother to 
them, and dreams of the days when the age of European 
conquests will be nothing but a distant memory, her 
actions have consistently belied her words and shown 
that she has not progressed in political thought much 
beyond the crude conceptions of the Eighteenth Cen- 
tury. Thus Korea, which fell under her sway because 
the nominal independence of the country had long 
made it the centre of disastrous international intrigues, 
is governed to-day as a conquered province by a mili- 
tary viceroy without a trace of autonomy remaining 
and without any promise that such a regime is only tem- 
porary. Although nothing in the undertakings made 
with the Powers has ever admitted that ^ nation which 
boasts of an ancient line of kings, and which gave Japan 
much of her own civilization, should be stamped under 
foot in such manner, the course which politics have 
taken in Korea has been disastrous in the extreme ever 
since Lord Lansdowne in 1905, as British Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, pointed out in a careful dispatch to 
the Russian Government that Korea was a region which 
fell naturally under the sway of Japan. Not only has 
a tragic fate overcome the sixteen million inhabitants of 
that country, but there has been a covert extension of 
the principles applied to them to the people of China. 
Now if as we say European concepts are to have 
universal meaning, and if Japan desires European 
treatment, it is time that it is realized that the policy 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 887 

followed in Korea, combined with the attempt to 
extend that treatment to soil where China rightly claims 
undisputed sovereignty, forms an insuperable barrier 
to Japan being admitted to the inner council of the 
nations/ No one wishes to deny to Japan her proper 
place in the world, in view of her marvellous industrial 
progress, but that place must be one which fits in with 
modern conceptions and is not one thing to the West 
and another to the East. Even the saying which was 
made so much of during the Russian war of 1904, that 
Korea in foreign hands was a dagger pointed at the 
heart of Japan — has been shown to be inherently false 
by the lessons of the present struggle, the Korean 
dagger-point being 120 sea miles from the Japanese 
coast. Such arguments clearly show that if the truce 
which was hastily patched up in 1905 is to give way to 
a permanent peace, that can be evolved only by lock- 

1 A very remarkable confirmation of these statements is afforded in the 
latest Japanese decision regarding Manchuria which will be immediately 
enforced. The experience of the past three years having proved conclu- 
sively that the Chinese, in spite of their internal strife, are united to a man 
in their determination to prevent Japan from tightening her hold on Man- 
churia and instituting an open Protectorate, the Tokio Government has 
now drawn up a subtle scheme which it is believed will be effective. A 
Bill for the unification of administration in South Manchuria has passed 
the Japanese Cabinet Conference and will soon be formally promulgated. 
Under the provisions of this Bill, the Manchuria Railway Company will be- 
come the actual organ of Japanese administration in South Manchuria; the 
Japanese Consular Service will be subordinate to the administration of the 
Railway; and all the powers hitherto vested in the Consular Service, politi- 
cal, commercial, judicial and administrative, will be made part of the 
organization of the South Manchuria Railway. This is not all. From 
another Japanese source we learn that a law is about to take effect by 
which the administration of the South Manchuria Railway will be trans- 
ferred directly to the control of the Government-General of Korea, thus 
making the Railway at once an apparently commercial but really political 
organization. In future the revenues of the South Manchuria Railway 
are to be paid direct to the Government-General of Korea; and the yearly 
appropriation for the upkeep and administration of the Railway is to be 
fixed at Yen 12,000,000. These arrangements, especially the amalgamation 
of the South Manchuria Railway, are to take effect from the 1st July, 
1917, and are an attempt to do in the dark what Japan dares not yet 
attempt in the open. 



388 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

ing on to the Far East the principles which are in 
process of being vindicated in Europe. In other 
words, precisely as Poland is to be given autonomy, so 
must Korea enjoy the same privileges, the whole Jap^ 
anese theory of suzerainty on the Eastern Asiatic Con- 
tinent being abandoned. To re-establish a proper bal- 
ance of power in the Far East, the Korean nation, which 
has had a known historical existence of 1,500 years, must 
be reinstated in something resembling its old position; 
for Korea has always been the keystone of the Far 
Eastern arch, and it is the destruction of that arch 
more than anything else which has brought the collapse 
of China so perilously near. 

Once the legitimate aspirations of the Korean peo- 
ple have been satisfied, the whole Manchurian-Mon- 
golian question will assume a different aspect, and a 
true peace between China and Japan will be made pos- 
sible. It is to no one's interest to have a Polish ques- 
tion in the Far East with all the bitterness and the 
crimes which such a question must inevitably lead to; 
and the time to obviate the creation of such a question is 
at the very beginning before it has become an obsession 
and a great international issue. Although the Jap- 
anese annexation may be held to have settled the ques- 
tion once and for all, we have but to point to Poland to 
show that a race can pass through every possible humili- 
ation and endure every possible species of truncation 
without dying or abating by one whit its determination 
to enjoy what happier races have won. 

The issue is a vital one. China by her recent acts 
has given a categorical and unmistakable reply to all 
the insidious attempts to place her outside and beyond 
the operation of international law and all those sane- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 389 

tions which make Hfe worth hving; and because of the 
formal birth of a Foreign Pohcy it can be definitely 
expected that this nation, despite its internal troubles 
and struggles, will never rest content until she has cre- 
ated a new nexus of world-relationships which shall 
affirm and apply every one of the principles experience 
elsewhere has proved are the absolute essentials to peace 
and happiness. China is already many decades ahead 
of Japan in her theory of government, no matter what 
the practice may be, the marvellous revolution of 1911 
having given back to this ancient race its old position 
of leader in ideas on the shores of the Yellow Sea. 
The whole dream Japan has cherished, and has sought 
to give form to during the war, is in the last analysis 
antiquated and forlorn and must ultimately dissolve 
into thin air; for it is monstrous to suppose, in an age 
when European men have sacrificed everything to free 
themselves from the last vestiges of feudalism, that in 
the Far East the cult of Sparta should remain a hal- 
lowed and respected doctrine. Japan's policy in the 
Far East during the period of the war has been uni- 
formly mischievous and is largely responsible for the 
fierce hatreds which burst out in 1917 over the war issue; 
and China will be forced to raise at the earliest possible 
moment the whole question of the validity of the under- 
takings extorted from her in 1915 under the threat of an 
ultimatum. Although the precise nature of Anglo- 
Japanese diplomacy during the vital eleven days from 
the 4th to the 15th August, 1914, [i. e. from the Brit- 
ish declaration of war on Germany to the Japanese ulti- 
matum regarding Kiaochow] remains a sealed book, 
China suspects that Japan from the very beginning of 
the present war world-struggle has taken advantage of 



390 THE FIGHT FOR THE 

England's vast commitments and acted ultra vires. 
China hopes and believes that Britain will never again 
renew the Japanese alliance, which expires in 1921, in its 
present form, particularly now that an Anglo-American 
agreement has been made possible. China knows that 
in spite of all coquetting with both the extreme radical 
and military parties which is going on daily in Peking 
and the provinces, the secret object of Japanese diplom- 
acy is either the restoration of the Manchu dynasty, or 
the enthronement of some phant usurper, a puppet- 
Emperor being what is needed to repeat in China the 
history of Korea. Japan would be willing to go to 
any lengths to secure the attainment of this reaction- 
ary object. Faithful to her "divine mission," she is 
ceaselessly stirring up trouble and hoping that time 
may still be left her to consolidate her position on the 
Asiatic mainland, one of her latest methods being to 
busy herself at distant points in the Pacific so that 
Western men for the sake of peace may be ultimately 
willing to abandon the shores of the ^Yellow Seas to 
her unchallenged mastery. 

The problem thus outlined becomes a great dramatic 
thing. The lines which trace the problem are immense, 
stretching from China to every shore bathed by the 
Pacific and then from there to the distant west. 
Whenever there is a dull calm, that calm must be treated 
solely as an intermission, an interval between the acts, 
a preparation for something more sensational than the 
last episode, but not as a permanent settlement which 
can only come by the methods we have indicated. For 
the Chinese question is no longer a local problem, but a 
great world-issue which statesmen must regulate by 
conferences in which universal principles will be vin- 



REPUBLIC IN CHINA 391 

dicated if they wish permanently to eliminate what is 
almost the last remaining international powder-maga- 
zine. A China that is henceforth not only admitted to 
the family of nations on terms of equality but welcomed 
as a representative of Liberalism and a subscriber to all 
those sanctions on which the civilization of peace rests, 
will directly tend to adjust every other Asiatic problem 
and to prevent a recrudescence of those evil phenomena 
which are the enemies of progress and happiness. Is 
it too much to dream of such a consummation? We 
think not. It is to America and to England that China 
looks to rehabilitate herself and to make her Republic 
a reality. If they lend her their help, if they are con- 
sistent, there is still no reason why this democracy on 
the shores of the Yellow Sea should not be reinstated 
in the proud position it occupied twenty centuries ago, 
when it furnished the very silks which clothed the daugh- 
ters of the Ccesars. 



APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS IN GROUP I 

(1) The so-called Nineteen Articles, being the grant made 
by the Throne after the outbreak of the Wuchang Rebellion in 
1911 in a vain attempt to satisfy the nation. 

(2) The Abdication Edicts issued on the 12th February, 
1912, endorsing the establishment of the Republic. 

(3) The terms of abdication, generally referred to as "The 
articles of Favourable Treatment," in which special provision 
is made for the "rights" of Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans 
and Tibetans, who are considered as being outside the Chinese 
nation. 

THE NINETEEN ARTICLES 

1. The Ta-Ching Dynasty shall reign for ever. 

2. The person of the Emperor shall be inviolable. 

3. The power of the Emperor shall be limited by a Constitu- 
tion. 

4. The order of the succession shall be prescribed in the Con- 
stitution. 

5. The Constitution shall be drawn up and adopted by the 
National Assembly, and promulgated by the Emperor. 

6. The power of amending the Constitution belongs to Par- 
liament. 

7. The members of the Upper House shall be elected by the 
people from among those particularly eligible for the position. 

8. Parliament shall select, and the Emperor shall appoint, 
the Premier, who will recommend the other members of the 
Cabinet, these also being appointed by the Emperor. The Im- 
perial Princes shall be ineligible as Premier, Cabinet Ministers, 
or administrative heads of provinces. 

9. If the Premier, on being impeached by Parliament, does 
not dissolve Parliament he must resign but one Cabinet shall 
not be allowed to dissolve Parliament more than once. 

10. The Emperor shall assume direct control of the army 

393 



394 APPENDIX 

and navy, but when that power is used with regard to internal 
affairs, he must observe special conditions, to be decided upon 
by Parliament, otherwise he is prohibited from exercising such 
power. 

11. Imperial decrees cannot be made to replace the law ex- 
cept in the event of immediate necessity in which case decrees 
in the nature of a law may be issued in accordance with special 
conditions, but only when they are in connection with the exe- 
cution of a law or what has by law been delegated. 

12. International treaties shall not be concluded without the 
consent of Parliament, but the conclusion of peace or a dec- 
laration of war may be made by the Emperor if Parliament 
is not sitting, the approval of Parliament to be obtained after- 
wards. 

13. Ordinances in connection with the administration shall be 
settled by Acts of Parliament. 

14. In case the Budget fails to receive the approval of Par- 
liament the Government cannot act upon the previous year's 
Budget, nor may items of expenditure not provided for in the 
Budget be appended to it. Further, the Government shall not 
be allowed to adopt extraordinary financial measures outside 
the Budget. 

15. Parliament shall fix the expenses of the Imperial house- 
hold, and any increase or decrease therein. 

16. Regulations in connection with the Imperial family must 
not conflict with the Constitution. 

17. The two Houses shall establish the machinery of an ad- 
ministrative court. 

18. The Emperor shall promulgate the decisions of Parlia- 
ment. 

19. The National Assembly shall act upon Articles 8, 9, 10, 
12, 13, 14, 15 and 18 until the opening of Parliament. 

EDICTS OF ABDICATION 
I 

We (the Emperor) have respectfully received the following 
Imperial Edict from Her Imperial Majesty the Empress 
Dowager Lung Yu: — 



APPENDIX 895 

As a consequence of the uprising of the Republican Army, 
to which the different provinces immediately responded, the 
Empire seethed like a boiling cauldron and the people were 
plunged into utter misery. Yuan Shih-kai was, therefore, es- 
pecially commanded some time ago to dispatch commissioners 
to confer with the representatives of the Republican Army on 
the general situation and to discuss matters pertaining to the 
convening of a National Assembly for the decision of the 
suitable mode of settlement has been discovered. Separated as 
the South and the North are by great distances, the unwilling- 
ness of either side to yield to the other can result only in the 
continued interruption of trade and the prolongation of hos- 
tilities, for, so long as the form of government is undecided, the 
Nation can have no peace. It is now evident that the hearts 
of the majority of the people are in favour of a republican form 
of government : the provinces of the South were the first to 
espouse the cause, and the generals of the North have since 
pledged their support. From the preference of the people's 
hearts, the Will of Heaven can be discerned. How could We 
then bear to oppose the will of the millions for the glory of one 
Family ! Therefore, observing the tendencies of the age on the 
one hand and studying the opinions of the people on the other, 
We and His Majesty the Emperor hereby vest the sovereignty 
in the People and decide in favour of a republican form of con- 
stitutional government. Thus we would gratify on the one 
hand the desires of the whole nation who, tired of anarchy, are 
desirous of peace, and on the other hand would follow in the 
footsteps of the Ancient Sages, who regarded the Throne as the 
sacred trust of the Nation. 

Now Yuan Shih-kai was elected by the Tucheng-yuan to be 
the Premier. During this period of transference of govern- 
ment from the old to the new, there should be some means of 
uniting the South and the North. Let Yuan Shih-kai organize 
with full powers a provisional republican government and con- 
fer with the Republican Army as to the methods of union, thus 
assuring peace to the people and tranquillity to the Empire, 
and forming the one Great Republic of China by the union as 
heretofore, of the five peoples, namely, Manchus, Chinese, Mon- 



396 APPENDIX 

gols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans together with their jterrl- 
torj In its integrity. We and His Majesty the Emperor, thus 
enabled to live in retirement, free from responsibilities, and 
cares and passing the time in ease and comfort, shall enjoy with- 
out interruption the courteous treatment of the Nation and see 
Vith Our own eyes the consummation of an illustrious govern- 
ment. Is not this highly advisable? 

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by Yuan Shih-tal, the 

Premier ; 
Hoo Wei-teh, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs ; 
Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior; 
Tan Hsuch-heng, Acting Minister of Navy ; 
Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Com- 
merce ; 
Liang Shih-yl, Acting Minister of Communications ; 
Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies. 

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung. 

II 

• We have respectfully received the following Imperial Edict 
from Her Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung Yu: — 
On account of the perilous situation of the State and the 
intense sufferings of the people. We some time ago commanded 
the Cabinet to negotiate with the Republican Army the terms 
for the courteous treatment of the Imperial House, with a view 
to a peaceful settlement. According to the memorial now sub- 
mitted to Us by the Cabinet embodying the articles of courteous 
treatment proposed by the Republican Army, they undertake 
to hold themselves responsible for the perpetual offering of 
sacrifices before the Imperial Ancestral Temples and the Im- 
perial Mausolea and the completion as planned of the Man- 
soleum of His Late Majesty the Emperor Kuang Hsu. His 
Majesty the Emperor Is understood to resign only his political 
power, while the Imperial Title Is not abolished. There have 
also been concluded eight articles for the courteous treatment 
of the Imperial House, four articles for the favourable treat- 
ment of Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans, and Tibetans. We 



APPENDIX 397 

find the terms of perusal to be fairly comprehensive. We hereby 
proclaim to the Imperial Kinsmen and the Manchus, Mongols, 
Mohammedans, and Tibetans that they should endeavour in 
the future to fuse and remove all racial differences and preju- 
dices and maintain law and order with united efforts. It is our 
sincere hope that peace will once more be seen in the country and 
all the people will enjoy happiness under a republican govern- 
inent. 

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the 

Premier ; 
Hoo Wei-teh, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs ; 
Chao Ping-chun, Minister of the Interior; 
Tan Hsuen-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy ; 
Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Com- 
merce ; 
Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications ; 
Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies. 

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan Tung. 

in 

We have respectfully received the following Edict from Her 
Imperial Majesty the Empress Dowager Lung Yu: — 

In ancient times the ruler of a country emphasized the im- 
portant duty of protecting the lives of his people, and as their 
shepherd could not have the heart to cause them injur3\ Now 
the newly established form of government has for its sole object 
the appeasement of the present disorder with a view to the res- 
toration of peace. If, however, renewed warfare were to be 
indefinitely maintained, by disregarding the opinion of the ma- 
j ority of the people, the general condition of the country might 
be irretrievably ruined, and there might follow mutual slaughter 
among the people, resulting in the horrible effects of a racial 
war. As a consequence, the spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors 
might be greatly disturbed and millions of people might be ter- 
rorized. The evil consequences cannot be described. Between 
the two evils, We have adopted the lesser one. Such is the 
motive of the Throne in modelling its policy in accordance 



398 APPENDIX 

with the progress of time, the change of circumstances, and the^ 
earnest desires of Our People. Our Ministers and subjects both 
in and out of the MetropoKs should, in conformity with Our 
idea, consider most carefully the public weal and should not 
cause the country and the people to suffer from the evil conse- 
quences of a stubborn pride and of prejudiced opinions. 

The Ministry of the Interior, the General Commandant of 
the Gendarmerie, Chiang Kuei-ti, and Feng Kuo-chang, are 
ordered to take strict precautions, and to make explanations to 
the peoples so clearly and precisely as to enable every and all 
of them to understand the wish of the Throne to abide by the 
ordinance of heaven, to meet the public opinion of the people 
and to be just and unselfish. 

The institution of the different offices by the State has been 
for the welfare of the people, and the Cabinet, the various 
Ministries in the Capital, the Vice-royalties, Governorships, 
Commissionerships, and Taotaiships, have therefore been estab- 
lished for the safe protection of the people, and not for the 
benefit of one man or of one family. Metropolitan and Pro- 
vincial officials of all grades should ponder over the present 
diflticulties and carefully perform their duties. We^hereby hold 
it the duty of the senior officials earnestly to advise and warn 
their subordinates not to shirk their responsibilities, in order 
to conform with Our original sincere intention to love and to 
take care of Our people. 

Bearing the Imperial Seal and Signed by Yuan Shih-kai, the 

Premier ; 
Hoo Wei-teh, Minister of Foreign Affairs; 
Chao-ping-chun, Minister of the Interior ; 
Tan Hseuh-heng, Acting Minister of the Navy ; 
Hsi Yen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Works and Com- 
merce ; 
Liang Shih-yi, Acting Minister of Communications ; 
Ta Shou, Acting Minister of the Dependencies. 

25th day of the 12th moon of the 3rd year of Hsuan 
Tung. 



APPENDIX 899 



TERMS OF ABDICATION 

N. B. These terms are generally referred to in China as 
"The Articles of Favourable Treatments." 

A. — Concerning the Emperor. 

The Ta Ching Emperor having proclaimed a republican 
form of government, the Republic of China will accord the fol- 
lowing treatment to the Emperor after his resignation and 
retirement. 

Article 1. After abdication the Emperor may retain his 
title and shall receive from the Republic of China the respect 
due to a foreign sovereign. 

Article 2. After the abdication the Throne shall receive 
from the Republic of China an annuity of Tls. 4,000,000 until 
the establishment of a new currency, when the sum shall be 
$4,000,000. 

Article 3. After abdication the Emperor shall for the pres- 
ent be allowed to reside in the Imperial Palace, but shall later 
remove to the Eho Park, retaining his bodyguards at the same 
strength as hitherto. 

Article 4. After abdication the Emperor shall continue to 
perform the religious ritual at the Imperial Ancestral Temples 
and Mausolea, which shall be protected by guards provided by 
the Republic of China. 

Article 5. The Mausoleum of the late Emperor not being 
completed, the work shall be carried out according to the orig- 
inal plans, and the services in connexion with the removal of 
the remains of the late Emperor to the new Mausoleum shall be 
carried out as originally arranged, the expense being borne by 
the Republic of China. 

Article 6. All the retinue of the Imperial Household shall be 
employed as hitherto, but no more eunuchs shall be appointed. 

Article 7. After abdication all the private property of the 
Emperor shall be respected and protected by the Republic of 
China. 

Article 8. The Imperial Guards will be retained without 
change in members or emolument, but they will be placed under 
the control of the Department of War of the Republic of China. 



400 APPENDIX 

B. — Concerning the Imperial Clansmen. 

Article 1. Princes, Dukes and other hereditary nobility 
shall retain their titles as hitherto. 

Article 2. Imperial Clansmen shall enjoy public and private 
rights in the Republic of China on an equality with all other 
citizens. 

Article 3. The private property of the Imperial Clansmen 
shall be duly protected. 

Article 4. The Imperial Clansmen shall be exempt from 
military service. 

C. — Concerning Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and 
Tibetans. 

The Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans having 
accepted the Republic, the following terms are accorded to 
them : — 

Article 1. They shall enjoy full equality with . Chinese. 

Article 2. They shall enjoy the full protection of their^ 
private property. 

Article 3. Princes, Dukes and other hereditary nobility 
shall retain their titles as hitherto. 

Article 4. Impoverished Princes and Dukes shall be pro- 
vided with means of livelihood. 

Article 5. Provision for the livelihood of the Eight Banners, 
shall with all dispatch be made, but until such provision has 
been made the pay of the Eight Banners shall be continued as 
hitherto. 

Article 6. Restrictions regarding trade and residence that 
have hitherto been binding on them are abolished, and they shall 
now be allowed to reside and settle In any department or dis- 
trict. 

Article 7. Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and Tibetans 
shall enjoy complete religious freedom. 



APPENDIX 

DOCUMENTS IN GROUP II 

' (1) The Provisional Constitution passed at Nanking in 
January, 1912. 

(2) The Presidential Election Law passed on the 4th 
October, 1913, by the full Parliament, under which Yuan Shih 
Kai was elected President, — and now formally incorporated as 
a separate chapter in the Permanent Constitution. 
\ (3) The Constitutional Compact, promulgated on 1st May, 
191^. This "law" which was the first result of the coup d'etat 
of 4th November, 1913, and designed to take the place of the 
Nanking Constitution is wholly illegal and disappeared with 
the death of Yuan Shih Kai. 

(4) The Presidential Succession Law. 

This instrument, like the Constitutional Compact, was wholly 
illegal and drawn up to make Yuan Shih Kai dictator for life. 

THE PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION OF THE 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

Passed at Nanking in 1912, currently referred to as the old 

Constitution 

CHAPTER I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 

Article 1. The Republic of China is composed of the Chinese 
people. 

Art. 2. The sovereignty of the Chinese Republic is vested 
in the people. 

Art. 3. The territory of the Chinese Republic consists of 
the 18 provinces. Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Ching- 
hai. 

Art. 4. The sovereignty of the Chinese Republic is exer- 
cised by the National Council, the Provisional President, the 
Cabinet and the Judiciary. 

401 



402 APPENDIX 

CHAPTER n. CITIZENS 

Art. 5. Citizens of the Chinese Republic are all equal, and 
there shall be no racial class or religious distinctions. 
Art. 6. Citizens shall enjoy the following rights: — 

(a) The person of the citizens shall not be arrested, im- 
prisoned, tried or punished except in accordance with 
law. 

(b) The habitations of citizens shall not be entered or 
searched except in accordance with law. 

(c) Citizens shall enjoy the right of the security of their 
property and the freedom of trade. 

(d) Citizens shall have the freedom of speech, of composi- 
tion, of publication, of assembly and of association. 

(e) Citizens shall have the right of the secrecy of their 
letters. 

(f) Citizens shall have the liberty of residence and removal. 

(g) Citizens shall have the freedom of religion. 

Art. 7. Citizens shall have the right to petition the Par- 
liament. 

Art. 8. Citizens shall have the right of petitioning the ex- 
ecutive officials. 

Art. 9. Citizens shall have the right to institute proceed- 
ings before the Judiciary, and to receive its trial and judgment. 

Art. 10. Citizens shall have the right of suing officials in 
the Administrative Courts for violation of law or against their 
rights. 

Art. 11. Citizens shall have the right of participating in 
civil examinations. 

Art. 12. Citizens shall have the right to vote and to be 
voted for. 

Art. 13. Citizens shall have the duty to pay taxes accord- 
ing to law. 

Art. 14. Citizens shall have the duty to enlist as soldiers 
according to law. 

Art. 15. The rights of citizens as provided in the present 
Chapter shall be limited or modified by laws, provided such lim- 
itation or modification shall be deemed necessary for the promo- 



APPENDIX 403 

tion of public welfare, for the maintenance of public order, or 
on account of extraordinary exigency. 

CHAPTER III. THE NATIONAL COUNCIL, 

Art. 16. The legislative power of the Chinese Republic is 
exercised by the National Council. 

Art. 17. The Council shall be composed of members elected 
by the several districts as provided in Article 18. 

Art. 18. The Provinces, Inner and Outer Mongolia, and 
Tibet shall each elect and depute five members to the Council, 
and Chinghai shall elect one member. 

The election districts and methods of elections shall be de- 
cided by the localities concerned. 

During the meeting of the Council each member shall have one 
vote. 

Art. 19. The National Council shall have the following 
powers : 

(a) To pass all Bills. 

(b) To pass the budgets of the Provisional Government. 

(c) To pass laws of taxation of currency, and weights and 
measures for the whole country. 

(d) To pass measures for the calling of public loans and to 
conclude contracts affecting the National Treasury. 

(e) To give consent to matters provided in Articles 34, 35, 
and 40. 

(f) To reply to inquiries from the Provisional Government. 

(g) To receive and consider petitions of citizens. 

(h) To make suggestions to the Government on legal or other 
matters. 

(i) To introduce interpellations to members of the Cabinet, 
and to insist on their being present in the Council in 
making replies thereto. 

(j) To insist on the Government investigating into any al- 
leged bribery and infringement of laws by officials. 

(k) To impeach the Provisional President for high treason 
by a majority vote of three-fourths of the quorum con- 
sisting of more than four-fifths of the total number of 
the members. 



404, APPENDIX 

(1) To impeach members of the Cabinet for failure to per- 
form their official duties or for violation of the law by 
majority votes of two- thirds of the quorum consisting 
of over three-fourths of the total number of the mem- 
bers. 

Art. SO. The National Council shall itself convoke, con- 
duct and adjourn its own meetings. 

Art. 21. The meetings of the Advisory Council shall be 
conducted publicly, but secret meetings may be held at the sug- 
gestion of members of the Cabinet or by the majority vote of 
its quorum. 

Art. 22. Matters passed by the Advisory Council shall be 
communicated to the Provisional President for promulgation 
and execution. 

Art. 23. If the Provisional President should veto matters 
passed by the National Council he shall, within ten days after 
he has received such resolutions, return the same with stated 
reasons to the Council for reconsideration. If by a two-thirds 
vote of the quorum of the Council, it shall be dealt with in ac- 
cordance with Article 22. 

Art. 24. The Chairman of the National Council shall be 
elected by ballots signed by the voting members and the one 
receiving more than one-half of the total number of the votes 
cast shall be elected. 

Art. 25. Members of the National Council shall not, out- 
side the Council, be responsible for their opinion expressed and 
votes cast in the Council. 

Art. 26. Members of the Council shall not be arrested with- 
out the permission of the Chairman of the Council except for 
crimes pertaining to civil and international warfare. 

Art. 27. Procedure of the National Council shall be de- 
cided by its own members. 

Art. 28. The National Council shall be dissolved on the day 
of the convocation of the National Assembly, and its powers 
shall be exercised by the latter. 



APPENDIX 405 

CHAPTEK. IV. THE PEOVISIONAL PKESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT 

Art. 29. The Provisional President and Vice-President 
shall be elected by the National Council, and he who receives 
two-thirds of the total number of votes cast by a sitting of the 
Council consisting of over three-fourths of the total number 
of members shall be elected. 

Art. 30. The Provisional President represents the Provi- 
sional Government as the fountain of all executive powers and 
for promulgating all laws. 

Art. 31. The Provisional President may issue or cause to 
be issued orders for the execution of laws and of powers dele- 
gated to him by the law. 

Art. 32. The Provisional President shall be the Com- 
mander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the whole of China. 

Art. 33. The Provisional President shall ordain and estab- 
lish the administrative system and official regulations, but he 
must first submit them to the National Council for its approval. 

Art. 34. The Provisional President shall appoint and re- 
move civil and military officials, but in the appointment of Mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, Ambassadors and Ministers he must have 
the concurrence of the National Council. 

Art. 35. The Provisional President shall have power, with 
the concurrence of the National Council, to declare war and 
conclude treaties. 

Art. 36. The Provisional President may, in accordance 
with law, declare a state of siege. 

Art. 37. The Provisional President shall, representing the 
whole country, receive Ambassadors and Ministers of foreign 
countries. 

Art. 38. The Provisional President may introduce Bills into 
the National Council. 

Art, 39. The Provisional President may confer decorations 
and other insignia of honour. 

Art. 40. The Provisional President may declare general 
amnesty, grant special pardon, commute punishment, and re- 
store rights, but in the case of a general amnesty he must have 
the concurrence of the National Council. 

Art. 41. In case the Provisional President is impeached by 



400 APPENDIX 

the National Council he shall be tried by a special Court con- 
sisting of nine judges elected among the justices of the Supreme 
Court of the realm. 

Art. 42. In case the Provisional President vacates his office 
for various reasons, or is unable to discharge the powers and 
duties of the said office, the Provisional Vice-President shall 
take his place. 

CHAPTER V. MEMBERS OP THE CABINET 

Art. 43. The Premier and the Chiefs of the Government 
Departments shall be called Members of the Cabinet (literally, 
Secretaries of State Affairs). 

Art. 44. Members of the Cabinet shall assist the Provi- 
sional President in assuming responsibilities. 

Art. 45. Members of the Cabinet shall countersign all Bills 
introduced by the Provisional President, and all laws and orders 
issued by him. 

Art. 46. Members of the Cabinet and their deputies may 
be present and speak in the National Council. 

Art. 47. Upon members of the Cabinet have been impeached 
by the National Council, the Provisional President may re- 
move them from office, but such removal shall be subject to the 
reconsideration of the National Council. 

CHAPTER VI. THE JUDICIARY 

Art. 48. The Judiciary shall be composed of those judges 
appointed by the Provisional President and the Minister of 
Justice. 

The organization of the Courts and the qualifications of 
judges shall be determined by law. 

Art. 49. The Judiciary shall try civil and criminal cases, 
but cases involving administrative affairs or arising from other 
particular causes shall be dealt with according to special laws. 

Art. 50. The trial of cases in the law Courts shall be con- 
ducted publicly, but those affecting public safety and order 
may be in camera. 

Art. 51. Judges shall be independent, and shall not be ob- 
ject to the interference of higher officials. 



APPENDIX 407 

Art. 52. Judges during their continuance in office shall not 
have their emoluments decreased and shall not be transferred 
to other offices, nor shall they be removed from office except 
when they are convicted of crimes, or of offences punishable 
according to law by removal from office. 

Regulations for the punishment of judges shall be determined 
by law. 

CHAPTER Vn. SUPPLEMENTAKY ARTICLES 

Art. 53. Within ten months after the promulgation of this 
Provisional Constitution the Provisional President shall con- 
vene a National Assembly, the organization of which and the 
laws for the election of whose members shall be decided by the 
National Council. 

Art. 54, The Constitution of the Republic of China shall 
be adopted by the National Assembly, but before the promulga- 
tion of the Constitution, the Provisional Constitution shall be 
as effective as the Constitution itself. 

Art. 55. The Provisional Constitution may be amended by 
the assent of two-thirds of the members of the National Council 
or upon the application of the Provisional President and being 
passed by over three-fourths of the quorum of the Council con- 
sisting of over four-fifths of the total number of its members. 

Art. 56. The present Provisional Constitution shall take 
effect on the date of its promulgation, and the fundamental 
articles for the organization of the Provisional Government 
shall cease to be effective on the same date. 

Sealed by 
The National Council. 

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION LAW 

Passed October 4» 1913, hy the National Assembly and prornid- 
gated by the then Provisional President on October 5 of 
the same year. 

Article 1. A citizen of the Chinese Republic, who is entitled 
to all the rights of citizenship, is 40 years or more in age and 
has resided in China for not less than ten years, is eligible for 
election as President. 



408 APPENDIX 

Art. 2. The President shall be elected by an Electoral Col- 
lege organized by the members of the National Assembly of the 
Chinese Republic. 

The said election shall be held by a quorum of two-thirds or 
more of the entire membership of the said Electoral College and 
shall be conducted by secret ballot. A candidate shall be 
deemed elected when the number of votes in his favour shall 
not be less than three-fourths of the total number of votes cast 
at the election. If no candidate secures the requisite number 
of votes after two ballotings, a final balloting shall be held with 
the two persons, securing the greatest number of votes at the 
second balloting, as candidates. The one securing a majority 
of votes shall be elected. 

Art. 3. The term of office of the President shall be five 
years ; and if re-elected, he may hold office for one more term. 

Three months previous to the expiration of the term, the 
members of the National Assembly shall convene and organize 
by themselves the Electoral College to elect the President for 
the next period. 

Art. 4. The President on taking office shall make oath as 
follows : 

"I hereby swear that I will most sincerely obey the constitu- 
tion and faithfully discharge the duties of the President." 

Art. 5. Should the post of the President become vacant, the 
Vice-President shall succeed to the same to the end of the term 
of the original President. 

Should the President be unable to discharge his duties for 
any cause the Vice-President shall act in his stead. 

Should the Vice-President vacate his post at the same time, 
the Cabinet shall officiate for the President. In this event the 
members of the National Assembly of the Chinese Republic shall 
convene themselves within three months to organize an Electoral 
College to elect a new President. 

Art. 6. The President shall vacate office on the expiry of 
his term. Should the election of the next President or Vice- 
President be not effected for any cause, or having been elected 
should they be unable to be inaugurated, the President and 



APPENDIX 409 

Vice-President whose terms have expired shall quit their posts 
and the Cabinet shall officiate for them. 

Art. 7. The election of the Vice-President shall be accord- 
ing to the fixed regulations for the election of the President, 
and the election of the Vice-President shall take place at the 
same time when the President is elected. Should there be a 
vacancy for the Vice-Presidency a Vice-President shall be 
elected according to the provisions herein set forth. 

APPENDIX 

Before the completion of the Formal Constitution, with re- 
gard to the duties and privileges of the President the Pro- 
visional Constitution regarding the same shall temporarily be 
followed. 

"THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT" 

Drafted hy Dr. Frank Johnson Goodnoze), Legal Adviser to 
Yuan Shih-kai, and promulgated on May 1, 1914- 

CHAPTER I. THE NATION ,; w' -*'•'"*'' 

Article 1. The Chung Hua Min Kuo is organized by the 
people of Chung Hua. 

i Art. 2. The sovereignty of Chung Hua Min Kuo originates 
from the whole body of the citizens. 

Art. 3. The territory of the Chung Hua Min Kuo is the 
same as that possessed by the former Empire. 

CHAPTER n. THE PEOPLE 

Art. 4. The people of the Chung Hua Min Kuo are all 
equal in law, irrespective of race, caste, or religion. 

Art. 5. The people are entitled to the following rights of 
liberty : — 

(1) No person shall be arrested, imprisoned, tried, or pun- 
ished except in accordance with law. 

(2) The habitation of any person shall not be entered or 
searched except in accordance with law. 

(3) The people have the right of possession and protection 



410 APPENDIX 

of property and the freedom of trade within the bounds of law. 

(4) The people have the right of freedom of speech, of 
writing and publication, of meeting and organizing association, 
within the bounds of law. 

(5) The people have the right of the secrecy of correspond- 
ence within the bounds of law. 

(6) The people have the liberty of residence and removal, 
within the bounds of law. 

(7) The people have freedom of religious belief, within the 
bounds of law. 

Art. 6. The people have the right to memorialize the Li 
Ta Yuan according to the provisions of law. 

Art. 7. The people have the right to institute proceedings 
at the judiciary organ in accordance with the provisions of 
law. 

Art. 8. The people have the right to petition the admin- 
istrative organs and lodge protests with the Administrative 
Court in accordance with the provisions of law. 

Art. 9. The people have the right to attend examinations 
held for securing officials and to join the public service in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of law. 

Art. 10. The people have the right to vote and to be voted 
for in accordance with the provisions of law. 

Art. 11. The people have the obligation to pay taxes ac- 
cording to the provisions of law. 

Art. 12. The people have the obligation to serve in a mili- 
tary capacity in accordance with the provisions of law. 

Art. 13. The provisions made in this Chapter, except when 
in conflict with the Army or Naval orders and rules, shall be 
applicable to military and naval men. 

CHAPTER III. THE PRESIDENT 

Art. 14. The President is the Head of the nation, and con- 
trols the power of the entire administration. 

Art. 15. The President represents the Chung Hua Min 
Kuo. 

I Art. 16. The President is responsible to the entire body of 
citizens. 



APPENDIX 4.11 

Art. 17. The President convokes the Li Fa Yuan, declares 
the opening, the suspension and the closing of the sessions. 

The President may dissolve the Li Fa Yuan with the ap- 
proval of the Tsan Cheng Yuan ; but in that case he must have 
the new members elected and the House convoked within six 
months from the day of dissolution. 
I Art. 18. The President shall submit Bills of Law and the 
Budget to the Li Fa Yuan. 

Art. 19. For the purposes of improving the public welfare 
or enforcing law or in accordance with the duties imposed upon 
him by law, the President may issue orders and cause orders to 
be issued, but he shall not alter the law by his order. 
vArt. 20. In order to maintain public peace or to prevent 
extraordinary calamities at a time of great emergency when 
time will not permit the convocation of the Li Fa Yuan, the 
President may, with the approval of the Tsan Cheng Yuan 
[Senate], issue provisional orders which shall have the force of 
law; but in that case he shall ask the Li Fa Yuan [House of 
Representative] for indemnification at its next session. 

The provisional orders mentioned above shall immediately 
become void when they are rejected by the Li Fa Yuan. 

Art. 21. The President shall fix the official systems and of- 
ficial regulations. The President shall appoint and dismiss 
military and civil officials. 

Art. 22. The President shall declare war and conclude 
peace. 

Art. 23. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of, and 
controls, the Army and Navy of the whole country. The Pres- 
ident shall decide the system of organization and the respective 
strength of the Army and Navy. 

Art. 24. The President shall receive the Ambassadors and 
Ministers of the foreign countries. 

Art. 25. The President makes treaties. 

But the approval of the Li Fa Yuan must be secured if the 
articles should change the territories or increase the burdens 
of the citizens. 

Art. 26. The President may, according to law, declare 
Martial Law. 



412 APPENDIX 

, Art. 27. The President may confer titles of nobility, dec- 
orations and other insignia of honour. 

Art. 28. The President may declare general amnesty, spe- 
cial pardon, commutation of punishment, or restoration of 
rights. In case of general amnesty the approvalof the Li Fa 
Yuan must be secured. 

Art. 29. When the President, for any cause, vacates his 
post or is unable to attend to his duties, the Vice-President shall 
assume his duties and authority in his stead. 

CHAPTEK IV. THE LEGISLATURE 

Art. SO. Legislation shall be done by the Legislature or- 
ganized with the members elected by the people. 

The organization of the Legislature and the method of elect- 
ing the legislative members shall be fixed by the Provisional Con- 
stitution Conference. 

Art. 31. The duties and authorities of the Li Fa Yuan 
shall be as follows: 
1 (1) To discuss and pass all bills of law. 
• (2) To discuss and pass the Budget. 

; (3) To discuss and pass or approve articles relating to 
raising of public loans and national financial responsibilities. 

(4) To reply to the inquiries addressed to it by the Govern- 
ment. 

(5) To receive petitions of the people. 

(6) To bring up bills on law. 

(7) To bring up suggestions and opinions before the Presi- 
dent regarding law and other affairs. 

(8) To bring out the doubtful points of the administration 
and request the President for an explanation; but when the 
President deems it necessary for a matter to be kept secret he 
may refuse to give the answer. 

(9) Should the President attempt treason the Li Fa Yuan 
may institute judicial proceedings in the Supreme Court against 
him by a three-fourths or more vote of a four-fifths attendance 
of the total membership. 

Regarding the clauses from 1 to 8 and articles 20, 25, 28, 55 
and 27, the approval of a majority of more than half of the 
attending members will be required to make a decision. 



APPENDIX 413 

Art. S9. The regular annual session of the Li Fa Yuan 
will be four months in duration ; but when the President deems 
it necessary it may be prolonged. The President may also call 
special sessions when it is not in session. 

Art. 33. The meetings of the Li Fa Yuan shall be "open 
sessions," but they may be held in secret at the request of the 
President or the decision of the majority of more than half of 
the members present. 

Art. 34. The law bills passed by the Li Fa Yuan shall be 
promulgated by the President and enforced. 

When the President vetoes a law bill passed by the Li Fa 
Yuan he must give the reason and refer it again to the Li Fa 
Yuan for reconsideration. If such bill should be again passed 
by a two-thirds vote of the members present at the Li Fa Yuan 
but at the same time the President should firmly hold that it 
would greatly harm the internal administration or diplomacy 
to enforce such law or there will be great and important ob- 
stacles against enforcing it, he may withhold promulgation 
with the approval of the Tsan Cheng Yuan. 

Art. 35. The Speaker and vice-Speaker of the Li Fa Yuan 
shall be elected by and from among the members themselves by 
ballot. The one who secures more than half of the votes cast 
shall be considered elected. 

Art. 36. The members of the Li Fa Yuan shall not be held 
responsible to outsiders for their speeches, arguments and vot- 
ing in the House. 

Art. 37. Except when discovered in the act of committing 
a crime or for internal rebellion or external treason, the mem- 
bers of the Li Fa Yuan shall not be arrested during the session 
period without the permission of the House. 

Art. 38. The House laws of the Li Fa Yuan shall be made 
by the House itself. 

CHAPTER V. THE ADMINISTRATION 

Art. 39. The President shall be the Chief of the Admin- 
istration. A Secretary of State shall be provided to assist 
him. 

Art. 40. The affairs of the Administration shall be sepa- 



414 APPENDIX 

rately administered by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, of In- 
terior, of Finance, of Army, of Navy, of Justice, of Education, 
of Agriculture and Commerce and of Communications. 

Art. 41. The Minister of each Ministry shall control the 
affairs in accordance with law and orders. 

Art. 42. The Secretary of State, Ministers of the Min- 
istries and the special representative of the President may take 
seats in the Li Fa Yuan and express their views. 

, Art. 43. The Secretary of State or any of the Ministers 
when they commit a breach of law shall be liable to impeach- 
ment by the Censorate (Suchengting) and trial by the Ad- 
ministrative Court. 

CHAPTER VI. THE JUDICIARY 

Art. 44. The judicial power shall be administered by the 
Judiciary formed by the judicial officials appointed by the 
President. 

The organization of the Judiciary and the qualifications of 
the Judicial officials shall be fixed by law. 

Art. 45. The Judiciary shall independently try and decide 
cases of civil and criminal law suits according to law. But with 
regard to administrative law suits and other special law cases 
they shall be attended to according to the provisions of this 
law. 

Art. 46. As to the procedure the Supreme Court should 
adopt for the impeachment case stated in clause 9 of article 31, 
special rules will be made by law. 

Art. 47. The trial of law suits in the judicial courts should 
be open to the public ; but when they are deemed to be harmful 
to peace and order or good custom, they may be held in camera. 

Art. 48. The judicial officials shall not be given a reduced 
salary or shifted from their posts when functioning as such, 
and except when a sentence has been passed upon him for pun- 
ishment or he is sentenced to be removed, a judicial official shall 
not be dismissed from his post. 

The regulations regarding punishment shall be fixed by 
law. 



APPENDIX 415 

CHAPTER VII. THE TSAN CHENG YUAN 

Art. 49. The Tsan Cheng Yuan shall answer the inquiries 
of the President and discuss important administrative affairs. 

The organization of the Tsan Cheng Yuan shall be fixed hj 
the Provisional Constitution Conference. 

CHAPTER Vni. FINANCES 

Art. 50. Levying of new taxes and dues and change of 
tarijfF shall be decided by law. 

The taxes and dues which are now in existence shall con- 
tinue to be collected as of old except as changed by law. 

Art. 51. With regard to the annual receipts and expendi- 
tures of the nation, they shall be dealt with in accordance with 
the Budget approved by the Li Fa Yuan. 

Art. 52. For special purposes continuous expenditures for 
a specified number of years may be included in the budget. 

Art. 53. To prepare for any deficiency of the budget and 
expenses needed outside of the estimates in the budget, a special 
reserve fund must be provided in the budget. 
|,,.Art. 54. The following items of expenditures shall not be 
cancelled or reduced except with the approval of the Presi- 
dent : — 

1. Any duties belonging to the nation according to law. 

2. Necessities stipulated by law. 

3. Necessities for the purpose of carrying out the treaties. 

4. Expenses for the Army and Navy. ""^ 
Art. 55. For national war or suppression of internal dis- 
turbance or under unusual circumstances when time will not 
permit to convoke the Li Fa Yuan, the President may make 
emergency disposal of finance with the approval of the Tsan 
Cheng Yuan, but in such case he shall ask the Li Fa Yuan for 
indemnification at its next session. 

Art. 56. When a new Budget cannot be established, the 
Budget of the previous year will be used. The same procedure 
will be adopted when the Budget fails to pass at the time when 
the fiscal year has begun. 

Art. 57. When the closed accounts of the receipts and ex- 
penditures of the nation have been audited by the Board of 



416 APPENDIX 

Audit, t-hey shall be submitted by the President to the Li Fa 
Yuan for approval. 

Art. 58. The organization of the Board of Audit shall be 
fixed by the Provisional Constitution Conference. 

CHAPTER IX. PROCEDURE OF CONSTITUTION MAKING 

"t»^rt. 59. The Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo shall 
be drafted by the Constitution Draft Committee, which shall 
be organized with the members elected by and from among the 
members of the Tsan Cheng Yuan. The number of such draft- 
ing Committee shall be limited to ten. 

Art. 60. The Bill on the Constitution of Chung Hua Min 
Kuo shall be fixed by the Tsan Cheng Yuan. 

Art. 61. When the Bill on the Constitution of the Chung 
Hua Min Kuo has been passed by the Tsan Cheng Yuan, it 
shall be submitted by the President to the Citizens' Conference 
for final passage. 

The organization of the Citizens' Conference shall be fixed by 
the Provisional Constitution Conference. 

Art. 62. The Citizens' Conference shall be convoked and 
dissolved by the President. 

Art. 63. The Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo shall be 
promulgated by the President. 

CHAPTER X. APPENDIX 

{/Art. 64. — Before the Constitution of Chung Hua Min Kuo 
comes into force this Provisional Constitution shall have equal 
force to the Permanent Constitution. 

The order and instructions in force before the enforcement 
of this Provisional Constitution shall continue to be valid, pro- 
vided that they do not come into conflict with the provisions of 
this Provisional Constitution. 

Art. 65. The articles published on the 12th of the Second 
Month of the First Year of Chung Hua Min Kuo, regarding the 
favourable treatment of the Ta Ching Emperor after his abdi- 
cation, and the special treatment of the Ching Imperial Clan, as 
well as the special treatment of the Manchus, Mongols, Ma- 
homedans and Tibetans shall never lose their ejffect. 



/ APPENDIX 417 

As to the Articles dealing with the special treatment of Mon- 
gols in connexion with the special treatment articles, it is guar- 
anteed that they shall continue to be effective, and that the 
same will not be changed except by law. 

Art. 66. This Provisional Constitution may be amended at 
the request of two-thirds .of the members of the Li Fa Yuan, or 
the proposal of the President, by a three-fourths majority of a 
quorum consisting of four-fifths or more of the whole member- 
ship of the House. The Provisional Constitution Conference 
will then be convoked by the President to undertake the amend- 
ment. 

Art. 67. Before the establishment of the Li Fa Yuan the 
Tsan Cheng Yuan shall have the duty and authority of the 
former and function in its stead. 

Art. 68. This Provisional Constitution shall come into 
force from the date of promulgation. The Temporary Provi- 
sional Constitution promulgated on the 11th day of the Third 
Month of the First Year of the Min Kuo shall automatically 
cease to have force from the date on which this Provisional 
Constitution comes into force. 

THE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION. 

Passed by a puppet political body and promulgated by Yuan 
Shih-kai on December ^9, 1914- 

Article 1. A male citizen of the Republic of Chung Hua, 
possessing the rights of citizenship, 40 or more years of age 
and having resided in the Republic for not less than 20 years 
shall be eligible for election as President. 

Art. 2. The Presidential term shall be ten years with eli- 
gibility for re-election. 

Art. 3. At the time of the Presidential Election the then 
President shall, representing the opinion of the people carefully 
and reverently nominate (recommend) three persons, with the 
qualifications stated in the first Article, as candidates for the 
Presidential Office. 

The names of these nominated persons shall be written by the 
then President on a gold Chla-ho-plate, sealed with the National 



418 APPENDIX 

Seal and placed in a gold box, which shall be placed in a stone 
house in the residence of the President. 

The key of the box will be kept by the President while the 
keys to the Stone House shall be kept separately by the Presi- 
dent, the Chairman of the Tsan Cheng Yuan and the Secretary 
of State. The Stone House may not be opened without an 
order from the President. 

Art. 4. The Presidential Electoral College shall be organ- 
ized with the following members : 

1. Fifty members elected from the Tsan Cheng Yuan. 

2. Fifty members elected from the Li Fa Yuan. 

The said members shall be elected by ballot among the mem- 
bers themselves. Those who secure the largest number of votes 
shall be elected. The election shall be presided over by the 
Minister of Interior. If it should happen that the Li Fa Yuan 
is in session at the time of the organization of the Presidential 
Electoral College, the fifty members heading the roll of the 
House and then in the Capital, shall be automatically made 
members of the Electoral College. 

Art. 5. The Electoral College shall be convocated by the 
President and organized within three days before the electon. 

Art. 6. The house of the Tsan Cheng Yuan shall be used 
as a meeting place for the Presidential Electoral College. The 
chairman of the Tsan Cheng Yuan shall act as the chairman 
of the College. 

If the Vice-President is the chairman of the Tsan Cheng 
Yuan or for other reasons, the chairman of the Li Fa Yuan 
shall act as the chairman. 

Art. 7. On the day of the Presidential Election the Presi- 
dent shall respectfully make known to the Presidential Elec- 
toral College the names of the persons recommended by him as 
qualified candidates for the Presidential office. 

Art. 8. The Electoral College may vote for the re-election 
of the then President, besides three candidates recommended by 
him. 

Art. 9. The single ballot system will be adopted for the 
Presidential Election. There should be an attendance of not 
less than three-fourths of the total membership. One who re- 



APPENDIX 419 

ceives a two-thirds majority or greater of the total number of 
votes cast shall be elected. If no one secures a two-thirds ma- 
jority the two persons receiving the largest number of votes 
shall be put to the final vote. 

Art. 10. When the year of election arrives should the 
members of the Tsan Cheng Yuan consider it a political neces- 
sity, the then President may be re-elected for another term by 
a two-thirds majority of the Tsan Cheng Yuan without a for- 
mal election. The decision shall then be promulgated by the 
President. 

Art. 11. Should the President vacate his post before the 
expiration of his term of office a special Presidential Electoral 
College shall be organized within three days. Before the elec- 
tion takes place the Vice-President shall officiate as President 
according to the provisions of Article 29 of the Constitutional 
Compact and if the Vice-President should also vacate his post 
at the same time, or be absent from the Capital or for any other 
reasons be unable to take up the office, the Secretary of State 
shall officiate but he shall not assume the duties of clauses 1 and 
2, either as a substitute or a temporary executive. 

Art. 12. On the day of the Presidential Election, the per- 
son officiating as President or carrying on the duties as a sub- 
stitute shall notify the Chairman of the Special Presidential 
Electoral College to appoint ten members as witnesses to the 
opening of the Stone House or the Gold Box, which shall be car- 
ried reverently to the House and opened before the assembly 
and its contents made known to them. Votes shall then be 
forthwith cast for the election of one of the three candidates 
recommended as provided for in article 9. 

Art. 13. Whether at the re-election of the old President or 
the assumption office of the new President, he shall take oath 
in the following words at the time of taking over the office : 

"I swear that I shall with all sincerity adhere to the Consti- 
tution and execute the duties of the President. I reverently 
swear." 

Before the promulgation of the Constitution it shall be spe- 
cifically stated in the oath that the President shall adhere to the 
Constitutional Compact. 



420 APPENDIX 

Art. 14. The term of office for the Vice-President shall be 
the same as that of the President. Upon the expiration of the 
term, three candidates, possessing the qualifications of article 
1, shall be nominated by the re-elected or the new President, for 
election. The regulations governing the election of the Presi- 
dent shall be applicable. 

Should the Vice-President vacate his post before the expira- 
tion of his term for some reasons, the President shall proceed 
according to the provisions of the preceding article. 

Art. 15. The Law shall be enforced from the date of pro- 
mulgation. 

On the day of enforcement of this Law the Law on the Elec- 
tion of the President as promulgated on the 5th day of the 10th 
Month of the 2nd Year of the Min Kuo shaU be cancelled. 



APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS IN GROUP III 

(1) The Russo-Chinese agreement of 5th November, 1913, 
which affirmed the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. 

(2) The Russo-Chinese-Mongolian tripartite agreement of 
the 7th June, 1915, ratifying the agreement of the 5th Novem- 
ber, 1913. 

(3) The Chino- Japanese Treaties and annexes of the 25th 
May, 1915, in settlement of the Twenty-one Demands of the 
18th January, 1915. 

THE RUSSO-CHINESE AGREEMENT REGARDING 
OUTER MONGOLIA 

(Translation from the official French Text.) 

DECLARATION 

The Imperial Russian Government having formulated the 
principles on which its relations with China on the subject of 
Outer Mongolia should be based ; and the Government of the 
Republic of China having signified its approval of the afore- 
said principles, the two Governments have come to the follow- 
ing agreement: 

Article I. Russia recognizes that Outer Mongolia is placed 
under the suzerainty of China. 

Art. II. China recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia. 

Art. III. Similarly, recognizing the exclusive right of the 
Mongols of Outer Mongolia to carry on the internal administra- 
tion of autonomous Mongolia and to regulate all commercial 
and industrial questions affecting that country, China under- 
takes not to interfere in these matters, nor to dispatch troops 
to Outer Mongolia nor to appoint any civil or military officer 
nor to carry out any colonization scheme in this region. It is 
nevertheless understood that an envoy of the Chinese Govern- 

421 



422 APPENDIX 

ment may reside at Urga and be accompanied by the necessary 
staff as well as an armed escort. In addition the Chinese Gov- 
ernment may, in case of necessity, maintain her agents for the 
protection of the interests of her citizens at certain points in 
Outer Mongolia to be agreed upon during the exchange of views 
provided for in Article V of this agreement. Russia on her 
part undertakes not to quarter troops in Outer Mongolia, ex- 
cepting Consular Guards, nor to interfere in any question af- 
fecting the administration of the country and will likewise ab- 
stain from all colonization. 

Art. IV. China declares herself ready to accept the good 
offices of Russia in order to establish relations in conformity 
with the principles mentioned above and with the stipulations 
of the Russo-Mongolian Commercial Treaty of the 21st Oc- 
tober, 1912. 

Art. V. Questions affecting the interests of Russia and 
China in Outer Mongolia which have been created by the new 
conditions of affairs in that country shall be discussed at sub- 
sequent meetings. In witness whereof the undersigned, duly 
authorized to that effect, have signed and sealed the Present 
Declaration. Done in Duplicate in Peking on the 5th Novem- 
ber, 1913, corresponding to the 5th Day,of the 11th Month of 
the Second Year of the Republic of China. 
(Signed) B. Krupensky. (Signed) Sun Pao Chi. 

ADDENDUM 

In signing the Declaration of to-day's date covering Outer 
Mongolia, the undersigned Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Rus- 
sias, duly authorized to that effect, has the honour to declare 
in the name of his Government to His Excellency Monsieur Sun 
Pao Chi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China 
as follows: 

I. Russia recognizes that the territory of Outer Mongolia 
forms part of the territory of China. 

II. In all questions affecting matters of a political or ter- 
ritorial nature, the Chinese Government will come to an under- 
standing with the Russian Government by means of negotia- 



APPENDIX 423 

tions at which the authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take 
part. 

III. The discussions which have been provided for in Article 

V of the Declaration shall take place between the three con- 
tracting parties at a place to be designated by them for that 
purpose for the meeting of their delegates. 

IV. Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions 
hitherto under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, 
the Tartar General of Uliasoutai and the Chinese Amban of 
Kobdo. In view of the fact that there are no detailed maps 
of Mongolia, and that the boundaries of the administrative di- 
visions of this country are ill-defined, it is hereby agreed that 
the precise boundaries of Outer Mongolia, as well as the de- 
limitation of the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, 
shall be the subject of subsequent negotiations as provided for 
by Article V of the Declaration. 

The undersigned seizes the present occasion to renew to His 
Excellency Sun Pao Chi the assurance of his highest considera- 
tion. (Signed) B. Krupensky. 

In signing the Declaration of to-day's date covering Outer 
Mongolia, the undersigned Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
Republic of China, duly authorized to that effect, has the hon- 
our to declare in the name of his Government to His Excellency 
Monsieur Krupensky, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Rus- 
sias as follows : 

I. Russia recognizes that the territory of Outer Mongolia 
forms part of the territory of China. 

II. In all questions affecting matters of a political or ter- 
ritorial nature, the Chinese Government will come to an under- 
standing with the Russian Government by means of negotia- 
tions at which the authorities of Outer Mongolia shall take 
part. 

III. The discussions which have been provided for in Article 

V of the Declaration shall take place between the three con- 
tracting parties at a place to be designated by them for that 
purpose for the meeting of their delegates. 

IV. Autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises the regions 



424. APPENDIX 

hitherto under the jurisdiction of the Chinese Amban of Urga, 
the Tartar General of Uliasoutai and the Chinese Amban of 
Kobdo. In view of the fact that there are no detailed maps 
of Mongolia, and that the boundaries of the administrative di- 
visions of this country are ill-defined, it is hereby agreed that 
the precise boundaries of Outer Mongolia, as well as the delim- 
itation of the district of Kobdo and the district of Altai, shall 
be the subject of subsequent negotiations as provided for by 
Article V of the Declaration. 

The Undersigned seizes the present occasion to renew to His 
Excellency Monsieur Krupensky the assurance of his highest 
consideration. (Signed) Sun Pao Chi. 

SINO-RUSSO MONGOLIAN AGREEMENT 

(Translation from the French) 

The President of the Republic of China, His Imperial Magr- 
esty the Emperor of all Russias, and His Holiness the Bogdo 
Djembzoun Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan of Outer Mongolia, 
animated by a sincere desire to settle by mutual agreement 
various questions created by a new state of things in Outer 
Mongolia, have named for that purpose their Plenipotentiary 
Delegates, that is to say: 

The President of the Republic of China, General Py-Koue- 
Fang and Monsieur Tcheng-Loh, Envoy Extraordinary and 
Minister Plenipotentiary of China to Mexico ; 

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all Russias, His Coun- 
cillor of State, Alexandre Miller, Diplomatic Agent and Con- 
sul-General in Mongolia; and His Ploliness the Bogdo Djemb- 
zoun Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan of Outer Mongolia, Erdeni 
Djonan Beise Shirnin Damdin, Vice-Chief of Justice, and 
Touchetou Tsing Wang Tchakdourjab, Chief of Finance, who 
having verified their respective full powers found in good and 
due form, have agreed upon the following: 

Article 1. Outer Mongolia recognizes the SIno-Russian 
Declaration and the Notes exchanged between China and Rus- 
sia of the fifth day of the eleventh month of the second year 
of the Republic of China (23rd October, 1913. Old style.) 



APPENDIX 425 

Art. 2. Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty. 
China and Russia recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia 
forming part of Chinese territory. 

Art. 3. Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude in- 
ternational treaties with foreign powers respecting political and 
territorial questions. 

As respects questions of a political and territorial nature in 
Outer Mongolia, the Chinese Government engages to conform 
to Article II of the Note exchanged between China and Russia 
on the fifth day of the eleventh month of the second year of the 
Republic of China, 23rd October, 1913. 

Art. 4. The title: "Bogdo Djembzoun Damba Khoutou- 
khtou Khan of Outer Mongolia" is conferred by the President 
of the Republic of China. The calendar of the Republic as 
well as the Mongol calendar of cyclical signs are to be used in 
official documents. 

Art. 5. China and Russia, conformably to Article 2 and 3 
of the Sino-Russian Declaration of the fifth day of the eleventh 
month of the second year of the Republic of China, 23rd Oc- 
tober, 1913, recognize the exclusive right of the autonomous 
government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of its 
internal administration and to conclude with foreign powers 
international treaties and agreements respecting questions of 
a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous 
Mongolia. 

Art. 6. Conformably to the same Article III of the Dec- 
laration, China and Russia engage not to interfere in the sys- 
tem of autonomous internal administration existing in Outer 
Mongolia. 

Art. 7. The military escort of the Chinese Dignitary at 
Urga provided for by Article III of the above-mentioned Dec- 
laration is not to exceed two hundred men. The military es- 
corts of his assistants at Ouliassoutai, at Kobdo, and at the 
Mongolian-Kiachta are not to exceed fifty men each. If, by 
agreement with the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia, 
assistants of the Chinese Dignitary are appointed in other lo- 
calities of Outer Mongolia, their military escorts are not be 
exceed fifty men each. 



426 APPENDIX 

Art. 8. The Imperial Government of Russia is not to send 
more than one hundred and fifty men as consular guard for its 
representative at Urga. The military escorts of the Imperial 
consulates and vice-consulates of Russia, which have already 
been established or which may be established by agreement 
with the autonomous government of Outer Mongolia, in other 
localities of Outer Mongolia, are not to exceed fifty men 
each. 

Art. 9. On all ceremonial or official occasions the first place 
of honour is due to the Chinese Dignitary. He has the right, 
if necessary, to present himself in private audience with His 
Holiness Bogdo Djembzoun Damba Khoutoukhtou Khan of 
Outer Mongolia. The Imperial Representative of Russia en- 
joys the same right of private audience. 

Art. 10. The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants 
in the different localities of Outer Mongolia provided for by 
Article VII of this agreement are to exercise general control 
lest the acts of the autonomous government of Outer Mon- 
golia and its subordinate authorities may impair the suzerain 
rights and the interests of China and her subjects in auto- 
nomous Mongolia. 

Art. 11. Conformably to Article IV of the Note exchanged 
between China and Russia on the fifth day of the eleventh month 
of the second year of the Republic of China (23rd October, 
1915), the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia comprises 
the regions which were under the jurisdiction of the Chinese 
Amban at Ourga, or the Tartar-General at Ouliassoutai and of 
the Chinese Amban at Kobdo ; and connects with the boundary 
of China by the limits of the banners of the four aimaks of 
Khalkha and of the district of Kobdo, bounded by the district 
of Houloun-Bourie on the east, by Inner Mongolia on the south, 
by the Province of Sinkiang on the southwest, and by the dis- 
tricts of Altai on the West. 

The formal delimitation between China and autonomous Mon- 
golia is to be carried out by a special commission of delegates 
of China, Russia and autonomous Outer Mongolia, which shall 
set itself to the work of delimitation within a period of two 
years from the date of signature of the present Agreement. 



APPENDIX 427 

Art. 12. It is understood that customs duties are not to 
be established for goods of whatever origin they may be, im- 
ported by Chinese merchants into autonomous Outer Mongolia. 
Nevertheless, Chinese merchants shall pay all the taxes on in- 
ternal trade which have been established in autonomous Outer 
Mongolia and which may be established therein in the future, 
payable by the Mongols of autonomous Outer Mongolia. Sim- 
ilarly the merchants of autonomous Outer Mongolia, when im- 
porting any kind of goods of local production into "Inner 
China," shall pay all the taxes on trade which have been es- 
tablished in "Inner China" and which may be established therein 
in the future, payable by Chinese merchants. Goods of for- 
eign origin imported from autonomous Outer Mongolia into 
*'Inner China" shall be subject to the customs duties stipulated 
in the regulations for land trade of the seventh year of the 
reign of Kouang-Hsu (1881). 

Art. 13. Civil and criminal actions arising between Chinese 
subjects residing in autonomous Outer Mongolia are to be ex- 
amined and adjudicated by the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and 
by his assistants in the other localities of autonomous Outer 
Mongolia. 

Art. 14. Civil and criminal actions arising between Mon- 
gols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Chinese subjects re- 
siding therein are to be examined and adjudicated by the Chi- 
nese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants in the other lo- 
calities of autonomous Outer Mongolia, or their delegates, and 
the Mongolian authorities. If the defendant or accused of au- 
tonomous Outer Mongolia, the joint examination and decision 
of the case are to be held at the Chinese Dignitary's place at 
Niga and that of his assistants in the other localities of au- 
tonomous Outer Mongolia ; if the defendant or the accused is a 
Mongol of autonomous Outer Mongolia and the claimant or the 
complainment is a Chinese subject, the case is to be examined 
and decided in the same manner in the Mongolian yamen. The 
guilty are to be punished according to their own laws. The 
interested parties are free to arrange their disputes amicably 
by means of arbitrators chosen by themselves. 

Art. 15. Civil and criminal actions arising between Mon- 



428 APPENDIX 

gols of autonomous Outer Mongolia and Russian subjects re- 
siding therein are to be examined and decided conformably to 
the stipulations of Article XVI of the Russo-Mongolian Com- 
mercial protocol of 21st October, 1912. 

Art. 16. All civil and criminal actions arising between 
Chinese and Russian subjects in autonomous Outer Mongolia 
are to be examined and decided in the following manner: in an 
action wherein the claimant or the complainant is a Russian 
subject and the defendant or accused is a Chinese subject, the 
Russian Consul personally or through his delegate participates 
in the judicial trial, enjoying the same right as the Chinese 
Dignitary at Urga or his delegate or his assistants in the other 
localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia. The Russian Con- 
sul or his delegate proceeds to the hearing of the claimant and 
the Russian witnesses in the court in session, and interrogates 
the defendant and the Chinese witnesses through the medium of 
the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his delegates or of his assis- 
tants in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia ; 
the Russian Consul or his delegate examines the evidence pre- 
sented, demands security for "revindication" and has recourse 
to the opinion of experts, if he considers such expert opinion 
necessary for the elucidation of the rights of the parties, etc. ; 
he takes part in deciding and in the drafting of the judgment, 
which he signs with the Chinese Dignitary at Urga or his dele- 
gates or his assistants in the other localities of Autonomous 
Outer Mongolia. The execution of the judgment constitutes a 
duty of the Chinese authorities. 

The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his Assistants in the 
other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia may likewise 
personally or through their delegates be present at the hearing 
of an action in the Consulates of Russia wherein the defendant 
or the accused is a Russian subject and the claimant or the 
complainant is a Chinese subject. The execution of the judg- 
ment constitutes a duty of the Russian authorities. 

Art. 17. Since a section of the Kiachta-Urga-Kalgan tele- 
graph line lies in the territory of autonomous Outer Mongolia, 
it is agreed that the said section of the said telegraph line con- 
stitutes the complete property of the Autonomous Government 



APPENDIX 429 

of Outer Mongolia. The details respecting the establishment 
on the borders of that country and Inner Mongolia of a sta- 
tion to be administered by Chinese and Mongolian employes for 
the transmission of telegrams, as well as the questions of the 
tariff for telegrams transmitted and of the apportionment of 
the receipts, etc., are to be examined and settled by a special 
commission of technical delegates of China, Russia and Au- 
tonomous Outer Mongolia. 

Art. 18. The Chinese postal institutions at Urga and Mon- 
golian Kiachta remain in force on the old basis. 

Art. 19. The Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia 
will place at the disposal of the Chinese Dignitary at Urga and 
of his assistants at Ouliassoutai, Kobdo and Mongolian-Kiachta 
as well as of their staff, the necessary houses, which are to con- 
stitute the complete property of the Government of the Repub- 
lic of China. Similarly, necessary grounds in the vicinity of 
the residences of the said staff are to be granted for their 
escorts. 

Art. 20. The Chinese Dignitary at Urga and his assistants 
in the other localities of autonomous Outer Mongolia and also 
their staff are to enjoy the right to use the courier stations of 
the autonomous Mongolian Government conformably to the 
stipulations of Article XI of the Russo-Mongolian Protocol of 
21st October, 1912. 

Art. 21. The stipulations of the Sino-Russian declaration 
and the Notes exchanged between China and Russia of the 5th 
day of the 11th month of the 2nd year of the Republic of China, 
23rd October, 1913, as well as those of the Russo-Mongolian 
Commercial Protocol of the 21st October, 1912, remain in full 
force. 

Art. 22. The present Agreement, drawn up in triplicate in 
Chinese, Russian, Mongolian and French languages, comes into 
force from the day of its signature. Of the four texts which 
have been duly compared and found to agree, the French text 
shall be authoritative in the interpretation of the Present 
Agreement. 

Done at Kiachta the 7th day of the Sixth Month of the 
Fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the 



430 APPENDIX 

Twenty-fifth of May, Seventh of June, One Thousand Nine 
Hundred Fifteen. 



CHINO-JAPANESE TREATIES AND ANNEXES 

COMPLETE ENGLISH TEXT OF THE DOCUMENTS 

The followmg is an authoritative translation of the two 
Treaties and thirteen Notes exchanged between His Excellency 
the President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the 
Emperor of Japan through their respective plenipotentiaries: 

TREATY RESPECTING THE PROVINCE OF SHANTUNG 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to con- 
clude a Treaty with a view to the maintenance of general peace 
in the Extreme East and the further strengthening of the re- 
lations of friendship and good neighbourhood now existing be- 
tween the two nations, have for that purpose named as their 
Plenipotentiaries, that is to say: 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou 
Tseng-tsiang, Chung-ching, First Class Chia Ho Decoration, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

And His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, Hioki Eki, Jushit, 
Second Class of the Imperial Order of the Sacred Treasure, 
Minister Plenipotentiary, and Envoy Extraordinary: 

Who, after having communicated to each other their full 
powers and found them to be in good and due form, have agreed 
upon and concluded the following Articles : — 

Article 1. The Chinese Government agrees to give full as- 
sent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may 
hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the 
disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Ger- 
many, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to 
the Province of Shantung. 

Art. 2. The Chinese Government agrees that as regards 
the railway to be built by China herself from Chefoo or Lung- 
kow to connect with the Kiaochow-Tsinanfu railway, if Ger- 
many abandons the privilege of financing the Chefoo-Weihsien 



APPENDIX 431 

line, China will approach Japanese capitalists to negotiate for 
a loan. 

Art. 3. The Chinese Government agrees in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China 
herself as soon as possible certain suitable places in the Province 
of Shantung as Commercial Ports. 

Art. 4. The present treaty shall come into force on the day 
of its signature. 

The present treaty shall be ratified by His Excellency the 
President of the Republic of China and His Majesty the Em- 
peror of Japan, and the ratification thereof shall be exchanged 
at Tokio as soon as possible. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the 
High Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present 
Treaty, two copies in the Chinese language and two in Japan- 
ese. 

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of 
the fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the 
same day of the same month of the fourth year of Taisho. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING SHANTUNG 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th years of the Republic of 
China. 
Monsieur le Ministre. 

In the name of the Chinese Government I have the honour to 
make the following declaration to your Government : — "Within 
the Province of Shantung or along its coast no territory or 
island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power under any 
pretext." 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 



432 APPENDIX 

— Reply — 

Peking, the 25th day of the 6th 
month of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you made the follow- 
ing declaration in the name of the Chinese Government : — 
"Within the Province of Shantung or along its coast no ter- 
ritory or island will be leased or ceded to any foreign Power 
under any pretext." 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of this dec- 
laration. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Higki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Aifairs. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE OPENING OP POETS IN 

SHANTUNG 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre. 

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be 
opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in 
Article 3 of the Treaty respecting the Province of Shantung 
signed this day, will be selected and the regulations therefor, 
will be drawn up, by the Chinese Government itself, a decision 
concerning which will be made after consulting the Minister of 
Japan. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 



APPENDIX 433 

—Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you stated "that the 
places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China 
herself, as provided in Article S of the Treaty respecting the 
province of Shantung signed this day, will be selected and the 
regulations therefor, will be drawn up by the Chinese Govern- 
ment itself, a decision concerning which will be made after con- 
sulting the ]\Iinister of Japan." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Higki Kei. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE RESTORATION OF THE 
LEASED TERRITORY OF KIAOCHOW BAY 

-Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

In the name of my Government I have the honour to make 
the following declaration to the Chinese Government : — 

When, after the termination of the present war, the leased 
territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free dis- 
posal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said 
leased territory to China under the following conditions : — 

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commer- 
cial Port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan to 
be established at a place designated by the Japanese Govern- 
ment. 

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international conces- 
sion may be established. 

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and 



:434 APPENDIX 

properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure re- 
lating thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Gov- 
ernment shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before 
the restoration. 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) Hioki Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

—Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you made the follow- 
ing declaration in the name of your Government : — 

"When, after the termination of the present war the leased 
territory of Kiaochow Bay is completely left to the free dis- 
posal of Japan, the Japanese Government will restore the said 
leased territory to China under the following conditions : — 

1. The whole of Kiaochow Bay to be opened as a Commercial 
Port. 

2. A concession under the exclusive jurisdiction of Japan 
to be established at a place designated by the Japanese Gov- 
ernment. 

3. If the foreign Powers desire it, an international concession 
may be established. 

4. As regards the disposal to be made of the buildings and 
properties of Germany and the conditions and procedure relat- 
ing thereto, the Japanese Government and the Chinese Govern- 
ment shall arrange the matter by mutual agreement before the 
restoration." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of this declara- 
tion. 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 



APPENDIX 435 

TREATY RESPECTING SOUTH MANCHURIA AND EASTERN INNER 

MONGOLIA 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and 
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, having resolved to con- 
clude a Treaty with a view to developing their economic rela- 
tions in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, have 
for that purpose named as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to 
say; 

His Excellency the President of the Republic of China, Lou 
Tseng-tsiang, Cliung-climg, First Class Chia-ho Decoration, 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs; And His Majesty the Em- 
peror of Japan, Hioki Eki, Jushii, Second Class of the Imperial 
Order of the Sacred Treasure, Minister Plenipotentiary and 
Envoy Extraordinary ; 

Who, after having communicated to each other their full 
powers, and found them to be in good and due form, have 
agreed upon and concluded the following Articles : — 

Article 1. The two High Contracting Parties agree that 
the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny and the terms of 
the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung-Mukden Rail- 
way, shall be extended to 99 years. 

Art. 2. Japanese subjects in South Manchuria may, by 
negotiation, lease land necessary for erecting suitable buildings 
for trade and manufacture or for prosecuting agricultural en- 
terprises. 

Art. 3. Japanese subjects shall be free to reside and travel 
in South Manchuria and to engage in business and manufacture 
of any kind whatsoever. 

Art. 4. In the event of Japanese and Chinese desiring 
jointly to undertake agricultural enterprises and industries in- 
cidental thereto, the Chinese Government may give its permis- 
sion. 

Art. 5. The Japanese subjects referred to in the preceding 
three articles, besides being required to register with the local 
Authorities passports which they must procure under the exist- 
ing regulations, shall also submit to the police laws and ordi- 
nances and taxation of China. 

Civil and criminal cases in which the defendants are Jap- 



436 APPENDIX 

anese shall be tried and adjudicated by the Japanese Consul: 
those in which the defendants are Chinese shall be tried and 
adjudicated by Chinese Authorities. In either case an officer 
may be deputed to the court to attend the proceedings. But 
mixed civil cases between Chinese and Japanese relating to 
land shall be tried and adjudicated by delegates of both na- 
tions conjointly in accordance with Chinese law and local 
usage. 

When, in future, the judicial system in the said region is 
completely reformed, all civil and criminal cases concerning 
Japanese subjects shall be tried and adjudicated entirely by 
Chinese law courts. 

Art. 6. The Chinese Government agrees, in the interest of 
trade and for the residence of foreigners, to open by China her- 
self, as soon as possible, certain suitable places In Eastern In- 
ner Mongolia as Commercial Ports. 

Art. 7. The Chinese Government agrees speedily to make 
a fundamental revision of the Kirin-Changchun Railway Loan 
Agreement, taking as a standard the provisions in railway loan 
agreements made heretofore between China and foreign finan- 
ciers. 

When in future, more advantageous terms than those in 
existing railway loan agreements are granted to foreign finan- 
ciers in connection with railway loans, the above agreement shall 
again be revised in accordance with Japan's wishes. 

Art. 8. All existing treaties between China and Japan re- 
lating to Manchuria shall, except where otherwise provided for 
by this Treaty, remain in force. 

Art. 9. The present Treaty shall come into force on the 
date of its signature. The present Treaty shall be ratified by 
His Excellency the President of the Republic of China and His 
Majesty the Emperor of Japan, and the ratifications thereof 
shall be exchanged at Tokio as soon as possible. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries of the two 
High Contracting Parties have signed and sealed the present 
Treaty, two copies in the Chinese language and two in 
Japanese. 

Done at Peking this twenty-fifth day of the fifth month of 



APPENDIX 437 

the fourth year of the Republic of China, corresponding to the 
same day of the same month of the fourth year of Taisho. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES 

Respecting the Terms of Lease of Port Arthur and Dalny 
and the Terms of South Manchurian and Antung-Mukden Rail- 
•ways. 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4the year of the Republic of 
China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that, respecting the provisions 
contained in Article 1 of the Treaty relating to South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed this day, the term 
of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall expire in the 86th year 
of the Republic or 1997. The date for restoring the South 
Manchuria Railway to China shall fall due in the 91st year of 
the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the original South Man- 
churian Railway Agreement providing that it may be redeemed 
by China after 36 years from the day on which the traffic is 
opened is hereby cancelled. The term of the Antung-Mukden 
Railway shall expire in the 96th year of the Republic or 2007. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

—Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date, in which you stated that re- 
specting the provisions contained in Article 1 of the Treaty re- 
lating to South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, signed 
this day, the term of lease of Port Arthur and Dalny shall ex- 
pire in the 86th year of the Republic or 1997. The date for 
restoring the South Manchurian Railway to China shall fall 



438 APPENDIX 

due in the 91st year of the Republic or 2002. Article 12 in the 
original South Manchurian Railway Agreement providing that 
it may be redeemed by China after 36 years from the day on 
which the traffic is opened, is hereby cancelled. The term of 
the Antung-Mukden Railway shall expire in the 96th year of 
the Republic or 2007. 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE OPENING OE PORTS IN 
EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of 
China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that the places which ought to be 
opened as Commercial Ports by China herself, as provided in 
Article 6 of the Treaty respecting'South Manchuria and East- 
ern Inner Mongolia signed this day, will be selected, and the 
regulations therefor, will be drawn up, by the Chinese Govern- 
ment itself, a decision concerning which will be made after 
consulting the Minister of Japan. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

-Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 



APPENDIX 439 

cellency's note of this day's date in which you stated "that the 
places which ought to be opened as Commercial Ports by China 
herself, as provided in Article 6 of the Treaty respecting South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day, will 
be selected, and the regulations therefor, will be drawn up, by 
the Chinese Government itself, a decision concerning which will 
be made after consulting the Minister of Japan." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 

His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

SOUTH MANCHURIA 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of 
China. 

Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that Japanese subjects shall, as 
soon as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas 
in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being 
prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government will 
then permit them to prospect or work the same ; but before the 
Mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice at pres- 
ent in force shall be followed. Provinces Fenfftien: — 



Locality 


District 


Mineral 


Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 


Coal 


Tien Shih Fu Kou 


a 


cc 


Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 


it 


T'ieh Ch'ang 


Tung-hua 


te 


Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin 


66 


An Shan Chan region 


From Liaoyang 






to Pen-hsi 


Iron 



440 



APPENDIX 



KiRIN 


{Southern portion) 




Locality 


District 


Mineral 


Sha Sung Kang 


Ho-lung 


C. &I. 


Kang Yao 


Chi-lin (Kir in) 


Coal 


Chia P'i Kou 


Hua-tien 

I avail, etc., 


Gold 


His Excellency, 


(Signed) Lou 


TSENG-TSIANG. 


Hioki Eki, 






Japanese Minister. 


"RoT^llT 





Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 

^ ,, of the 4th year of Taisho. 

Excellency, "^ 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day respecting the opening of mines in 
South Manchuria, stating; "Japanese subjects shall, as soon 
as possible, investigate and select mines in the mining areas 
in South Manchuria specified hereinunder, except those being 
prospected for or worked, and the Chinese Government will 
then permit them to prospect and or work the same ; but before 
the Mining regulations are definitely settled, the practice at 
present in force shall be followed. 

1 Provinces Fengtien. 



Locality 


District 




Mineral 


1. Niu Hsin T'ai 


Pen-hsi 






Coal 


2. Tien Shih Fu Kou 


(( 






i( 


3. Sha Sung Kang 


Hai-lung 






(t 


4. T'ieh Ch'ang 


Tung-hua 






a 


5. Nuan Ti T'ang 


Chin 






it 


6. An Shan Chan region From Liaoyang 










to Pen-hsi 






Iron 


KlEIN 


(SoutJiern portion) 






1. Sha Sung Kang 


Ho-lung 






C. &L 


2. Kang Yao 


Chi-lin (Kirin) 






Coal 


3. Chia P'i Kou 


Hua-tien 
I avail, etc.. 






Gold 


His Excellency, 


(SJ 


igned) 


HioKi Eki. 



Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. 



APPENDIX 441 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING RAILWAYS AND TAXES IN SOUTH 
MANCHURIA AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA 

— Note — 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Repubhc of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of my Government. 

I have the honour to make the following declaration to your 
Government : — 

China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary 
railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia; if 
foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan 
with Japanese capitalists first ; and further, the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, when making a loan in future on the security of the 
taxes in the above-mentioned places (excluding the salt and 
customs revenue which have already been pledged by the Chi- 
nese Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese 
capitalists first. 

I avail, etc. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

—Reply — 

Peking, the 25th day of the'Sth month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excel- 
lency's note of this day's date respecting railways and taxes 
in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia in which you 
stated: 

"China will hereafter provide funds for building necessary 
railways in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia ; 
if foreign capital is required China may negotiate for a loan 
with Japanese capitalists first ; and further, the Chinese Gov- 
ernment, when making a loan in future on the security of 
taxes in the above mentioned places (excluding the salt and 
customs revenue which has already been pledged by the Chinese 



442 APPENDIX 

Central Government) may negotiate for it with Japanese cap- 
italists first. 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, Signed) Hioki Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE EMPIiOYMENT OF ADVISERS 
IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

In the name of the Chinese Government, I have the honour 
to make the following declaration to your Government: — 

"Hereafter, if foreign advisers or instructors on political, 
financial, military or police matters are to be employed in South 
Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

— Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your 
Excellency's note of this day's date in which you made the fol- 
lowing declaration in the name of your Government: — 

"Hereafter if foreign advisers or instructors in political, 
financial, military or police matters are to be employed in 
South Manchuria, Japanese may be employed first." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 
His Excellency, (Signed) Hioki Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



APPENDIX 443 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE EXPLANATION OF "lEASE 
BY negotiation" IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 

— Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to state that the term lease by negotiation 
contained in Article 2 of the Treaty respecting South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day shall 
be understood to imply a long-term lease of not more than 
thirty years and also the possibility of its unconditional 
renewal. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 

—Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you state. 

"The term lease by negotiation contained in Article 2 of the 
Treaty respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mon- 
golia signed this day shall be understood to imply a long-term 
lease of not more than thirty years and also the possibility of 
its unconditional renewal." 

In reply I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 



444 APPENDIX 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE ARRANGEMENT FOR POIilCE 

LAWS AND ORDINANCES AND TAXATION IN SOUTH MANCHURIA 

AND EASTERN INNER MONGOLIA 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that the Chinese Authorities will 
notify the Japanese Consul of the police laws and ordinances 
and the taxation to which Japanese subjects shall submit ac- 
cording to Article 5 of the Treaty respecting South Manchuria 
and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed this day so as to come to 
an understanding with him before their enforcement. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

— Reply — 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you state: 

*'The Chinese Authorities will notify the Japanese Consul of 
the Police laws and ordinances and the taxation to which Jap- 
anese subjects shall submit according to Article 5 of the Treaty 
respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
signed this day so as to come to an understanding with him 
before their enforcement." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



APPENDIX 445 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that, inasmuch as preparations 
have to be made regarding Articles 2, 3, 4 & 5 of the Treaty 
respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia 
signed this day, the Chinese Government proposes that the 
operation of the said Articles be postponed for a period of 
three months beginning from the date of the signing of the 
said Treaty. 

I hope your Government will agree to this proposal. 
I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

-Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 
of the 4th year of Taisho. 
Excellency, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Ex- 
cellency's note of this day's date in which you stated that 
"inasmuch as preparations have to be made regarding Articles 
2, 3, 4 & 5 the Treaty respecting South Manchuria and East- 
ern Inner Mongolia signed this day, the Chinese Government 
proposes that the operation of the said Articles be postponed 
for a period of three months beginning from the date of the 
signing of the said Treaty." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs, 



446 APPENDIX 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES RESPECTING THE MATTER OF HANYEHPING 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to state that if in future the Hanyehping 
Company and the Japanese capitahsts agree upon co-operation, 
the Chinese Government, in view of the intimate relations sub- 
sisting between the Japanese capitalists and the said Company, 
will forthwith give its permission. The Chinese Government 
further agrees not to confiscate the said Company, nor, without 
the consent of the Japanese capitalists to convert it into a 
state enterprise, nor cause it to borrow and use foreign capital 
other than Japanese. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 

. Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 

—Reply- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month 

^ „ of the 4th year of Taisho. 

Excellency, *^ 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your 
Excellency's note of this day's date in which you state: 

"If in future the Hanyehping Company and the Japanese 
capitalists agree upon co-operation, the Chinese Government, 
in view of the intimate relations subsisting between the Japan- 
ese capitalists and the said Company, will forthwith give its 
permission. The Chinese Government further agrees not to 
confiscate the said Company, nor, without the consent of the 
Japanese capitalists to convert it into a state enterprise, nor 
cause it to borrow and use foreign capital other than Jap- 
anese." 

In reply, I beg to state that I have taken note of the same. 

I avail, etc.. 
His Excellency, (Signed) Hioki Eki. 

Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Affairs. 



APPENDIX 447 

EXCHANGE OF NOTES KESPECTING THE FUKIEN QUESTION 

—Note- 
Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Excellency, 

A report has reached me to the effect that the Chinese Gov- 
ernment has the intention of permitting foreign nations to 
establish, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock-yards, coaling 
stations for military use, naval bases, or to set up other mili- 
tary establishments ; and also of borrowing foreign capital for 
the purpose of setting up the above-mentioned establishments. 
I have the honour to request that Your Excellency will be 
good enough to give me reply stating whether or not the Chi- 
nese Government really entertains such an intention. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Hioki Eki. 
His Excellency, 
Lou Tseng-tsiang, 

Minister of Foreign Aifairs. 

— Reply — 

Peking, the 25th day of the 5th month of 
the 4th year of the Republic of China. 
Monsieur le Ministre, 

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excel- 
lency's note of this day's date which I have noted. 

In reply I beg to inform you that the Chinese Government 
hereby declares that it has given no permission to foreign 
nations to construct, on the coast of Fukien Province, dock- 
yards, coaling stations for military use, naval bases, or to set 
up other military establishment ; nor does it entertain an inten- 
tion of borrowing foreign capital for the purpose of setting 
up the above-mentioned establishmments. 

I avail, etc., 

(Signed) Lou Tseng-tsiang. 
His Excellency, 
Hioki Eki, 

Japanese Minister. 



APPENDIX 
DOCUMENTS IN GROUP IV 

>(1) The Draft of the Permanent Constitution completed in 
May, 1917. 

%iiS^) The proposed Provincial System, i.e., the local govern- 
ment law. 

(3) Memorandum by the Ministry of Commerce on Tariff Re- 
vision, illustrating the anomalies of present trade taxation. 

(4) The leading outstanding cases between China and the 
Foreign Powers. 

DRAFT OF THE NATIONAL CONSTITUTION OF CHINA 

(As it stood on May 28th, 1917, in its second reading at the 
Constitutional Conference.) 

The Constitutional Conference of the Republic of China, in 
order to enhance the national dignity, to unite the national 
dominion, to advance the interest of society and to uphold the 
sacredness of humanity, hereby adopt the following constitu- 
tion which shall be promulgated to the whole country, to be 
universally observed, and handed down unto the end of time. 

CHAPTER I. THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT 

Article 1. The Republic of China shall forever be a con- 
solidated Republic. 

CHAPTER II. NATIONAL TERRITORY 

Art. 2. The National Territory of the Republic of China 
shall be in accordance with the dominion hithertofore existing. 

No change in National Territory and its divisions can be 
made save in accordance with the law. 

CHAPTER .... GOVERNING AUTHORITY 

Art The power of Government of the Republic of 

China shall be derived from the entire body of citizens. 

448 



APPENDIX 449 

CHAPTER in. THE CITIZENS 

Art. 3. Those who are of Chinese nationahty according to 
law shall be called the citizens of the Republic of China. 

Art. 4f. Among the citizens of the Republic of China, 
there shall be, in the eyes of the law, no racial, class, or 
religious distinctions, but all shall be equal. 

Art. 5. No citizens of the Republic of China shall be 
arrested, detained, tried, or punished save in accordance with 
the law. Whoever happens to be detained in custody shall be 
entitled, on application therefore, to the immediate benefit of 
the writ of habeas corpus, bringing him before a judicial court 
of competent jurisdiction for an investigation of the case and 
appropriate action according to law. 

Art. 6. The private habitations of the citizens of the Re- 
public of China shall not be entered or searched except in 
accordance with the law. 

Art. 7. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
the right of secrecy of correspondence, which may not be vio- 
lated except as provided by law. 

Art. 8. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
liberty of choice of residence and of profession which shall be 
unrestricted except in accordance with law. 

Art. 9. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
liberty to call meetings or to organize societies which shall be 
unrestricted except in accordance with the law. 

Art. 10. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
freedom of speech, writing and publication which shall be 
unrestricted except in accordance with the law. 

Art. 11. The citizens of the Republic of China shall be 
entitled to honour Confucius and shall enjoy freedom of re- 
ligious belief which shall be unrestricted except in accordance 
with the law. 

Art. 12. The citizens of the Republic of China shall enjoy 
the inviolable right to the security of their property and any 
measure to the contrary necessitated by public interest shall be 
determined by law. 

Art The citizens of the Republic of China shall enjoy 

all other forms of freedom aside from those hithertofore men- 



450 APPENDIX 

tioned, provided they are not contrary to the spirit of the 
Constitution. 

Art. 13. The citizens of the RepubHc of China shall have 
the right to appeal to the Judicial Courts according to law. 

Art. 14. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
the right to submit petitions or make complaints according to 
law. 

Art. 15'. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
the right to vote and to be voted for according to law. 

Art. 16. The citizens of the Republic of China shall have 
the right to hold official posts according to law. 

Art. 17. The citizens of the Republic of China shall per- 
form the obligation of paying taxes according to law. 

Art. 18. The citizens of the Republic of China shall per- 
form the obligation of military service according to law. 

Art. 19. The citizens of the Republic of China shall be 
under the obligation to receive primary education according 
to law. 

CHAPTER. IV. THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 

Art. 20. The legislative power of the Republic of China 
shall be exercised by the National Assembly exclusively. 

Art. 21. The National Assembly shall consist of a Senate 
and House of Representatives. 

Art. 22. The Senate shall be composed of the Senators 
elected by the highest local legislative assemblies and other 
electoral bodies. 

Art. 23. The House of Representatives shall be composed 
of the representatives elected by the various electoral districts 
in proportion to the population. 

Art. 24. The members of both Houses shall be elected ac- 
cording to law. 

Art. 25. In no case shall one person be a member of both 
Houses simultaneously. 

Art. 26. No member of either House shall hold any official 
post, civil or military during liis term. 

Art. 27. The qualifications of the members of either House 
shall be determined by the respective Houses. 

Art. 28. The term of office for a member of the Senate 



APPENDIX 451 

shall be six years. One-third of the members shall retire and 
new ones be elected every two years. 

Art. 29. The term of office for a member of the House of 
Representatives shall be three years. 

Art. 30. Each House shall have a President and a Vice- 
President who shall be elected from among its members, 
^^'ft. 31. The National Assembly shall itself convene, open 
and close its sessions, but as to extraordinary sessions, they 
shall be called under one of the following circumstances : 

(1) A signed request of more than one-third of the members 
of each House. 

(2) A mandate of the President. 

Art. 32. The ordinary sessions of the National Assembly 
shall begin on the first day of the eighth month in each year. 

Art. 33. The period for the ordinary session of the Na- 
tional Assembly shall be four months which may be prolonged, 
but the prolonged period shall not exceed the length of the 
ordinary session. 

Art. 34. (Eliminated.) 

Art. 35. Both Houses shall meet in joint session at the 
opening and closing of the National Assembly. 

If one House suspends its session, the other House shall do 
likewise during the same period. 

When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the Senate 
shall adjourn during the same period. 

Art. 36. The work of the National Assembly shall be con- 
ducted in the Houses separately. No bill shall be introduced in 
both Houses simultaneously. 

Art. 37. Unless there be an attendance of over half of the 
total number of members of either House, no sitting shall be 
held. 

Art. 38. Any subject discussed in either House shall be 
decided by the votes of the majority of members attending 
the sitting. The President of each House shall have a decid- 
ing vote in case of a tie. 

Art. 39. A decision of the National Assembly shall re- 
quire the decision of both Houses. 

Art. 40. The sessions of both Houses shall be held in public, 



452 APPENDIX 

except on request of the government, or decision of the Houses 
when secret sessions may be held. 

Art. 41. Should the House of Representatives consider 
either the President or the Vice-President of the Republic of 
China has committed treason, he may be impeached by the de- 
cision of a majority of over two-thirds of the members present, 
there being a quorum of over two-thirds of the total member- 
ship of the House. 

Art. 42. Should the House of Representatives consider 
that the Cabinet Ministers have violated the law, an impeach- 
ment may be instituted with the approval of over two-thirds of 
the members present. 

Art. 43. The House of Representatives may pass a vote 
of want of Confidence in the Cabinet Ministers. 

Art. 44. The Senate shall try the impeached President, 
Vice-President and Cabinet Ministers. 

With regard to the above-mentioned trial, no judgment of 
guilt or violation of the law shall be passed without the ap- 
p]*oval of over two-thirds of the members present. 

When a verdict of "Guilty" is pronounced on the President 
or Vice-President, he shall be deprived of his post, but the 
infliction of punishment shall be determined by the Supreme 
Court of Justice. 

When the verdict of "Guilty" is pronounced upon a Cabi- 
net Minister, he shall be deprived of his office and may forfeit 
his public rights. Should the above penalty be insufficient for 
his offence, he shall be tried by the Judicial Court. 

Art. .... Either of the two Houses* shall have power to 
request the government to inquire into any case of delinquency 
or unlawful act on the part of any official and to punish him 
accordingly. 

Art. 45. Both Houses shall have the right to offer sugges- 
tions to the Government. 

Art. 46. Both Houses shall receive and consider the peti- 
tions of the citizens. 

Art. 47. Members of either House may introduce inter- 
pellations to the members of the Cabinet and demand their 
attendance in the House to reply thereto. 



APPENDIX 453 

Art. 48. Members of either House shall not be responsible 
to those outside the House for opinions expressed and votes 
cast in the House. 

Art. 49. No member of either House during session shall 
be arrested or detained in custody without the permission of 
his respective House, unless he be arrested in the commission of 
the offence or act. 

When any member of either House has been so arrested, the 
government should report the cause to his respective House. 
Such member's House, during session, may with the approval 
of its members demand for the release of the arrested member 
and for temporary suspension of the legal proceedings. 

Art. 50. The annual allowances and other expenses of the 
members of both Houses shall be fixed by law. 

(chapter V on Resident Committee of the National Assembly 
with 4 articles has been eliminated.) 

CHAPTER VI. THE PRESmENT 

Art. 55. The administrative power of the Republic of China 
shall be vested in the President with the assistance of the 
Cabinet Ministers. 

* Art 56. A person of the Republic of China in the full 
enjoyment of public rights, of the age of forty years or more, 
and resident in China for at least ten years, is eligible for 
election as President. 

* Art. 57. The President shall be elected by a Presidential 
Election Convention, composed of the members of the Na- 
tional Assembly. 

For the above election, an attendance of at least two-thirds 
of the number of electors shall be required, and the voting 
shall be performed by secret ballot. The person obtaining 
three-fourths of the total votes cast shall be elected ; but should 
no definite result be obtained after the second ballot, the two 
candidates obtaining the most votes in the second ballot shall 
be voted for and the candidate receiving the majority vote 
shall be elected. 

* Art. 58. The period of office of the President shall be five 
years, and if re-elected, he may hold office for another term. 



454 APPENDIX 

Three months previous to the expiration of the term, the 
members of the National Assembly of the Republic shall them- 
selves convene and organize the President Election Convention 
to elect a President for the next term. 

* Art. 59. When the President is being inaugurated, he 
shall make an oath as follows : "I hereby solemnly swear that 
I wiU most faithfully obey the Constitution and discharge the 
duties of the President." 

* Art. 60. Should the post of the President become vacant, 
the Vice-President shall succeed him until the expiration of 
the term of office of the President. Should the President be 
unable to discharge his duties for any cause, the Vice-Presi- 
dent shall act for him. 

Should the Vice-President vacate his post at the same time, 
the Cabinet shall officiate for the President, but at the same 
time, the members of the National Assembly shall within three 
months convene themselves and organize the Presidential Elec- 
tion Convention to elect a new President. 

* Art. 61. The President shall be relieved of his office at the 
expiration of his term of his office. If, at the end of the period, 
the new President has not been elected, or, having been elected, 
be unable to assure office and when the Vice-President is also 
unable to act as President, the Cabinet shall officiate for the 
President. 

* Art. 62. The election of the Vice-President shall be in ac- 
cordance with the regulations fixed for the election of the Presi- 
dent ; and the election of the Vice-President shall take place 
simultaneously with the election of the President. Should the 
post of the Vice-President become vacant, a new Vice-President 
shall be elected. 

Art. 63. The President shall promulgate all laws and su- 
pervise and secure their enforcement. 

Art. 64. The President may issue and publish mandates 
for the execution of laws in accordance with the powers dele- 
gated to him by the law. 

Art. 65. (Eliminated.) 

Art. 66. The President shall appoint and remove aU civil 



APPENDIX 4^55 

and military officials, with the exception of those specially 
provided for by the Constitution or laws. 

Art. 67. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the Republic. 

i^.The organization of the Army and Navy shall be fixed by 
law. 

Art, 68. Intercourse with foreign countries, the President 
shall be the representative of the Republic. 

LA:rt. 69. The President may, with the concurrence of the 
National Assembly, declare war, but, in case of defence against 
foreign invasion, he may request recognition of the National 
Assembly after the declaration of the war. 

Art. 70. The President may conclude treaties ; but with 
regards to treaties of peace, and those effecting legislation, 
they shall not be valid, if the consent of the National Assembly 
is not obtained. 

vArt. 71. The President may proclaim martial law accord- 
ing to law; but if the National Assembly should consider that 
there is no such necessity, he should declare the withdrawal 
of the martial law. 

Art. 72. (Eliminated.) 
j,Art. 73. The President may, with the concurrence of the 
Supreme Court of Justice, grant pardons, commute punishment, 
and restore rights ; but with regard to a verdict of impeach- 
ment, unless with the concurrence of the National Assembly, 
he shall not make any announcement of the restoration of 
rights. 

Art. 74. The President may suspend the session of either 
the Senate or the House of Representatives for a period not 
exceeding ten days, but during any one session, he may not 
exercise this right more than once. 

I-Art. 75. With the concurrence of two-thirds or more of 
the members of the Senate present, the President may dissolve 
the House of Representatives, but there must not be a second 
dissolution during the period of the same session. 

When the House of Representatives is dissolved by the 
President, another election shall take place immediately, and 



456 APPENDIX 

the convocation of the House at a fixed date within five months 
should be effected to continue the session. 

Art. 76. With the exception of high treason, no criminal 
charges shall be brought against the President before he has 
vacated his office. 

Art. 77. The salaries of the President and Vice-President 
shall be fixed by law. 

CHAPTER Vn. THE CABINET 

Art. 78. The Cabinet shall be composed of the Cabinet 
Ministers. 

Art. 79. The Premier and the Ministers of the various min- 
istries shall be called the Cabinet Ministers. 

Art. 80. The appointment of the Premier shall be approved 
by the House of Representatives. 

Should a vacancy in the Premiership occur during the time 
of adjournment of the National Assembly, the President may 
appoint an Acting-Premier, but it shall be required that the 
appointment must be submitted to the House of Representa- 
tives for approval within seven days after the convening of 
the next session. 

Art. 81. Cabinet Ministers shall assist the President and 
shall be responsible to the House of Representatives. 

Without the counter-signature of the Cabinet Minister to 
whose Ministry the Mandate or dispatch applies, the mandate 
or dispatch of the President in connection with State affairs 
shall not be valid ; but this shall not apply to the appointment 
or dismissal of the Premier. 

.Art. 82. When a vote of want of confidence in the Cabi- 
net Ministers is passed, if the President does not dissolve .the 
House of Representatives according to the provisions made in 
Art. 75, he should remove the Cabinet Ministers. 

Art. 83. The Cabinet Ministers shall be allowed to attend 
both Houses and make speeches, but in case of introducing 
bills for the Executive Department, their delegates may act for 
them. 



APPENDIX 45T 

CHAPTER Vni. COURTS OF JUSTICE 

Art. 84. The Judicial authority of the Republic of China 
shall be exercised by the Courts of Justice exclusively. 

Art. 85. The organization of the Courts of Justice and 
the qualifications of the Judges shall be fixed by law. 

The appointment of the Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court 
should have the approval of the Senate. 

Art. 86. The Judiciary shall attend to and settle all civil, 
criminal administrative and other cases, but this does not 
include those cases which have been specially provided for by 
the Constitution or law. 

Art. 87. The trial of cases in the law courts shall be con- 
ducted publicly, but those affecting public peace and order or 
propriety may be held in camera. 

Art. 88. The Judges shall be independent in the conducting 
of trials and none shall be allowed to interfere. 

Art. 89. Except in accordance with law, judges, during 
their continuation of office shall not have their emoluments de- 
creased, nor be transferred to other offices, nor shall they be 
removed from office. 

During his tenure of oflSce, no judge shall be deprived of his 
office unless he is convicted of crime, or for offences punishable 
by law. But the above does not include cases of reorganization 
of Judicial Courts and when the qualification of the Judges are 
modified. The punishments and fines of the Judicial Officials 
shall be fixed by law. 

CHAPTER IX. LEGISXlA.TION 

Art. 90. The members of both Houses and the Executive 
Department may introduce bills of law, but if any bill of law 
is rejected by the House it shall not be re-introduced during the 
same session. 

Art. 91. Any bill of law which has been passed by the 
National Assembly shall be promulgated by the President 
within 15 days after receipt of the same. 

Art. 92. Should the President disapprove of any bill of 
law passed by the National Assembly, he shall within the period 
allowed for promulgation, state the reason of his disapproval 



458 APPENDIX 

and request the re-consideration of the same by the National 
Assembly. 

If a bill of law has not yet been submitted with a request for 
consideration and the period for promulgation has passed; it 
shall become law. But the above shall not apply to the case 
when the session of the National Assembly is adjourned, or, the 
House of Representatives dissolved before the period for the 
promulgation is ended. 

, Art. 93. The law shall not be altered or repealed except in 
accordance with the law. 

Art. 94f. Any law that is in conflict with the Constitution 
shall not be valid. 

CHAPTER X. NATIONAL, FINANCE 

Art. 95. The introductions of new taxes and alterations 
in the rate of taxation shall be fixed by law. 

Art. 96. (Eliminated.) 
, Art. 97. The approval fo the National Assembly must be 
obtained for National loans, or the conclusion of agreements 
which tend to increase the burden of the National Treasury. 

Art Financial bills involving direct obligation on 

the part of the citizens shall first be submitted to the House of 
Representatives. 

Art. 98. The Executive Department of the Government 
shall prepare a budget setting forth expenditures and receipts 
of the Nation for the fiscal year which shall be submitted to the 
House of Representatives within 15 days after the opening of 
the session of the National Assembly. 

Should the Senate amend or reject the budget passed by the 
House of Representatives, it shall request the concurrence of 
the House of Representatives in its amendment or rejection, 
and, if such concurrence is not obtained, the budget shall be 
considered as passed. 

Art. 99. In case of special provisions, the Executive De- 
partment may fix in advance in the budget the period over 
which the appropriations are to be spread and may provide for 
the successive appropriations continuing over this period. 

Art. 100. In order to provide for a safe margin for under- 



APPENDIX 459 

estimates or for items left out of the budget, the Executive 
Department may include contingent items in the budget under 
the heading of Reserve Fund. The sum expended under the 
above provision shall be submitted to the House of Representa- 
tives at the next session for recognition. 

i,Art. 101. Unless approved by the Executive Department, 
the National Assembly shall have no right to abolish or curtail 
any of the following items: 

(1) Items in connection with obligations of the Government 
according to law. 

(2) Items necessitated by the observance of treaties. 

(3) Items legally fixed. 

(4) Successive appropriations continuing over a period. 
yArt. 102. The National Assembly shall not increase the 

annual ex^endjtjirei^^i^s.et down in the budget. 

. Art. 103. In case the budget is not yet passed, when the 
fiscal year begins, the Executive Department maj^, during this 
period, follow the budget for the preceding year by limiting 
its expenditures and receipts by one-twelfth of tlie total 
amount for each month. " ^ ^ - - 

Art. 104. Should there be a defensive war against foreign 
invasion, or should there be a suppression of internal rebellion, 
or provide against extraordinary calamity, when it is impos- 
sible to issue writs for summoning the National Assembly, the 
Executive Department may adopt financial measures for the 
emergency, but it should request the recognition thereof by 
the House of Representatives within seven days after the con- 
vening of the next session of the National Assembly. 

Art. 105. Orders on the Treasury for payments on account 
of the annual expenditures of the Government shall first be 
passed by the Auditing Department. 

Art. 106. Accounts of the annual expenditures and annual 
receipts for each year should first be referred to the Auditing 
Department for investigation and then the Executive Depart- 
ment shall report the same to the National Assembly. 

If the account be rejected by the House of Representatives, 
the Cabinet shall be held responsible. 

Art. 107. The method of organization of the Auditing De- 



460 APPENDIX 

partment and the qualification of the Auditors shall be fixed 
by law. 

During his tenure of office, the auditor shall not be dis- 
missed or transferred to any other duty or his salary be re- 
duced except in accordance with the law. 

The manner of punishment of Auditors shall be fixed by law. 

Art. 108. The Chief of the Auditing Department shall be 
elected by the Senate. The Chief of the Auditing Department 
may attend sittings of both Houses and report on the Audit 
with explanatory statements. 

CHAPTER XI. AMENDMENTS, INTERPKETATION AND INVIOLABIL- 
ITY OF THE CONSTITUTION 

, Art. 109. The National Assembly may bring up bills for 
the amendment of the National Constitution. 

Bills of this nature shall not take effect unless approved 
by two-thirds of the members of each House present. 

No bill for the amendment of the Constitution shall be 
introduced unless signed by one-fourth of the members of each 
House. 

Art. 110. The amendment of the National Constitution 
shall be discussed and decided by the National Constitutional 
Conference. 

Art. 111. No proposal for a change of the form of Gov- 
ernment shall be allowed as a subject for amendment. 

Art. 112. Should there be any doubt as to the meaning 
of the text of the Constitution, it shall be interpreted by the 
National Constitutional Conference. 

Art. 113. The National Constitutional Conference shall 
be composed of the members of the National Assembly. 

Unless there be a quorum of two-thirds of the total number 
of the members of the National Assembly, no Constitutional 
Conference shall be held, and unless three-fourths of the mem- 
bers present vote in favour, no amendment shall be passed. 
But with regard to the interpretation of the Constitution, only 
two-thirds of the members present is required to decide an 
issue. 

Art The National Constitution shall be the Supreme 



APPENDIX 461 

Law of the land and shall be inviolable under any circumstances 
unless duly amended in accordance with the procedure specified 
in this Constitution. 
iA/ a Chapter on Provincial or local organization is to be 

inserted under Chapter , providing for certain powers 

and rights to be given to local governments with the residual 
power left in the hands of the central government. The exact 
text is not yet settled. 

Note: The Mark (*) indicated that the article has already 
been formally adopted as a part of the finished Constitution. 

The mark ( V ) indicates that the article has not yet passed 
through the second reading. 

Those without marks have passed through the second read- 
ing on May 28th, 1917. Articles bearing no number are addi- 
tions to the original draft as presented to the Conference by 
the Drafting Committee. 

THE LOCAL SYSTEM 

DRAFT SUBMITTED TO PARLIAMENT 

The following Regulations on the Local System have been 
referred to the Parliamentary Committee for consideration: — 

'vArticle 1. The Local System shall embrace provinces and 
hsien distjricts. 

Any change for the existing division of provinces and hsien 
districts shall be decided by the Senate. As to Mongolia, 
Tibet, Chinghai and other places where no provinces and hsien 
districts have been fixed. Parliament shall enforce these regula- 
tions there in future. 

^/Art. 2. A province shall have the following duties and 
rights: (a) To fix local laws. (6) To manage proyincial 
properties, (c) To attend to the affairs in connexion with 
police organization, sanitation, conservancy, roads, and public 
works, (d) To develop education and industry in accordance 
with the order and mandates of the Central Government, (e) 
To improve its navigation and telegraphic lines, or to under- 
take such enterprises with the co-operation of other provinces. 

(f) To organize precautionary troops for the protection of 



* \ 



462 APPENDIX 

local interests, the method of whose organization, uniforms and 
arms shall be similar to those of the National Army. With the 
exception of the matter of declaring war against foreign coun- 
tries, the President shall have no power to transfer these troops 
to other provinces : and unless the province is unable to sup- 
press its own internal troubles, it shall not ask the Central 
Government for the service of the National Army, (g) The 
province shall defray its own expenses for the administration 
and the maintenance of precautionary troops ; but the provinces 
which have hitherto received subsidies, shall continue to receive 
same from the National Treasury with the approval of Parlia- 
ment, (h) Land, Title Deed, License, Mortgage, Tobacco and 
Wine, Butchery, Fishery and all other principal and additional 
taxes shall be considered as local revenues, (ij The province 
may fix rates for local tax or levy additional tax on the Na- 
tional Taxes. ( j ) The province shall have^ajarovincial treas- 
ury. {Ji) It may raise provincial public loans. (Z) It shall 
elect a certain number of Senators, (m) It shall fix regula- 
tioQSL-f or. ±he smaller local Self-Governing Bodies. ~"~~ " 

Art. 3. Besides the above rights and privileges, a province 
shall bear the following responsibilities : 

{a) In case of financial difficulties of the Central Govern- 
ment, it shall share the burden according to the proportion of 
its revenue. (6) It shall enforce the laws and mandates pro- 
mulgated by the Central Government, (c) It shall enforce the 
measures entrusted by the Central Government, but the latter 
shall bear the expenses, (d) In case the local laws and regula- 
tions are in conflict with those of the Central Government the 
latter may with the approval of Parliament cancel or modify 
the same, (e) In case of great necessity the provincial tele- 
graph, railway, etc., may be utilized by the Central Govern- 
ment. (/) In case of negligence, or blunder made by the pro- 
vincial authorities, which injures the interests of the nation, 
the Central Government, with the approval of Parliament, may 
reprimand and rectify same, (g) It shall not make laws on the 
grant of monopoly and of copyrights ; neither issue bank notes, 
manufacture coins, make implements of weights and measures ; 
neither grant the right to local banks to manage the Govern- 



APPENDIX 463 

ment Treasury ; nor sign contracts with foreigners on the pur- 
chase or sale of lands and, mines, or mortgage land tax to them 
or construct naval harbours or arsenals, {h) All local laws, 
budgets, and other important matters shall be reported to the 
President from time to time, (i) The Central Government 
may transfer to itself the ownership of enterprises or rights 
which Parliament has decided should become national, (j) In 
QSLse of a quarrel arising between the Central Government and 
tlie province, or between provinces, it shall be decided by Parlia- 
ment, (k) In case of refusal to obey the orders of the Central 
Government,_the President with the approval of Parliament 
may_ change the Shenchang (Governor) or dissolve the Pro- 
vincial Assembly. (Z) The President with the approval of 
Parliament may suppress by force any province which defies 
the Central Authorities. 

Art. 4. A Shenchang shall be appointed for each province 
to represent the Central Government in the supervision of the 
local administration. The appointment shall be made with 
the approval of the Senate, the term of office for the Shenchang 
shall be four years, and his annual salary shall be $24,000, 
which shall be paid out of the National Treasury. 

Art. 5. The administration measures entrusted by the Gov- 
ernment to the Shenchang shall be enforced by the adminis- 
trative organs under his supervision, and he shall be responsi- 
ble for same. 

Art. 6. In the enforcement of the laws and mandates of the 
Central Government, or of the laws and regulations of his 
province, he may issue orders. 

Art. 7. The province shall establish the following five De- 
partments, namely interior, Police, Finance, Education and 
Industry. There shall be one Department Chief for each De- 
partment, to be appointed by the Shenchang. 

Art. 8. A Provincial Council shall be organized to assist 
the Shenchang to enforce the administrative measures, and it 
shall be responsible to the Provincial Assembly for same. 

This Council shall be composed of all the Departmental 
Chiefs, and five members elected out of the Provincial Assembly. 
It shall discuss the Bills on Budget, on administration, and on 



464 APPENDIX 

the organization of police forces, submitted by the Shenchang. 

Art. 9. If one member of the Council be impeached by the 
Provincial Assembly, the Shenchang shall replace him, but if 
the whole body of the Council be impeached, the Shenchang^hall 
either dissolve the Assembly or dismiss all his Departmental 
Chiefs. In one session the Assembly shall not be dissolved 
twice, and aftefTwo months '^of the dissolution, it shall be con- 
vened again. 

Art. 10. The organization and election of the Provincial 
Assembly shall be fixed by law. 

Art. 11. The Provincial Assembly shall have the following 
duties and powers: (a) It may pass such laws as allowed by 
the Constitution. (6) It may pass the bills on the provincial 
Budget and Accounts, (c) It may impeach the members of the 
Provincial Council, (d) It may address interpellations or give 
suggestions to the Provincial Council. (^) It may elect Mem- 
bers for the Provincial Council. (/) It may attend to the peti- 
tions submitted by the public. 

Art. 12. A Magistrate shall be appointed for each hsien 
district to enforce administrative measures. He shall be ap- 
pointed directly by the Shenchang, and his term of office shall 
be three yearsl'""^ '™"™— ->—»-»-... - 

Art. 13. The Central Government shall hold examinations 
in the provinces for candidates for the Magistracy. In a prov- 
ince half of the total number of magistrates shall be natives of 
the province and the other half of other provinces ; but a native 
shall hold office of Magistrate 300 li away from his home. 

,Art. 14. The organization for the legislative organ of the 
hsien district shall be fixed by law. „ • \\ 

TARIFF REVISION IN CHINA >^ 

The following is a translation of a memorandum prepared 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce regarding aboli- 
tion of likin and an increase of the Customs duties : — 

THE MEMORANDUM 

"Disproportionate taxation on commodities at inland towns 
and cities tends to cripple the productive power of a country. 



APPENDIX 465 

Acting upon this principle, France in the 17th, England, Amer- 
ica, Germany and Austria in the 18th Century abolished such 
kind of taxation, the Customs tariff remaining, which is a levy 
on imports at the first port of entry. Its purpose is to increase 
the cost of production of imported goods and to serve as a pro- 
tection of native products (sic). Raw materials from abroad 
are, however, exempt from Customs duty in order to provide 
cheap material for home manufactures. An altogether differ- 
ent state of affairs, however, exists in this country. Likin sta- 
tions are found throughout the country, while raw materials 
are taxed. Take the Hangchow silk for instance. When 
transported to the Capital for sale, it has to pay a tax on raw 
material of 18 per cent. Foreign imported goods on the other 
hand, are only taxed at the rate of five per cent, ad 'valorem 
Customs duty at the first port of entry with another 2,5 per 
cent, transit duty at one of the other ports through which the 
goods pass. Besides these only landing duty is imposed upon 
imported goods at the port of destination. Upon timber being 
shipped from Fengtien and Antung to Peking, it has to pay 
duties at five different places, the total amount of which aggre- 
gates 20 per cent, of its market value, while timber from Amer- 
ican is taxed only ten per cent. Timber from Jueichow to 
Hankow and Shanghai is taxed at six different places, the total 
amount of duty paid aggregating IT. 5 per cent., while timber 
imported from abroad to these ports is required to pay Cus- 
toms duty only one-third thereof. The above-mentioned rates 
on native goods are the minimum. Not every merchant can, 
however, obtain such special "exemption," without a long nego- 
tiation and special arrangements with the authorities. Other- 
wise, a merchant must pay 25 per cent, of the market value of 
his goods as duty. For this reason the import of timber into 
this country has greatly increased within the last few 3^ears, 
the total amount of which being valued at $13,000,000 a year. 
Is this not a great injustice to native merchants? 

THE CHINESE METHOD 

'^Respecting the improvement of the economic condition of 
the people, a country can hardly attain this object without 



y Kti 



466 APPENDIX 

developing its foreign commerce. The United States of Amer- 
ica, Germany and Japan have one bj one abolished their export 
duty as well as made appropriations for subsidies to encourage 
the export of certain kinds of commodities. We, on the other 
hand, impose likin all along the line upon native commodities 
destined for foreign market in addition to export duty. Goods 
for foreign market are more heavily taxed than for home con- 
sumption. Take the Chekiang silk for instance. Silk for 
export is more heavily taxed than that for home use. Differ- 
ent rates of taxation are imposed upon tea for foreign and 
home market. Other kinds of native products for export are 
also heavily taxed with the result that, within the last two 
decades, the annual exports of this country are exceeded by 
imports by over Tls. 640,000,000,000. From the 32nd year 
of the reign of Kuang Hsu to the 4th year of the Republic, 
imports exceed exports on the average by Tls. 120,000,000. 
These figures speak for themselves. 

LIKIN 

"Likin stations have been established at places where railway 
communication is available. This has done a good deal of harm 
to transportation and the railway traffic. Lately a proposal 
has been made in certain quarters that likin stations along the 
railways be abolished; and the measure has been adopted by 
the Peking-Tientsin and Tientsin-Pukow Railways at certain 
places. When the towns and cities throughout the country are 
connected by railways, there will be no place for likin stations. 
With the increase in the number of treaty ports, the "likin 
zone" will be gradually diminished. Thencefrom the proceeds 
from likin will be decreased year by year. 

*'Owing to the collection of likin the development of both 
home and foreign trade has been arrested and the people are 
working under great disadvantages. Hence in order to develop 
foreign and home trade, the Government must do away with 
likin, which will bring back business prosperity, and in time 
the same will enable the Government to obtain new sources of 
revenues. 

"From the above-mentioned considerations, the Government 



APPENDIX 467 

can hardly develop and encourage trade without the abolition 
of likin. By treaty with Great Britain, America and Japan, 
the Government can increase the rate of Customs tariff to cover 
losses due to the abolition of likin. The question under con- 
sideration is not a new one. But the cause which has prevented 
the Government from reaching a prompt decision upon this 
question is the fear that, after the abolition of likin, the pro- 
ceeds from the increased Customs tariff would not be sufficient 
to cover the shortage caused by the abolition of likin. 

COST OF ABOLITION OF LIKIN 

But such a fear should disappear when the Authorities re- 
member the following facts : — 

(a) The loss as the result of the abolition of likin: $38,- 

9oo;ooo. 

(b) The loss as the result of the abolition of a part of duty 
collected by the native Customs houses : $7,300,000. 

(c) Annual proceeds from different kinds of principal and 
miscellaneous taxes which shall be done away with the abolition 
of likin $11,800,000. 

The above figures are determined by comparing the actual 
amount of proceeds collected by the Government in the 3rd 
and 4th years of the Republic with the estimated amount In 
the Budget of the fifth year. The total.amount of loss caused 
by the abolition of likin will be $58,000,000. 

INCREASE OF CUSTOMS TARIFF 

The amount of increase in the Customs tariff which the* Gov- 
ernment expects to collect Is as follows : — 

(a) The increase in Import duties $29,000,000. 

(b) The increase in export duties Tls. 6,560,000. 

The above figures are determined according to the Customs 
returns of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th years of the Republic. By de- 
ducting Tls. 2,200,000 of transit duty, the net increase will be 
Tls. 33,600,000 taels, which Is equal to $48,500,000. For the 
sake of prudence, allowance of five per cent, of the total amount 
Is made against any Incidental shortage. The net revenue thus 
increased would amount to $46,100,000. Against the loss of 



468 APPENDIX 

$58,000,000, there will be a shortage of some $11,900,000. 
This, however, will not be difficult to make good by new sources 
of revenue as the result of a tariff revision: — 

(a) Tax on goods at the time of manufacture $800,000. 

(b) Tax on goods at the time of sale $8,000,000. 

(c) Tax on cattle and slaughtering houses $2,000,000. 

(d) Tax on foodstuffs $4,000,000. 

"Under (a) and (b) are the taxes to be collected on native 
made foreign imitation goods and various kinds of luxurious 
articles. Under (c) and (d) are taxes which are already en- 
forced in the provinces but which can be increased to that much 
by reorganizing the method of collection. The total sum of 
the proceeds set forth under above items will amount to $14,- 
800,000. These will be quite sufficient to cover the loss caused 
by the abolition of likin. 

A VITAL INTEREST 

"As the abolition of likin concerns the vital interest of the 
merchants and manufacturers, it should be carried out without 
delay. The commercial and industrial enterprises of the coun- 
try can only thrive after likin is abolished and only then can 
new sources of revenue be obtained. This measure will form 
the fundamental factor of our industrial and economical de- 
velopment. But one thing to which we should like to call the 
special attention of the Government is the procedure to be 
adopted to negotiate with the Foreign countries respecting the 
adoption of this measure. The first step in this connexion 
should be the increase of the present Customs tariff to the 
actual five per cent, ad valorem rate. When this is done, pro- 
posal should be made to the Powers having treaty relations with 
us concerning the abolition of likin and revision of Customs 
tariff. The transit destination duties on imported goods should 
at the same time be done away with. This would not entail any 
disadvantage to the importers of foreign goods and any diplo- 
matic question would not be difficult of solution. Meantime 
preparatory measures should be devised for reorganizing the 
method of collecting duties set forth aboveeso that the abolition 
of likin can take place as soon as the Government obtains the 



APPENDIX 469 

consent of the foreign Powers respecting the increase of Cus- 
toms tariff." 

MEMORANDUM 

THE LEADING OUTSTANDING CASES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE 
FOREIGN POWERS 

(Author's note. The following memorandum was drawn up 
by Dr. C. C. Wu, Councillor at the Chinese Foreign Office and 
son of Dr. Wu Ting-fang, the Foreign Minister, and is a most 
competent and precise statement. It is a noteworthy fact 
that not only is Dr. C. C. Wu a British barrister but he dis- 
tinguished himself above all his fellows in the year he was called 
to the Bar. It is also noteworthy that the Lao Hsi-kai case 
does not figure in this summary, China taking the view that 
French action throughout was ultra vires, and beyond dis- 
cussion.) 

BY Du. c. c. wu 

Republican China inherited from imperial China the vast and 
rich territory of China Proper and its Dependencies, but the 
inheritance was by no means free from incumbrances as in the 
case of Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Manchuria, and other im- 
pediments in the form of unfavourable treaty obligations and 
a long list of outstanding foreign cases affecting sovereign and 
territorial rights. 

I have been asked by the Editor of the North-China Daily 
News to contribute an article on some of the outstanding 
questions between China and foreign powers, instancing Tibet, 
Manchuria, Mongolia, and to give the Chinese point of view 
on these questions. Although the subject is a delicate one to 
handle, particularly in the press, being as it is one in which in- 
ternational susceptibilities are apt to be aroused, I have yet 
accepted the invitation in the belief that a calm and temperate 
statement of the Chinese case will hurt no one whose case will 
bear public discussion but will perhaps do some good by bring- 
ing about a clear understanding of the points at issue between 
China and the foreign Powers concerned, and thus facilitating 
an early settlement which is so earnestly desired by China. I 



470 APPENDIX 

may say that I have appreciated the British sense of justice 
and fairplay displayed by the "North-China Daily News" in 
inviting a statement of the Chinese case in its own columns on 
questions one of which concerns British interests in no small 
degree, and the discussion cannot be conducted under a better 
spirit than that expressed in the motto of the senior British 
journal in the Far East: "Impartial not Neutral.'* 

1° MANCHURIA 

The treaty between China and Japan of 1915 respecting 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia giving that 
power special rights and privileges in those regions has given 
rise to many knotty problems for the diplomatists of the two 
countries to solve. Two of such problems are mentioned here. 

JAPANESE POLICE BOXES IN MANCHURIA AND MONGOLIA 

Since the last days of the Tsings, the Japanese have been 
establishing police boxes in different parts of South Man- 
churia and Eastern Inner Mongolia always under protest of 
the local and Peking authorities. Since the treaty of 1915, a 
new reason has become available in the right of mixed resi- 
dence given to Japanese in these regions. It is said that for 
the protection and control of their subjects, and indeed for the 
interest of the Chinese themselves, it is best that this measure 
should be taken. It is further contended that the stationing 
of police officers is but a corollary to the right of exterritorial- 
ity, and that it is in no way a derogation of Chinese sovereignty. 

It is pointed out by the Chinese Government that in the 
treaty of 1915, express provision is made for Japanese in South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia to submit to the police 
laws and ordinances and taxation of China (Article 5). This 
leaves the matter in no doubt. If the Japanese wish to facili- 
tate the Chinese police in their duty of protection and control 
of the Japanese, they have many means at their command for 
so doing. It is unnecessary to point out that the establish- 
ment of foreign police on Chinese soil (except in foreign set- 
tlements and concessions where it is by the permission of the 
Chinese Government) is, to our thinking, at any rate, a verj 



APPENDIX 471 

grave derogation to China's sovereign rights. Furthermore, 
from actual experience, we know that the activities of these 
foreigTi poHce will not be confined to their countrymen ; in a 
dispute between a Chinese and a Japanese both will be taken 
to the Japanese station by the Japanese policeman. This ex- 
istence of an imperiimi in imperio, so far from accomplishing 
its avowed object of "improving the relations of the countries 
and bringing about the development of economic interests to no 
small degree," will, it is feared, be the cause of continual fric- 
tion between the officials and people of the two countries. 

As to the legal contention that the right of police control is a 
natural corollary to the right of exterritoriality, it must be 
said that ever since the grant of consular jurisdiction to for- 
eigners by China in her first treaties, this is the first time that 
such a claim has been seriously put forward. We can only say 
that if this interpretation of exterritoriality is correct the 
other nations enjoying exteriorality in China have been very 
neglectful in the assertion of their just rights. 

In the Chengchiatun case, the claim of establishing police 
boxes wherever the Japanese think necessary was made one of 
the demands. The Chinese Government in its final reply which 
settled the case took the stand as above outlined. 

It may be mentioned in passing that in Amoy the Japanese 
have also endeavoured to establish similar police rights. The 
people of that city and province, and indeed of the whole coun- 
try, as evidenced by the protests received from all over China, 
have been very much exercised over the matter. It is sincerely 
hoped that with the undoubted improvement of relations be- 
tween the two countries within the last several months, the 
matter will be smoothly and equitably settled. 

LEGAL STATUS OF KOREAKS IN CHIENTAO 

The region which goes by the name of Chientao, a Japanese 
denomination, comprises several districts in the Yenchi Circuit 
of Kirin Province north of the Tumen Kiang (or the Tiumen 
River) which here forms the boundary between China and 
Korea. For over thirty years Koreans have been allowed 
here to cultivate the waste lands and acquire ownership therein, 



472 APPENDIX 

a privilege which has not been permitted to any other foreigners 
in China and which has been granted to these Koreans on ac- 
count of the peculiar local conditions. According to reliable 
sources, the Korean population now amounts to over 200,000 
which is more than the Chinese population itself. In 1909 an 
Agreement, known as the Tumen Kiang Boundary Agreement, 
was arrived at between China and Japan, who was then the 
acknowledged suzerain of Korea, dealing, inter alia, with the 
status of these Koreans. It was provided that while Koreans 
were to continue to enjoy protection of their landed property, 
they were to be subject to Chinese laws and to the jurisdiction 
of Chinese courts. The subsequent annexation of Korea did 
not affect this agreement in point of international law, and as a 
matter of practice Japan has adhered to it until September, 
1915. Then the Japanese Consul suddenly interfered in the 
administration of justice by the local authorities over the 
Koreans and claimed that he should have jurisdiction. 

The Japanese claim is based on the Treaty Respecting South 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia signed in May, 1915, 
article 5 of which provides that civil and criminal cases in 
which the defendants are Japanese shall be tried and adjudi- 
cated by the Japanese consul. 

The Chinese view is that this article is inapplicable to 
Koreans in this region and that the Tumen Kiang Agreement 
continues in force. This view is based on a saving clause in 
article 8 of the Treaty of 1915 which says that "all existing 
treaties between China and Japan relating to Manchuria shall, 
except where otherwise provided for by treaty, remain in 
force." 

In the first place, the origin of the Tumen Kiang Agreement 
supports this view. When the Japanese assumed suzerainty 
over Korea they raised certain questions as to the boundary 
between China and Korea. There were also outstanding sev- 
eral questions regarding railways and mines between China and 
Japan. Japan insisted that the boundary question and the 
railway and mining questions be settled at the same time. As 
a result, two agreements were concluded in 1909 one respecting 
the boundary question, the Tumen Kiang Agreement, and the 



APPENDIX 473 

other respecting railways and mines whereby Japan obtained 
many new and valuable privileges and concessions, such as the 
extension of the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the Korean fron- 
tier, the option on the Hsinminfu-Fakumen line, and the 
working of the Fushun and Yentai mines, while in return China 
obtained a bare recognition of existing rights, namely the 
boundary between Chma and Korea and the jurisdiction over 
the Koreans in the Yenchi region. The two settlements were 
in the nature of quid pro quo though it is clear that the Japan- 
ese side of the scale heavily outweighed that of the Chinese. 
Now Japan endeavours to repudiate, for no apparent reason so 
far as we can see, the agreement which formed the considera- 
tion whereby she obtained so many valuable concessions. 

Secondly, while Koreans are now Japanese subjects, it is 
contended by the Chinese that the particular Koreans inhabit- 
ing the Yenchi region are, as regards China, in a different posi- 
tion from Japanese subjects elsewhere. These Koreans enjoy 
the rights of free residence and of cultivating and owning land 
in the interior of China, rights denied to other foreigners, includ- 
ing Japanese who, even by the new treaty, may only lease land 
in South Manchuria. For this exceptional privilege, they are 
subject to the jurisdiction of Chinese laws and Chinese courts, 
a duty not imposed on other foreigners. It would be "blowing 
hot and cold at the same time" in the language of English 
lawyers if it is sought to enjoy the special privileges without 
performing the duties. 

Thirdly, Japanese under the Treaty of 1915 are required to 
register their passports with the local authorities. On the 
other hand, Koreans in Yenchi have never been nor are they 
now required to procure passports. This would seem to be 
conclusive proof that Koreans in that region are not within the 
provisions of the treaty of 1915 but are still governed by the 
Tumen Kiang Agreement. 

The question is something more than one of academic or 
even merely judicial importance. As has been stated, the 
Koreans in Yenchi outnumber the Chinese and the only thing 
that has kept the region Chinese territory in fact as well as 
in name is the possession by the Chinese of jurisdiction over 



474 APPENDIX 

every Inhabitant, whether Chinese or Korean. Were China to 
surrender that jurisdiction over a majority of those inhabit- 
ants, it would be tantamount to a cession of territory. 

2° MACAO 

The dispute between China and Portugal over the Macao 
question has been one of long standing. The first treaty of 
commerce signed between them on August 13, 1862, at Tientsin, 
was not ratified in consequence of a dispute respecting the 
Sovereignty of Macao. By a Protocol signed at Lisbon on 
March 26, 1887, China formally recognized the perpetual occu- 
pation and government of Macao and its dependencies by Por- 
tugal, as any other Portuguese possession; and in December 
of the same year, when the formal treaty was signed, provision 
was made for the appointment of a Commission to delimit the 
boundaries of Macao ; "but as long as the delimitation of the 
boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect to them shall 
continue as at present without addition, diminution, or altera- 
tion by either of the Parties." 

In the beginning of 1908, a Japanese steamer, the Tatsu 
Maru, engaged in gun-running was captured by a Chinese 
customs cruiser near the Kau-chau archipelago (Nove Ilhas). 
The Portuguese authorities demanded her release on the ground 
that she was seized in Portuguese territorial waters thus raising 
the question of the status of the waters surrounding Macao. 

In the same year the Portuguese authorities of Macao at- 
tempted the imposition of land tax in Maliaoho, and proposed 
to dredge the waterways in the vicinity of Macao. The Chi- 
nese Government thereupon instructed its Minister in France, 
who was also accredited to Portugal, to make personal repre- 
sentations to the Portuguese Foreign Ofiice in regard to the 
unwarrantable action of the local Portuguese authorities. 
The Portuguese Government requested the withdrawal of Chi- 
nese troops on the Island of Lappa as a quid pro quo for the 
appointment of a new Demarcation Commissioner, reserving to 
itself the right to refer to the Hague Tribunal any dispute that 
may arise between the Commissioners appointed by the respec- 
tive Governments. 



APPENDIX 475 

After protracted negotiations it was agreed between the 
Chinese Minister and the Portuguese Government by an ex- 
change of notes that the respective Governments should each 
appoint a Demarcation Commissioner to dehmit the boundaries 
of Macao and its dependencies in pursuance of the Lisbon Pro- 
tocol and Article 2 of the Sino-Portuguese Treaty of 1887, 
subject to the decision of their respective Governments. 

THE PORTUGUESE CLAIM 

In February, 1909, Portugal appointed General Jaoquim 
Machado and China Mr. Kao Erh-chien as their respective 
Commissioners and they met at Hongkong in June of the same 
year. 

The Portuguese claim consisted of the whole of the Peninsula 
of Macao as far north as Portas do Cerco, the Island of Lappa, 
Green Island (Ilha Yerde), Ilhas de Taipa, Ilha de Coloane, 
Ilha Macarira, Ilha da Tai-Vong-Cam, other small islands, 
and the waters of Porto Interior. The Portuguese Commis- 
sioner also demanded that the portion of Chinese territory be- 
tween Portas do Cerco and Peishanling be neutralized. 

In the absence of evidence, documentary or otherwise, China 
could not admit Portugal's title to half the territory claimed, 
but was prepared to concede all that part of the Peninsula of 
Macao south of Portas do Cerco which was already beyond the 
limits of the original Portuguese Possession of Macao, and also 
to grant the developed parts of Ilhas de Coloane as Portuguese 
settlements. The ownership of territorial waters was to re- 
main vested in China. 

The negotiations having proved fruitless were transferred 
to Lisbon but on the outbreak of the Revolution in Portugal 
they were suspended. No material progress has been made 
since. 

3° TIBET 

In November, 1911, the Chinese garrison in Lhassa, in sym- 
pathy with the revolutionary cause in China, mutinied against 
Amban Lien-yu, a Chinese Bannerman, and a few months later 
the Tibetans, by order of the Dalai Lama, revolted and be- 
sieged the Chinese forces in Lhassa till they were starved out 



476 APPENDIX 

and eventually evacuated Tibet. Chinese troops in Kham were 
also ejected. An expedition was sent from Szechuan and 
Yunnan to Tibet, but Great Britain protested and caused its 
withdrawal. 

In August, 1912, the British Minister in Peking presented 
a Memorandum to the Chinese Government outlining the atti- 
tude of Great Britain towards the Tibetan question. China 
was asked to refrain from dispatching a military expedition 
into Tibet, as the re-establishment of Chinese authority would, 
it is stated, constitute a violation of the Anglo-Chinese Treaty 
of 1906. Chinese suzerainty in regard to Tibet was recognized. 
But Great Britain could not consent to the assertion of 
Chinese sovereignty over a State enjoying independent treaty 
relations with her. In conclusion, China was invited to come 
to an agreement regarding Tibet on the lines indicated in the 
Memorandum, such agreement to be antecedent to Great Brit- 
ain's recognition of the Republic. Great Britain also imposed 
an embargo on the communications between China and Tibet 
via India. 

In deference to the wishes of the British Government, China 
at once issued orders that the expeditionary force should not 
proceed beyond Giamda. In her reply she declared that the 
Chinese Government had no intention of converting Tibet into 
another province of China and that the preservation of the 
traditional system of Tibetan government was as much the 
desire of China as of Great Britain. The dispatch of troops 
into Tibet was, however, necessary for the fulfilment of the 
responsibilities attaching to China's treaty obligations with 
Great Britain, which required her to preserve peace and order 
throughout that vast territory, but she did not contemplate 
the idea of stationing an unlimited number of soldiers in Tibet. 
China considered that the existing treaties defined the status 
of Tibet with suflScient clearness, and therefore there was no 
need to negotiate a new treaty. She expressed the regret that 
the Indian Government had placed an embargo on the com- 
munications between China and Tibet via India, as China was 
at peace with Great Britain and regretted that Great Britain 
should threaten to withhold recognition of the Republic, such 



APPENDIX 477 

recognition being of mutual advantage to both countries. 
Finally, the Chinese Government hoped that the British Gov- 
ernment would reconsider its attitude. 

THE SIMLA CONFERENCE 

In May, 1913, the British Minister renewed his suggestion 
of the previous year that China should come to an agreement 
on the Tibetan question, and ultimately a Tripartite Confer- 
ence was opened on October 13, at Simla with Mr. Ivan Chen, 
Sir Henry McMahon, and Lonchen Shatra as plemipotentiaries 
representing China, Great Britain, and Tibet, respectively. 

The following is the substance of the Tibetan proposals : — 

1. Tibet shall be an independent State, repudiating the 
Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. 

2. The boundary of Tibet in regard to China includes that 
portion of Sinkiang south of Kuenlun Range and Altyn Tagh, 
the whole territory of Chinghai, the western portion of Kansuh 
and Szechuan, including Tachienlu, and the northwestern por- 
tion of Yunnan, including Atuntzu. 

3. Great Britain and Tibet to negotiate, independent of 
China, new trade regulations. 

4. No Chinese officials and troops to be stationed in Tibet. 

5. China to recognize Dalai Lama as the head of the 
Buddhist Religion and institutions in Mongolia and China. 

6. China to compensate Tibet for forcible exactions of 
money or property taken from the Tibetan Government. 

The Chinese Plenipotentiary made the following counter- 
proposals : — 

1. Tibet forms an integral part of Chinese territory and 
Chinese rights of every description which have existed in con- 
sequence of this integrity shall be respected by Tibet and 
recognized by Great Britan. China engages not to convert 
Tibet into a province and Great Britain not to annex Tibet or 
any portion of it. 

2. China to appoint a Resident at Lhassa with an escort 
of 2,600 soldiers. 

3. Tibet undertakes to be guided by China in her foreign 
and military affairs and not to enter into negotiations with any 



478 APPENDIX 

foreign Power except through the intermediary of China but 
this engagement does not exclude direct relations between Brit- 
ish Trade Agents and Tibetan authorities as provided in the 
Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906. 

4. Tibet to grant amnesty to those Tibetans kiiown for their 
pro-Chinese inclinations and to restore to them their property. 

5. Clause 5 of Tibetan claims can be discussed. 

6. Revision of Trade Regulations of 1893 and 1908, if 
found necessary, must be made by all the parties concerned. 

7. In regard to the limits of Tibet China claims Giamda 
and all the places east of it. 

THE BOUNDARY DEADIiOCK 

The British plenipotentiary sustained in the main the 
Tibetan view concerning the limits of Tibet. He suggested the 
creation of Inner and Outer Tibet by a line drawn along the 
Kuenlun Range to the 96th longitude, turning south reaching 
a point south of the 34th latitude, then in south-easterly direc- 
tion to Niarong, passing Hokow, Litang, Batang in a western 
and then southern and southwestern direction to Rima, thus 
involving the inclusion of Chiamdo in Outer Tibet and the 
withdrawal of the Chinese garrison stationed there. He pro- 
posed that recognition should be accorded to the autonomy of 
Outer Tibet whilst admitting the right of the Chinese to re- 
establish such a measure of control in Inner Tibet as would 
restore and safeguard their historic position there, without 
in any way infringing the integrity of Tibet as a geographical 
and political entity. Sir Henry McMahon also submitted to 
the Conference a draft proposal of the Convention to the pleni- 
potentiaries. After some modification this draft was initialled 
by the British and Tibetan delegates but the Chinese delegate 
did not consider himself authorized to do so. Thereupon the 
British member after making slight concessions in regard to 
representation in the Chinese Parliament and the boundary in 
the neighbourhood of Lake Kokonor threatened, in the event of 
his persisting in his refusal, to eliminate the clause recognizing 
the suzerainty of China, and ipso facto the privileges apper- 
taining thereto from the draft Convention already initialled by 



APPENDIX 479 

the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries. In order to save 
the situation, the Chinese delegate initialled the documents, but 
on the clear understanding that to initial and to sign were two 
different things and that to sign he must obtain instructions 
from his Government. 

China, dissatisfied with the suggested division into an Inner 
and Outer Tibet the boundaries of which would involve the 
evacuation of those districts actually in Chinese effective occu- 
pation and under its administration, though otherwise in accord 
with the general principles of the draft Convention, declared 
that the initialled draft was in no way binding upon her and 
took up the matter with the British Government in London and 
with its representative in Peking. Protracted negotiations 
took place thereafter, but, in spite of repeated concessions 
from the Chinese side in regard to the Chinese side in regard 
to the boundary question, the British Government would not 
negotiate on any basis other than the initialled convention. 
On July 3 an Agreement based on the terms of the draft Con- 
vention but providing special safeguards for the interests of 
Great Britain and Tibet in the event of China continuing to 
withhold her adherence, was signed between Great Britain and 
Tibet, not, however, before Mr. Ivan Chen had declared that 
the Chinese Government would recognize any treaty or similar 
document that might then or thereafter be signed between 
Great Britain and Tibet. 

china's standpoint 

With the same spirit of compromise and a readiness to meet 
the wishes of the British Government and even to the extent of 
making considerable sacrifices in so far as they were compatible 
with her dignity, China has more than once offered to renew 
negotiations with the British Government but the latter has up 
to the present declined to do so. China wants nothing more 
than the re-establishment of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, 
with recognition of the autonomy of the territory immediately 
under the control of the Lhassa Government ; she is agreeable 
to the British idea of forming an effective buffer territory in 
so far as it is consistent with equity and justice; she is anxious 



480 APPENDIX 

that her trade interest should be looked after by her trade 
agents as do the British, a point which is agreeable even to the 
Tibetans though apparently not to the British ; in other words, 
she expects that Great Britain would at least make with her an 
arrangement regarding Tibet which should not be any less dis- 
advantageous to her than that made with Russia respecting 
Outer Mongolia. 

Considering that China has claimed and exercised sovereign 
rights over Tibet, commanded the Tibetan army, supervised 
Tibetan internal administration, and confirmed the appoint- 
ments of Tibetan officials, high and low, secular and even eccle- 
siastical, such expectations are modest enough, surely. At the 
present moment, with communication via India closed, with 
no official representative or agent present, with relations un- 
settled and unregulated, the position of China vis-a-vis Tibet 
is far from satisfactory and altogether anomalous, while as 
between China and Great Britain there is always this import- 
ant question outstanding. An early settlement in a reciprocal 
spirit of give and take and giving reasonable satisfaction to the 
legitimate aspirations and claims of all parties is extremely 
desirable. 

4° OUTER MONGOLIA 

The world is more or less acquainted with the events in Urga 
in December, 1911, and the proclamation of independence of 
Outer Mongolia with Jetsun Dampa Hutukhtu as its ruler. 
By the Russo-Chinese Declaration of November 5, 1913, and 
the Tripartite Convention of Kiakhta of 1914 China has re- 
established her suzerainty over Outer Mongolia and obtained 
the acknowledgement that it forms a part of the Chinese terri- 
tory. There remains the demarcation of boundary between 
Inner and Outer Mongolia which will take place shortly, and 
the outstanding question of the status of Tannu Uriankhai 
where Russia is lately reported to be subjecting the inhabitants 
to Russian jurisdiction and expelling Chinese traders. 

The Tannu Uriankhai lands, according to the Imperial In- 
stitutes of the Tsing Dynasty, were under the control of the 
Tartar General of Uliasutai, the Sain Noin Aimak, the Jasaktu 
Khan Aimak and the Jetsun Dampa Hutkhta, and divided into 



APPENDIX 481 

forty-eight somons (tsoling). Geographically, according to 
the same authority, Tannu Uriankhai is bounded on the north 
by Russia, east by Tushetu Khan Aimak, west by the various 
aimks of Kobdo, and south by Jasaktu Khan Aimak. By a 
Joint Demarcation Commission in 1868 the Russo Chinese 
boundary in respect to Uriankhai was denmited and eight 
wooden boundary posts were erected to mark their respective 
frontiers. 

In 1910, however, a Russian officer removed and burnt the 
boundary post at Chapuchi Yalodapa. The matter was taken 
up by the then Waiwupu with the Russian Minister. He re- 
plied to the effect that the limits of Uriankhai were an unsettled 
question and the Russian Government would not entertain the 
Chinese idea of taking independent steps to remark the boun- 
dary or to replace the post and expressed dissatisfaction with 
the work of the Joint Demarcation Commission of 1868, a dis- 
satisfaction which would seem to be somewhat tardily expressed, 
to say the least. The case was temporarily dropped on ac- 
count of the secession of Uliasutai from China in the following 
year. 

While Uriankhai forms part of Autonomous Outer Mongolia, 
yet since Outer Mongolia is under China's suzerainty, and its 
territory is expressly recognized to form part of that of China, 
China cannot look on with indifference to any possible cession 
of territory by Outer Mongolia to Russia. Article 3 of the 
Kiakhta Agreement, 1915, prohibiting Outer Mongolia from 
concluding treaties with foreign powers respecting political 
and territorial question acknowledges China's right to negoti- 
ate and make such treaties. It is the firm intention of the 
Chinese Government to maintain its territorial integrity basing 
its case on historical records, on treaty rights and finally on the 
principle of nationality. It is notorious that the Mongols will 
be extremely unwilling to see Uriankhai incorporated into the 
Russian Empire. While Russia is spending countless lives 
and incalculable treasure in fighting for the sacred principle of 
nationality in Europe, we cannot believe that she will delib- 
erately violate the same principle in Asia. 



INDEX 



Abdication Edict of 1912, text of, 

396 
Absolutism, the myth of, 4 
Agreement between the Revolu- 
tionary Party and Europe 
and Asia Trading Co., 143 
America drops out of the Six- 
Power group, 50 
American press agents, 68 
treaty opening Korea, 78 
America's Chinese policy, 315 
Anglo-Japanese treaty, 107 
Annuity of Manchu Imperial Fam- 
ily, 41 
Antimg-Mukden railway, 103, 108 
Ariga, Dr., 354 

Army Reorganization Council, 30 
"Articles of Favourable Treatment 
for the Manchus," 37, 41; 
text of, 397 

Babachapu, 294 
Bannerman families, 291 
Belgian loan, the, 20» 

Syndicate, 45 
Black Dragon Society's review of 
European war issues, 126- 
128 
Boycott on Japanese commerce, 145 
Boxer Indemnities postponed, 337 
rebellion, the, 17; and European 
intervention, 29 
Black Dragon Society, the, 125; 

memorandum of, 126-138 
British policies in China, 68 
position towards the Yuan Shih- 
kai regime, 84 

Cambaluc of Marco Polo, the, 4 
Canton province, 11 
Cassini Convention, the, 125 
Catholic, Roman, controversies, 5 
Central Government, organization 

of, 40-44 
Chang Cheng-wu, Gen., 59; execu- 
tion of, 47 
Chang Chih-tung, 276 
Chang Hsun, Gen., 53, 67, 264, 281, 
343, 344, 366, 367 



483 



Chang Kuo-kan, 268 

Chang Tso-lin, Gen., 294, 300 

Chang, Tsung-hsiang, 268 

Chang Yao Ching and the Europe 

and Asia Trading Co., 143 
Chengehiatun incident, the, 293-304 
Chekiang revolts against Yuan 

Shih-kai, 262 
Chen Yi, Gen., 263 
Chia Ching, emperor, 2 
Chiang Chao-tsung, Gen., 348 
Chiang Chun, the, 63 
Chien Lung, emperor, 2 
Chih Fa Chu, or Military Court, at 

Pekin, 62 
Chihli province, 11 
China and her foreign residents, 307 
and the Foreign Powers, out- 
standing cases between, 467 
and the German submarine war, 

315 
considers war with Germany, 

329-338 
declares war against Germany, 
369 
China's break with Germany, causes 
leading to, 320-325 
economics, weakness of, 18 
financial reorganization, 379 
future in Manchuria, 95 
Imperial Government, negative- 

ness disguised, 7 
indignation at Japan ultimatum, 

145 
note to Germany severing rela- 
tions, 328 
neutrality position, 318 
new regime, 372-374 
passivity, 374 
polity, principles of, 9» 
protest against submarine war, 

315 
reception of Wilson's Peace note, 

312-314 
reply to Demands of Japan, 107- 

116 
reply to Japan's ultimatum, 122 
reply to President Wilson, 317 
tariff question, 375 



INDEX 



Chinese army, German trained, 310 
boycott of the French, 306 
intrigues in Korea, 23 
Ching, Prince, 33 
Chingputang, the (Progressives), 

280 
Chino-Japanese relations, 78-83 
secret alliance proposed, 130 
treaties of 1915, text of, 430 
Chou An Hui (Society for the 

Preservation of Peace), 148 
Chow Tzu-chi, 268 
Chu Chi-chun's telegram devising 

plans for electing Yuan Shih- 

kai as Emperor, 224, 226 
Ch'un, Prince Regent, 36 
Chungking, open port, 97 
Clauservitz, war-principle of, 80 
Conference of Governors on the 

war question, 336 
Confucian worship re-established 

by Yuan Shih-kai, 64 
Conquest, Manchu, of XVIIth Cen- 
tury, 3, 5 
Mongul, of Xlllth Century, 3 
Consolidating national debt, 376 
Constitution first granted in Japan, 

76 
Permanent, work on, 282 
"Constitutional Compact" of Yuan 

Shih-kai, 63; text of, 409 
monarchy planned, 147 
Continental quadrilateral, the, of 

Japan, 299 
Coup d'etat, the, of Sept., 1899, 28 
Coup d'etat, the parliamentary of 

1913, 5Q 
Crisp, Birch, attempts to float 

loan, 45 



Dane, Sir Richard, 292 
Death of Empress Lun Yi, 60 
Decree cancelling the Empire, 258 
Defence of the monarchial move- 
ment, by Yang Tu, 150-171; 
by Dr. Goodnow, 175-185 
Dementi, 1913, of Yuan Shih-kai, 

85 
Diet of Japan, first summoned, 76 
Diplomatic relations with China 

broken, 320-330 
Distance in China, philosophy of, 
7, 8 



Eastern Asia, contestants for land- 
power in, 78 



Emperor, analysis of powers of, 
4-7 
Chia Ching, 2 
Chien Limg, 2 
Hsiaouri, 64 
Hsuan Tung, 36, 347 
K'anghsi, 2, 5 
Kwanghsu, 26, 31, 36, 60 

Emperors, immurement of in For- 
bidden City, 2 

Empire, the dissolution of, 265 

Empress Lun Yi, death of, 60 
Tzu Hsi, 60 

Election of 1913, 52 
of Yuan Shih-kai as emperor, 

machinery of, 221-229 
the, of 1915, 220-230; records 
ordered burnt, 234 

Electoral College, provision for, 
66 

Europe and Asia Trading Co., the, 
140 

European War, the, its effect in 
China, 71, 309-312; China's 
predilection for Teutonism, 
310, 311; consideration of 
war-partnership with the 
Allies, 311; Japan's opposi- 
tion, 312; German propa- 
ganda, 312; Pres. Wilson's 
Peace Note, 313; China's re- 
ply, 314; the submarine ques- 
tion, 315; note to Germany, 
316; reply to America, 317; 
Chinese diplomacy enters a 
new field, 319; Japan's poli- 
cies, 323; China considers 
breaking diplomatic relations 
with Germany, 325; Parlia- 
ment's action, 326; Ger- 
many's reply to China's note, 
826; diplomatic relations sev- 
ered, 328; German Minister 
leaves Pekin, 329; Liang Ch'i- 
chao's Memorandum, 329; 
Kang Yu-wei's Memorandum, 
333; Cabinet decides on war, 
337; interpellation to the 
Government, 338; Parliament 
mobbed, 339; Cabinet resigns, 
340; Japan's subterranean ac- 
tivities, 341, 353; note of the 
United States, 345; war 
against Germany declared, 
369 

Europeans failed to recognize true 
state of Chinese government, 
7 



INDEX 



485 



Feng Kuo-ohang, Gen., 53, 186n, 

246, 263, 325, 345, 361, 368 
Fengtien, Manchurian province, 11 
Feudal organization of Japan, 74- 

76 
Finance between the provinces, 14 
the binding chain between pro- 
vincial and metropolitan 
China, 9-11 
Financial troubles, 40, 46, 61, 257, 

292 
Foochow arsenal, 98 
Forbidden City, immurement of 

emperors in, 2 
Foreign Debt Commission, 50 
intervention threatened, 48 
loan, the first, 16 
loans, 44 
Foreigners in China, position of, 

307 
Four-Power group, the, 44, 45 
France's status after the war, 127 
Franco-Belgian Syndicate, 44 
French diplomacy in China, 306 
Republic, Goodnow review of, 

179, 188 
the, and the Lao-hsi-kai dispute, 

304-306 
the, Chinese boycott of, 306 
Fuhkien province, 11 

German Boxer indemnity, 330 
diplomatic relations broken, 320- 

330 
minister leaves Pekin, 329 
negotiations with Yuan Shih-kai, 

71 
propaganda in China, 310-312 
reply to China's protest, 326 
war declaration considered, 329 
Germany, war against declared, 

369 
Germany's status after the war, 

126 
Goodnow, Dr., 63, 6671; legal ad- 
viser of Yuan Shih-kai, 173; 
memorandum of, 175-185 
Gordon, General, 26 
Government, the Central, defini- 
tion of, 40-44 
Governmental system of the Man- 

chu dynasty, 8 
Great Britain's status after the 
war, 127, 136 

Hankow editor flogged to death, 62 
Hangchow, open port, 97 



Hanyang arsenal, 97, 98 

Hanyehping Company, the, 91, 98, 
105, 110, 111, 115 

Heilungchiang, Manchurian prov- 
ince, 11 

Hioki, Dr., Japanese Minister, 87, 
89, 107 

Hsianfu flight, the, 2, 9 

Hsaiochan camp, the, 25 
Division, the, 26 

Hsiaown, emperor, 64 

Hsuan Tung, boy emperor, 36, 347; 
enthroned, 355 

Huai Chun, the, 26 

Huang Hsin, 53 

Hutuktu, the Living Buddha of 
Urga, 47 

Imperial Clan Society, 46 
Imperialist-Republican conflict of 

1917, 365-369 
Inner Mongolia, political unrest in, 

69 
Insurrection of the "White Wolfs," 

62 
International Debt Commission, 44 

financial contests, 45 
Interpellation to the government on 

the question of war with 

Germany, 338 
Ito, Prince, 24 

Japan and Korea, 386-388 

and the Kiaochow campaign, 84 

demands participation in loan, 
45 

demands the Kiaochow territory 
from Germany, 71 

feudal organization of, 74-76 

first Diet summoned, 76 

forced to revise the Twenty-one 
Demands, 100 

forecasts result of European 
War, 126-138 

formation of the Shogunate in, 75 

inquires as to the monarchial 
movement, 219 

militarism in, 77 

receives fugitive President Li 
Yuan-hung, 361 

recognizes Yuan Shih-kai as Dic- 
tator, 87 

socialism in, 77 

the new Far Eastern policy after 
Russian war, 81 
Japan-China secret alliance pro- 
posed, 130 



486 



INDEX 



Japanese Constitution first granted, 

76 
driven from Tong Kwan Palace, 

24 
incident at Chengchiatun, 293-304( 
intrigues, 47 

Liberalism vs. Imperialism, 76 
merchants and Lun Yat Sen, 

alleged secret agreement, 

140-143 
war indemnity, 16 
war of 1894, 15, 16 
Japan's activities in the Yangtsze 

Valley, 97 
account of the Chengchiatun in- 
cident, 297 
alarm at the Chinese revolution, 

83 
animosity towards Yuan Shih- 

kai, 83 
attitude toward Yuan Shih-kai, 

70 
Chinese policy, 72-85, 299-301 
"Continental quadrilateral," 299 
Doctrine of Maximum Pressure, 

81 
Far East activities, 380-385 
German policy, 384 
government foundry at Waka- 

matsu, 97 
influence in China on European 

war question, 311-313 
influence on the monarchial elec- 
tion, 228 
influence over China's war meas- 
ures, 324 
original Twenty-one Demands, 

89-92 
Pekin Expeditionary Force, 80 
police rights in Manchuria, 300- 

303 
political history, 74-78 
pressure on Yuan Shih-kai, 124- 

126 
subterranean activities in China 

in 1916, 341, 353 
ultimatum to China, 117-121; 

China's reply, 123 
ultimatum, China's indignation at, 

145 
Twenty-four Demands, 101-107 
Jehol, mountain palaces of, 2 
Jung Lu, viceroy of Chihli, 27 

Kameio Nishihara, 336 
Kang Yu Wei, 27, 191, 333 
K'anghsi, emperor, 2, 5 



Kato, Japanese Viscount, 94, 138 
Kawasaki Kulanoske, 143 
Kiaochow campaign, unpopularity 

of in Japan, 84 
demanded by Japan, 71 
Kien, Manchurian province, 11 
Kirin-Changchun railway, 90, 104 
Kiushiu, island of, 97 
Ko-Iao-hui, the, origin of, 1 
Korea, the opening of, 22, 78 
Korean question, the, 386-388 
Kowshing, British steamer, sinking 

of, 24 
Kublai Khan, 4 
Kueichow province, revolt of, 248, 

257 
Kuomingtang, the, 49, 56, 279 
Kuo-ti, the question of, 193 
Kwanghsu, emperor, 26, 28, 31, 36, 

60 
Kwangsi province, revolt of, 248, 

257 
Kwangtung revolts against Yuan 

Shih-Kai, 262 



Landsdowne, Lord, 386 

Lao-hsi-kai dispute, the 304-306 

Legations in Pekin, their attitude 
towards Yuan Shih-kai, 68 
inquire as to the monarchial move- 
ment, 220 

Li Hung Chang, 24, 25 

Li Lieh-chun, Gen., 53 

Li Yuan-hung, 58; elected Presi- 
dent, 264; assumes the office, 
271; first presidential acts, 
273; monarchists plot against 
him, 274; his early life and 
career, 276-279; his position 
as to breaking diplomatic re- 
lations with Germany, 325; 
he dissolves Parliament, 349; 
escapes from Pekin, 360; his 
important telegrams, 361-363 

Liang Ch'i-chao, resigns from Min- 
istry of Justice, 148; his ac- 
cusation of Yuan Shih-kai, 
192-215; his address to Yuan 
Shih-kai, 220-255; opposes the 
movemeniy, 243; directs the 
Yunnan revolt, 280; writes 
note to Germany on the sub- 
marine war, 316; his Memo- 
randum on the war question, 
329; upholds the Republic, 
363 



INDEX 



487 



Liang Shih-yi, political power of, 

217, 264. 
Likin taxation, introduction of, 13 
Liu-Kuan-hsiung, 268 
Loan Agreement, details of, 52 
first foreign, 16 
foreign, struggles over, 44^6 
Local Government Law, draft of, 

461 
Lu Yun Ting, Gen., 248 
Lun Yi, empress, death of, 60 
Lung Chi-Kwang, Gen., 54; created 

Prince, 257 
Lung Wu, Empress, 36 



Mahommedan rebellions, 3 
Manchu conquest, the, of XVIIth 
Century, 3, 5 
dynasty, governmental system of, 
8 
plots against, 1 
Imperial Family annuity, 41 
people, number and distribution, 
3n 
Manchuria, Chinese domination of, 
95, 96 
Japan's intrigues in, 299-303 
Manchurian policy of the Twenty- 
One Demands, 95 
Mandate of Cancellation, the, 259 

Yuan Shih-kai's last, 267 
Manifesto of Gen. Tuan Chi-jui, 364 
Marco Polo, 3 
Marriage, immunity of Chinese 

women, with Manchus, 5n 
Meiji, Japanese Emperor, 76 
Memorandum of Dr. Goodnow, 
175-185 
of policy of the Black Dragon So- 
ciety, 126-128, 130-138 
on Tariff Revision, draft of, 464 
Military Governors, independence 
of, 46; attempt to coerce 
Parliament, 340; leave Pekin, 
343; assemble in rebellion at 
Tientsin, 344 
party opposition to New Repub- 
lic, 281 
Militarism in Japan, 77 
Mining privileges demanded by 

Japan, 104, 108 
Ministerial irresponsibility, 284 
Modern commercialism, invasion of, 

13 
Monarchial movement, Yang Tu's, 
defence of, 150-171; Dr. 



Goodnow's defence of, 175-' 
185 

Monarchy adopts a new calendar, 
Q36 

Monarchy vs. Republicanism, memo- 
randum by Dr. Goodnow, 
175-185 

Monetary confusion in the new Re- 
public, 40 

Money the bond of Chinese union, 
12 

Mongul conquest, the, of Xlllth 
Century, 3 

Mongolian policy of the Twenty- 
one Demands, 94 

National debt, consolidation of, 376 

Salvation Fund, 145 
Nationalists, the (Kuomingtang), 

279 
Nanking, 36 
Conference, the, 263, 264 
Delegates, 42 

Provisional Constitution, 42, 49, 
280 
New calendar adopted, 236 
New Republic, organization of, 279; 
opposition of the Military 
party, 281 
Neutrality position of China, 318 
Ni Shih-chung, Gen., 264, 347 
Nineteen Articles, the, text of, 393- 
397 
Fundamental Articles, the, 35 

Oath of office, presidential, 43 
Outer Mongolia question, 47; auton- 
omy conceded to, 56 

"Palace of Generals," 67 

Pamphlet of Yang Tu, 150-171 

Parliament, composition of, 49n; 
provides for election of Presi- 
dent, 55; Radical members 
imseated, 56; session of 1916, 
280-290; dissensions over dis- 
solution, 347; is dissolved, 349 

Parliamentary change bj' the "Con- 
stitutional Compact," 65 
struggles, 54, 55 

Peace note. President Wilson's, 
China's reply to, 313 

Peace of Portsmouth, 377 

Pekin, distances from, 8 

Peking System vs. Manchu Dynasty, 
19 



INDEX 



Permanent Constitution, J82, 342; 

draft of, 448 
Ping-hsiang collieries, 98 
Presidential Election Law of 1913, 
407 
oath of office, 43 

Succession Law, the, 66; text of, 
417 
Progressives, the (Chinputang), 280 
Provincial capitals, influence and 
power of, 10 
financial system, 14 
system of government, 10-lJ, 283 
Provisional Constitution of 1912, 
text of, 401 
Nanking Constitution, the, 42, 49 

Railway concessions demanded by 
Japan, 90, 103 
construction, progress of, under 
Yuan Shih-kai, 69 

Rebellion of 1813, 54 

Referendum arranged for by Sen- 
ate, 218 

Reform Edicts of 1898, 27 

Religious provisions of "The Con- 
stitutional Compact," 63 

Reorganization loan, the, 50 

Republic proclaimed, 36 

recognition of by the Powers, 51 

Republic's anniversary, non-observ- 
ance of, 224 
review of in Goodnow Memoran- 
dum, 177 

Republican-Imperialist Conflict of 
1917, 365-369 

Restoration Edict of Hsuan Tung, 
355 

Revolt of February, 1912, 43 

Revolution of 1911, 19; effect on 
Japan, 82 

Revolutionary base at Hankow, 
Hanyang and Wuchang, 34 
Party and the Europe and Asia 
Trading Co. agreement, 143 

Rioting in Pekin, 340 

Russia demands participation in 
loan, 45; recognizes the inde- 
pendence of Tibet, 47; agrees 
to autonomy of Outer Mon- 
golia, 56 

Russian loan, the, 378 

Russia's Chinese policy, 376, 377 
r81e in the Far East, 80 
status after the war, 127, 136 
Russo-Chinese Agreement of 1913, 
text of, 421 



Russo-Chinese — continued 
Declaration, the, 378 
-Mongolian triparte agreement of 
1915, text of, 424 

Salt Administration, the, 52, 282 

Santuao harbour, 98 

Secret society plots, 2 

Sectional dispute, 42 

Senate, rules of, 285 

Shanghai, specie hoarded at, 61 

Shansi Bankers, 14 

Shantung and the Twenty-One De- 
mands, 94 
province. Yuan Shih-kai ap- 
pointed governor, 28 

Shasi, open port, 97 

Shogunate, establishment of, in 
Japan, 75 

Six-Power group, the, 45, 50 

Socialism in Japan, 77 

Society for the Preservation of 
Peace (Chou Au Hui), 148 

Soochow, open port, 97 

South Manchurian railway, 90, 103, 
108, 109 

Southern Confederacy formed, 262; 
dissolution of, 43 
Rebellion, the 52-53 

Special Constitutional Drafting 
Committee, 54 

Specie payment suspended in Pekin, 
263 

Submarine war question, 315 

Sun Yat Sen, Dr., 39, 47, 69; his 
alleged secret agreement with 
Japan, 140-143 

Sung Chiao-jen, assassination of, 48 

Sungari River, 299 

Szechuan province revolts against 
Yuan Shih-kai, 263 

Taiping rebellion, 3, 12 

Tanaka, Gen., 353 

Taonanfu administration, 293 

Tariff reformation, 375 

Tax collection, 15 

Tayeh iron mines, 97 

Tibet, independence of recognized 

by Russia, 47 
Tieh Liang, 30 
Tientsin rebellion of the Military 

Governors, 344 
Tong Kwan Palace, the battle at, 23 
Tong Shao-yi, 36 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, 378 



INDEX 



489 



Treaty-ports, economical effects of, 
18 

Tsao-ao, Gen., 242-245 

Tsao Ju-lin, 268 

Tsan Cheng Yuan, passes a "king- 
making" bill, 218 

Tseng Kuo-fan, Marquis, 26 

Tsung She Tang, the, 46 

Tuan Chi-jui, Gen. 59, 221, 268, 271, 
275," 336, 337, 341, 342, 361 

Tung Fu-hsiang, 28 

Twenty-Four Demands, Japan's re- 
vised, 101-107; China's reply 
to, 112-116 

Twenty-One Demands of Japan, 89- 
92; Japan forced to revise, 
100; the psychology of, 124- 
126; China's reply to, 107-113 

Tzu-Hsi, Empress, 26, 27, 60 

United States, Goodnow's review of, 
177, 187 

Viceroy's, prerogatives of in Chinese 
government, 8-10 

Wai Chiao Pu conference, 107 
Wakamatsu, Japanese government 

foundry at, 97 
Wang Yi-tang, 268 
War memorandums, 329, 333 
"White Wolfs," insurrection of, 63 
Wilson, President, 50n, 312 
Wu, C. C, Dr., 467 
Wu Chang-ching, Gen., 22 
Wu Ting-fang, Dr., 342, 347, 348 

Yang Tu, champion of neo-imperial- 
lists, 148; publisher famous 
pamphlet, 149; the pamphlet, 
150-171 

Yangtsze Valley, Japanese activi- 
ties in, 97 

Yuan Shih-kai, 19; the bailiff of the 
Powers, 20; his early life, 21; 
first emerges into public view, 
22; in Seoul, 23; appointed 
Imperial Resident at Seoul, 
24; leaves Korea, 25; in com- 
mand of Hsaiochan camp, 25; 
refuses to depose Empress 
Tzu-Hsi, 27; appointed Gov- 
ernor of Shantung, 28; de- 
feats the Boxers, 29; made 
Viceroy of Chili, 29; reor- 
ganizes the army, 30; made 



Grand Councillor and Presi- 
dent of the Board of Foreign 
Affairs, 30; made "Senior 
Guardian of the Heir Appar- 
pent," 32; dismissed from 
Pekin, 32; appointed Viceroy 
of Hupeh and Hunan, 33; 
appointed President of Grand 
Council, 33; schemes for the 
abdication of the Manchu 
Dynasty, 34-36 ; attempted 
assassination of, 37; commis- 
sioned to organize the Repub- 
lic, 37; elected Provisional 
President, 39; takes oath of 
oflBce, 43; negotiates the Re- 
organization loan, 50; negoti- 
ates and controls the great 
foreign loan, 50-53; sup- 
presses the Southern rebel- 
lion, 54; elected full Presi- 
dent, 55; unseats Radical 
members of Parliament, 56; 
entices Vice-President to 
Pekin, 59; position strength- 
ened by death of Empress 
Lun Yi, 61; ruthless suppres- 
sion of opposition, 62; brings 
out the Constitutional Com- 
pact, 63; promulgates the 
Presidential Succession law, 
66; creates a "Palace of Gen- 
erals," 67; negotiates with 
Germany, 71; animosity of 
Japan, 83; his dementi of, 
1913, 85; bribes the Japanese 
press, 87; his Dictatorship 
recognized by Japan, 87; the 
precis of Japanese Minister's 
coercive conversation, 124; 
reviewed in Black Dragon So- 
ciety's Memorandum, 132; in- 
trigues of his family, 145; he 
yields to advocates of mon- 
archy, 146; invokes services of 
Yang-tu, 148; his interview 
with Gen. Feng Kuo-chang, 
lB6n; his accusation by 
Liang Chi-chao, 192-215; 
throws responsibility on the 
Senate, 216; his Mandate for 
a referendum, 218; elected 
Emperor, 230; substitutes 
title of Emperor for Presi- 
dent, 228; refuses, then ac- 
cepts the throne, 230; the re- 
volt of Yunnan, 236-248; he 



490 



INDEX 



rehearses court ceremonies, 
241; his position weakens, 
250; the communication from 
Liang Ch'i-chao, 250-255; at- 
tempts to placate Japan, 256; 
distributes patents of no- 
bility, 256; financial troubles, 
257; issues the Mandate of 



Cancellation, 258; his retire- 
ment sought, 262; he offers to 
resign, 264; his death, 266; 
his last mandate, 267 ; his fun- 
eral, 275; his policy towards 
the European War, 309-312 
Yunnan revolt of 1916, 236- 
248 



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